Municipalities and counties have authority to levy taxes to carry out powers granted.

- Counties and municipalities are given authority to enact reasonable ordinances and to contract and combine with each other to effectuate and carry out extensive supplementary powers granted; as a corollary, it is necessary that municipalities and counties have authority to levy taxes to carry out powers given. Peacock v. Georgia Mun. Ass'n, 247 Ga. 740, 279 S.E.2d 434 (1981).

City met active municipality requirements despite services contract with county.

- City's contract with county under which the county provided law enforcement, street construction and maintenance, solid waste collection, and recreational services in consideration of the county's receipt of sales taxes was valid and showed that the city met the requirements of an active municipality. Sherrer v. City of Pulaski, 228 Ga. App. 78, 491 S.E.2d 129 (1997).

Counties and municipalities may appropriate and expend for public purposes connected with administration of local government.

- Under Constitution and state statutes, both county governments and municipalities may levy taxes for public purposes connected with administration of county and city governments; as a corollary to this principle, it follows that counties and municipalities may appropriate and expend money for such public purpose. Peacock v. Georgia Mun. Ass'n, 247 Ga. 740, 279 S.E.2d 434 (1981).

Ambiguity as to whether local amendment to paragraph creates exemption from taxation is construed against taxpayer or, stated otherwise, exemption from taxation must be created expressly and distinctly and will not arise by implication. DeKalb County v. City of Decatur, 247 Ga. 695, 279 S.E.2d 427 (1981).

Differential tax rollback void.

- This paragraph did not authorize differential tax rollback mandated by subsections (i) and (j) of Ga. L. 1978, p. 1695 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-8-91); thus, differential rollback was void. Martin v. Ellis, 242 Ga. 340, 249 S.E.2d 23 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III).

Constitutionality of Metropolitan River Protection Act.

- The Metropolitan River Protection Act, Ga. L. 1978, p. 128 (see now O.C.G.A. § 12-5-440 et seq.), does not constitute zoning within the definition set out in the Georgia Constitution, but instead falls within the reserved powers of the state to act, along with the local governing authorities, with regard to the water system, as is set out in the purpose of the Act, and is, therefore, constitutional. Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 240 S.E.2d 241 (1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936, 99 S. Ct. 1281, 59 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1979).

Not illegal for county governing body to seek outside advice before officially acting.

- Under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I), and this paragraph there is nothing illegal or unconstitutional nor is it an abuse of discretion for a governing body of a county to seek advice and recommendations from various department heads, advisory committees, and the general public prior to taking official action. Lindsey v. Guhl, 237 Ga. 567, 229 S.E.2d 354 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III).

Political subdivisions.

- This paragraph of the state Constitution specifically categorizes counties and municipalities as "political subdivisions" for purposes of achieving self-government. King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 271 S.E.2d 630 (1980) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III).

General Assembly still empowered to create and dissolve municipal corporations.

- This paragraph provides uniformity of certain powers of municipalities, not autonomy. The General Assembly may not remove these powers in a random fashion. However, this paragraph does not operate to abolish the General Assembly's plenary power to create and dissolve municipal corporations. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 902, 99 S. Ct. 1205, 59 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III).

Annexation ordinances are not void because they violate this paragraph, which prohibits cities and counties from providing water and sewer service inside each other's service areas except by contract with each other. City of Cartersville v. Bartow County School Dist., 145 Ga. App. 129, 243 S.E.2d 293 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III).

Construction of annexation resolution.

- Where a service district covering unincorporated areas is created under this paragraph, and a portion is subsequently annexed to the city, the resolution should not be construed according to the intent of the drafters, but should be construed against duplication of services and double taxation and in favor of municipal annexation, unless the contrary clearly appears. Cobb County v. Allen, 236 Ga. 910, 226 S.E.2d 57 (1976).

City's authority to regulate county's building projects within city limits.

