(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution of this state and, during the continuance of the term of imprisonment, there is pending in this state any untried indictment or information against such prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred twenty days after he has caused to be delivered, to the state's attorney or assistant state's attorney of the judicial district or geographical area, in which the indictment or information is pending, and to the appropriate court, written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition to be made of the indictment or information. For good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the warden, Community Correctional Center Administrator or other official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the Board of Pardons and Paroles relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in subsection (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, Community Correctional Center Administrator or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
(c) The warden, Community Correctional Center Administrator or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him in writing of the source and contents of any untried indictment or information against him concerning which the warden, administrator or other official has knowledge and of his right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
(d) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition referred to in subsection (a) hereof shall void the request.
(1957, P.A. 551, S. 1; 1961, P.A. 465; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 79; P.A. 73-116, S. 14; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 156, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 558, 681; P.A. 80-313, S. 37; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 74, 121; P.A. 04-234, S. 2.)
History: 1961 act specified, in Subsec. (a), request and notice be to state's attorney or prosecuting attorney and added circuit court; 1963 act stipulated state's attorney be of the county, deleted reference to prosecuting attorney of county and substituted jail administrator for sheriff; P.A. 73-116 added reference to judicial districts and replaced jail administrator with community correctional center administrator; P.A. 73-667 changed effective date of P.A. 73-116 from October 1, 1973, to April 25, 1973; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, reflecting reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced prosecuting attorneys of common pleas court with assistant state's attorneys and deleted reference to various courts' jurisdiction, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 80-313 deleted reference to counties and made slight change in wording; Sec. 54-139 transferred to Sec. 54-82c in 1981; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004.
Annotations to former section 54-139:
Phrase “has caused to be delivered” is equivalent of “has delivered” and 120-day period runs from completion of delivery of both request and supplemental information. 149 C. 250. Cited. 153 C. 28. Statute permits court to grant continuance for good cause shown even where facts which lead court to grant continuance are beyond defendant's control. 171 C. 487. Cited. 185 C. 118; 194 C. 297; 198 C. 573.
Cited. 40 CA 757.
Does not apply to prisoner in federal institution in Connecticut; does not purport to place a limit on time within which information should be made. 24 CS 308. Cited. 36 CS 327, 330.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 193 C. 270; 194 C. 297; 197 C. 166; 198 C. 573; 202 C. 93; 221 C. 921; 224 C. 163; 242 C. 409.
Cited. 12 CA 1; 14 CA 244; Id., 493; 20 CA 205; 26 CA 698; 28 CA 195; 29 CA 694; 32 CA 38; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; 40 CA 757. In absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that officials acted properly under statute and therefore, because written notice was not delivered to state's attorney, the statutory 120-day period did not commence. 107 CA 517. For purposes of speedy trial calculations, delays attributable to initiations of the defense are excludable. 110 CA 245. Time limits under section excluded entire period of time during which defendant's competency claim was considered and resolved. 132 CA 24.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
49
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1981–2024 · leading case:
State v. Toste, 504 A.2d 1036 (Conn. 1986).
State v. Toste, 504 A.2d 1036 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 24× “Specifically, he argues that the delay in retrying him violated General Statutes §§ 54-82c and 54-82d, and also violated his right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.”
Craig v. Bronson, 520 A.2d 155 (Conn. 1987).
· cites it 28× “” The trial court denied the petition on two grounds: (1) that § 54-82d does not require the sanction of dismissal to be imposed where an assignment of the case for trial is made within the 120 day period specified by § 54-82c even though the trial does not commence or the case…”
State v. Milton, 603 A.2d 750 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
· cites it 56× “The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss filed on the basis of the failure to notify him of his statutory speedy trial rights pursuant to General Statutes §§ 54-82c and 54-82d. 1 We affirm the judgment of conviction.”
State v. Rosado, 945 A.2d 1028 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 32× “found that the filing of the notice of the defendant’s request for a speedy trial was *522 defective in that the defendant failed to cause to be delivered to the state’s attorney or assistant state’s attorney of the Danbury judicial district a written notice of the place of his…”
State v. Foshay, 530 A.2d 611 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
· cites it 23× “Thereafter, on September 12, 1984, voir dire examination of jurors began, and on September 14,1984, the jury impaneled to decide the case against the defendant was sworn in, and testimony from the state’s first witness was presented.”
State v. McCarthy, 496 A.2d 190 (Conn. 1985).
· cites it 14× “On appeal he claims that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82c, (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of insurance payments to establish the value of the stolen property, (3) he was denied effective assistance…”
State v. Harris, 540 A.2d 395 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
· cites it 28× “The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the speedy trial provisions of General Statutes § 54-82c apply to this defendant.”
State v. Mish, 954 A.2d 854 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 13× “On February 2, 2005, the defendant filed a motion for a speedy trial pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82c. On February 8, 2005, the court, Brunetti, J.”
McIver v. Warden, 612 A.2d 103 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
· cites it 15× “The habeas court disposed of this claim, however, by concluding that there was a necessary and reasonable continuance of the petitioner’s initial trial, and that such continuance tolled the petitioner’s right to a trial within 120 days from his request for a speedy trial…”
Pelletier v. Warden, 627 A.2d 1363 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
· cites it 9× “On March 5,1981, the petitioner filed a pro se notice and request for final disposition pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82c. 4 At an April 7,1981 hearing, the trial *42 court brought up the subject of the petitioner’s statutory speedy trial request.”
State v. Winer, 945 A.2d 430 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 7× “9 The statute encouraged the docketing of cases to prevent dormancy, promoted the efficient flow of cases through the court system, and created a procedure to erase by operation of law those cases that were lost or forgotten.”
Parks v. Bourbeau, 477 A.2d 636 (Conn. 1984).
· cites it 9× “ents is “palpably illegal and insufficient”; (2) he is not a fugitive from justice because his Connecticut arrest, based on the Florida “Affidavit of Probable Cause” was illegal and voided the arrest; (3) he was substantially deprived of his fourteenth amendment due process…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.