claimant claim in Texas

2009See Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 226 . 6: While Howard mentions Darnell as an employee of Austin in his argument of this point, Howard does not challenge, either generally or specifically, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Darnell.

2009See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 . 6 While Howard mentions Darnell as an employee of Austin in his argument of this point, Howard does not challenge, either generally or specifically, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Darnell.

2007AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120-22 , 122 S.Ct. 2061 , 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (U.S.2002) (“A court’s task is to determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory time period.”). 4 B.

2007AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120-22 , 122 S.Ct. 2061 , 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (U.S.2002) (“A court’s task is to determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory time period.”). 4 B.

2022See City of McKinney, 412 S.W.3d at 112 .

2011Justice Medina concludes that when a trial court finds an expert report inadequate and denies a motion to cure, the claimant " must move the court to reconsider and promptly fix any problems." 332 S.W.3d at 411 (emphasis added).

2010See id. at 658-59 . 5 On appeal, Carroll acknowledges the existence of “cases out there that one can cite for the proposition that ‘all cases against the state must be [tort claims act] cases.’”2 Nonetheless, she urges that any such cases are “logically flawed” and inconsistent with “the main body of Supreme Court caselaw.” In support of this assertion, Carroll cites precedents that analyze whether claimants have alleged facts within one of the tort claims act’s waivers of immunity.3 However, whether a claimant has stated a claim within one of the act’s waivers of immunity is distinct from the

2009See In re Tex. Dep't of Transp. , 218 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2007) (stating that provisions of Tort Claims Act regarding traffic and road-control devices do not create cause of action) (construing Tex. Civ.

1993Had the judgment been for the claimant because of the insurer’s discovery abuse, not only would an oral hearing have been required, Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), but the trial court’s detailing of specific factual findings justifying the judgment would have been well advised, see Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.1992), and de novo review by this Court of every detail of the trial court’s order would have been assured.

1993Had the judgment been for the claimant because of the insurer's discovery abuse, not only would an oral hearing have been required, Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), but the trial court's detailing of specific factual findings justifying the judgment would have been well advised, see Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.1992), and de novo review by this Court of every detail of the trial court's order would have been assured.

1993Had the judgment been for the claimant because of the insurer’s discovery abuse, not only would an oral hearing have been required, Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), but the trial court’s detailing of specific factual findings justifying the judgment would have been well advised, see Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.1992), and de novo review by this Court of every detail of the trial court’s order would have been assured.

1993Had the judgment been for the claimant because of the insurer's discovery abuse, not only would an oral hearing have been required, Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), but the trial court's detailing of specific factual findings justifying the judgment would have been well advised, see Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.1992), and de novo review by this Court of every detail of the trial court's order would have been assured.

1988The documents themselves may constitute the only sufficient evidence, and certainly the best evidence, conclusively substantiating — or overcoming — the claim of privilege, and, under the facts of this case, the trial court “had no choice but to review the allegedly privileged documents.” Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex.1986) (per curiam).

1983Huff v. Fidelity Union Life Insurance Co., 158 Tex. 433 , 312 S.W.2d 493, 500 (1958).

1983Huff v. Fidelity Union Life Insurance Co., 158 Tex. 433 , 312 S.W.2d 493, 500 (1958).