claimant claim in Oregon

2017In Tull , we were faced with the question whether the insurer’s check mark in an “accepted” box on an 801 form constituted an acceptance that prevented a subsequent denial under the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bauman v. SAIF, 295 Or 788, 794 , 670 P2d 1027 (1983) («If*** an insurer officially notifies the claimant that the claim has been accepted, the insurer may not * * * deny the compen-sability of the claim” absent a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or other illegal activity.) 113 Or App at 452-53 .

2017In Tull , we were faced with the question whether the insurer’s check mark in an “accepted” box on an 801 form constituted an acceptance that prevented a subsequent denial under the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bauman v. SAIF, 295 Or 788, 794 , 670 P2d 1027 (1983) («If*** an insurer officially notifies the claimant that the claim has been accepted, the insurer may not * * * deny the compen-sability of the claim” absent a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or other illegal activity.) 113 Or App at 452-53 .

2002The court held in Koskela that: (1) a claimant whose claim has been accepted has a significant property interest in receiving permanent total disability benefits, 331 Or. at 378-79 , 15 P.3d 548 ; (2) because a worker seeking permanent total disability benefits must establish willingness to work and reasonable efforts to find suitable employment, and because those elements "require judgment about the worker's credibility and veracity," the probable value of an oral hearing is substantial, id. at 381 , 15 P.3d 548 ; and (3) the additional cost of providing a hearing is minimal compared to the m

2002The court held in Koskela that: (1) a claimant whose claim has been accepted has a significant property interest in receiving permanent total disability benefits, 331 Or. at 378-79 , 15 P.3d 548 ; (2) because a worker seeking permanent total disability benefits must establish willingness to work and reasonable efforts to find suitable employment, and because those elements "require judgment about the worker's credibility and veracity," the probable value of an oral hearing is substantial, id. at 381 , 15 P.3d 548 ; and (3) the additional cost of providing a hearing is minimal compared to the m

2002Applying the familiar three-part analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the court held: (1) a claimant whose claim has been accepted has a significant property interest in receiving permanent total disability benefits, Koskela, 331 Or. at 378-79 , 15 P.3d 548 ; (2) because a worker seeking permanent total disability benefits must establish willingness to work and reasonable efforts to find suitable employment, and because those elements "require judgment about the worker's credibility and veracity," the probable value of an oral hearing is sub

2002Applying the familiar three-part analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the court held: (1) a claimant whose claim has been accepted has a significant property interest in receiving permanent total disability benefits, Koskela, 331 Or. at 378-79 , 15 P.3d 548 ; (2) because a worker seeking permanent total disability benefits must establish willingness to work and reasonable efforts to find suitable employment, and because those elements "require judgment about the worker's credibility and veracity," the probable value of an oral hearing is sub

1999Accordingly, we held that “if an employer chooses to reclassify a claim from disabling to nondisabling, it must do so within sufficient time to permit the claimant to challenge the reclassification within one year from the date of the injury.” Id.

1999Application of DeGrauw’s reasoning in the initial classification context would yield the untenable result of requiring employers to initially classify all claims “within sufficient time to permit the claimant to challenge the [ Classification within one year from the date of the injury.” DeGrauw, 118 Or App at 281 .

2025The majority reasons that “denial” is a status that exists throughout the claim resolution process, and that a denial consequently may be “based on” different evi- dence at different times. 374 Or at 282 .

2019Cite as 301 Or App 177 (2019) 183 acceptance of a claim.

2018The claimant did not challenge those causation findings, and we affirmed. *768 "Absent any causal relationship between claimant's compensable injury and her claimed disabilities, ORS 656.214 does not authorize an award of permanent disability." Id. at 36 , 366 P.3d 764 . *555 Like the claimant in Magana-Marquez , claimant in this case does not challenge the board's factual finding that there was no causal relationship between claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome and his lost range of motion; as a result, the latter condition is not "due to" claimant's accepted condition, and he therefore is not e

2018The claimant did not challenge those causation findings, and we affirmed. *768 "Absent any causal relationship between claimant's compensable injury and her claimed disabilities, ORS 656.214 does not authorize an award of permanent disability." Id. at 36 , 366 P.3d 764 . *555 Like the claimant in Magana-Marquez , claimant in this case does not challenge the board's factual finding that there was no causal relationship between claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome and his lost range of motion; as a result, the latter condition is not "due to" claimant's accepted condition, and he therefore is not e

2017In Tull , we were faced with the question whether the insurer’s check mark in an “accepted” box on an 801 form constituted an acceptance that prevented a subsequent denial under the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bauman v. SAIF, 295 Or 788, 794 , 670 P2d 1027 (1983) («If*** an insurer officially notifies the claimant that the claim has been accepted, the insurer may not * * * deny the compen-sability of the claim” absent a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or other illegal activity.) 113 Or App at 452-53 .

