claimant claim in California

2018(See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 , 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ; J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323 , 333-335, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 ; Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238 , 1251-1252, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 .) We conclude here that a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where a public entity's failure to notify the claimant that a claim is untimely is induced by the claimant's representation on the government claim form.

2018(See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 , 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ; J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323 , 333-335, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 ; Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238 , 1251-1252, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 .) We conclude here that a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where a public entity's failure to notify the claimant that a claim is untimely is induced by the claimant's representation on the government claim form.

2018(See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 , 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ; J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323 , 333-335, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 ; Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238 , 1251-1252, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 .) We conclude here that a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where a public entity's failure to notify the claimant that a claim is untimely is induced by the claimant's representation on the government claim form.

2018(See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 , 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ; J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323 , 333-335, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 ; Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238 , 1251-1252, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 .) We conclude here that a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where a public entity's failure to notify the claimant that a claim is untimely is induced by the claimant's representation on the government claim form.

2018(See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 , 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ; J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323 , 333-335, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 ; Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238 , 1251-1252, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 .) We conclude here that a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where a public entity's failure to notify the claimant that a claim is untimely is induced by the claimant's representation on the government claim form.

2018(See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 445 ; J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323, 333-335 ; Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251-1252 .) We conclude here that a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where a public entity’s failure to notify the claimant that a claim is untimely is induced by the claimant’s representation on the government claim form.

2025(J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 653 .) If a personal injury claim is presented more than six months after the action accrues, and the claim does not contain an application to present a late claim, the public entity may, within 45 days after the claim is presented, give written notice to the claimant that the claim was not filed timely and is being returned without further action. (§ 911.3, subd. (a).) The notice must state that the claimant’s only recourse is to apply to the public entity for leave to present the claim late or to petition the superior co

2024Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118 .) A claim that does not substantially comply with section 910 may still be considered a “ ‘claim as presented,’ ” requiring the public entity to inform the claimant of the claim’s shortcomings, if the claim “puts the public entity on notice both that the 8 claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation will result if the matter is not resolved.” (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 769 ; §§ 910.8, 911.) None of plaintiff’s administrative grievances informed the Department he intended to initiate litigation if his grievances were no

2024Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118 .) A claim that does not substantially comply with section 910 may still be considered a “ ‘claim as presented,’ ” requiring the public entity to inform the claimant of the claim’s shortcomings, if the claim “puts the public entity on notice both that the 8 claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation will result if the matter is not resolved.” (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 769 ; §§ 910.8, 911.) None of plaintiff’s administrative grievances informed the Department he intended to initiate litigation if his grievances were no

2023The appellate court in Petersen, however, presumed the mother sought damages for her husband’s wrongful death in her claim and based on that presumption, concluded the daughter could not rely on her mother’s claim to excuse her failure to file a timely claim. ( Petersen, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at pp. 765‒766.) This applies equally here, where the Estate filed the only claim, as there is nothing to indicate the Estate filed the claim on plaintiffs’ behalf, and the claim did not name either plaintiff as a claimant or claim damages on their behalf.

2023(Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 680 ; see also Comerica Bank v. Howsam (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 790, 817 [“[A]n award may be vacated where an arbitrator commits clear legal error which denies a litigant a hearing on an unwaivable important statutory right.”].) The trial court’s order denying the motion to vacate is reviewed de novo.

2023(Ibid.) The statute goes on to provide: “Any defense as to the time limit for presenting a claim described in subdivision (a) is waived by failure to give the notice set forth in subdivision (a) within 45 days after the claim is presented, except that no notice need be given and no waiver shall result when the claim as presented fails to state either an address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent or an address of the claimant.” (§ 911.3, subd. (b).) Thus, when a public entity notifies a claimant the claim is late, it “must warn the [claimant] that his or her onl

2014(Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 442 & fn. 12.) We review the trial court's decision under the substantial evidence standard, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of its determination.

