claimant claim in Oklahoma

1995Under the reasonableness standard set out in Coy v. Dover Corporation/Norris Division, supra, unless running of the limitation was otherwise tolled, Claimant’s claim was barred by application of the awareness doctrine no later than one year from the time of his surgery in 1971.

1990In Coy v. Dover Corporation/Norris Division, 773 P.2d at 748 , the Court stated: The amended statute [§ 43] is not, however, given retrospective application.

1967Claimant’s brief cites Sutherland Lumber Co. v. Roberts, 167 Okl. 646 , 31 P.2d 581 , wherein this court said: ‘Medical testimony based on employee’s statement at the time of the examination in compensation cases, though not made for the purpose of treatment, is competent.’ * * » * * * * * * in óur view, whether Dr. P was told about Dr. V’s diagnosis by the claimant, or by Dr. V himself, is immaterial under the circumstances of this case. * * * ” In speaking of Dr. P’s report, we there said: “ * * * His report reflects that he made his own independent examination of the claimant, and this incl

1967Claimant’s brief cites Sutherland Lumber Co. v. Roberts, 167 Okl. 646 , 31 P.2d 581 , wherein this court said: ‘Medical testimony based on employee’s statement at the time of the examination in compensation cases, though not made for the purpose of treatment, is competent.’ * * » * * * * * * in óur view, whether Dr. P was told about Dr. V’s diagnosis by the claimant, or by Dr. V himself, is immaterial under the circumstances of this case. * * * ” In speaking of Dr. P’s report, we there said: “ * * * His report reflects that he made his own independent examination of the claimant, and this incl

2012This language, subsequently renumbered as § 3(18)(c), is the same language applicable to Claimant's claim. 25 Pursuant to this language, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that "[the Act requires any psychological or mental injury be accompanied by physical injury in order to receive disability benefits for a debilitating psychological condition ...." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reinholts, 1998 OK 11, ¶ 12 , 955 P.2d 223, 225 . 125 The Supreme Court has consistently categorized mental/psychological disorders, including (in Fenwick) PTSD, as "mental injuries," despite their physical manifestati

2012This language, subsequently renumbered as § 3(18)(c), is the same language applicable to Claimant's claim. 25 Pursuant to this language, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that "[the Act requires any psychological or mental injury be accompanied by physical injury in order to receive disability benefits for a debilitating psychological condition ...." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reinholts, 1998 OK 11, ¶ 12 , 955 P.2d 223, 225 . 125 The Supreme Court has consistently categorized mental/psychological disorders, including (in Fenwick) PTSD, as "mental injuries," despite their physical manifestati

2012The facts are set out in McGuire v. N. Glantz & Son, LLC, 2010 OK 74 , 242 P.3d 530 , and so will not be set out at length. {38 Claimant alleged he contracted Hepatitis A from one of several restaurants while on a job assignment as a driver for Employer N. Glantz & Son, LLC.

2012The facts are set out in McGuire v. N. Glantz & Son, LLC, 2010 OK 74 , 242 P.3d 530 , and so will not be set out at length. {38 Claimant alleged he contracted Hepatitis A from one of several restaurants while on a job assignment as a driver for Employer N. Glantz & Son, LLC.

2009Absent that ruling, this Court cannot determine what evidence may be considered in assessing the existence of any competent evidence to support the order appealed." The trial court is required to rule on such objections "prior to any award being entered or denied. 13 Lacy, 1992 OK 54, n. 35 , 839 P.2d 157 , 164 n. 35; Gaines, 1990 OK 33, n. 5 , 790 P.2d 1073 , 1080 n. 5.

2009Absent that ruling, this Court cannot determine what evidence may be considered in assessing the existence of any competent evidence to support the order appealed." The trial court is required to rule on such objections "prior to any award being entered or denied. 13 Lacy, 1992 OK 54, n. 35 , 839 P.2d 157 , 164 n. 35; Gaines, 1990 OK 33, n. 5 , 790 P.2d 1073 , 1080 n. 5.