2017We recognize that in Tull we said that the issue “[w]hether furnishing a notice to claimant was a necessary element for an ‘acceptance’ to occur under ORS 656.262(6)” was not before the court in Johnson. 113 Or App at 453 .

2017In Johnson , the court adhered to Bauman but explained that Bauman’s prohibition of “retrospective denials” applies only when a claim has been “specifically” or “officially” accepted by “written notice of acceptance or denial of the claim.” 303 Or at 55 ; see also SAIF v. Mize, 129 Or App 636, 640 , 879 P2d 907 (1994) (“Once an employer or insurer officially notifies a claimant that the claim has been accepted, it may not subsequently deny compensability without complying with ORS 656.262(6).”); Allen v. Bohemia, Inc., 125 Or App 205, 209 , 864 P2d 1365 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 582 (1994) (“Bau

2017In Johnson , the court adhered to Bauman but explained that Bauman’s prohibition of “retrospective denials” applies only when a claim has been “specifically” or “officially” accepted by “written notice of acceptance or denial of the claim.” 303 Or at 55 ; see also SAIF v. Mize, 129 Or App 636, 640 , 879 P2d 907 (1994) (“Once an employer or insurer officially notifies a claimant that the claim has been accepted, it may not subsequently deny compensability without complying with ORS 656.262(6).”); Allen v. Bohemia, Inc., 125 Or App 205, 209 , 864 P2d 1365 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 582 (1994) (“Bau

2003In Getz v. Wonder Bur, 183 Or App 494 , 497 n 1, 52 P3d 1097 , rev den, 335 Or 104 (2002), we noted the divergent names and acronyms given to the exam referred to in ORS 656.325 and OAR 436-010-0265; we decided in that case to call the exam a CME, or “compelled medical exam,” because that was the term the Supreme Court used in Robinson, 331 Or at 181 .

2003In Getz v. Wonder Bur, 183 Or App 494 , 497 n 1, 52 P3d 1097 , rev den, 335 Or 104 (2002), we noted the divergent names and acronyms given to the exam referred to in ORS 656.325 and OAR 436-010-0265; we decided in that case to call the exam a CME, or “compelled medical exam,” because that was the term the Supreme Court used in Robinson, 331 Or at 181 .

2003In Getz v. Wonder Bur, 183 Or App 494 , 497 n 1, 52 P3d 1097 , rev den, 335 Or 104 (2002), we noted the divergent names and acronyms given to the exam referred to in ORS 656.325 and OAR 436-010-0265; we decided in that case to call the exam a CME, or “compelled medical exam,” because that was the term the Supreme Court used in Robinson, 331 Or at 181 .

2000Failure to pay the fee ‘shall conclusively constitute a forfeiture of the unpatented mining claim . . . by the claimant and the claim shall be deemed null and void by operation of law.’ 30 U.S.C. § 28i.” 2 Kunkes v. United States, 78 F3d 1549, 1551 (Fed Cir), cert den 519 US 820 (1996).

1999To the contrary, as the United States Supreme Court has cautioned, in reiterating what it referred to as the “wise admonishment” of Justice Frankfurter, “differences in the origin and function of administrative agencies ‘preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.’ ” Mathews, 424 US at 348 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 US 134, 143 , 60 S Ct 437 , 84 L Ed 2d 656 (1940)).

1999To the contrary, as the United States Supreme Court has cautioned, in reiterating what it referred to as the “wise admonishment” of Justice Frankfurter, “differences in the origin and function of administrative agencies ‘preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.’ ” Mathews, 424 US at 348 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 US 134, 143 , 60 S Ct 437 , 84 L Ed 2d 656 (1940)).

