consistent standard in Michigan

2006Id. at 1295 .

2006Id. at 1295 .

2023In sum, MCL 500.3135(2)(c) applies if the party seeking noneconomic damages failed to maintain no-fault insurance as required by MCL 500.3101(1), which applies only if the vehicle 7 This is consistent with the analysis in Tienda v Integon Nat’l Ins Co, 300 Mich App 605 , 620 n 3; 834 NW2d 908 (2013), which explained, in construing MCL 500.3102(2), that “for people who travel to Michigan for, as here, three to four months out of each year for agricultural work or other reasons, they must carry no-fault insurance coverage as a matter of law . . . .” While not necessary to our decision, it seems

2023In sum, MCL 500.3135(2)(c) applies if the party seeking noneconomic damages failed to maintain no-fault insurance as required by MCL 500.3101(1), which applies only if the vehicle 7 This is consistent with the analysis in Tienda v Integon Nat’l Ins Co, 300 Mich App 605 , 620 n 3; 834 NW2d 908 (2013), which explained, in construing MCL 500.3102(2), that “for people who travel to Michigan for, as here, three to four months out of each year for agricultural work or other reasons, they must carry no-fault insurance coverage as a matter of law . . . .” While not necessary to our decision, it seems

2020Rather, our decision in that case adopted a consistent standard of interpretation, one that “prohibit[ed] the purchase, with public funds, of educational services from a nonpublic school,” Traverse City, 384 Mich at 407 , and then applied that same standard throughout the case to other issues.

2019This is consistent with the test adopted and applied by other appellate courts without demonstrated difficulties or systemic disruptions. [Id. at 164.] -6- The Supreme Court in Lafler rejected arguments that “there can be no finding of Strickland prejudice arising from plea bargaining if the defendant is later convicted at a fair trial.” Id.

2008The Wanzers rely on the general, and venerable, rule that “ [occupation in common with the public is not exclusive possession, neither is possession concurrent with that of the true owner ever exclusive.” LeRoy v Collins, 176 Mich 465, 475 ; 142 NW 842 (1913).

2008The Wanzers rely on the general, and venerable, rule that “ [occupation in common with the public is not exclusive possession, neither is possession concurrent with that of the true owner ever exclusive.” LeRoy v Collins, 176 Mich 465, 475 ; 142 NW 842 (1913).

1992That rule, as established by DiPonio, supra, and Boiko, supra, is that upon the death of a patient, the sixty-day period is tolled pending the appointment of a personal representative who is empowered to proceed with legal action on behalf of the estate, including the right to revoke the arbitration agreement.

1992That rule, as established by DiPonio, supra, and Boiko, supra, is that upon the death of a patient, the sixty-day period is tolled pending the appointment of a personal representative who is empowered to proceed with legal action on behalf of the estate, including the right to revoke the arbitration agreement.

1976This is consistent with the standard of review used in Naudzius v Lahr, 253 Mich 216 , *151 223; 234 NW 581 (1931), quoting Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co, 220 US 61, 78 ; 31 S Ct 337 ; 55 L Ed 369 (1911): "[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [a law], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. * * * One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.” However, this standard is no longer appropriate for vie

1976This is consistent with the standard of review used in Naudzius v Lahr, 253 Mich 216 , *151 223; 234 NW 581 (1931), quoting Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co, 220 US 61, 78 ; 31 S Ct 337 ; 55 L Ed 369 (1911): "[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [a law], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. * * * One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.” However, this standard is no longer appropriate for vie

1976This is consistent with the standard of review used in Naudzius v Lahr, 253 Mich 216 , *151 223; 234 NW 581 (1931), quoting Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co, 220 US 61, 78 ; 31 S Ct 337 ; 55 L Ed 369 (1911): "[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [a law], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. * * * One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.” However, this standard is no longer appropriate for vie

1976This is consistent with the standard of review used in Naudzius v Lahr, 253 Mich 216 , *151 223; 234 NW 581 (1931), quoting Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co, 220 US 61, 78 ; 31 S Ct 337 ; 55 L Ed 369 (1911): "[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [a law], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. * * * One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.” However, this standard is no longer appropriate for vie

1976We held in Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 671 ; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), that where the challenged statute carves out a discrete exception to a general rule and the statutory exception is no longer experimental, the substantial-relation-to-the-object test should be applied.” This test, as used by the United States Supreme Court in Reed v Reed, 404 US 71, 76 ; 92 S Ct 251 ; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971), requires that "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation *

1976We held in Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 671 ; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), that where the challenged statute carves out a discrete exception to a general rule and the statutory exception is no longer experimental, the substantial-relation-to-the-object test should be applied.” This test, as used by the United States Supreme Court in Reed v Reed, 404 US 71, 76 ; 92 S Ct 251 ; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971), requires that "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation *

1976We held in Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 671 ; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), that where the challenged statute carves out a discrete exception to a general rule and the statutory exception is no longer experimental, the substantial-relation-to-the-object test should be applied.” This test, as used by the United States Supreme Court in Reed v Reed, 404 US 71, 76 ; 92 S Ct 251 ; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971), requires that "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation *

1976We held in Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 671 ; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), that where the challenged statute carves out a discrete exception to a general rule and the statutory exception is no longer experimental, the substantial-relation-to-the-object test should be applied.” This test, as used by the United States Supreme Court in Reed v Reed, 404 US 71, 76 ; 92 S Ct 251 ; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971), requires that "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation *