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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 46a — Human RightsChapter 814c — Human Rights and Opportunities

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51 (2025)

(Formerly Sec. 31-122). Definitions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1982–2026 207citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 207 opinions since 1982, 59 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (15) (28 cases).

As used in section 4a-60a and this chapter:

(1) “Blind” refers to an individual whose central visual acuity does not exceed 20/200 in the better eye with correcting lenses, or whose visual acuity is greater than 20/200 but is accompanied by a limitation in the fields of vision such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle no greater than twenty degrees;

(2) “Commission” means the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities created by section 46a-52;

(3) “Commission legal counsel” means a member of the legal staff employed by the commission pursuant to section 46a-54;

(4) “Commissioner” means a member of the commission;

(5) “Court” means the Superior Court or any judge of said court;

(6) “Discrimination” includes segregation and separation;

(7) “Discriminatory employment practice” means any discriminatory practice specified in subsection (b), (d), (e) or (f) of section 31-51i or section 46a-60 or 46a-81c;

(8) “Discriminatory practice” means a violation of section 4a-60, 4a-60a, 4a-60g, 31-40y, subsection (b), (d), (e) or (f) of section 31-51i, subparagraph (C) of subdivision (15) of section 46a-54, subdivisions (16) and (17) of section 46a-54, section 46a-58, 46a-59, 46a-60, 46a-64, 46a-64c, 46a-66 or 46a-68, sections 46a-68c to 46a-68f, inclusive, sections 46a-70 to 46a-78, inclusive, subsection (a) of section 46a-80, sections 46a-81b to 46a-81o, inclusive, sections 46a-80b to 46a-80e, inclusive, sections 46a-80k to 46a-80m, inclusive, or section 19a-498c;

(9) “Employee” means any person employed by an employer but shall not include any individual employed by such individual's parents, spouse or child. “Employee” includes any elected or appointed official of a municipality, board, commission, counsel or other governmental body;

(10) “Employer” includes the state and all political subdivisions thereof and means any person or employer with one or more persons in such person's or employer's employ;

(11) “Employment agency” means any person undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees or opportunities to work;

(12) “Labor organization” means any organization which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or protection in connection with employment;

(13) “Intellectual disability” means intellectual disability as defined in section 1-1g;

(14) “Person” means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, limited liability companies, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers and the state and all political subdivisions and agencies thereof;

(15) “Physically disabled” refers to any individual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, deafness or being hard of hearing or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device;

(16) “Respondent” means any person alleged in a complaint filed pursuant to section 46a-82 to have committed a discriminatory practice;

(17) “Discrimination on the basis of sex” includes but is not limited to discrimination related to pregnancy, child-bearing capacity, sterilization, fertility or related medical conditions;

(18) “Discrimination on the basis of religious creed” includes but is not limited to discrimination related to all aspects of religious observances and practice as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that the employer is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business;

(19) “Learning disability” refers to an individual who exhibits a severe discrepancy between educational performance and measured intellectual ability and who exhibits a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which may manifest itself in a diminished ability to listen, speak, read, write, spell or to do mathematical calculations;

(20) “Mental disability” refers to an individual who has a record of, or is regarded as having one or more mental disorders, as defined in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”;

(21) “Gender identity or expression” means a person's gender-related identity, appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance or behavior is different from that traditionally associated with the person's physiology or assigned sex at birth, which gender-related identity can be shown by providing evidence including, but not limited to, medical history, care or treatment of the gender-related identity, consistent and uniform assertion of the gender-related identity or any other evidence that the gender-related identity is sincerely held, part of a person's core identity or not being asserted for an improper purpose;

(22) “Veteran” means veteran as defined in subsection (a) of section 27-103;

(23) “Race” is inclusive of ethnic traits historically associated with race, including, but not limited to, hair texture and protective hairstyles;

(24) “Protective hairstyles” includes, but is not limited to, wigs, headwraps and hairstyles such as individual braids, cornrows, locs, twists, Bantu knots, afros and afro puffs;

(25) “Domestic violence” has the same meaning as provided in subsection (b) of section 46b-1; and

(26) “Sexual orientation” means a person's identity in relation to the gender or genders to which they are romantically, emotionally or sexually attracted, inclusive of any identity that a person (A) may have previously expressed, or (B) is perceived by another person to hold.