- A county government is exempt from all municipal regulation of construction projects undertaken by the county with respect to county-owned property located within the city and used for governmental purposes, but they are subject to other municipal regulations as indicated by the Georgia General Assembly such as fire safety standards, O.C.G.A. § 25-2-12, or compliance with the Erosion and Sedimentation Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-7-1 et seq. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 256 Ga. App. 46, 567 S.E.2d 376 (2002).

County was required to maintain easements it owned within a city; no contract required.

- County, as owner of easements over cemetery property in the City of Sandy Springs even after the city was incorporated, was required to maintain and repair a dam and ponds that the county built on the easements for so long as the county retained ownership of the easements. Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III, requiring an intergovernmental contract before a county could perform services in a city, did not apply because the county owned the easements. Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs, 295 Ga. 16, 757 S.E.2d 123 (2014).

Instance of payment by county not unconstitutional.

- Where a resolution of the General Assembly directing county authorities to reimburse a surety on the sum paid by the surety on the criminal recognizance under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI) and where the surety's principal had been apprehended and placed in the custody of the proper officers and the principal had been punished as prescribed by law, such resolution is not violative of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. XII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI) which forbids the General Assembly to grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any firm, person, or association, nor is such a resolution in violation of this paragraph. Stewart v. Davis, 175 Ga. 545, 165 S.E. 598 (1932) (decided under Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VII, Sec. VI, Para. II; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III).

Employment of counsel.

- A county governing authority has the implicit power to employ counsel for county officers. Stephenson v. Board of Comm'rs, 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991).

Immunity from federal antitrust liability.

- A city's anticompetitive operation of a waterworks is protected from federal antitrust liability by the state action immunity doctrine under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1943), and its progeny. McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992).

Zoning.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III does not constitute authorization for a municipality to exercise any zoning powers. Century Ctr. at Braselton, LLC v. Town of Braselton, 285 Ga. 380, 677 S.E.2d 106 (2009).

Ordinance restricting waste disposal services upheld.

- Georgia trial court erred by denying injunctive relief to a county and its chosen waste disposal company wherein it sought to prohibit an unauthorized waste company from providing services in the county against an ordinance because the ordinance served a legitimate public purpose by providing a comprehensive solid waste management plan as it was required to do under O.C.G.A. § 12-8-31.1. Advanced Disposal Servs. Middle Ga., LLC v. Deep S. Sanitation, LLC, 296 Ga. 103, 765 S.E.2d 364 (2014).

City ordinance increasing pension plan contribution rate.

- Trial court properly granted the city defendants summary judgment on the city employees' claims of breach of contract and unconstitutional impairment of contract regarding an ordinance increasing their pension plan contribution rate because the Georgia General Assembly expressly contemplated that a municipal corporation's provision for employee retirement or pension benefits would be subject to being supplemented by local law. Borders v. City of Atlanta, 298 Ga. 188, 779 S.E.2d 279 (2015).

