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13 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1959–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chart Development Corp. v. Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Chart Development Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 17 OTR 170, 171, 172-176 (2003) (finding no basis to adjust taxpayer’s maximum assessed value after taxpayer “taxpayer razed one or more structures on the property and removed a quantity of timber from the property”; “voluntary retirements and removals” did not qualify as a casualty loss or a loss due to fire or act of God). 13 This is consistent with the rule that courts cannot “insert what has been omitted” into statute. | 1 | 1 |
Kelly Park v. Karen Thompsongreen1 sentence2020See Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F3d 910, 921-22 (9th Cir 2017) (reviewing the “variety of causation standards for claims of witness interference” in federal circuit courts, but not settling on one). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Department of Transportation v. Hewett Professional Groupgreen2 sentences2004See also Dept. of Transportation v. Hewitt Professional Group, 321 Or 118 , 895 P2d 755 (1995) (it was not reasonable to rely on representations about the likelihood of condemnation of property in light of notice that provided information concerning the topic); Gregory v. Novak, 121 Or App 651, 655 , 855 P2d 1142 (1993) (“Justifiable reliance requires a ‘right to rely,’ which is acquired by taking reasonable precautions to safeguard one’s own interests.”). *428 Thus, notwithstanding some ostensible tensions, Oregon case law adheres to a consistent principle: Reliance in fact must be reasonable 2004See also Dept. of Transportation v. Hewitt Professional Group, 321 Or 118 , 895 P2d 755 (1995) (it was not reasonable to rely on representations about the likelihood of condemnation of property in light of notice that provided information concerning the topic); Gregory v. Novak, 121 Or App 651, 655 , 855 P2d 1142 (1993) (“Justifiable reliance requires a ‘right to rely,’ which is acquired by taking reasonable precautions to safeguard one’s own interests.”). *428 Thus, notwithstanding some ostensible tensions, Oregon case law adheres to a consistent principle: Reliance in fact must be reasonable | 1 | 1 |
Gregory v. Novakgreen2 sentences2004See also Dept. of Transportation v. Hewitt Professional Group, 321 Or 118 , 895 P2d 755 (1995) (it was not reasonable to rely on representations about the likelihood of condemnation of property in light of notice that provided information concerning the topic); Gregory v. Novak, 121 Or App 651, 655 , 855 P2d 1142 (1993) (“Justifiable reliance requires a ‘right to rely,’ which is acquired by taking reasonable precautions to safeguard one’s own interests.”). *428 Thus, notwithstanding some ostensible tensions, Oregon case law adheres to a consistent principle: Reliance in fact must be reasonable 2004See also Dept. of Transportation v. Hewitt Professional Group, 321 Or 118 , 895 P2d 755 (1995) (it was not reasonable to rely on representations about the likelihood of condemnation of property in light of notice that provided information concerning the topic); Gregory v. Novak, 121 Or App 651, 655 , 855 P2d 1142 (1993) (“Justifiable reliance requires a ‘right to rely,’ which is acquired by taking reasonable precautions to safeguard one’s own interests.”). *428 Thus, notwithstanding some ostensible tensions, Oregon case law adheres to a consistent principle: Reliance in fact must be reasonable | 1 | 1 |
Lambert v. Palmateergreen1 sentence2003See Lambert, 182 Or App at 134-36 (trial counsel made a reasonable tactical choice not to raise an alternative theory of self-defense that was inconsistent with the petitioner’s own testimony in his criminal trial and that therefore would have undermined the petitioner’s credibility regarding his primary defense theory, that his conduct occurred accidentally); Pachl v. Zenon, 145 Or App 350, 359 , 929 P2d 1088 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 621 (1997) (“It behooves any trial counsel to present a consistent defense throughout a jury trial, given the weaknesses and opportunities for attacks by an oppon | 1 | 1 |
Krummacher v. Gierloffgreen1 sentence2003See Lambert, 182 Or App at 134-36 (trial counsel made a reasonable tactical choice not to raise an alternative theory of self-defense that was inconsistent with the petitioner’s own testimony in his criminal trial and that therefore would have undermined the petitioner’s credibility regarding his primary defense theory, that his conduct occurred accidentally); Pachl v. Zenon, 145 Or App 350, 359 , 929 P2d 1088 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 621 (1997) (“It behooves any trial counsel to present a consistent defense throughout a jury trial, given the weaknesses and opportunities for attacks by an oppon | 1 | 1 |