2009Absent that ruling, this Court cannot determine what evidence may be considered in assessing the existence of any competent evidence to support the order appealed." The trial court is required to rule on such objections "prior to any award being entered or denied. 13 Lacy, 1992 OK 54, n. 35 , 839 P.2d 157 , 164 n. 35; Gaines, 1990 OK 33, n. 5 , 790 P.2d 1073 , 1080 n. 5.

2009Absent that ruling, this Court cannot determine what evidence may be considered in assessing the existence of any competent evidence to support the order appealed." The trial court is required to rule on such objections "prior to any award being entered or denied. 13 Lacy, 1992 OK 54, n. 35 , 839 P.2d 157 , 164 n. 35; Gaines, 1990 OK 33, n. 5 , 790 P.2d 1073 , 1080 n. 5.

2009Claimant's brief cites LaBarge v. Zebco, 1988 OK 147 , 769 P.2d 125 , which held that a physician's report that failed to meet the requirements of Rule 20 specifying ten issues that must be addressed in a medical expert's report constituted "no evidence" supporting the employer's defense. 11 LaBarge, 1988 OK 147 at ¶ 8 , 769 P.2d at 128 .

2009Claimant's brief cites LaBarge v. Zebco, 1988 OK 147 , 769 P.2d 125 , which held that a physician's report that failed to meet the requirements of Rule 20 specifying ten issues that must be addressed in a medical expert's report constituted "no evidence" supporting the employer's defense. 11 LaBarge, 1988 OK 147 at ¶ 8 , 769 P.2d at 128 .

2008Aguirre, 1996 OK 133 at ¶ 9 , 980 P.2d at 218.

2006According to Mitchell, the State’s notice of seizure and forfeiture rests on three grounds: (1) the money was a thing of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for or used or intended to be used to facilitate a violation of the Act; (2) the money was property or a thing of value acquired by the possessor during or within a reasonable time after a violation of the Act; (3) the money was found in close proximity to forfei-table controlled substances. 11 . 1995 OK 75 , 898 P.2d 1280 . 12 .

2006According to Mitchell, the State’s notice of seizure and forfeiture rests on three grounds: (1) the money was a thing of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for or used or intended to be used to facilitate a violation of the Act; (2) the money was property or a thing of value acquired by the possessor during or within a reasonable time after a violation of the Act; (3) the money was found in close proximity to forfei-table controlled substances. 11 . 1995 OK 75 , 898 P.2d 1280 . 12 .

2006“An appellant cannot prevail or seek review on a theory not presented below.” TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 1992 OK 31, ¶20 , 829 P.2d 15, 24 . ¶ 13 We sustain the panel’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Claimant’s claim, because there is competent evidence to support a finding that Scott Shroff was Claimant’s employer for the last 90 days of his injurious exposure to cumulative trauma to his hands. ¶ 14 SUSTAINED.

2006“An appellant cannot prevail or seek review on a theory not presented below.” TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 1992 OK 31, ¶20 , 829 P.2d 15, 24 . ¶ 13 We sustain the panel’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Claimant’s claim, because there is competent evidence to support a finding that Scott Shroff was Claimant’s employer for the last 90 days of his injurious exposure to cumulative trauma to his hands. ¶ 14 SUSTAINED.

2006STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 7 To prove he or she has sustained a change of condition for the worse, a claimant must show “(1) that a change of condition for the worse has occurred since [the] last prior order, and (2) that the change of condition is due to the original injury.” Wald v. Roto Rooter, 1995 OK CIV APP 122 , ¶ 5, 910 P.2d 354, 356 .

2006Claimant now seeks review of the panel’s order. ¶ 5 In establishing that an injury arose out of employment, a claimant bears “a two-pronged pattern of proof: (1) the claimant must show by lay testimony the nature of the work performed at the time of injury and (2) there must be expert medical opinion which establishes a nexus between that activity and the disability for which compensation is sought.” Hughes v. Cole Grain Co., 1998 OK 76, ¶ 6 , 964 P.2d 206, 208 .

2006Claimant now seeks review of the panel’s order. ¶ 5 In establishing that an injury arose out of employment, a claimant bears “a two-pronged pattern of proof: (1) the claimant must show by lay testimony the nature of the work performed at the time of injury and (2) there must be expert medical opinion which establishes a nexus between that activity and the disability for which compensation is sought.” Hughes v. Cole Grain Co., 1998 OK 76, ¶ 6 , 964 P.2d 206, 208 .