1993Attorney fees provided for in this section shall be paid by the insurer or self-insured employer.” (Emphasis supplied.) A claimant is entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) only in an appeal ‘ ‘from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation.” Shoulders v. SAIF, 300 Or 606, 611 , 716 P2d 751 (1986); O’Neal v. Tewell, 119 Or App 329 , 850 P2d 1144 (1993).

1993Attorney fees provided for in this section shall be paid by the insurer or self-insured employer.” (Emphasis supplied.) A claimant is entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) only in an appeal ‘ ‘from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation.” Shoulders v. SAIF, 300 Or 606, 611 , 716 P2d 751 (1986); O’Neal v. Tewell, 119 Or App 329 , 850 P2d 1144 (1993).

1993We affirmed the Board, relying on our original decision in Jones v. OSCI, 107 Or App 78 , 810 P2d 1318 , mod 108 Or App 230 , 814 P2d 558 (1991), where we held that no attorney fees are available under ORS 656.386(1) if “the matter of compensability is [not] resolved by the forum.” After the legislature amended ORS 656.386(1) to provide for attorney fees when “an attorney is instrumental in obtaining compensation for a claimant and a hearing by the referee is not held,” we reconsidered our decision in Jones and also in this case, and remanded for the Board to reconsider its decision regarding

1993We affirmed the Board, relying on our original decision in Jones v. OSCI, 107 Or App 78 , 810 P2d 1318 , mod 108 Or App 230 , 814 P2d 558 (1991), where we held that no attorney fees are available under ORS 656.386(1) if “the matter of compensability is [not] resolved by the forum.” After the legislature amended ORS 656.386(1) to provide for attorney fees when “an attorney is instrumental in obtaining compensation for a claimant and a hearing by the referee is not held,” we reconsidered our decision in Jones and also in this case, and remanded for the Board to reconsider its decision regarding

1993Attorney fees provided for in this section shall be paid by the insurer or self-insured employer.” (Emphasis supplied.) A claimant is entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) only in an appeal ‘ ‘from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation.” Shoulders v. SAIF, 300 Or 606, 611 , 716 P2d 751 (1986); O’Neal v. Tewell, 119 Or App 329 , 850 P2d 1144 (1993).

1993Attorney fees provided for in this section shall be paid by the insurer or self-insured employer.” (Emphasis supplied.) A claimant is entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) only in an appeal ‘ ‘from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation.” Shoulders v. SAIF, 300 Or 606, 611 , 716 P2d 751 (1986); O’Neal v. Tewell, 119 Or App 329 , 850 P2d 1144 (1993).

1992He cites Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250 , 94 S Ct 1076 , 39 L Ed 2d 306 (1974), for the proposition that a state violates the right to interstate travel if it denies benefits based on one’s residency.

1992He cites Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250 , 94 S Ct 1076 , 39 L Ed 2d 306 (1974), for the proposition that a state violates the right to interstate travel if it denies benefits based on one’s residency.

1986The Court reaffirmed Sherbert in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 US 707 , 101 S Ct 1425 , 67 L Ed 2d 624 (1981).

1986The Court reaffirmed Sherbert in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 US 707 , 101 S Ct 1425 , 67 L Ed 2d 624 (1981).

1983ORS 656.382(2) provides: “If a request for hearing, request for review or court appeal is initiated by an employer or insurer, and the referee, board or court finds that the compensation awarded to a claimant should not be disallowed or reduced, the employer or insurer shall be required to pay to the claimant of the attorney of the claimant a reasonable attorney’s fee in an amount set by the referee, board or the court for legal representation by an attorney for the claimant at the hearing, review or appeal.” Bracke v. Baza’r, Inc., 294 Or 483 , 658 P2d 1158 (1983) holds that ORS 656.382(2) do

1983ORS 656.382(2) provides: “If a request for hearing, request for review or court appeal is initiated by an employer or insurer, and the referee, board or court finds that the compensation awarded to a claimant should not be disallowed or reduced, the employer or insurer shall be required to pay to the claimant of the attorney of the claimant a reasonable attorney’s fee in an amount set by the referee, board or the court for legal representation by an attorney for the claimant at the hearing, review or appeal.” Bracke v. Baza’r, Inc., 294 Or 483 , 658 P2d 1158 (1983) holds that ORS 656.382(2) do