Cited in Howden v. Mayor of Savannah, 172 Ga. 833, 159 S.E. 401 (1931); Wofford Oil Co. v. David, 181 Ga. 639, 183 S.E. 808 (1935); Commissioners of Glynn County v. Cate, 183 Ga. 111, 187 S.E. 636 (1936); Enzor v. Askew, 191 Ga. 576, 13 S.E.2d 374 (1941); Snow v. Johnston, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S.E.2d 270 (1943); Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 76 S.E.2d 38 (1953); Fletcher v. Daniels, 211 Ga. 403, 86 S.E.2d 232 (1955); Toomey v. Norwood Realty Co., 211 Ga. 814, 89 S.E.2d 265 (1955); Hunter v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 179, 91 S.E.2d 338 (1956); Prince v. Thompson, 215 Ga. 860, 113 S.E.2d 772 (1960); Horras v. Williams, 219 Ga. 115, 132 S.E.2d 68 (1963); Cota v. Northside Hosp. Ass'n, 221 Ga. 110, 143 S.E.2d 167 (1965); McLennan v. Aldredge, 223 Ga. 879, 159 S.E.2d 682 (1968); Flanigen v. Preferred Dev. Corp., 226 Ga. 267, 174 S.E.2d 425 (1970); DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 232 Ga. 238, 205 S.E.2d 864 (1974); House v. James, 232 Ga. 443, 207 S.E.2d 201 (1974); Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 219 S.E.2d 399 (1975); Thompson v. Hornsby, 235 Ga. 561, 221 S.E.2d 192 (1975); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 235 Ga. 689, 221 S.E.2d 401 (1975); City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 Ga. 261, 240 S.E.2d 60 (1977); Brown v. Housing Auth., 240 Ga. 647, 242 S.E.2d 143 (1978); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978); Martin v. Ellis, 242 Ga. 340, 249 S.E.2d 23 (1978); City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979); Board of Comm'rs v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980); Cox Enters., Inc. v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 39, 273 S.E.2d 841 (1981); In re Board of Twiggs County Comm'rs, 249 Ga. 642, 292 S.E.2d 673 (1982); Terrell County v. Albany/Dougherty Hosp. Auth., 256 Ga. 627, 352 S.E.2d 378 (1987); AMBAC Indem. Corp. v. Akridge, 262 Ga. 773, 425 S.E.2d 637 (1993); Malcom v. Newton County, 244 Ga. App. 464, 535 S.E.2d 824 (2000); City of Atlanta v. Heard, 252 Ga. App. 179, 555 S.E.2d 849 (2001).

This paragraph not construable to prevent use of city property for necessary governmental purpose.

- This paragraph will not be given a construction which will prevent the city from erecting a fire station, which is a necessary governmental use of property, in any area of the city, though it may be zoned for other and different uses; to construe them so as to prevent the city's use of any property for a necessary governmental purpose would offend that provision of the Constitution which declares that the right of eminent domain shall not be abridged. Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, 211 Ga. 191, 84 S.E.2d 454 (1954).

Counties are authorized to do whatever necessary to carry out the goal of providing fire protection. Georgia Ass'n of Am. Inst. of Architects v. Gwinnett County, 238 Ga. 277, 233 S.E.2d 142 (1977).

Counties are authorized to enter contracts to provide fire protection, even though that particular contractual power is not expressly conferred. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 244 Ga. 133, 259 S.E.2d 74 (1979).

Use of purchased property for necessary governmental property valid.

- Since a municipality unquestionably has the right to condemn private property for a necessary governmental use, though it may be located in an area which has been zoned for other and different uses, it necessarily follows that it may likewise use property for a necessary governmental use which it has acquired previously by purchase. Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, 211 Ga. 191, 84 S.E.2d 454 (1954).

This paragraph authorizes a county to decide to provide its citizens with fire protection services, and then to implement that decision; in implementing that decision, counties are "authorized to do whatever [is] necessary to carry out this goal." Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 244 Ga. 133, 259 S.E.2d 74 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III).

Implied authority and discretion to handle details.

- Because where "jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred upon county authorities . . ., the further power to contract in regard to that subject matter is to be implied; . . ." a part of this implicit power is the authority to use discretion as to the details of such contracts, subject only to the limitations imposed by the statutes or public policy of the state. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 244 Ga. 133, 259 S.E.2d 74 (1979).

Court cannot decide whether the governing authority made the correct decision, but only whether it was a lawful one; the discretion to choose among lawful means is given by law to the local government, not to the court. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 244 Ga. 133, 259 S.E.2d 74 (1979).

Providing full-time, paid fire personnel constitutional.

- A proposed municipal charter amendment which would require provision of fire protection and that such fire protection be provided by a city fire department, with full-time, paid personnel employed by the city, does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III. Sadler v. Nijem, 251 Ga. 375, 306 S.E.2d 257 (1983).

No authority to arrest outside of territorial jurisdiction.

