claimant privilege in Louisiana

1967That there is a different rule in such cases is well established.' *88 "We cited Marquez v. Le Blanc, La.App., 143 So. 108, 112 , in which we said: `* * * The main reason for a lack of satisfactory consistency in the jurisprudence on this subject comes from the fact that in compensation cases the courts have adopted a liberal construction in favor of the claimant where the defense was that the relation of employer and employee did not exist between the parties due to the fact that the claimant was working for an independent contractor.

1959That there is a different rule in such cases is well established.” We cited Marquez v. Le Blanc, La.App., 143 So. 108, 112 , in which we said: “ * * * The main reason for a lack of satisfactory consistency in the jurisprudence on this subject comes from the fact that in compensation cases the courts have adopted a liberal construction in favor of the claimant where the defense was that the relation of employer and employee did not exist between the parties due to the fact that the claimant was working for an independent contractor.

1962Under such circum- stcmces a complete settlement of the claim against the abutting owner by the claimant is a bar to am action against the municipality even though the settlement recites that the amount received thereunder is not full compensation and a right is reserved to bring an action against the municipality. * * * > “(4) Terry v. Memphis Stone & Gravel Co., 6 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 652, 653 . “ ‘ * * * Inasmuch as the liability alleged against the appellee company rested solely upon the averment that the truck driver was the servant or agent of the appellee company for whose negligence it

1959Under such circumstances a complete settlement of the claim against the abutting owner by the claimant is a bar to an action against the municipality even though the settlement recites that the amount *62 received thereunder is not full compensation and a right is reserved to bring an action against the municipality. * * *" (4) Terry v. Memphis Stone & Gravel Co., 6 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 652, 653 . "* * * Inasmuch as the liability alleged against the appellee company rested solely upon the averment that the truck driver was the servant or agent of the appellee company for whose negligence it wo

1962The case is clearly distinguishable from those cases in which a covenant not to sue one joint tort-feas- or does not protect another joint tort-feasor from an action for damages brought against it by an injured party.’ “(5) Hillyer v. City of East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552 , 99 N.E.2d 772, 776 . “ Tt has long been the law of this state that in a situation where a city is liable to a person for failure to keep its highways or sidewalks open, in repair and free from nuisance, under Section 3714, General Code, and an abutting owner is also liable for active negligence in creating the nuisance f

1962The case is clearly distinguishable from those cases in which a covenant not to sue one joint tort-feas- or does not protect another joint tort-feasor from an action for damages brought against it by an injured party.’ “(5) Hillyer v. City of East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552 , 99 N.E.2d 772, 776 . “ Tt has long been the law of this state that in a situation where a city is liable to a person for failure to keep its highways or sidewalks open, in repair and free from nuisance, under Section 3714, General Code, and an abutting owner is also liable for active negligence in creating the nuisance f

2018Pierce Foundations, Inc., 190 So.3d at 301 ( citing Wilkin, 561 So.2d at 70 ).

1987Fontenot v. Lafleur, 341 So.2d 62 (La.

1986Lester v. Southern Casualty Insurance Company, 466 So.2d 25 (La.1985); Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 158 So.2d 609 (La.1963); Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651 , 86 So.2d 522 (1956); Jones v. Hunsicker, 188 La. 468 , 177 So. 576 (1937).

1986Lester v. Southern Casualty Insurance Company, 466 So.2d 25 (La.1985); Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 158 So.2d 609 (La.1963); Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651 , 86 So.2d 522 (1956); Jones v. Hunsicker, 188 La. 468 , 177 So. 576 (1937).

1986Lester v. Southern Casualty Insurance Company, 466 So.2d 25 (La.1985); Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 158 So.2d 609 (La.1963); Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651 , 86 So.2d 522 (1956); Jones v. Hunsicker, 188 La. 468 , 177 So. 576 (1937).

1986Lester v. Southern Casualty Insurance Company, 466 So.2d 25 (La.1985); Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 158 So.2d 609 (La.1963); Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651 , 86 So.2d 522 (1956); Jones v. Hunsicker, 188 La. 468 , 177 So. 576 (1937).

1986Lester v. Southern Casualty Insurance Company, 466 So.2d 25 (La.1985); Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 158 So.2d 609 (La.1963); Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651 , 86 So.2d 522 (1956); Jones v. Hunsicker, 188 La. 468 , 177 So. 576 (1937).

1986Lester v. Southern Casualty Insurance Company, 466 So.2d 25 (La.1985); Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 158 So.2d 609 (La.1963); Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651 , 86 So.2d 522 (1956); Jones v. Hunsicker, 188 La. 468 , 177 So. 576 (1937).

1979Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Note, “Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Ter-tii”, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 423 (1974).

1979Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Note, “Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Ter-tii”, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 423 (1974).

1936They cite the recent case of Victor v. Lewis, 182 La. 243 , 161 So. 597, 598 , in support of their argument.

1936They cite the recent case of Victor v. Lewis, 182 La. 243 , 161 So. 597, 598 , in support of their argument.

1936Co.), supra, in discussing the necessity for strictness in interpreting this same statute and in overruling an earlier interpretation given by the court in Re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Jones County, Intervener), 181 La. 335 , 159 So. 576 , said: “In order to grant the privilege claimed by Jones County, the majority opinion placed a liberal rather than a strict construction upon the provisions of the act in favor of the claimant of the privilege, contrary to the established jurisprudence.” It would require not only a broad interpretation, but, rather, a rewriting of the statute

1936Co.), supra, in discussing the necessity for strictness in interpreting this same statute and in overruling an earlier interpretation given by the court in Re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Jones County, Intervener), 181 La. 335 , 159 So. 576 , said: “In order to grant the privilege claimed by Jones County, the majority opinion placed a liberal rather than a strict construction upon the provisions of the act in favor of the claimant of the privilege, contrary to the established jurisprudence.” It would require not only a broad interpretation, but, rather, a rewriting of the statute