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23 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mayor &C. of Athens v. Cookgreen2 sentences1984Co. v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 719 ( 137 SE2d 391 ) this court noted that: “It is a condition precedent to the award of a lump sum payment on the application of a claimant that a hearing be had on the question and evidence be presented sufficient to authorize a finding of fact by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation that the lump sum award will be ‘to the best interest of the employee or his dependents.’ ” Mayor &c. of Athens v. Cook, 104 Ga. App. 136, 138 ( 121 SE2d 82 ) cited by the court in Travelers Ins. 1984Co. v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 719 ( 137 SE2d 391 ) this court noted that: “It is a condition precedent to the award of a lump sum payment on the application of a claimant that a hearing be had on the question and evidence be presented sufficient to authorize a finding of fact by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation that the lump sum award will be ‘to the best interest of the employee or his dependents.’ ” Mayor &c. of Athens v. Cook, 104 Ga. App. 136, 138 ( 121 SE2d 82 ) cited by the court in Travelers Ins. | 1 | 2 |
Portee v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Moreover, under OCGA § 9-11-15 (a), the Claimant could amend his answer without leave of court at any time before the entry of a pretrial order and thereafter 5 Portee v. State, 277 Ga. App. 536, 537 (1) ( 627 SE2d 63 ) (2006). 6 by leave of court, which “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”6 In light of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s grant of the Claimant’s motion to amend.7 2. 2023Moreover, under OCGA § 9-11-15 (a), the Claimant could amend his answer without leave of court at any time before the entry of a pretrial order and thereafter 5 Portee v. State, 277 Ga. App. 536, 537 (1) ( 627 SE2d 63 ) (2006). 6 by leave of court, which “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”6 In light of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s grant of the Claimant’s motion to amend.7 2. | 1 | 1 |
Cowart v. Widenergreen2 sentences2019See also Cowart v. Widener , 287 Ga. 622 , 633 (3) (c), 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010) ("Summary judgment cannot be avoided based on speculation or conjecture."). 5 OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) provides: Prior to the filing of a civil action, any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf of a claimant or claimants shall be in writing and contain the following material terms: (1) The time period within which such offer must be accepted, which shall be not less than 30 days from 2019See also Cowart v. Widener , 287 Ga. 622 , 633 (3) (c), 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010) ("Summary judgment cannot be avoided based on speculation or conjecture."). 5 OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) provides: Prior to the filing of a civil action, any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf of a claimant or claimants shall be in writing and contain the following material terms: (1) The time period within which such offer must be accepted, which shall be not less than 30 days from | 1 | 1 |
City of Poulan v. Hodgegreen1 sentence2002Where the Court of Appeals erred, however, was applying its misinterpretation of Birditt in light of Ledbetter’s holding in order to conclude that “[a]bsent [an MMI finding], any disability rating is premature, and no award can be made for a permanent disability.” City of Poulan, supra, 251 Ga. App. at 503 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Nolengreen2 sentences1977This case differs on its facts from that of Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Nolen, 137 Ga. App. 205, 207 ( 223 SE2d 250 ), wherein there was an affirmative assurance to the claimant that his claim would not be adversely affected by a delay. 1977This case differs on its facts from that of Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Nolen, 137 Ga. App. 205, 207 ( 223 SE2d 250 ), wherein there was an affirmative assurance to the claimant that his claim would not be adversely affected by a delay. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Equitable Mortgage Co.green2 sentences1972Walker v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 114 Ga. 862, 866 ( 40 SE 1010 ); Fincher v. Stanley Elec. 1972Walker v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 114 Ga. 862, 866 ( 40 SE 1010 ); Fincher v. Stanley Elec. | 1 | 1 |
GENERAL MOTORS CORP. &C. v. Dempseygreen2 sentences1958The language of the judgment is found in General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Division v. Dempsey, 93 Ga. App. 423, 426 ( 91 S. E. 2d 850 ): "The above award is favorable to the claimant with the exception of the finding that he lost no compensable time to the date of the hearing. 