- Arrest warrants issued by a Georgia court did not insulate a payee or a county deputy from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for causing a businesswoman who had given the payee postdated checks for merchandise to be arrested on bad check charges because the warrants were executed in Florida, outside the issuing court's territorial jurisdiction as set forth in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III(b). Brown v. Camden County, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Ga. 2008).

Authority to arrest outside of jurisdiction.

- Trial court did not err in granting police officers summary judgment in a citizen's action alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the defendant's arrest because the arrest was lawful under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 since obstruction occurred in the officers' presence; even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant, the officers had the authority and discretion to arrest outside the officers' jurisdiction for offenses committed in the officers' presence and, therefore, the officers' immunity could not be defeated by the officers' decision to arrest outside of the officers' jurisdiction. Taylor v. Waldo, 309 Ga. App. 108, 709 S.E.2d 278 (2011).

Must demonstrate abuse of discretion or constitutional violation.

- In order to enjoin a county board's action in selecting a solid waste disposal site, plaintiffs are required to show an abuse of discretion or a constitutional violation. Lindsey v. Guhl, 237 Ga. 567, 229 S.E.2d 354 (1976).

County ordinance requiring a fence and buffer space around all open storage and junkyard businesses is constitutional. Rockdale County v. Mitchell's Used Auto Parts, Inc., 243 Ga. 465, 254 S.E.2d 846 (1979).

County contract with private solid waste collection companies.

- In choosing the option of contracting with private solid waste collection companies, a county was, through that method, providing solid waste collection services to county property owners within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 12-8-39.3(a); the fact that the individuals performing that service were not county employees, but employees of private contractors, was of no moment, insofar as it related to a property owner's constitutional challenge to the county's solid waste ordinance. Mesteller v. Gwinnett County, 292 Ga. 675, 740 S.E.2d 605 (2013).

Ordinance covering payment of garbage collection fees.

- The state constitution, statutes, and case law permit a county to enact an ordinance making property owners responsible for the payment of garbage collection fees for their rental property. Board of Comm'rs v. Guthrie, 273 Ga. 1, 537 S.E.2d 329 (2000).

Regulations must be reasonable and means must relate to objective.

- The Constitution requires that regulations not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that means adopted regulations must have some real and substantial relation to the object to be attained. Rockdale County v. Mitchell's Used Auto Parts, Inc., 243 Ga. 465, 254 S.E.2d 846 (1979).

State cannot authorize violation of commerce clause.

- A state cannot authorize activity which violates the commerce clause; thus, if the Georgia statute enabling authorities to enter agreements for exclusive rights with respect to solid waste disposal is interpreted to exclude competition from the solid waste disposal market, then it would conflict with the commerce clause, and, accordingly, conduct of authorities pursuant to the statute would not be entitled to state action immunity. Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, 855 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ga. 1994).

Authority to supply water.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III did not require a contract between Coweta County and the City of Newnan's Water, Sewerage and Light Commission in order for the commission to supply water in the county because such authority is provided by local law. Coweta County v. City of Newnan, 253 Ga. 457, 320 S.E.2d 747 (1984).

Installation of competing water system by county.

- A county that installs a competing water system is not required to compensate a private water system owner for property loss of its business with customers under the taking clause of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I when the owner has neither an exclusive franchise to supply water nor a non-compete agreement with the county. Amos Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Bennett, 261 Ga. 810, 411 S.E.2d 490 (1992).

Local laws.

- A local amendment to Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. II of the 1945 Georgia Constitution, authorizing a county to levy a tax for water and sewerage purposes, was not repealed by ratification of a later amendment giving counties direct authority to create special taxing districts for water and sewerage services, and to tax for those services only within the special district. Copeland v. State, 268 Ga. 375, 490 S.E.2d 68 (1997).