2003If it is not, Claimant’s motion is time-barred. 4 ¶ 6 In Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 18 , 16 P.3d 1120, 1126 , the Oklahoma Supreme Court held “an order qualifies as a ‘last order’ within the meaning of § 43(C) only if it substantially affects the range of monetary, medical, or rehabilitative benefits conferrable by the workers’ compensation law.” (Emphasis omitted.) The Court concluded that an order directing an employer to provide a vocational rehabilitation evaluation was a “last order.” Id. at ¶ 19, 16 P.3d at 1126 . ¶ 7 In Gratzer v. Happy Foods, 2001 OK CIV APP 44, ¶ 12 , 2

2003If it is not, Claimant’s motion is time-barred. 4 ¶ 6 In Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 18 , 16 P.3d 1120, 1126 , the Oklahoma Supreme Court held “an order qualifies as a ‘last order’ within the meaning of § 43(C) only if it substantially affects the range of monetary, medical, or rehabilitative benefits conferrable by the workers’ compensation law.” (Emphasis omitted.) The Court concluded that an order directing an employer to provide a vocational rehabilitation evaluation was a “last order.” Id. at ¶ 19, 16 P.3d at 1126 . ¶ 7 In Gratzer v. Happy Foods, 2001 OK CIV APP 44, ¶ 12 , 2

2003If it is not, Claimant’s motion is time-barred. 4 ¶ 6 In Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 18 , 16 P.3d 1120, 1126 , the Oklahoma Supreme Court held “an order qualifies as a ‘last order’ within the meaning of § 43(C) only if it substantially affects the range of monetary, medical, or rehabilitative benefits conferrable by the workers’ compensation law.” (Emphasis omitted.) The Court concluded that an order directing an employer to provide a vocational rehabilitation evaluation was a “last order.” Id. at ¶ 19, 16 P.3d at 1126 . ¶ 7 In Gratzer v. Happy Foods, 2001 OK CIV APP 44, ¶ 12 , 2

2003If it is not, Claimant’s motion is time-barred. 4 ¶ 6 In Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 18 , 16 P.3d 1120, 1126 , the Oklahoma Supreme Court held “an order qualifies as a ‘last order’ within the meaning of § 43(C) only if it substantially affects the range of monetary, medical, or rehabilitative benefits conferrable by the workers’ compensation law.” (Emphasis omitted.) The Court concluded that an order directing an employer to provide a vocational rehabilitation evaluation was a “last order.” Id. at ¶ 19, 16 P.3d at 1126 . ¶ 7 In Gratzer v. Happy Foods, 2001 OK CIV APP 44, ¶ 12 , 2

2001Claimant's claim is therefore denied." On page one of its order, Finding 2, the trial tribunal concludes: "However, angina pain alone is insufficient without actual physical injury to the heart to constitute an accidental injury Haynes v. Pryor High School, 1977 OK 1 , 566 P.2d 852, 854 ." (Emphasis original.) 1 9 These findings establish the trial tribunal denied Johnson's claims for medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits because it concluded he did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that physical injury to his heart occurred during the May 6, 1999, incident.

2001Claimant's claim is therefore denied." On page one of its order, Finding 2, the trial tribunal concludes: "However, angina pain alone is insufficient without actual physical injury to the heart to constitute an accidental injury Haynes v. Pryor High School, 1977 OK 1 , 566 P.2d 852, 854 ." (Emphasis original.) 1 9 These findings establish the trial tribunal denied Johnson's claims for medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits because it concluded he did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that physical injury to his heart occurred during the May 6, 1999, incident.

2001Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1999 OK 41, ¶ 19 , 982 P.2d 1071, 1078-79 , provides the most recent pronouncement by the supreme court on the subject of statute of repose versus statute of limitation.

2001Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1999 OK 41, ¶ 19 , 982 P.2d 1071, 1078-79 , provides the most recent pronouncement by the supreme court on the subject of statute of repose versus statute of limitation.