2014The exception does not apply to claimants who are aware of the appointment of a receiver but who do not receive notice of the filing deadline.’ [Citation.]” (RTC Mortgage Trust 1994-N2 v. Haith (8th Cir. 1998) 133 F.3d 574, 579 .) Further when there is “sufficient inquiry notice of the receivership, the failure to receive mailed notice does not avoid the jurisdictional bar of the statute.” (Ibid.) Even where the claimant may not know the exact nature of the receiver’s role, knowledge of the receiver’s involvement may sufficiently place the claimant on inquiry notice “as to require further inqu

2013Where the facts indicate a claimant may have a claim in the future, we believe the likelihood that the potential claim may ripen into an actual claim, like the likelihood that any particular alleged joint tortfeasor will be found liable for a portion of the claimant’s loss, is a factor to be considered in determining whether the settlement is in good faith. 6 “‘Unlike some jurisdictions wherein wrongful death actions are derivative, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 “creates a new cause of action in favor of the heirs as beneficiaries, based upon their own independent pecuniary injury suf

2011(See Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 828 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] (Rason); Ngo v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 946, 952 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 140 ].) County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 445 ], cited by Fillmore and the trial court for the proposition that Industry and Livermore were required to apply for leave to present a late claim, neither held nor suggested that a claimant who challenges a public entity’s decision that a claim was untimely must apply for leave to present a late claim.

2011(See Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 828 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] (Rason); Ngo v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 946, 952 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 140 ].) County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 445 ], cited by Fillmore and the trial court for the proposition that Industry and Livermore were required to apply for leave to present a late claim, neither held nor suggested that a claimant who challenges a public entity’s decision that a claim was untimely must apply for leave to present a late claim.

2005When the Insurance Code was recodified two years later, the Legislature changed the language to the current formulation, which states that a claimant whose claim has been rejected “may apply to the court... for an order to show cause why the claim should not be allowed.” (Stats. 1935, ch. 145, § 1032, pp. 544-545.) The current language is more consistent with the presumed role of review. 9 As in Low I, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at page 1368 , appellants here do not challenge application of the abuse of discretion standard.

2002In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 607 P.2d 924 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1061 ], holding that a claimant could state a claim against DES manufacturers based on market share and shift the burden to the defendant manufacturer to disprove its involvement.

2002In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 607 P.2d 924 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1061 ], holding that a claimant could state a claim against DES manufacturers based on market share and shift the burden to the defendant manufacturer to disprove its involvement.

2001Section 3097, subdivision (g) provides that “A person required by this section to give notice . . . need give only one notice . . . with respect to all materials, service, labor, or equipment he or she furnishes for a work of improvement, . . . [^] If a notice contains a general description required by subdivision (a) or (b) of the materials, services, labor, or equipment furnished to the date of notice, it is not defective because, after that date, the person giving notice furnishes materials, services, labor, or equipment not within the scope of this general description.” We see nothing in t

1989The claimant in Dyna-Med had a choice whether to seek administrative or judicial relief. ( 43 Cal. 3d at p. 1402 .) In the present case, by contrast, the claimant is provided a hearing and administrative mandamus review as his exclusive remedy.

1979(See Harvey, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at p. 820 .) The Harvey court stated ( 252 Cal.App.2d at p. 598 ): “Where a claimant, in reliance upon the representation of an authorized employee of the public entity that his application to file a late claim has been granted and his claim denied, loses his right to petition the court for leave to make a late presentation, *61 the public entity will be estopped to assert it did not grant his application ....

1979(See Harvey, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at p. 820 .) The Harvey court stated ( 252 Cal.App.2d at p. 598 ): “Where a claimant, in reliance upon the representation of an authorized employee of the public entity that his application to file a late claim has been granted and his claim denied, loses his right to petition the court for leave to make a late presentation, *61 the public entity will be estopped to assert it did not grant his application ....