1958The language of the judgment is found in General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Division v. Dempsey, 93 Ga. App. 423, 426 ( 91 S. E. 2d 850 ): "The above award is favorable to the claimant with the exception of the finding that he lost no compensable time to the date of the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Wash v. First National Bankgreen1 sentence1948See Wash v. Bank, 99 Ga. 592 .” In Collier v. Blake, 16 Ga. App. 382 ( 85 S. E. 354 ), it was stated that no counter-affidavit was filed in that case, and it followed the rule in Ford v. Fargason, supra. Applying these rules to the instant case, where the claimant does not claim title to the property levied upon by a conveyance from the husband, the mortgagor, or any of his successors in title, but claims that she purchased the cows from a third party, on the trial of the statutory claim to the property levied upon under the chattel mortgage fi. fa., which was apparently regular and valid on i | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Fargasongreen1 sentence1948See Wash v. Bank, 99 Ga. 592 .” In Collier v. Blake, 16 Ga. App. 382 ( 85 S. E. 354 ), it was stated that no counter-affidavit was filed in that case, and it followed the rule in Ford v. Fargason, supra. Applying these rules to the instant case, where the claimant does not claim title to the property levied upon by a conveyance from the husband, the mortgagor, or any of his successors in title, but claims that she purchased the cows from a third party, on the trial of the statutory claim to the property levied upon under the chattel mortgage fi. fa., which was apparently regular and valid on i | 1 | 1 |
Collier v. Blakegreen2 sentences1948See Wash v. Bank, 99 Ga. 592 .” In Collier v. Blake, 16 Ga. App. 382 ( 85 S. E. 354 ), it was stated that no counter-affidavit was filed in that case, and it followed the rule in Ford v. Fargason, supra. Applying these rules to the instant case, where the claimant does not claim title to the property levied upon by a conveyance from the husband, the mortgagor, or any of his successors in title, but claims that she purchased the cows from a third party, on the trial of the statutory claim to the property levied upon under the chattel mortgage fi. fa., which was apparently regular and valid on i 1948See Wash v. Bank, 99 Ga. 592 .” In Collier v. Blake, 16 Ga. App. 382 ( 85 S. E. 354 ), it was stated that no counter-affidavit was filed in that case, and it followed the rule in Ford v. Fargason, supra. Applying these rules to the instant case, where the claimant does not claim title to the property levied upon by a conveyance from the husband, the mortgagor, or any of his successors in title, but claims that she purchased the cows from a third party, on the trial of the statutory claim to the property levied upon under the chattel mortgage fi. fa., which was apparently regular and valid on i | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Paxton v. TRUST COMPANY BANK OF GWINNETT COUNTYgreen2 sentences1984But see Paxton v. Trust Co. Bank of Gwinnett County, 245 Ga. 834 ( 268 SE2d 154 ) (1980) (standard to be applied should any facts be recited in the order); Smith v. Public Storage, Inc., 163 Ga. App. 455 ( 294 SE2d 685 ) (1982). 1984But see Paxton v. Trust Co. Bank of Gwinnett County, 245 Ga. 834 ( 268 SE2d 154 ) (1980) (standard to be applied should any facts be recited in the order); Smith v. Public Storage, Inc., 163 Ga. App. 455 ( 294 SE2d 685 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abbercrombie v. Maryland Casualty Co.
neutral
2 sentences1942Abercrombie v. American Casualty Co., 41 Ga. App. 729 ( 154 S.E. 459 ). 1942Abercrombie v. American Casualty Co., 41 Ga. App. 729 ( 154 S.E. 459 ). | 2 | 1942–1942 |
Lockett v. State
green
2 sentences1997Again, in Lockett v. State of Ga., 218 Ga. App. 289 ( 460 SE2d 857 ) (1995), the claimant did not claim that her failure to file an unverified answer was the result of mistake. 1997Again, in Lockett v. State of Ga., 218 Ga. App. 289 ( 460 SE2d 857 ) (1995), the claimant did not claim that her failure to file an unverified answer was the result of mistake. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
C & H COURIERS, INC. v. American Mutual Insurance Company
green
2 sentences1984Co., 166 Ga. App. 853 ( 305 SE2d 500 ) (1983) and Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 267 SE2d 757 ) (1980), we must hold that the trial judge’s bare recital that “this Court hereby finds in favor of the claimant on her claim and hereby grants judgment in favor of Patricia Upton declaring that she is the rightful owner of all of the property listed in exhibit ‘A’ attached hereto except [a list of 12 items]” is insufficient under the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). 1984Co., 166 Ga. App. 853 ( 305 SE2d 500 ) (1983) and Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 267 SE2d 757 ) (1980), we must hold that the trial judge’s bare recital that “this Court hereby finds in favor of the claimant on her claim and hereby grants judgment in favor of Patricia Upton declaring that she is the rightful owner of all of the property listed in exhibit ‘A’ attached hereto except [a list of 12 items]” is insufficient under the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Travelers Insurance Company v. Williams
neutral
2 sentences1984Co. v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 719 ( 137 SE2d 391 ) this court noted that: “It is a condition precedent to the award of a lump sum payment on the application of a claimant that a hearing be had on the question and evidence be presented sufficient to authorize a finding of fact by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation that the lump sum award will be ‘to the best interest of the employee or his dependents.’ ” Mayor &c. of Athens v. Cook, 104 Ga. App. 136, 138 ( 121 SE2d 82 ) cited by the court in Travelers Ins. 1984Co. v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 719 ( 137 SE2d 391 ) this court noted that: “It is a condition precedent to the award of a lump sum payment on the application of a claimant that a hearing be had on the question and evidence be presented sufficient to authorize a finding of fact by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation that the lump sum award will be ‘to the best interest of the employee or his dependents.’ ” Mayor &c. of Athens v. Cook, 104 Ga. App. 136, 138 ( 121 SE2d 82 ) cited by the court in Travelers Ins. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Smith v. Public Storage, Inc.