1999Claimant cites Plummer v. Special Indemnity Fund, 1998 OK CIV APP 136, ¶ 19 , 965 P.2d 998, 1001 , that held “the statutory amendment of ... § 42, as applied to injuries sustained prior to November 4, 1994, [impairs] a substantive right of the claimant in violation of Okla.

1999Claimant cites Plummer v. Special Indemnity Fund, 1998 OK CIV APP 136, ¶ 19 , 965 P.2d 998, 1001 , that held “the statutory amendment of ... § 42, as applied to injuries sustained prior to November 4, 1994, [impairs] a substantive right of the claimant in violation of Okla.

1998See, i.e., Special Indemnity Fund v. Flagg, 1993 OK 28 , 849 P.2d 395 ; Eagle Picher Mining and Smelting Co. v. Lamkin, 189 Okla. 463 , 117 P.2d 519 (1941). ¶ 9 We believe Claimant’s challenge to Employer’s standing has some merit.

1998See, i.e., Special Indemnity Fund v. Flagg, 1993 OK 28 , 849 P.2d 395 ; Eagle Picher Mining and Smelting Co. v. Lamkin, 189 Okla. 463 , 117 P.2d 519 (1941). ¶ 9 We believe Claimant’s challenge to Employer’s standing has some merit.

1990The case of Earl W Baker & Co. v. Morris, 176 Okla. 68 , 54 P.2d 353 (1935), concerned the first amendment to the law governing reopening of workers’ compensation claims for change of condition.

1990The case of Earl W Baker & Co. v. Morris, 176 Okla. 68 , 54 P.2d 353 (1935), concerned the first amendment to the law governing reopening of workers’ compensation claims for change of condition.

1989MEMORANDUM OPINION HANSEN, Judge: This original proceeding to review the denial of benefits for Claimant’s hearing loss is controlled by a recent decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Bodine v. Crane Carrier, 755 P.2d 675 (Okla.1988).

1985In White v. Loffland Brothers Equipment, 689 P.2d 311 (Okl.1984) and Armco, Inc. v. Holcomb, 694 P.2d 937 (Okl.1984), this Court acknowledged and gave legal force and effect to all provisions of 85 O.S.1981 § 8, above.

1985In White v. Loffland Brothers Equipment, 689 P.2d 311 (Okl. 1984) and Armco, Inc. v. Holcomb, 694 P.2d 937 (Okl. 1984), this Court acknowledged and gave legal force and effect to all provisions of 85 O.S. 1981 § 8, above.

1985In White v. Loffland Brothers Equipment, 689 P.2d 311 (Okl.1984) and Armco, Inc. v. Holcomb, 694 P.2d 937 (Okl.1984), this Court acknowledged and gave legal force and effect to all provisions of 85 O.S.1981 § 8, above.

1985In White v. Loffland Brothers Equipment, 689 P.2d 311 (Okl. 1984) and Armco, Inc. v. Holcomb, 694 P.2d 937 (Okl. 1984), this Court acknowledged and gave legal force and effect to all provisions of 85 O.S. 1981 § 8, above.

1982The claimant may claim against the contractor’s statutory payment bond pursuant to 61 O.S.1971, § 1 et seq., and additionally, the claimant has an equitable claim against money due and owing as recognized in Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. United States Casualty Co., 199 Okl. 530 , 188 P.2d 204 (1947) and in Stroud Oil Reclaiming Go. v. Community Bank of Bristow, 475 P.2d 819 (1970).

1982The claimant may claim against the contractor’s statutory payment bond pursuant to 61 O.S.1971, § 1 et seq., and additionally, the claimant has an equitable claim against money due and owing as recognized in Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. United States Casualty Co., 199 Okl. 530 , 188 P.2d 204 (1947) and in Stroud Oil Reclaiming Go. v. Community Bank of Bristow, 475 P.2d 819 (1970).

1982The claimant may claim against the contractor’s statutory payment bond pursuant to 61 O.S.1971, § 1 et seq., and additionally, the claimant has an equitable claim against money due and owing as recognized in Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. United States Casualty Co., 199 Okl. 530 , 188 P.2d 204 (1947) and in Stroud Oil Reclaiming Go. v. Community Bank of Bristow, 475 P.2d 819 (1970).