(1949 Rev., S. 7401; 1959, P.A. 145, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 253; 636, S. 5, 6; P.A. 75-350, S. 1; P.A. 76-96, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-452, S. 61, 72; P.A. 80-422, S. 1; 80-449, S. 3, 6; P.A. 81-81, S. 3; 81-382, S. 1; P.A. 82-51, S. 2; P.A. 83-587, S. 56, 96; P.A. 84-204; P.A. 88-303, S. 4; P.A. 90-246, S. 1; 90-330, S. 2, 11; P.A. 91-58, S. 20; P.A. 95-79, S. 167, 189; P.A. 01-28, S. 1; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, S. 189; P.A. 07-142, S. 1; P.A. 11-55, S. 1; 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 15-56, S. 2; 15-249, S. 1; P.A. 17-127, S. 1; 17-202, S. 96; P.A. 19-16, S. 2; 19-93, S. 1; P.A. 21-2, S. 1; 21-32, S. 10; P.A. 22-82, S. 7; P.A. 23-145, S. 2; P.A. 24-19, S. 39; 24-24, S. 16.)

History: 1959 act added Subdiv. (k) defining age; 1967 acts redefined “employer” as one with three or more rather than five or more employees and redefined “commission” and “commissioner” to change commission name from commission on civil rights to commission on human rights and opportunities; P.A. 75-350 deleted definition of “age”, i.e. as “any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive”; P.A. 76-96 redefined “court” as court of common pleas rather than superior court; P.A. 77-452 redefined “court” as superior court; P.A. 80-422 deleted definition of “unfair employment practice”, defined “blind”, “commission counsel”, “discriminatory employment practice”, “discriminatory practice”, “mental retardation” and “respondent”, replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators with numeric indicators and arranged definitions in alphabetical order; P.A. 80-449 made no substantive change; Sec. 31-122 transferred to Sec. 46a-51 in 1981; P.A. 81-81 amended Subdiv. (8) by adding reference to “section 47a-2a” which was subsequently transferred and redesignated Sec. 46a-64a; P.A. 81-382 added Subdiv. (17) defining “discrimination on the basis of sex”; P.A. 82-51 redefined “mental retardation” to adopt the definition of Sec. 1-1g of the general statutes; P.A. 83-587 substituted “46a-54” for “46-54” in Subdiv. (3); P.A. 84-204 added Subdiv. (18) defining “discrimination on the basis of religious creed”; P.A. 88-303 redefined “discriminatory practice” to include a violation of Sec. 4-114a; P.A. 90-246 amended Subdiv. (8) by deleting reference to repealed Sec. 46a-64a and adding reference to Sec. 46a-64c; P.A. 90-330 added definition of “learning disability”; P.A. 91-58 added reference in introductory clause to Sec. 4a-60a and proposed to add reference to Secs. 46a-81a to 46a-81o, inclusive, but said Secs. already included in existing reference to “this chapter”, amended definition of “discriminatory employment practice” to add reference to Sec. 46a-81c, and amended definition of “discriminatory practice” to include a violation of Sec. 4a-60a and Secs. 46a-81b to 46a-81o, inclusive; P.A. 95-79 redefined “person” to include limited liability companies, effective May 31, 1995; P.A. 01-28 added Subdiv. (20) defining “mental disability” and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality in Subdivs. (9), (10) and (18); June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6 replaced “commission counsel” with “commission legal counsel” as the defined term and replaced “the counsel employed by the commission pursuant to section 46a-54” with “a member of the legal staff employed by the commission pursuant to section 46a-54” as the definition of said term, effective August 20, 2003; P.A. 07-142 amended Subdiv. (8) by adding reference to Sec. 4a-60g and Secs. 46a-68c to 46a-68f, inclusive, and making technical changes, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 11-55 added Subdiv. (21) defining “gender identity or expression”; pursuant to P.A. 11-129, “mental retardation” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “intellectual disability” in Subdiv. (13); P.A. 15-56 amended Subdiv. (8) by adding reference to Sec. 31-40y in definition of “discriminatory practice”; P.A. 15-249 amended Subdiv. (9) by deleting reference to individuals employed in domestic service of any person in definition of “employee”, effective January 1, 2016; P.A. 17-127 added Subdiv. (22) defining “veteran”; P.A. 17-202 amended Subdiv. (15) by replacing “hearing impairment” with “being hard of hearing” in definition of “physically disabled”; P.A. 19-16 amended Subdiv. (8) by redefining “discriminatory practice”; P.A. 19-93 amended Subdiv. (8) by redefining “discriminatory practice”; P.A. 21-2 added Subdiv. (23) defining “race” and Subdiv. (24) defining “protective hairstyles”, effective March 4, 2021; P.A. 21-32 amended Subdiv. (7) to add reference to Secs. 31-51i(b) and (d) to (f) in definition of “discriminatory employment” and amended Subdiv. (8) to add reference to Secs. 31-51i(b) and (d) to (f), 46a-80b to 46a-80e and 46a-80k to 46a-80m in definition of “discriminatory practice”, effective January 1, 2023; P.A. 22-82 redefined “employee” and “employer” in Subdivs. (9) and (10), added Subdiv. (25) defining “domestic violence” and made technical changes; P.A. 23-145 added Subdiv. (26) defining “sexual orientation” and made technical changes, effective July 1, 2023; P.A. 24-19 amended Subdiv. (8) to add reference to Sec. 19a-498c; P.A. 24-24 made a technical change in Subdiv. (20).

Annotations to former section 31-122:

Cited. 153 C. 173; 163 C. 327. A corporation is not privileged under chapter to do what an individual is precluded from doing; segregating employment opportunity advertisements into sex classifications constitutes discrimination. 168 C. 26.

Court cannot substitute its own discretion for that reposed by statute in hearing tribunal. 18 CS 125. Cited. 28 CS 472.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 188 C. 44; 195 C. 226; 220 C. 307; 226 C. 670; 231 C. 328; 236 C. 96; 237 C. 209. Plaintiff who testified at trial that he had sustained a knee injury during course of his employment that required surgery and resulted in his receiving worker's compensation benefits and a disability rating for his knee satisfied statutory definition of being “physically disabled” under Subdiv. (15). 278 C. 692. Appellate Court properly applied the federal “remuneration test” rather than Connecticut's common-law “right to control” test to determine whether individual was an employee under section. 322 C. 154.

Cited. 3 CA 464; 35 CA 474. Subdiv. (10) does not evince an intent by General Assembly to grant small businesses a license to discriminate, but instead evidences intention to exempt small businesses from the other burdens of act, not from its antidiscrimination policy. 64 CA 573. Subdiv. (15): Definition does not extend to those who may be regarded or perceived as disabled by their employers. 137 CA 446. Re definition of “employee”, common law “agency” or “right of control” test alone is insufficient in determining whether an individual is an employee; only if federal “remuneration” test is satisfied would a court apply common law “agency” or “right of control” test; courts may look to federal precedent for guidance in enforcing antidiscrimination statutes. 156 CA 239; judgment affirmed, see 322 C. 154. Court reasonably could have concluded that plaintiff was not suffering from a mental disorder defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but rather from a more general lack of requisite temperament. Id., 597. The United States Supreme Court's definition of “supervisor” in the case of Vance v. Ball, 570 U.S. 431-432, that is used by courts in Title VII cases, is the appropriate definition for distinguishing between the coworker and supervisor theories of liability for hostile work environment claims brought under CFEPA. 219 CA 1.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENPerodeau v. City of Hartford, 792 A.2d 752 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 46a-51 23×cited by 182 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“9 The plaintiff con *735 tends that, because the term “employer” in § 46a-60 is defined in General Statutes § 46a-51 (10) 10 to encompass any “person,” which is defined in General Statutes § 46a-51 (14) 11 to include an individual, an individual employee may be liable for…”
The case’s holding
Individual employees are not liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from conduct occurring within a continuing employment relationship.
Later courts cite it for
“may not be found liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of conduct occurring within a continuing employment context, as distinguished from conduct occurring in the termination of employment.” · 17 citing courts
2
GREENThibodeau v. Design Grp. One Architects, LLC, 802 A.2d 731 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 46a-51 28×cited by 91 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“Under the Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. (act), employers with three or more employees are prohibited from discriminating against their employees on the basis of sex, including discrimination related to pregnancy.”
The case’s holding
The legislative intent behind small-employer exemptions from anti-discrimination laws is to protect small businesses from liability and preserve intimate personal relations within the workplace.
Later courts cite it for
“employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability.” · 8 citing courts
cites § 46a-51 8×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“[26] General Statutes § 46a-51 (8) provides: "`Discriminatory practice' means a violation of section 4a-60, 4a-60a, 46a-58, 46a-59, 46a-60, 46a-64, 46a-64c, 46a-66, 46a-68, sections 46a-70 to 46a-78, inclusive, subsection (a) of section 46a-80, or sections 46a-81b to 46a-81o,…”
The case’s holding
A remand issued pursuant to General Statutes section 4-183(j) constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal regardless of the nature of the remand or subsequent proceedings.
Later courts cite it for
“where the court issues a remand pursuant to 4-183 (j), the remand is a final judgment for purposes of appeal, irrespective of both the nature of the remand and the administrative proceedings that are expected to follow it” · 2 citing courts
4
REDThibodeau v. Design Grp. One Architects, LLC, 781 A.2d 363 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 46a-51 16×cited by 10 cases
Reversed by Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC (2002): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 46a-51
“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined as a matter of law that the statutory scheme of the Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., bars a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on pregnancy if an employer…”
5
GREENPhadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., 153 A.3d 687 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 46a-51 6×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“The plaintiff commenced the present action alleging various violations of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., in addition to her claims of wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair…”
6
GREENCurry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 944 A.2d 925 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 46a-51 5×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“Although the defendant requested oral argument on its motion for summary judgment, the trial court neither heard argument nor responded to the plaintiffs procedural objection.”
The case’s holding
State antidiscrimination statutes impose a duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodation to disabled individuals consistent with federal law.
Later courts cite it for
“connecticut antidiscrimination statutes should be interpreted in accordance with federal antidiscrimination laws.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 46a-51 5×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“We are called upon to decide what test should be applied to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an "employee" for purposes of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. More specifically, we must decide whether a volunteer must…”
The case’s holding
Under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, an unpaid volunteer must first show remuneration in wages or benefits before qualifying as an employee, before any right-to-control analysis.
Later courts cite it for
“called upon to decide what test should be applied to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an 'employee' for purposes of the connecticut fair employment practices act (cfepa).” · 1 citing court
8
GREENJackson v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 900 A.2d 498 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 46a-51 5×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“The plaintiff, Nathan Jackson, brought this action against the named defendant, the water pollution control authority of the city of Bridgeport, 1 to recover damages for discrimination on the basis of race and physical disability in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment…”
The case’s holding
State courts look to federal antidiscrimination jurisprudence to interpret state employment laws regarding disability discrimination (applying federal antidiscrimination jurisprudence in disability case).
Later courts cite it for
“we look to federal law for guidance in interpreting state employment discrimination law, and analyze claims under the cfepa in the same manner as federal courts evaluate federal discrimination claims.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENTomick v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 153 A.3d 615 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 46a-51 4×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“**472 In this certified appeal, we consider whether General Statutes § 46a-104 1 provides for an award of statutory punitive damages as a remedy for discriminatory practices under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The…”
The case’s holding
General Statutes § 46a-104 does not authorize an award of punitive damages in employment discrimination cases because the statute lacks express statutory language permitting such relief.
10
GREENRivers v. City of New Britain, 950 A.2d 1247 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 46a-51 4×cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“, General Statutes § 46a-51 (10) (including within definition of term "`[e]mployer,'" for purposes of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, "the state and all political subdivisions thereof"); General Statutes § 47a-1(f) ("`[p]erson' means an individual, corporation,…”
The case’s holding
Courts may interpret a statute's plain language to avoid an unworkable result that fails to achieve the obvious public safety purpose of the law.
Later courts cite it for
“when the legislature intends to waive immunity from suit or liability, it expresses that intent by using explicit statutory language.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENDonald Beason v. United Tech. Corp., 337 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2003).
cites § 46a-51 4×subsections: (15) 2× (20)cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“, and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-51 et seq. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint in district court asserting that Hamilton Standard had incorrectly perceived him as disabled and discriminated against him as a disabled person…”
The case’s holding
The Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act defines physical disability more broadly than the Americans with Disabilities Act because it does not require a substantial limitation of a major life activity.
Later courts cite it for
“cfepa's definition of physical disability is broader than the ada's.” · 6 citing courts
12
GREENVollemans v. Town of Wallingford, 928 A.2d 586 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 46a-51 4×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“The plaintiff filed a complaint with the commission on June 3, 2003, which alleged that his employment was terminated “because of his age in violation of the prohibitions in the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act [(CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.].” After…”
The case’s holding
Connecticut rejects the Ricks-Chardon rule regarding filing requirements for discriminatory discharge claims because following federal guidance would contradict the intent of the state legislature.
Later courts cite it for
“although the trial court did not rule on those alternative grounds for summary judgment, it is within our discretion to do so on appeal” · 1 citing court
13
REDDesrosiers v. Diageo North Am., Inc., 49 A.3d 233 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
cites § 46a-51 16×cited by 4 cases
Reversed in part by Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc. (2014): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case ("The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed in part and the case is remanded to that court wit…
Where it cites § 46a-51
“The first three counts alleged disparate treatment discrimination under General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. 4 The third count of the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her physical disability and/or her perceived disability.”
cites § 46a-51 4×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“By enacting the statutes under title 46a, Connecticut’s human rights laws, the legislature set out not only to prevent impermissible discrimination, but also to compensate, as nearly as possible, the victims of discrimination.”
The case’s holding
An issue is deemed waived if it is merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a bare assertion of the claim (basis: inadequate briefing).
Later courts cite it for
“well-settled principle of statutory construction that specific terms covering a given subject matter will prevail over general language of . . . another statute which might otherwise prove controlling.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENDep't of Admin. Servs. v. Employees' Review Bd., 628 A.2d 957 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 46a-51 6×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“to 1989) § 46a-51. “Discriminatory employment practice” is defined in § 46a-51 (7), 12 and pertains to certain types of employment discrimination.”
The case’s holding
The statutory term discrimination is limited to political or religious discrimination and does not encompass compensation differences arising from collective bargaining.
Later courts cite it for
“when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny, as in this case, the agency is not entitled to special deference” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENDavis-Garett v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 921 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2019).
cites § 46a-51 1×cited by 230 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“("NYSHRL"), and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51 et seq. ("CFEPA").”
The case’s holding
A retaliation claim is actionable if the adverse action could well have dissuaded a reasonable employee from complaining of unlawful discrimination.
Later courts cite it for
“the proper question for a retaliation claim is whether the alleged adverse action to which the plaintiff was subjected could well have dissuaded a reasonable employee in his position from complaining of unlawful discrimination.” · 36 citing courts
17
GREENMiner v. Town of Cheshire, 126 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. Conn. 2000).
cites § 46a-51 4×subsections: (10) 4×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“The court noted that “[a]t least one court has found significant the fact that an employer need only employ three employees to fit within CFE-PA’s definition of an employer, and has interpreted this difference as an indication that the Connecticut legislature intended to provide…”
The case’s holding
An employer's adverse yet routine employment action does not constitute extreme and outrageous behavior unless the conduct is egregious, oppressive, and goes beyond all bounds of decency.
Later courts cite it for
“an employer's adverse yet routine employment action, even if improperly motivated, does not constitute extreme and outrageous behavior when the employer does not conduct that action in an egregious and oppressive manner.” · 7 citing courts
18
GREENHatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 819 A.2d 260 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 46a-51 2×cited by 90 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“For example, the state antidiscrimination laws apply to employers with three or more employees; see General Statutes § 46a-51 (10); whereas the ADA applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees.”
The case’s holding
The statutory apportionment scheme for occupational diseases and repetitive trauma does not apply to separate and distinct injuries under the workers' compensation act.
Later courts cite it for
“so as to create a rational, coherent and consistent body of law” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENSheppard v. Sheppard, 834 A.2d 730 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 46a-51 5×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that even if an actual finding of autism is not made, she has presented sufficient evidence to prove that the child has a mental or physical disability, as defined in General Statutes § 46a-51 (15) 5 and required by § 46b-84 (c).”
20
GREENMartinez v. Connecticut, State Library, 817 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D. Conn. 2011).
cites § 46a-51 2×subsections: (15) 2×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 46a-51
“2009) (quoting Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-51(15)). For Martinez to be protected under CFEPA, her asthma must have been a chronic impairment.”
The case’s holding
A brief suspension without pay does not constitute a material adverse employment action for purposes of a discrimination claim.
Later courts cite it for
“at the summary judgment stage of the proceeding, the moving party is required to present admissible evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to back them up, are not sufficient.” · 15 citing courts

Show all 207 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198220042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 14 cases in 2024. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D. Conn.75Conn. App. Ct.70Conn.482d Cir.9Conn. Super. Ct.3Bankr. E.D. Pa.1SCOTUS1
By subsection
(9)3 cases
Tyszka v. Edward McMahon Agency, 188 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D. Conn. 2001).
DeSouza v. EGL Eagle Global Logistics LP, 596 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Conn. 2009).
Lee v. Yale Univ., No. 22-2634 (2d Cir. June 20, 2023).
(10)8 cases
Miner v. Town of Cheshire, 126 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. Conn. 2000).“The court noted that “[a]t least one court has found significant the fact that an employer need only employ three employees to fit within CFE-PA’s definition of an employer, and has interpreted this difference as an indication that the Connecticut legislature intended to provide…”
Garris v. Dep't of Corr., 170 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Conn. 2001).
Lyon v. Jones, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Conn. 2001).
Gomez v. Metro. Dist., 10 F. Supp. 3d 224 (D. Conn. 2014).
Mercer v. Brunt, 272 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D. Conn. 2002).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(14)5 cases
DeSouza v. EGL Eagle Global Logistics LP, 596 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Conn. 2009).
Viens v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins., 113 F. Supp. 3d 555 (D. Conn. 2015).
Corfey v. Rainbow Diner of Danbury, 746 F. Supp. 2d 420 (D. Conn. 2010).
Wilcox v. Fishers Island Ferry Dist., No. 3:20-cv-00678 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2021).
Moscony v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00821 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2024).
(15)28 cases
Martinez v. Connecticut, State Library, 817 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D. Conn. 2011).“2009) (quoting Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-51(15)). For Martinez to be protected under CFEPA, her asthma must have been a chronic impairment.”
Donald Beason v. United Tech. Corp., 337 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2003).“, and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-51 et seq. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint in district court asserting that Hamilton Standard had incorrectly perceived him as disabled and discriminated against him as a disabled person…”
Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Schs., 221 F. Supp. 3d 255 (D. Conn. 2016).
Green v. Cellco P'ship, 218 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D. Conn. 2016).
Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn. 2012).
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(17)1 case
Grewcock v. Yale New Haven Health Servs. Corp., 293 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Conn. 2017).
(20)5 cases
Donald Beason v. United Tech. Corp., 337 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2003).
Lyte v. South Cent. Connecticut Reg'l Water Auth., 482 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D. Conn. 2007).
Sanders, No. 3:24-cv-00770 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 2026).
Radek, No. 3:24-cv-01746 (D. Conn. May 15, 2026).
Wade v. Elec. Boat Corp, No. 3:16-cv-02041 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2019).

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