Conn. Gen. Stat. » Title 43 — WEIGHTS AND MEASURES · Chapter 752 — Weight and Measurement of Specific Articles
Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 43-40 (2025)

Sealing of meters

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Meters for measuring liquefied petroleum gas sold in the vapor state shall be sealed by the manufacturer thereof as hereinafter provided or by a sealer of weights and measures. The Commissioner of Weights and Measures shall prescribe regulations including specifications and tolerances governing the testing and sealing of such meters by the manufacturers and method of determining quantity of liquefied petroleum gas, and may authorize any manufacturer to seal such meters upon written agreement to conform to such regulations. Said commissioner may at any time for cause revoke the authority so given by him to any manufacturer.

(1951, S. 2886d.)

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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2000–2022 · leading case: State v. Bonner, 964 A.2d 73 (Conn. 2009).
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State v. Bonner, 964 A.2d 73 (Conn. 2009). · cites it 14× “Noting that there was no factual dispute, we characterized these issues as “questions of law involving the interpretation of § 54-82m and Practice Book §§ 43-40 and 43-41 . . . .” Id. In distinguishing the circumstances present in McCahill from the well established precedent of…”
State v. Turner, 751 A.2d 372 (Conn. 2000). · cites it 11× “The trial court denied Corey Turner’s motion for a speedy trial, reasoning that, under Practice Book § 43-40 (4), then Practice Book § 956C, 21 *742 the time that Charles Turner’s attorney was unavailable was a reasonable period of delay that could be excluded from the…”
State v. McCahill, 828 A.2d 1235 (Conn. 2003). · cites it 14× “5 The defendant contends that the trial court improperly concluded that the misfilings of his motion for a speedy trial constituted “good cause” for the state’s failure to commence his trial within the time frame required by § 54-82m and pursuant to Practice Book § 43-40. 6 We…”
State v. Joseph, 165 A.3d 241 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 6× “within eight months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of arrest, whichever is later; and (2) if a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit set forth in subdivision (1) and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a motion…”
State v. Cote, 922 A.2d 322 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007). · cites it 9× “The court delayed ruling on the motion for a speedy trial and on July 14,2004, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss after determining that the motion for a speedy trial was premature given the amount of time excludable 2 in accordance with Practice Book § 43-40. 3 After…”
State v. Ortiz, 747 A.2d 487 (Conn. 2000). · cites it 4× “The state argues, however, that the trial court expressly relied upon Practice Book § 956C (d), now § 43-40 (4), 26 for its proper finding of good cause for delay.”
State v. Jeffreys, 828 A.2d 659 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 4× “Practice Book § 43-40 (7) expressly provides for the exclusion of time resulting from a continuance granted by the judicial authority at the personal request of the defendant.”
State v. Miller, 998 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 2× “g date of the information or indictment or from the date of arrest, whichever is later; and *786 (2) if a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit set forth in subdivision (1) and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a motion for a speedy trial made by…”
State v. Rosario, 984 A.2d 98 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). · cites it 5× “This time weighs against the defendant as excludable time, pursuant to Practice Book § 43-40 (2). See State v. Brown, supra, 40 Conn.”
State v. Gaston, 860 A.2d 1253 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 2× ““Practice Book § 43-40 (7) expressly provides for the exclusion of time resulting from a continuance granted *225 by the judicial authority at the personal request of the defendant.”
State v. Richard P., 181 A.3d 107 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). “] ); Practice Book § 43-40(2) (for purposes of calculating speedy trial deadline, "any essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever such person's whereabouts are known but his or her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he or she resists…”
State v. Winer, 945 A.2d 430 (Conn. 2008). “Section 43-39 sets forth the speedy trial rules, and § 43-40 sets forth a detailed, but nonexhaustive, list of circumstances constituting “delay[s] caused by the action of the defendant, or the defendant’s inability to stand for trial, to be excluded in computing the time limits…”
Show all 21 citing cases →
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 43-40(2): 1 case
State v. Richard P., 181 A.3d 107 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). “] ); Practice Book § 43-40(2) (for purposes of calculating speedy trial deadline, "any essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever such person's whereabouts are known but his or her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he or she resists…”
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