State v. Krognessgreen2 sentences1974See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 442 (1973) Marshall, J. dissenting. [3] As in State v. Keller, 265 Or. 622 , 510 P.2d 568 (1973). [4] As in State v. Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 145 , 388 P.2d 120 (1964). [5] The confusion of the police feared by the majority seems at least as likely to result from adopting a new rule with unknown limits as from maintenance of a separate but consistent state rule. [6] State v. Kaluna, Haw., 520 P.2d 51, 59 (1974). 1974See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 442 (1973) Marshall, J. dissenting. [3] As in State v. Keller, 265 Or. 622 , 510 P.2d 568 (1973). [4] As in State v. Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 145 , 388 P.2d 120 (1964). [5] The confusion of the police feared by the majority seems at least as likely to result from adopting a new rule with unknown limits as from maintenance of a separate but consistent state rule. [6] State v. Kaluna, Haw., 520 P.2d 51, 59 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kalunagreen2 sentences1974See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 442 (1973) Marshall, J. dissenting. [3] As in State v. Keller, 265 Or. 622 , 510 P.2d 568 (1973). [4] As in State v. Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 145 , 388 P.2d 120 (1964). [5] The confusion of the police feared by the majority seems at least as likely to result from adopting a new rule with unknown limits as from maintenance of a separate but consistent state rule. [6] State v. Kaluna, Haw., 520 P.2d 51, 59 (1974). 1974State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw 361, 520 P2d 51, 59 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robinsongreen2 sentences1974See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 442 (1973) Marshall, J. dissenting. [3] As in State v. Keller, 265 Or. 622 , 510 P.2d 568 (1973). [4] As in State v. Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 145 , 388 P.2d 120 (1964). [5] The confusion of the police feared by the majority seems at least as likely to result from adopting a new rule with unknown limits as from maintenance of a separate but consistent state rule. [6] State v. Kaluna, Haw., 520 P.2d 51, 59 (1974). 1974See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 442 (1973) Marshall, J. dissenting. [3] As in State v. Keller, 265 Or. 622 , 510 P.2d 568 (1973). [4] As in State v. Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 145 , 388 P.2d 120 (1964). [5] The confusion of the police feared by the majority seems at least as likely to result from adopting a new rule with unknown limits as from maintenance of a separate but consistent state rule. [6] State v. Kaluna, Haw., 520 P.2d 51, 59 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kellergreen2 sentences1974See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 442 (1973) Marshall, J. dissenting. [3] As in State v. Keller, 265 Or. 622 , 510 P.2d 568 (1973). [4] As in State v. Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 145 , 388 P.2d 120 (1964). [5] The confusion of the police feared by the majority seems at least as likely to result from adopting a new rule with unknown limits as from maintenance of a separate but consistent state rule. [6] State v. Kaluna, Haw., 520 P.2d 51, 59 (1974). 1974See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 442 (1973) Marshall, J. dissenting. [3] As in State v. Keller, 265 Or. 622 , 510 P.2d 568 (1973). [4] As in State v. Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 145 , 388 P.2d 120 (1964). [5] The confusion of the police feared by the majority seems at least as likely to result from adopting a new rule with unknown limits as from maintenance of a separate but consistent state rule. [6] State v. Kaluna, Haw., 520 P.2d 51, 59 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Caveny v. ASHEIMgreen2 sentences1972But see Caveny v. Asheim et al., 202 Or. 195, 218 , 274 P.2d 281 (1954), and 2 Restatement of the Law, Contracts 638 and 659, §§ 359 and 365. [11] This is consistent with the rule that a purchaser who has knowledge of defects in title or subject matter is not ordinarily entitled to compensation or abatement of the purchase price as an incident to equitable relief, even though entitled to a decree of specific performance. 1972But see Caveny v. Asheim et al., 202 Or. 195, 218 , 274 P.2d 281 (1954), and 2 Restatement of the Law, Contracts 638 and 659, §§ 359 and 365. [11] This is consistent with the rule that a purchaser who has knowledge of defects in title or subject matter is not ordinarily entitled to compensation or abatement of the purchase price as an incident to equitable relief, even though entitled to a decree of specific performance. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caveny v. ASHEIMgreen2 sentences1972But see Caveny v. Asheim et al., 202 Or. 195, 218 , 274 P.2d 281 (1954), and 2 Restatement of the Law, Contracts 638 and 659, §§ 359 and 365. [11] This is consistent with the rule that a purchaser who has knowledge of defects in title or subject matter is not ordinarily entitled to compensation or abatement of the purchase price as an incident to equitable relief, even though entitled to a decree of specific performance. 1972But see Caveny v. Asheim et al., 202 Or. 195, 218 , 274 P.2d 281 (1954), and 2 Restatement of the Law, Contracts 638 and 659, §§ 359 and 365. [11] This is consistent with the rule that a purchaser who has knowledge of defects in title or subject matter is not ordinarily entitled to compensation or abatement of the purchase price as an incident to equitable relief, even though entitled to a decree of specific performance. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
