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13 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shull v. Duggergreen2 sentences1992This is consistent with the rule espoused in Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748, 749 (Fla.1987), that “when all of the reasons stated by the trial court in support of departure are found invalid, resentencing following remand must be within the presumptive guidelines sentence.” The district court found the reasons for departure to'be invalid, and, therefore, Smith should be resentenced according to the original scoresheet. 1988This is consistent with the rule espoused in Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748, 749 (Fla. 1987), that "when all of the reasons stated by the trial court in support of departure are found invalid, resentencing following remand must be within the presumptive guidelines sentence." The district court found the reasons for departure to be invalid, and, therefore, Smith should be resentenced according to the original scoresheet. | 2 | 2 |
Eason v. Stategreen1 sentence2017It is also consistent with the First District’s pronouncement that “[a] manifest injustice occurs when a defendant’s sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.” Eason v. State, 932 So.2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Benjamin v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Double Jeopardy “Because double jeopardy issues involve purely legal determinations, the standard of review is de novo.” Rimondi v. State, 89 So. 3d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Benjamin v. State, 77 So. 3d 781, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). | 1 | 1 |
Rimondi v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Double Jeopardy “Because double jeopardy issues involve purely legal determinations, the standard of review is de novo.” Rimondi v. State, 89 So. 3d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Benjamin v. State, 77 So. 3d 781, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). | 1 | 1 |
City of St. Petersburg v. Nasworthygreen1 sentence2004Petersburg v. Nasworthy, 751 So.2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Arling v. Stategreen1 sentence2002Indeed, this is consistent with the analysis employed by the Second District in Arling v. State, 559 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), where the defendant who was convicted of dealing in stolen property challenged the assessment of restitution for attorneys' fees incurred by the victim in an interpleader action. | 1 | 1 |
Carawan v. Statered1 sentence1988For the reasons given in my dissent to Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161, 171 (Fla. 1987), I dissent from the holding that the rule of lenity should override the clear statement of legislative intent in section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1983), that separate offenses shall be separately punished. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mitchellgreen1 sentence1977In discussing this very subsection of the statute, the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 618, 623 (Fla. 1971), said — “We hold, therefore, that it is unnecessary either under the Federal or Florida Constitutions or under Florida Statutes 322.261 to place a person under arrest prior to administering a blood test as authorized under subsection 1 (b) [now subsection 1(c)] of the Act.” The Attorney General in Opinion 073-361, set forth the law as follows — “Since 322.261 (1) (b) [which is now subsection (l)(c)] does not require that the person be arrested prior to the administr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sullivan v. Sapp
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 36-37 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1995Rather, our analysis is that the most consistent principle followed by courts interpreting Mullis was described in note 3 of Justice Shaw's dissenting opinion in Valiant: The majority claims that Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971), and subsequent cases "follow the principle" that uninsured motorist (UM) coverage is unavailable if the corresponding liability coverage is inapplicable to a particular accident. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Commercial Consultants Corp. v. DEPT. OF BUS. REGULATION
green
2 sentences1985In Commercial Consultants Corp. v. Department of Business Regulation, 363 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), we found that these provisions requiring an agency to "recite with particularity" or to publish "the specific facts and reasons" demonstrating an immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare, contemplate a consistent standard to be applied to all summary agency action. 363 So.2d at 1164 . 1985In Commercial Consultants Corp. v. Department of Business Regulation, 363 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), we found that these provisions requiring an agency to "recite with particularity" or to publish "the specific facts and reasons" demonstrating an immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare, contemplate a consistent standard to be applied to all summary agency action. 363 So.2d at 1164 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty
green
1 sentence1978Beginning with Cloud and extending to the recent case of Wackenhut Corporation v. Canty, 359 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Wackenhut ], a consistent standard has emerged. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Company
green
1 sentence1978Cloud stated at page 673: "When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record." The meaning of this statement was refined in Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 234 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1970), where this Court reviewed a Di | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.