green
2 sentences1984But see Paxton v. Trust Co. Bank of Gwinnett County, 245 Ga. 834 ( 268 SE2d 154 ) (1980) (standard to be applied should any facts be recited in the order); Smith v. Public Storage, Inc., 163 Ga. App. 455 ( 294 SE2d 685 ) (1982). 1984But see Paxton v. Trust Co. Bank of Gwinnett County, 245 Ga. 834 ( 268 SE2d 154 ) (1980) (standard to be applied should any facts be recited in the order); Smith v. Public Storage, Inc., 163 Ga. App. 455 ( 294 SE2d 685 ) (1982). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Woodruff v. BX CORPORATION
neutral
2 sentences1984Co., 166 Ga. App. 853 ( 305 SE2d 500 ) (1983) and Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 267 SE2d 757 ) (1980), we must hold that the trial judge’s bare recital that “this Court hereby finds in favor of the claimant on her claim and hereby grants judgment in favor of Patricia Upton declaring that she is the rightful owner of all of the property listed in exhibit ‘A’ attached hereto except [a list of 12 items]” is insufficient under the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). 1984Co., 166 Ga. App. 853 ( 305 SE2d 500 ) (1983) and Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 267 SE2d 757 ) (1980), we must hold that the trial judge’s bare recital that “this Court hereby finds in favor of the claimant on her claim and hereby grants judgment in favor of Patricia Upton declaring that she is the rightful owner of all of the property listed in exhibit ‘A’ attached hereto except [a list of 12 items]” is insufficient under the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hall v. Kendall
green
2 sentences1975Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 ( 59 SE2d 421 ); Young v. American Ins. 1975Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 ( 59 SE2d 421 ); Young v. American Ins. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Cohen v. Broughton
neutral
1 sentence1959Cohen v. Broughton, 54 Ga. 296 ; Drawdy v. Littlefield, 75 Ga. 215 (5); Pharr v. Estey Piano & Organ Co., 7 Ga. App. 262 ( 66 S. E. 618 ). 4. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Drawdy v. Littlefield
green
1 sentence1959Cohen v. Broughton, 54 Ga. 296 ; Drawdy v. Littlefield, 75 Ga. 215 (5); Pharr v. Estey Piano & Organ Co., 7 Ga. App. 262 ( 66 S. E. 618 ). 4. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Pharr v. Estey Piano & Organ Co.
neutral
2 sentences1959Cohen v. Broughton, 54 Ga. 296 ; Drawdy v. Littlefield, 75 Ga. 215 (5); Pharr v. Estey Piano & Organ Co., 7 Ga. App. 262 ( 66 S. E. 618 ). 4. 1959Cohen v. Broughton, 54 Ga. 296 ; Drawdy v. Littlefield, 75 Ga. 215 (5); Pharr v. Estey Piano & Organ Co., 7 Ga. App. 262 ( 66 S. E. 618 ). 4. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Smith v. Lockett
green
1 sentence1948The facts of this case differentiate it from Smith v. Lockett, 73 Ga. 104 , Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65 ( 5 S. E. 2d, 41 ), Oliver v. Parramore, 66 Ga. App. 584 ( 18 S. E. 2d, 562 ), and other cases cited by the plaintiff in error in discussing this assignment of error. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Benson v. Hines
green
1 sentence1948In Benson v. Hines, 166 Ga. 781 (2) (supra), it was said: “This writ [quo warranto] will lie in behalf of a claimant to test title to a private office.” The theory upon which these decisions were based was that quo warranto was the proper remedy to test the title to the office involved, not because the incumbent was a public officer within *360 the literal meaning of that term, but because the corporations involved had been'granted, by legislative authority, á franchise, and that the usurpation of a corporate office, therefore, amounts to the usurpation of a privilege granted by the State. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Calhoun v. Williamson
green
2 sentences1948The facts of this case differentiate it from Smith v. Lockett, 73 Ga. 104 , Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65 ( 5 S. E. 2d, 41 ), Oliver v. Parramore, 66 Ga. App. 584 ( 18 S. E. 2d, 562 ), and other cases cited by the plaintiff in error in discussing this assignment of error. 1948The facts of this case differentiate it from Smith v. Lockett, 73 Ga. 104 , Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65 ( 5 S. E. 2d, 41 ), Oliver v. Parramore, 66 Ga. App. 584 ( 18 S. E. 2d, 562 ), and other cases cited by the plaintiff in error in discussing this assignment of error. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Oliver v. Parramore
green
2 sentences1948The facts of this case differentiate it from Smith v. Lockett, 73 Ga. 104 , Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65 ( 5 S. E. 2d, 41 ), Oliver v. Parramore, 66 Ga. App. 584 ( 18 S. E. 2d, 562 ), and other cases cited by the plaintiff in error in discussing this assignment of error. 1948The facts of this case differentiate it from Smith v. Lockett, 73 Ga. 104 , Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65 ( 5 S. E. 2d, 41 ), Oliver v. Parramore, 66 Ga. App. 584 ( 18 S. E. 2d, 562 ), and other cases cited by the plaintiff in error in discussing this assignment of error. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
James v. Kiser & Co.
