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8 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fuscellaro v. Industrial National Corporationgreen1 sentence2024To permit the inherently unknowable exception to extend as asked could disrupt the subsequent commercial transactions or expose a corporation to additional liability when there is no suggestion that it has done anything but follow state law90 and well-accepted norms of keeping record of its shares.91 What’s more, in Delaware, “the time of discovery rule operates to toll the statutory period until the claimant is on inquiry notice of its claim—that is, until 88 Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842 (“This Court has applied the above-described ‘discovery rule’ in cases claiming accounting and attorney malpra | 1 | 1 |
Gerard C. Menichini, T/a Best Legal Services v. Lissa L. Grant Mellon Bank (East), Mellon Bank (East) National Associationgreen1 sentence2024To permit the inherently unknowable exception to extend as asked could disrupt the subsequent commercial transactions or expose a corporation to additional liability when there is no suggestion that it has done anything but follow state law90 and well-accepted norms of keeping record of its shares.91 What’s more, in Delaware, “the time of discovery rule operates to toll the statutory period until the claimant is on inquiry notice of its claim—that is, until 88 Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842 (“This Court has applied the above-described ‘discovery rule’ in cases claiming accounting and attorney malpra | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLCgreen1 sentence2024To permit the inherently unknowable exception to extend as asked could disrupt the subsequent commercial transactions or expose a corporation to additional liability when there is no suggestion that it has done anything but follow state law90 and well-accepted norms of keeping record of its shares.91 What’s more, in Delaware, “the time of discovery rule operates to toll the statutory period until the claimant is on inquiry notice of its claim—that is, until 88 Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842 (“This Court has applied the above-described ‘discovery rule’ in cases claiming accounting and attorney malpra | 1 | 1 |
Rash v. C. & M. Corp.green1 sentence2019Corp., 218 A.2d 670, 672 (Del. 1966). -1ll- limitations, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts from which application of a recognized tolling doctrine can be reasonably inferred.” To determine if a claim is time-barred, the Court examines three things for each individual claim:*! (i) the accrual date for the cause of action; (ii) whether the statute of limitations has been tolled; and (iii) assuming a tolling exception applies, when the claimant was on inquiry notice.” A. PREJUDICE FROM DELAY IS IRRELEVANT. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Wainscott
green
2 sentences2025Evaluating The Precedent 116 Id. at 976 . 117 Id. at 978 . 118 Id. at 979 . 119 Id. 120 Id. at 983 . 45 With only three jurisdictions having addressed the standard of review applicable to claim recommendations, a clear majority rule has not yet emerged. 2025Evaluating The Precedent 116 Id. at 976 . 117 Id. at 978 . 118 Id. at 979 . 119 Id. 120 Id. at 983 . 45 With only three jurisdictions having addressed the standard of review applicable to claim recommendations, a clear majority rule has not yet emerged. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation
green
1 sentence2020Nov. 29, 2016); Olney v. Cooch, 42 A.2d 610 , 614 (Del. 1981). 6 Christiana Care Health Servs. v. Davis, 127 A.2d 391 , 394 (Del. 2015); Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66 . 7 Histed v. E.I. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Culver v. Bennett
green
1 sentence1992In Culver v. Bennett, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1094 (1991), this Court found error in the use of the term “substantial factor” in a jury instruction defining proximate cause. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Stagg v. Bendix Corp.
green
1 sentence1987Stagg, 472 A.2d at 42-43 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
DiSabatino & Sons, Inc. v. Facciolo
green
1 sentence1985As applied in most workmen’s compensation cases, however, it is limited to the return of an impairment without the intervention of a new or independent accident.” DiSabatino & Sons, Inc. v. Facciolo, 306 A.2d at 719 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Terry v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1922It is true, generally speaking, as claimed by the plaintiff, “that the limitation of an action is a matter of remedy and not of right.” 36 Cyc. 1142; Lewis’ Sutherland, Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) § 668; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 , 24 L. 1922It is true, generally speaking, as claimed by the plaintiff, “that the limitation of an action is a matter of remedy and not of right.” 36 Cyc. 1142; Lewis’ Sutherland, Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) § 668; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 , 24 L. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.