green
2 sentences2008Noting that the United States Supreme Court “has not articulated and applied a consistent test,” the court explained that the cases “make it apparent that immunity is a case-specific inquiry that turns on whether ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’ ” Johnson, 343 Or at 146 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US 89, 101 , 104 S Ct 900 , 79 L Ed 2d 67 (1984)). 2008Noting that the United States Supreme Court “has not articulated and applied a consistent test,” the court explained that the cases “make it apparent that immunity is a case-specific inquiry that turns on whether ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’ ” Johnson, 343 Or at 146 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US 89, 101 , 104 S Ct 900 , 79 L Ed 2d 67 (1984)). | 2 | 2007–2008 |
North Harbour Corp. v. Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ledford v. Gutoski
green
1 sentence2008That is, for purposes of determining the scope of an insurer’s duties under a policy, the Oregon appellate courts have not distinguished between a grant of coverage for unexpected and unintended events on the one hand, and an exclusion for intentionally caused losses on the other: In both instances, the question is whether “the insured intended to cause the particular injury or harm, as opposed to merely intending the act.” Ledford, 319 Or at 401 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Johnson v. SAIF Corp.
green
1 sentence2008Noting that the United States Supreme Court “has not articulated and applied a consistent test,” the court explained that the cases “make it apparent that immunity is a case-specific inquiry that turns on whether ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’ ” Johnson, 343 Or at 146 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US 89, 101 , 104 S Ct 900 , 79 L Ed 2d 67 (1984)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pachl v. Zenon
green
2 sentences2003See Lambert, 182 Or App at 134-36 (trial counsel made a reasonable tactical choice not to raise an alternative theory of self-defense that was inconsistent with the petitioner’s own testimony in his criminal trial and that therefore would have undermined the petitioner’s credibility regarding his primary defense theory, that his conduct occurred accidentally); Pachl v. Zenon, 145 Or App 350, 359 , 929 P2d 1088 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 621 (1997) (“It behooves any trial counsel to present a consistent defense throughout a jury trial, given the weaknesses and opportunities for attacks by an oppon 2003See Lambert, 182 Or App at 134-36 (trial counsel made a reasonable tactical choice not to raise an alternative theory of self-defense that was inconsistent with the petitioner’s own testimony in his criminal trial and that therefore would have undermined the petitioner’s credibility regarding his primary defense theory, that his conduct occurred accidentally); Pachl v. Zenon, 145 Or App 350, 359 , 929 P2d 1088 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 621 (1997) (“It behooves any trial counsel to present a consistent defense throughout a jury trial, given the weaknesses and opportunities for attacks by an oppon | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Williams v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1990Williams v. Wilson, 42 Or 299 , 70 P 1031 (1902), has received considerable attention by the parties in the present dispute and by the Court of Appeals. 1990Williams v. Wilson, 42 Or 299 , 70 P 1031 (1902), has received considerable attention by the parties in the present dispute and by the Court of Appeals. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Trombley v. Trombley
green
2 sentences1971This is consistent with the rule that in making an award for the benefit of the wife and children, “* * * it is proper for the court, as far as practicable, to take into consideration ‘the social standing, comforts, and luxuries of life’ which she and their children probably would have enjoyed but for the divorce. * * *” Trombley v. Trombley, 225 Or 209, 211 , 357 P2d 283 (1960). 1971This is consistent with the rule that in making an award for the benefit of the wife and children, “* * * it is proper for the court, as far as practicable, to take into consideration ‘the social standing, comforts, and luxuries of life’ which she and their children probably would have enjoyed but for the divorce. * * *” Trombley v. Trombley, 225 Or 209, 211 , 357 P2d 283 (1960). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
In re Willow Creek
green
2 sentences1959This is consistent with the principle announced in Rough v. Porter, supra, and In re Silvies River, supra. See also, In re Willow Creek, 74 Or 592 , 144 P 505 , 146 P 475 (1915). 1959This is consistent with the principle announced in Rough v. Porter, supra, and In re Silvies River, supra. See also, In re Willow Creek, 74 Or 592 , 144 P 505 , 146 P 475 (1915). | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.