neutral
1 sentence1930Yet, as far back as the decision written by Chief Justice Jackson in the case of James v. Kiser, 65 Ga. 515 , it was held th^t the opening and conclusion will not be awarded the claimant in a claim case if he sits silently by and compels the plaintiff in fi. fa. to prove his case, and delays until all the necessary evidence has been submitted by both' parties to ask for the opening and concluding arguments. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Williams v. State
neutral
1 sentence1930In Taylor v. Brown, 139 Ga. 797 ( 77 S. E. 1062 ), where the facts were very similar to those of this case, it was ruled: ""Where, in a claim case, the claimant, before the introduction of evidence commenced, did not admit possession in the defendant in execution, or in any manner claim the right to assume the burden of proof and to open and conclude the argument, but permitted the plaintiffs in execution to assume the burden of proof and to open and conclude the introduction of evidence (each side introducing evidence), it was too late, after the evidence had closed and before the argument be | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Taylor v. Brown & Co.
neutral
1 sentence1930In Taylor v. Brown, 139 Ga. 797 ( 77 S. E. 1062 ), where the facts were very similar to those of this case, it was ruled: ""Where, in a claim case, the claimant, before the introduction of evidence commenced, did not admit possession in the defendant in execution, or in any manner claim the right to assume the burden of proof and to open and conclude the argument, but permitted the plaintiffs in execution to assume the burden of proof and to open and conclude the introduction of evidence (each side introducing evidence), it was too late, after the evidence had closed and before the argument be | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Hussey v. Gallagher neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Harris v. Pounds neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Seals, Armour & Co. v. Stocks
green
2 sentences1928If he had not assented in person, he would have been concluded by the acts of his counsel; for the agreement was executed by plaintiffs not trying but continuing their cases, and the claimant is estopped from saying that the agreement was not in writing.” In Seals v. Stocks, 100 Ga. 10 ( 30 S. E. 278 ), the controversy was in relation to the effect of an order procured by the plaintiff dismissing an action of bail-trover in which the bond had been given by the plaintiff. 1928If he had not assented in person, he would have been concluded by the acts of his counsel; for the agreement was executed by plaintiffs not trying but continuing their cases, and the claimant is estopped from saying that the agreement was not in writing.” In Seals v. Stocks, 100 Ga. 10 ( 30 S. E. 278 ), the controversy was in relation to the effect of an order procured by the plaintiff dismissing an action of bail-trover in which the bond had been given by the plaintiff. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
McCarthy v. McKinney
green
2 sentences1928Hussey v. Gallagher, 61 Ga. 86, 91 ; Harris v. Pounds, 64 Ga. 121 ; McCarthy v. McKinney, 137 Ga. 292 ( 73 S. E. 394 ). 1928Hussey v. Gallagher, 61 Ga. 86, 91 ; Harris v. Pounds, 64 Ga. 121 ; McCarthy v. McKinney, 137 Ga. 292 ( 73 S. E. 394 ). | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Hogan v. Morris green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Taylor v. Boynton neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Cottle v. Dodson neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Hawkins v. Studdard green | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Pollak v. Harmon green | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Haynes v. McRae green | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Bates v. Morris neutral | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Nelms v. Steiner Bros. neutral | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.