consistent standard in Tennessee

2020This is consistent with our principle holdings above, concluding that a juvenile transfer hearing is a critical stage in the proceedings which “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 560-62 ; see also State v. Iacona, 2001-Ohio-1292 , 93 Ohio St. 3d 83, 92 , 752 N.E.2d 937, 947 (Ohio 2001) (holding that the State is under a constitutional duty to “disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the state’s possession favorable to the juvenile respondent and material either to guilt or punishment that is known at the time of a

2011If not perfect, counsel’s performance at least fell “within the range of competence required of attorneys in criminal cases.” Carpenter, 126 S.W.3d at 887 . *287 Thus, the courts below erred in concluding that trial counsel performed deficiently.

2000In so holding, we recognized that “[a]n element of deterrence is present in every case but the degree of significance of this factor in restraining the offender or curbing the propensity for criminal activity in others, varies widely with the class of offense and the facts of each ease.” Id. (citing State v. Michael, 629 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn.1982)). 5 *7 Because deterrence is a concept that frequently defies practical analysis, it should come as no surprise that the appellate courts of this State have had significant trouble in developing a consistent standard by which to determine when a defendant

2000At various times, courts have stated that deterrence may only be shown when: (1) crime “is rampant, or at least on the increase in the area,” Home, 612 S.W.2d at 187 ; 6 (2) the crime committed was “one frequently repeated by lawless members of society,” State v. Kirk, 868 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993); (3) the crime is one that is unique to a particular jurisdiction, State v. Bryant, 775 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); 7 or (4) there is “some special need or consideration relative to that jurisdiction which would not be addressed by the normal deterrence inherent in any criminal penalty

2000At various times, courts have stated that deterrence may only be shown when: (1) crime “is rampant, or at least on the increase in the area,” Home, 612 S.W.2d at 187 ; 6 (2) the crime committed was “one frequently repeated by lawless members of society,” State v. Kirk, 868 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993); (3) the crime is one that is unique to a particular jurisdiction, State v. Bryant, 775 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); 7 or (4) there is “some special need or consideration relative to that jurisdiction which would not be addressed by the normal deterrence inherent in any criminal penalty

2000In so holding, we recognized that “[a]n element of deterrence is present in every case but the degree of significance of this factor in restraining the offender or curbing the propensity for criminal activity in others, varies widely with the class of offense and the facts of each ease.” Id. (citing State v. Michael, 629 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn.1982)). 5 *7 Because deterrence is a concept that frequently defies practical analysis, it should come as no surprise that the appellate courts of this State have had significant trouble in developing a consistent standard by which to determine when a defendant

1991See Prospecting Unlimited, supra; Sunday River Skiway Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 573 A.2d 24 (Me.1990); Katz v. State Tax Assessor, 472 A.2d 428 (Me.1984) Likewise, we hold that where title to tangible personal property passes to the buyer prior to the seller/contractor’s use of that property, a resale of tangible personal property has occurred.

1991See Prospecting Unlimited, supra; Sunday River Skiway Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 573 A.2d 24 (Me.1990); Katz v. State Tax Assessor, 472 A.2d 428 (Me.1984) Likewise, we hold that where title to tangible personal property passes to the buyer prior to the seller/contractor’s use of that property, a resale of tangible personal property has occurred.