Damages awarded pursuant to section serve dual purpose.

- Damages are given not only as penalty upon plaintiff in error, but also as compensation for delay, cost, and vexation occasioned thereby to the defendant in error. Hardy v. Truitt, 20 Ga. App. 529, 93 S.E. 149 (1917).

Statute is properly invoked when courts are used to evade judgments.

- When courts are used to evade judgments, especially when effort is made on frivolous grounds, after full opportunity has been had for fair adjudication, this statute in nature of penalty is properly invoked. Felker v. Johnson, 189 Ga. 797, 7 S.E.2d 668 (1940).

Justice demands damages award when appeal is obviously frivolous.

- When record discloses that the plaintiff in error has no just case, that no new question of law is involved, and the record is full of those things which every judge and every lawyer recognizes as indicia of an attempt to fight merely for time, justice demands that the court overcome any personal hesitancy the court may have, and that it add an award of damages to the judgment of affirmance. Prattes v. Southeast Ceramics, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 584, 208 S.E.2d 600 (1974).

When motion for 10 percent damages is filed, court shall carefully examine record, and pass upon motion in light of entire history of the case as there presented. Prattes v. Southeast Ceramics, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 584, 208 S.E.2d 600 (1974).

Filing of enumeration of errors is essential to completion of appeal. James v. Seritt, 121 Ga. App. 783, 175 S.E.2d 163 (1970).

Motion for sum not representing 10 percent of damages dismissed.

- Motion for imposition of $5,000 damages for filing a frivolous appeal will be denied when this sum does not represent 10 percent of the amount of damages awarded by the court below. Taylor v. Bentley, 166 Ga. App. 887, 305 S.E.2d 617 (1983).

Arbitration of attorney fees incurred on appeal.

- Contractor, who successfully defended an arbitration award on appeal, was not limited to then seeking attorney fees for a frivolous appeal before the appellate court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6, but could submit the appellate fee dispute to arbitration as the issue of attorney fees was governed by the arbitration provision in a contract between the contractor and a county. Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan County, 265 Ga. App. 578, 594 S.E.2d 756 (2004).

Cited in Holmes v. Booher, Fee & Co., 41 Ga. 125 (1870); Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Wise, 48 Ga. 630 (1873); Crusselle v. Reinhardt, 68 Ga. 619 (1882); Saffold v. Foster, 75 Ga. 233 (1885); Bailey v. Wilner, 107 Ga. 364, 33 S.E. 434 (1899); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Cooper, 14 Ga. App. 738, 82 S.E. 310 (1914); Sirmans v. Folsom & Tillman Hdwe. Co., 18 Ga. App. 586, 89 S.E. 1103 (1916); Realty Bond & Mtg. Co. v. Harley, 19 Ga. App. 186, 91 S.E. 254 (1917); Wimberly v. Lumpkin Home Mixture Co., 19 Ga. App. 809, 92 S.E. 286 (1917); Kirkland v. Citizens Trust Co., 19 Ga. App. 133, 91 S.E. 254 (1917); Banks v. Giles, 20 Ga. App. 97, 92 S.E. 651 (1917); Adams v. Duvall, 20 Ga. App. 205, 92 S.E. 955 (1917); Coleman v. Hutcheson, Yeomans & Co., 21 Ga. App. 100, 94 S.E. 94 (1917); Miller v. Walker, 23 Ga. App. 273, 97 S.E. 869 (1919); Bateman v. Small & Tharpe, 24 Ga. App. 244, 100 S.E. 573 (1919); Bailey v. Miller Hdwe. & Furn. Co., 30 Ga. App. 786, 119 S.E. 428 (1923); Johnson v. Hicks, 31 Ga. App. 43, 119 S.E. 437 (1923); Dillingham v. Eslinger, 32 Ga. App. 36, 122 S.E. 627 (1924); Felker v. Still, 35 Ga. App. 236, 133 S.E. 519 (1926); Yeomans v. Beasley, 36 Ga. App. 467, 137 S.E. 131 (1927); Sheffield v. Sheffield, 38 Ga. App. 685, 145 S.E. 672 (1928); Todd-Worsham Auction Co. v. Underwood, 38 Ga. App. 792, 145 S.E. 889 (1928); Anthony v. Weldon, 40 Ga. App. 499, 150 S.E. 431 (1929); Felker v. Still, 41 Ga. App. 462, 153 S.E. 781 (1930); La Boon v. Wright & Locklin, 42 Ga. App. 275, 155 S.E. 770 (1930); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Rousseau, 42 Ga. App. 349, 156 S.E. 308 (1930); Mortgage Bond & Trust Co. v. Colonial Hill Co., 175 Ga. 150, 165 S.E. 25 (1932); Geer v. Underwood Typewriter Co., 45 Ga. App. 390, 165 S.E. 148 (1932); King v. Irwin, 47 Ga. App. 699, 171 S.E. 302 (1933); Varner v. Darien Bank, 48 Ga. App. 298, 172 S.E. 651 (1934); Sapp v. Sapp, 50 Ga. App. 145, 177 S.E. 265 (1934); Hall v. Eufaula Brick Co., 50 Ga. App. 466, 178 S.E. 403 (1935); Hartsfield Co. v. Ray, 51 Ga. App. 106, 179 S.E. 732 (1935); Campbell Coal Co. v. Pano, 51 Ga. App. 232, 180 S.E. 139 (1935); Wofford Oil Co. v. Story, 52 Ga. App. 496, 183 S.E. 840 (1936); First Joint Stock Land Bank v. Sasser, 185 Ga. 417, 195 S.E. 143 (1938); Hanley v. Rainey, 58 Ga. App. 485, 199 S.E. 248 (1938); Quinn v. O'Neal, 58 Ga. App. 628, 199 S.E. 359 (1938); Boggs v. Shadburn, 65 Ga. App. 683, 16 S.E.2d 234 (1941); Hankin v. Deaton, 68 Ga. App. 113, 22 S.E.2d 341 (1942); Haynie v. Murray, 74 Ga. App. 253, 39 S.E.2d 567 (1946); Adamson v. Gaultney, 74 Ga. App. 820, 41 S.E.2d 657 (1947); Saul Klenberg Co. v. Mrozinski, 78 Ga. App. 59, 50 S.E.2d 247 (1948); Bedgood v. Karp's U-Drive-It Co., 80 Ga. App. 216, 55 S.E.2d 654 (1949); Morrow v. Johnston, 85 Ga. App. 261, 68 S.E.2d 906 (1952); Quillian v. Mabry, 88 Ga. App. 817, 78 S.E.2d 97 (1953); Dickens v. Dickens, 211 Ga. 796, 89 S.E.2d 161 (1955); Tippins v. Spears, 92 Ga. App. 495, 89 S.E.2d 210 (1955); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Loyd, 94 Ga. App. 462, 95 S.E.2d 383 (1956); First Am. Acceptance Corp. v. Wheat, 217 Ga. 1, 120 S.E.2d 330 (1961); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Quick, 106 Ga. App. 59, 126 S.E.2d 431 (1962); Schnuck v. Riales, 106 Ga. App. 647, 127 S.E.2d 825 (1962); Stanley Home Prods., Inc. v. Lucas, 107 Ga. App. 260, 129 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Borochoff v. Russell, 108 Ga. App. 266, 132 S.E.2d 861 (1963); Wright v. Collins, 117 Ga. App. 105, 159 S.E.2d 468 (1968); Bragg v. Bragg, 224 Ga. 294, 161 S.E.2d 313 (1968); Federated Ins. Group v. Pitts, 118 Ga. App. 356, 163 S.E.2d 841 (1968); Brown v. Royal Wood, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 564, 168 S.E.2d 211 (1969); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 122 Ga. App. 407, 177 S.E.2d 176 (1970); Phoenix Ins. v. Weaver, 124 Ga. App. 423, 183 S.E.2d 920 (1971); Fulton Indus. v. Knight, 127 Ga. App. 604, 194 S.E.2d 346 (1972); Wilson v. Lee, 129 Ga. App. 647, 200 S.E.2d 480 (1973); Buffington v. McClelland, 130 Ga. App. 460, 203 S.E.2d 575 (1973); Knox Jewelry Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 519, 203 S.E.2d 739 (1974); Security Mgt. Co. v. King, 132 Ga. App. 618, 208 S.E.2d 576 (1974); Kelley v. Whitaker, 133 Ga. App. 229, 211 S.E.2d 176 (1974); American Fin. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 134 Ga. App. 24, 217 S.E.2d 364 (1975); Page v. Page, 235 Ga. 131, 218 S.E.2d 859 (1975); Lee v. Goldner, 135 Ga. App. 744, 219 S.E.2d 5 (1975); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Roper, 136 Ga. App. 224, 221 S.E.2d 55 (1975); Hodges v. Hodges, 235 Ga. 848, 221 S.E.2d 597 (1976); Waldrop v. Hite, 236 Ga. 608, 225 S.E.2d 19 (1976); Rea v. Rea, 237 Ga. 50, 226 S.E.2d 589 (1976); Crosby v. Greene, 237 Ga. 56, 226 S.E.2d 739 (1976); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Davis, 139 Ga. App. 138, 227 S.E.2d 915 (1976); Contractors Mgt. Corp. v. McDowell-Kelley, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 4, 228 S.E.2d 6 (1976); Thomas v. Estes, 139 Ga. App. 738, 229 S.E.2d 538 (1976); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Puckett, 139 Ga. App. 772, 229 S.E.2d 550 (1976); Richardson v. Richardson, 237 Ga. 830, 229 S.E.2d 641 (1976); Billas v. Dwyer, 140 Ga. App. 774, 232 S.E.2d 102 (1976); Trust Inv. & Dev. Co. v. First Ga. Bank, 238 Ga. 309, 232 S.E.2d 828 (1977); Roe v. Williamson, 142 Ga. App. 834, 238 S.E.2d 128 (1977); Associated Distribs., Inc. v. Strozier, 144 Ga. App. 205, 240 S.E.2d 761 (1977); Boyd v. Maslia, 144 Ga. App. 683, 242 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Wood v. Wood, 240 Ga. 861, 242 S.E.2d 599 (1978); Prudential Timber & Farm Co. v. Collins, 144 Ga. App. 849, 243 S.E.2d 80 (1978); Perry v. Dudley, 145 Ga. App. 728, 244 S.E.2d 580 (1978); Nelson v. Fulton County Bank, 147 Ga. App. 98, 248 S.E.2d 173 (1978); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Mauldin, 147 Ga. App. 230, 248 S.E.2d 528 (1978); Rives E. Worrell Co. v. Key Sys., 147 Ga. App. 383, 248 S.E.2d 686 (1978); F. & G. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Raines, 147 Ga. App. 675, 250 S.E.2d 58 (1978); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Huckaby, 148 Ga. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 833 (1978); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gaither, 148 Ga. App. 251, 251 S.E.2d 66 (1978); Match Point, Ltd. v. Adams, 148 Ga. App. 673, 252 S.E.2d 90 (1979); Berman v. Berman, 243 Ga. 246, 253 S.E.2d 706 (1979); Cale v. Cale, 243 Ga. 519, 255 S.E.2d 41 (1979); Thompson v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 149 Ga. App. 682, 255 S.E.2d 138 (1979); Department of Pub. Safety v. Rodgers, 149 Ga. App. 683, 255 S.E.2d 139 (1979); Grier v. Grier, 243 Ga. 520, 255 S.E.2d 728 (1979); Brannon v. Simpson, 244 Ga. 58, 257 S.E.2d 541 (1979); Pippin v. Brigadier Indus. Corp., 150 Ga. App. 401, 258 S.E.2d 18 (1979); Spivey v. Eavenson, 150 Ga. App. 429, 258 S.E.2d 54 (1979); Walsey v. American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 151 Ga. App. 104, 258 S.E.2d 760 (1979); Turner v. Turner, 244 Ga. 229, 259 S.E.2d 479 (1979); Ivey Contracting Co. v. Elliott, 151 Ga. App. 361, 259 S.E.2d 658 (1979); McCane v. Cappett Corp., 151 Ga. App. 423, 260 S.E.2d 379 (1979); Metaxis v. Sanders, 151 Ga. App. 702, 261 S.E.2d 651 (1979); Keappler v. Allen, 152 Ga. App. 746, 264 S.E.2d 37 (1979); Scales v. American Lease Plans, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 670, 266 S.E.2d 323 (1980); Morrison v. Morrison, 153 Ga. App. 818, 266 S.E.2d 521 (1980); Trade City G.M.C., Inc. v. May, 154 Ga. App. 371, 268 S.E.2d 421 (1980); Tucker v. Whitehead, 155 Ga. App. 104, 270 S.E.2d 317 (1980); Davidson v. Becker, 156 Ga. App. 236, 273 S.E.2d 422 (1980); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Towns, 156 Ga. App. 24, 274 S.E.2d 74 (1980); Barylak v. Jordan, 156 Ga. App. 508, 274 S.E.2d 846 (1980); Shepherd v. Shepherd, 247 Ga. 273, 275 S.E.2d 317 (1981); Garrett v. Atlantic Bank & Trust Co., 157 Ga. App. 103, 276 S.E.2d 152 (1981); Bhatia v. West Cash & Carry Bldg. Materials of Savannah, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 145, 276 S.E.2d 656 (1981); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 247 Ga. 481, 277 S.E.2d 23 (1981); Crutchfield v. Trust Co. Bank, 157 Ga. App. 557, 278 S.E.2d 138 (1981); Pharr v. Burnette, 158 Ga. App. 473, 280 S.E.2d 881 (1981); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Kelch, 158 Ga. App. 555, 281 S.E.2d 258 (1981); King v. Chrisler, 160 Ga. App. 784, 287 S.E.2d 124 (1982)

Edhul Co. v. Collins, 248 Ga. 611, 287 S.E.2d 216 (1981); City of Atlanta v. West, 160 Ga. App. 609, 287 S.E.2d 558 (1981); City of Atlanta v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 160 Ga. App. 822, 287 S.E.2d 665 (1982); Sizemore Sec. Int'l, Inc. v. Lee, 161 Ga. App. 332, 287 S.E.2d 782 (1982); Anderson v. King, 160 Ga. App. 802, 288 S.E.2d 231 (1982); McGaha v. Kwon, 161 Ga. App. 216, 288 S.E.2d 289 (1982); Decatur Invs. Co. v. McWilliams, 162 Ga. App. 181, 290 S.E.2d 526 (1982); Williams v. Struble, 162 Ga. App. 196, 290 S.E.2d 538 (1982); Holland v. Tri-City Hosp. Auth., 162 Ga. App. 256, 291 S.E.2d 107 (1982); Cameron v. Cox, 162 Ga. App. 268, 291 S.E.2d 115 (1982); Barker v. Century 21-Atlanta E. Realty, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 828, 293 S.E.2d 76 (1982); Collier v. Cosby, 293 S.E.2d 567 (1982); Freeman v. Paradise, Inc., 293 S.E.2d 567 (1982); Capitol T.V. Serv., Inc. v. Derrick, 163 Ga. App. 65, 293 S.E.2d 724 (1982); Watkins v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 163 Ga. App. 468, 294 S.E.2d 703 (1982); Burleson v. Jordan, 163 Ga. App. 496, 295 S.E.2d 335 (1982); Shick Moulding & Frame Co. v. Edwards, 163 Ga. App. 879, 296 S.E.2d 161 (1982); Gates Rental, Inc. v. Perry, 164 Ga. App. 297, 297 S.E.2d 79 (1982); Mansell v. Benson Chevrolet Co., 165 Ga. App. 568, 302 S.E.2d 114 (1983); McCormick v. Clemenson, 165 Ga. App. 529, 302 S.E.2d 122 (1983); Pittard Mach. Co. v. Eisele Corp., 166 Ga. App. 324, 304 S.E.2d 129 (1983); Becker v. Fairman, 167 Ga. App. 708, 307 S.E.2d 520 (1983); Toporek v. Water Processing Co., 169 Ga. App. 141, 312 S.E.2d 132 (1983); Chatham County Comm'rs v. Rumary, 253 Ga. 60, 315 S.E.2d 881 (1984); First of Ga. Underwriters Co. v. Beck, 170 Ga. App. 68, 316 S.E.2d 519 (1984); Kelco Roofing Co. v. Tri-D Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 170 Ga. App. 164, 316 S.E.2d 577 (1984); Price & Sons Grading Co. v. Associated Iron & Metal Co., 171 Ga. App. 270, 319 S.E.2d 105 (1984); Crawford v. Holt, 172 Ga. App. 326, 323 S.E.2d 245 (1984); Caswell v. Pelham, 172 Ga. App. 317, 323 S.E.2d 247 (1984); Khoury v. Skidaway Island Eng'g, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 503, 323 S.E.2d 692 (1984); Brown v. WTA/CHC, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 636, 324 S.E.2d 205 (1984); Miller v. Grier, 175 Ga. App. 91, 332 S.E.2d 323 (1985); Moore v. Sanford, Adams, McCullough & Beard, 175 Ga. App. 552, 333 S.E.2d 681 (1985); Wheeler v. McDonald, 175 Ga. App. 785, 334 S.E.2d 367 (1985); Anderson v. Hendrix, 175 Ga. App. 720, 334 S.E.2d 697 (1985); Gowdey v. Rem Assocs., 176 Ga. App. 83, 335 S.E.2d 309 (1985); Murray v. Pratt-Dudley Bldrs. Supply Co., 176 Ga. App. 225, 335 S.E.2d 443 (1985); Miller v. Bank of S., 177 Ga. App. 42, 338 S.E.2d 436 (1985); Re/Max 100 of Sandy Springs, Inc. v. Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., 177 Ga. App. 111, 338 S.E.2d 542 (1985); Associated Software Consultants Org., Inc. v. Wysocki, 177 Ga. App. 135, 338 S.E.2d 679 (1985); A.P.S.S., Inc. v. Clary & Assocs., 178 Ga. App. 131, 342 S.E.2d 375 (1986); Carr v. Nodvin, 178 Ga. App. 228, 342 S.E.2d 698 (1986); Dobbs v. Titan Properties, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 389, 343 S.E.2d 419 (1986); Sadler v. Trust Co. Bank, 178 Ga. App. 871, 344 S.E.2d 694 (1986); Smith v. Pierce, 179 Ga. App. 724, 347 S.E.2d 692 (1986); Barone v. McRae & Holloway, P.C., 179 Ga. App. 812, 348 S.E.2d 320 (1986); Holcomb v. Commercial Credit Servs. Corp., 180 Ga. App. 451, 349 S.E.2d 523 (1986); Crucet v. Bovis, Kyle & Burch, 180 Ga. App. 765, 350 S.E.2d 322 (1986); Concepts, Inc. v. Innovative Property Mgt., Inc., 180 Ga. App. 903, 350 S.E.2d 805 (1986); Murray v. Stratford, 181 Ga. App. 592, 353 S.E.2d 85 (1987); Grissett v. Wilson, 181 Ga. App. 727, 353 S.E.2d 621 (1987); Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. App. 39, 354 S.E.2d 666 (1987); AAA Van Servs., Inc. v. Willis, 182 Ga. App. 46, 354 S.E.2d 631 (1987); Republic Ins. Co. v. Martin, 182 Ga. App. 390, 355 S.E.2d 694 (1987); Chrysler Corp. v. Marinari, 182 Ga. App. 399, 355 S.E.2d 719 (1987); Harrell v. Thompson, 182 Ga. App. 470, 356 S.E.2d 69 (1987); Caylor v. Potts, 183 Ga. App. 133, 358 S.E.2d 291 (1987); Williams v. Kaminsky, 183 Ga. App. 283, 358 S.E.2d 667 (1987); Thomas v. Bartlett, 183 Ga. App. 412, 359 S.E.2d 156 (1987); DOT v. Pilgrim, 183 Ga. App. 470, 359 S.E.2d 227 (1987); Hudson v. Omaha Indem. Co., 183 Ga. App. 847, 360 S.E.2d 406 (1987); Carpet Transp., Inc. v. Dixie Truck Tire Co., 185 Ga. App. 181, 363 S.E.2d 840 (1987); Reahard v. Ivester, 188 Ga. App. 17, 371 S.E.2d 905 (1988); Morris v. Clark, 189 Ga. App. 228, 375 S.E.2d 616 (1989); Seligman v. Milam Bldrs., Inc., 191 Ga. App. 224, 381 S.E.2d 401 (1989); Phillips v. Plymale, 191 Ga. App. 338, 381 S.E.2d 580 (1989); Hert v. Gibbs, 191 Ga. App. 471, 382 S.E.2d 191 (1989); Zorn & Son Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Jim Altman Ins., Inc., 191 Ga. App. 649, 382 S.E.2d 696 (1989); Williamson v. Ward, 192 Ga. App. 857, 386 S.E.2d 727 (1989); Johnson v. Ashkouti, 193 Ga. App. 810, 389 S.E.2d 27 (1989); Sanders v. Robertson, 196 Ga. App. 739, 397 S.E.2d 26 (1990); Williamscraft Dev., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 196 Ga. App. 703, 397 S.E.2d 122 (1990); Stevens v. McCarty, 198 Ga. App. 412, 401 S.E.2d 605 (1991); Britt v. West Coast Cycle, 198 Ga. App. 525, 402 S.E.2d 121 (1991); City Group, Inc. v. Ehlers, 198 Ga. App. 709, 402 S.E.2d 787 (1991); Smith v. Law Office of Tony Center, 198 Ga. App. 873, 403 S.E.2d 451 (1991); Spicewood, Inc. v. Dykes Paving & Constr. Co., 199 Ga. App. 165, 404 S.E.2d 305 (1991); Bi-Lo, Inc. v. McConnell, 199 Ga. App. 154, 404 S.E.2d 327 (1991); Heslen v. Heslen, 199 Ga. App. 271, 404 S.E.2d 592 (1991); Moxley v. Lariscy, 199 Ga. App. 522, 405 S.E.2d 339 (1991); Gorham v. Turner Outdoor Adv., Ltd., 199 Ga. App. 712, 405 S.E.2d 900 (1991); Covrig v. Miller, 199 Ga. App. 864, 406 S.E.2d 239 (1991); Harris v. Wilwat Properties, 201 Ga. App. 161, 410 S.E.2d 372 (1991); Crow v. Northside Bldg. Supply Co., 201 Ga. App. 441, 411 S.E.2d 914 (1991); Webb v. Sheu, 201 Ga. App. 769, 412 S.E.2d 289 (1991); Gaillard v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Servs. of Ga., Inc., 202 Ga. App. 315, 414 S.E.2d 19 (1991); Alpharetta, Old Milton County, Ga. Historical & Genealogical Soc'y, Inc. v. Dowda, 217 Ga. App. 792, 459 S.E.2d 443 (1995); Johnson v. Nelson-Rives Realty, 245 Ga. App. 638, 538 S.E.2d 536 (2000); Hubbard v. DOT, 256 Ga. App. 342, 568 S.E.2d 559 (2002); Williams v. Morgan, 262 Ga. App. 848, 586 S.E.2d 740 (2003); Delta Cleaner Supply Co. v. Mendel Drive Assocs., 286 Ga. App. 227, 648 S.E.2d 651 (2007); DOT v. Gilbert's Auto Serv., 301 Ga. App. 419, 687 S.E.2d 659 (2009); Jones v. Peach Trader Inc., 302 Ga. 504, 807 S.E.2d 840 (2017).

Award of damages in connection with judgments requiring continuing payments.

- When judgment affirms compensation award requiring continuing payments, damages awarded under statute are to be computed against only so much of award as is for sum certain; that is, ten percent of whatever compensation is definitely ascertainable at date of judgment. Refrigerated Transp. Co. v. Kennelly, 144 Ga. App. 713, 242 S.E.2d 352 (1978).

Applicable only to affirmed judgments for sums certain appealed for delay only.

- Statute is applicable only upon affirmance of judgments for sums certain when, in the opinion of the court, an appeal was taken for delay only. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Slaton, 117 Ga. App. 317, 160 S.E.2d 414 (1968).

Applies when issue appealed is without merit, not when issue tried below is nonmeritorious. Brown v. Rooks, 139 Ga. App. 770, 229 S.E.2d 548 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Miller Grading Contractors v. Georgia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 247 Ga. 730, 279 S.E.2d 442 (1981).

Damages never assessed in doubtful cases.

- Damages under statute are in nature of a penalty, and will not be awarded in any case unless it is clearly apparent that it was brought up for delay only; and damages are never assessed in doubtful cases. Lipton v. Lipton, 211 Ga. 442, 86 S.E.2d 299 (1955).

Damages against litigant for bringing case up for delay only are never assessed in doubtful cases when exceptions are at least colorable. Almond v. Bentley Gray, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 508, 226 S.E.2d 776 (1976).

Court must be fully satisfied that appeal was for delay only.

- When the court is not fully convinced that the case is brought up for delay only, request to award damages should be denied. Hancock v. Tifton Guano Co., 19 Ga. App. 185, 91 S.E. 246 (1917); Robinson v. Woodruff Mach. Mfg. Co., 23 Ga. App. 426, 98 S.E. 405 (1919); Majette v. Strickland, 30 Ga. App. 624, 118 S.E. 477 (1923); Royal v. Montfort & Robinson, 30 Ga. App. 780, 119 S.E. 427 (1923); Guthrie v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S.E. 93 (1925).

Damages will not be awarded by Court of Appeals unless court is fully satisfied that case was brought up for delay only. Diamond v. Williams, 75 Ga. App. 111, 42 S.E.2d 382 (1947); Stone v. Cook, 190 Ga. App. 11, 378 S.E.2d 142 (1989).

When reviewing court is not fully satisfied that cause was taken up for delay only, additional damages will not be awarded. Rackard v. Merritt, 114 Ga. App. 743, 152 S.E.2d 701 (1966).

Sanction precluded when not meritorious but not for delay only.

- When the defendant's appeal is not meritorious, but the appeal is not so palpably without merit as to admit of no other conclusion than that the appeal was filed for purposes of delay, the sanction of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 is precluded. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Burgess, 157 Ga. App. 632, 278 S.E.2d 174 (1981).

When none of the appellant's enumerations of error are meritorious, but neither are the enumerations so specious as to warrant the conclusion that the appeal is taken for the purpose of delay only, a motion for damages for a frivolous appeal is denied. Ale-8-One of Am., Inc. v. Graphicolor Servs., Inc., 166 Ga. App. 506, 305 S.E.2d 14 (1983).

Lack of merit is not ordinarily a proper ground for dismissal of appeal but results in the affirmance of the trial court's judgment. Taylor v. Bentley, 166 Ga. App. 887, 305 S.E.2d 617 (1983).

Dismissal of appeal.

- O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 authorizing ten percent damages when a judgment is affirmed, does not expressly authorize these damages when an appeal is dismissed. Radford v. IPD Printing & Distrib., Inc., 184 Ga. App. 64, 360 S.E.2d 656 (1987); Bowles v. Lovett, 190 Ga. App. 650, 379 S.E.2d 805 (1989); Scott v. McLaughlin, 192 Ga. App. 230, 384 S.E.2d 212, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 903, 384 S.E.2d 212 (1989); Joyner v. Joyner, 197 Ga. App. 304, 398 S.E.2d 294 (1990); Royal v. Curry, 199 Ga. App. 133, 404 S.E.2d 302 (1991); Weiland v. Weiland, 216 Ga. App. 417, 454 S.E.2d 613 (1995).

Court of appeals was unable to assess damages against appellants under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 because that statute did not authorize damages when an appeal was dismissed. Noaha, LLC v. Vista Antiques & Persian Rugs, Inc., 306 Ga. App. 323, 702 S.E.2d 660 (2010).

Award of attorney's fees.

- While O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 and Ga. Ct. App. R. 15 allow the Court of Appeals of Georgia to impose damages and penalties for frivolous appeals, those provisions do not allow the court of appeals to award attorney fees for unjustified violations of the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq.; O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5 expressly vests jurisdiction to award such fees in the superior courts of Georgia, not in the court of appeals. Evans County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Claxton Enter., 255 Ga. App. 656, 566 S.E.2d 399 (2002).

Damages granted when appellant knew appeal ill-founded.

- When it appears that the appellant knew or should have known that, under a careful reading of the facts and the relevant law, the appellant's appeal was ill-founded, appellee's motion for ten percent damages will be granted. Ray v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 116, 308 S.E.2d 221 (1983).

Bank's motion for ten percent damages for frivolous appeal was granted since the plaintiffs brought an appeal only for purposes of delay and when there was no valid reason for the plaintiffs to anticipate reversal of the trial court's judgment. Jamison v. Button Gwinnett Sav. Bank, 204 Ga. App. 341, 419 S.E.2d 91 (1992); Cunningham v. Tara State Bank, 212 Ga. App. 468, 442 S.E.2d 18 (1994).

Motion for imposition of a frivolous appeal penalty, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6, was granted since all the issues raised by the appellant were meritless and pursued for purposes of delay only. Shamsai v. Coordinated Props., Inc., 259 Ga. App. 438, 576 S.E.2d 901 (2003).

Appealing litigant was assessed frivolous appeal penalties, as was the litigant's counsel, in the amount of $1,500 each, and a ten percent penalty against the judgment against the litigant was also assessed, as a result of the litigant pursuing meritless claims and filing a wholly meritless appeal solely for the purpose of delay, even after the trial court gave repeated warnings not to pursue an appeal. Austin v. Austin, 292 Ga. App. 335, 664 S.E.2d 780 (2008).

Case without merit evidences fact that it is brought up for delay. Chabble v. O'Neal, 19 Ga. App. 809, 92 S.E. 288 (1917).

When it did not appear from the facts that there was any valid reason for an appellant to anticipate reversal of the trial court's judgment, the appeal was brought only for purposes of delay, and the appellee's motion for ten percent damages for frivolous appeal was granted. Foreman v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 332, 393 S.E.2d 695 (1990); Malin Trucking, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 212 Ga. App. 273, 441 S.E.2d 684 (1994).

Pure attempt to gain time is proof of delay. Patillo v. Smith & Clifford, 61 Ga. 265 (1878).

Failure of plaintiff in error to appear and lack of good cause for exception warrants damages. Avera v. Vason, 42 Ga. 233 (1871); Craton v. Hackney, 91 Ga. 192, 17 S.E. 124 (1893); Bater v. Bater, 2 Ga. App. 62, 58 S.E. 312 (1907); Belcher v. Massey Bros., 8 Ga. App. 34, 68 S.E. 460 (1910).

Bringing affidavit of illegality in violation of

§ 9-13-121 as means of delay. - When the defendant attempts to go behind the judgment by bringing an affidavit of illegality in violation of Civil Code 1910, § 5311 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-13-121) and as a means of delay only, the court could award damages for delay. Drake v. Ludden & Bates S. Music House, 46 Ga. App. 745, 169 S.E. 213 (1933).

Damages warranted when issues raised have been previously decided adversely to plaintiff in error. Brown v. Brown, 51 Ga. 554 (1874).

When issues raised have been settled by previous decisions, damages are appropriate. Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 129 Ga. App. 881, 201 S.E.2d 654 (1973).

When there is no issue of fact and all questions of law raised on appeal have already been settled, so that no reason for appeal presents itself except to secure a delay in payment of the debt, damages may be awarded. Egerton v. Jolly, 133 Ga. App. 805, 212 S.E.2d 462 (1975).

Second appeal, raising issues identical to those raised unsuccessfully on first appeal.

- When second appeal from order for alimony payments raised issues identical to those raised on the first appeal which was decided adversely to the appellant, the appeal was for delay only and ten percent damages were justified. Maslia v. Maslia, 243 Ga. 244, 253 S.E.2d 706 (1979).

Absent valid reason to anticipate reversal of judgment below, a court may determine appeal is frivolous. Hatchett v. Hatchett, 240 Ga. 103, 239 S.E.2d 512 (1977).

When there was no valid reason for appellant to anticipate reversal of the superior court's judgment, the appeal was for purpose of delay only, and the appellee was entitled to an award of damages in the amount of ten 10 percent of judgment. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Scruggs Co., 162 Ga. App. 640, 292 S.E.2d 493 (1982); St. Amour v. Roberts, 170 Ga. App. 717, 318 S.E.2d 313 (1984); Hornsby v. Phillips, 190 Ga. App. 335, 378 S.E.2d 870, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 898, 378 S.E.2d 870 (1989).

Appellee's motion for imposition of damages as a sanction for filing a frivolous appeal will be granted when it appears that there was no reasonable ground upon which to anticipate reversal of the trial court's judgment and, consequently, that the appeal was brought for delay only. Burger v. Burton, 168 Ga. App. 378, 308 S.E.2d 868 (1983).

When the garnishee appealed the default judgments with no valid reason to anticipate reversal of the judgments, and the court accordingly concluded that the appeal was taken up for delay only, creditors were awarded ten percent damages. J.E.E.H. Enters., Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 172 Ga. App. 58, 321 S.E.2d 800 (1984).

Court permitted damages for frivolous appeal when there was no reason for the tenants to anticipate reversal of the court's judgment and appeals must have been brought for purpose of delay. Allen v. Peachtree Airport Park Joint Venture, 231 Ga. App. 549, 499 S.E.2d 690 (1998).

Penalty for frivolous appeal denied.

- Motion for assessing a penalty for a frivolous appeal denied, where although there is no merit in the appeal, there is no evidence the appeal was filed merely for the purpose of delay. Moultrie Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Goodbar, 203 Ga. App. 677, 417 S.E.2d 658 (1992).

Meritless argument on appeal different from trial strategy is for delay.

- When the argument raised on appeal is totally different from that argued at trial and lacks any merit whatever, the appellate court may conclude that the appeal was taken for the purpose of delay only. Ayers v. Advertising Concepts, Inc., 169 Ga. App. 400, 312 S.E.2d 876 (1984).

When appellant's liability was clear and amount of the appellant's liability was readily ascertainable, the issues raised in the appellant's appeal being meritless, a conclusion that the objective of the appeal was solely to delay, making an award of damages in the amount of ten percent of the judgment to appellees, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6, was justified. Karsman v. Portman, 173 Ga. App. 108, 325 S.E.2d 608 (1984).

Motion for ten percent damages granted. Petty v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 169 Ga. App. 418, 312 S.E.2d 874 (1984); Bacon v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 169 Ga. App. 538, 313 S.E.2d 727 (1984); Bradbury v. Mead Corp., 174 Ga. App. 601, 330 S.E.2d 801 (1985); Tiftarea Shopper, Inc. v. Maddox, 187 Ga. App. 227, 369 S.E.2d 545 (1988); Kennerly v. First Colony Bank, 205 Ga. App. 352, 422 S.E.2d 243 (1992); International Indem. Co. v. Saia Motor Freight Line, 223 Ga. App. 544, 478 S.E.2d 776 (1996); Safadi v. Thompson, 226 Ga. App. 685, 487 S.E.2d 457 (1997); Yoh v. Daniel, 230 Ga. App. 640, 497 S.E.2d 392 (1998); Phillips & Sons Logging v. Pioneer Mach., Inc., 232 Ga. App. 240, 501 S.E.2d 585 (1998); Sellers Bros., Inc. v. Imperial Flowers, Inc., 232 Ga. App. 687, 503 S.E.2d 573 (1998); Marshall v. SDA, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 312, 506 S.E.2d 661 (1998); Garrett v. McDowell, 242 Ga. App. 78, 527 S.E.2d 918 (2000).

Appeal was held to have been palpably without merit so as to permit no conclusion other than that the appeal was filed for purposes of delay, and appellee's motion for the imposition of ten percent damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 was granted. Adams v. Cato, 175 Ga. App. 28, 332 S.E.2d 355 (1985); I.M.C. Motor Express, Inc. v. Cochran, 180 Ga. App. 232, 348 S.E.2d 750 (1986); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. Sommers Co., 203 Ga. App. 404, 417 S.E.2d 44 (1992).

In an appeal of a proceeding in which an arbitrator's award in a home construction dispute was confirmed, the appealing homeowners were subject to a ten percent penalty, under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6, for a frivolous appeal, because the homeowners showed no basis for vacating the arbitrator's award, and no valid reason for the homeowners to anticipate the reversal of the trial court's confirmation of that award existed, so the appeal was brought only for purposes of delay. Marchelletta v. Seay Constr. Servs., 265 Ga. App. 23, 593 S.E.2d 64 (2004).

Appeal by county of summary judgment in a breach of contract action was frivolous.

- Summary judgment for a city for $2,885,827 damages, plus pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13, was proper on the city's claim against a county and the county's tax commissioner for breach of an agreement under which the county was required to collect the city's taxes and remit the taxes to the city, but instead withheld $2,885,827 for an obligation owed by the county. The county's appeal of the judgment was frivolous and subject to a ten percent penalty under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 and a $2,500 penalty against both the county and the county's counsel under Ga. Ct. App. R. 15(b). Ferdinand v. City of E. Point, 301 Ga. App. 333, 687 S.E.2d 617 (2009).

No purposeful delay found in meritless appeal.

- Despite the appellate court's conclusion that an appeal lacked merit, the appellate court could not conclude that the appealing party pursued the appeal for purposes of delay only; hence, the appellee's motion for sanctions for a frivolous appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 was denied. Realty Lenders, Inc. v. Levine, 286 Ga. App. 326, 649 S.E.2d 333 (2007).

Sanctions for a frivolous appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 were not imposed against an insurer that appealed a subrogation award against the insurer as there was no indication that the appeal was pursued for purposes of delay only, although the appeal was lacking in merit. Universal Underwriters Group v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 297 Ga. App. 587, 677 S.E.2d 760 (2009).

Presenting bona fide contest over colorable matter.

- If, after reviewing the whole matter, the court believes that the plaintiff in error is presenting a bona fide contest over colorable matter, though the plaintiff's view of the law may not in fact be well founded, or that the plaintiff is seeking a ruling upon an open or doubtful question, damages will be refused. Prattes v. Southeast Ceramics, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 584, 208 S.E.2d 600 (1974).

Appeal from what is determined to be harmless error.

- While assignments of error made are insufficient to bring about reversal, nevertheless counsel for the losing party has an absolute right to test the legality of the judgment, and the very fact that part of the charge on which the error was assigned was shown to have been inexact and perhaps even error, though harmless, afforded a reasonable ground for testing the judgment. Stripling v. Calhoun, 98 Ga. App. 354, 105 S.E.2d 923 (1958).

Mere zeal and persistence of counsel for plaintiff in error will not justify damages. Walden v. Barwick, 72 Ga. App. 545, 34 S.E.2d 552 (1945).

When the issue was not obviously controlled by former decisions, a request for damages was denied. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Windsor, 133 Ga. App. 159, 210 S.E.2d 373 (1974).

Reliance on grounds incorporated in prior writ of error.

- When an appeal is brought on grounds which were incorporated in, or by exercise of ordinary diligence could have been and were not incorporated in a prior writ of error, grant of damages to appellee is particularly appropriate. Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 129 Ga. App. 881, 201 S.E.2d 654 (1973).

When appellant wrongly contends appellant was misled.

- When plaintiff in error bases an appeal on the contention that the plaintiff was misled by the difference between service copy of document and original, and when discovery of the fact was made in time to have presented question on prior appeal of case, and statement of plaintiff in error's brief and facts in record refute entire contention that the plaintiff was misled, damages may be awarded. Rahal v. Titus, 110 Ga. App. 122, 138 S.E.2d 68 (1964).

When there is dismissal in appellate court, assessment of damages is not made. James v. Seritt, 121 Ga. App. 783, 175 S.E.2d 163 (1970).

When there is a dismissal in the appellate court, damages cannot be recovered in the trial court because of the dismissal. James v. Seritt, 121 Ga. App. 783, 175 S.E.2d 163 (1970).

Issues held sufficient for Court of Appeals to determine that the case was not taken up for delay only so that appellee's motion for damages was denied. Fleming v. Federal Land Bank, 167 Ga. App. 326, 306 S.E.2d 332 (1983); Carco Supply Co. v. Clem, 194 Ga. App. 566, 391 S.E.2d 134 (1990).

Reversible error.

- When a party files a motion for damages of ten percent of a judgment for filing a frivolous appeal, such motion must be denied when reversible error is found as to a part of the original judgment. Wisseh v. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l, 173 Ga. App. 286, 325 S.E.2d 897 (1985).

Motion for damages denied.

- Ranger Constr. Co. v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 166 Ga. App. 679, 305 S.E.2d 361 (1983); Hillis v. First Nat'l Bank, 168 Ga. App. 408, 309 S.E.2d 404 (1983); Gateway Leasing Corp. v. Heath, 168 Ga. App. 858, 310 S.E.2d 549 (1983); Glenn v. Fourteen W. Realty, Inc., 169 Ga. App. 549, 313 S.E.2d 730 (1984); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Miller, 180 Ga. App. 231, 348 S.E.2d 752 (1986); New York Ins. Co. v. Willett, 183 Ga. App. 767, 360 S.E.2d 37 (1987); Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Brown, 183 Ga. App. 810, 360 S.E.2d 42 (1987); Glenridge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Felton, 183 Ga. App. 858, 360 S.E.2d 418 (1987); Casgar v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 188 Ga. App. 234, 372 S.E.2d 815 (1988); Dever v. Lee, 188 Ga. App. 483, 373 S.E.2d 224 (1988); Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Huggins, 190 Ga. App. 664, 379 S.E.2d 630 (1989); Hunter v. Hardnett, 199 Ga. App. 443, 405 S.E.2d 286 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 405 S.E.2d 286 (1991); Pulliam v. Nichols, 202 Ga. App. 95, 413 S.E.2d 215 (1991); Signsation, Inc. v. Harper, 218 Ga. App. 141, 460 S.E.2d 854 (1995); Hendricks v. Blake & Pendleton, Inc., 221 Ga. App. 651, 472 S.E.2d 482 (1996); Moss v. Rutzke, 223 Ga. App. 58, 476 S.E.2d 770 (1996); Warnock v. Davis, 267 Ga. 336, 478 S.E.2d 124 (1996); Newman v. Filsoof, 224 Ga. App. 461, 481 S.E.2d 4 (1997); Starrett v. Commercial Bank, 226 Ga. App. 598, 486 S.E.2d 923 (1997).

Sanctions were denied after a doctor was successful on appeal in reversing an order requiring the doctor to pay attorney fees that the parties had mutually released in a settlement of all claims; the appeal was not frivolous and there was no merit in the motion for sanctions. Carey v. Houston Oral Surgeons, LLC, 265 Ga. App. 812, 595 S.E.2d 633 (2004).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, §§ 891, 892.

C.J.S.

- 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 754.

ALR.

- Award of damages for dilatory tactics in prosecuting appeal in state court, 91 A.L.R.3d 661.