Power to exercise the right of eminent domain outside the city limits to establish a city sewer system under the Revenue Bond Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-82-62, and the requirement under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III(b)(2) that the city must have a contract with the county to provide sewer services to county residents are not mutually exclusive. Kelley v. City of Griffin, 257 Ga. 407, 359 S.E.2d 644 (1987).

Storm water utility charges.

- Trial court properly concluded that a storm water utility charge which Columbia County (Georgia) imposed on property owners was not an invalid tax and that the county's method of apportioning costs of storm water services was not arbitrary. McLeod v. Columbia County, 278 Ga. 242, 599 S.E.2d 152 (2004).

City subject to antitrust restraints in providing water services.

- The Georgia legislation, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III, and O.C.G.A. § 36-34-5, contemplates that political subdivisions, in their provision of water services, will contract amongst themselves to divide markets in the provision of waters and that such political subdivisions may establish and maintain monopolies in this area, but even a lawful monopolist may be subject to antitrust restraint when it seeks to extend or exploit its monopoly in a manner not contemplated by its authorization. Wall v. City of Athens, 663 F. Supp. 747 (M.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd sub nom., McCallum v. Athens, 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992).

Grant of extra-territorial powers of eminent domain.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III(b)(1) did not apply when a governmental entity was given a specific, extraterritorial power by general or local law; therefore, because O.C.G.A. § 36-82-62 explicitly granted Henry County Water and Sewerage Authority extra-territorial powers of eminent domain, the authority was not required to obtain Butts County's agreement before instituting a condemnation action. Ware v. Henry County Water & Sewerage Auth., 258 Ga. App. 778, 575 S.E.2d 654 (2002).

Use of local option sales tax proceeds.

- Where a county creates a special service tax district which consists of the unincorporated area of the county, and it levies a special service district tax on property located therein, it may use its proceeds from the local option sales tax (O.C.G.A. § 48-8-80 et seq.) to reduce the millage rate of the general maintenance and operation tax which is levied countywide (i.e., is levied on property located in municipalities in the county and in the unincorporated area) and not just to reduce the millage rate in the special service tax district. Nielubowicz v. Chatham County, 252 Ga. 330, 312 S.E.2d 802 (1984).

2010 amendment to the Local Option Sales Tax Act, O.C.G.A.

§ 48-8-89(d)(4), violates separation of powers doctrine. - To the extent the 2010 amendment to the Local Option Sales Tax Act (LOST), O.C.G.A. § 48-8-89(d)(4), permits judicial resolution of the issue of whether LOST should be renewed and the governing bodies of the special district should be required to levy and collect the tax, the amendment violates the separation of powers doctrine of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. Turner County v. City of Ashburn, 293 Ga. 739, 749 S.E.2d 685 (2013).

Special district for health services proper.

- County Board of Commissioners was authorized to create the special taxation district for the purpose of providing health services, as Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VI allowed the special districts, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III allowed the county to provide public health services. Greene County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Higdon, 277 Ga. App. 350, 626 S.E.2d 541 (2006).

Airport facility.

- Even though, under a contract between the county and an airport authority for use by the county of an expanded airport facility, the consideration to be paid by the county was not expressed in terms of a definite dollar amount, it was not an unconstitutional "new debt". The contract was a valid intergovernmental contract and the consideration represented the authority's lawful "revenue pledged to the payment of" the bonds. Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State, 265 Ga. 24, 453 S.E.2d 8 (1995).

Contract between the county and the airport authority, which managed the airport, qualified as an enforceable intergovernmental agreement (IGA) that did not violate the Debt Clause in the Georgia Constitution because the IGA was between appropriate governmental entities; its term did not exceed 50 years; the agreement related to both the provision of services and the joint use of facilities as the airport authority agreed to manage and maintain the expanded taxiway, and the county, in return, agreed to provide funding and manage the debt required to be incurred to complete the expansion; and the agreement dealt with services and facilities about which the county had the authority to enter contracts. Avery v. State of Ga., 295 Ga. 630, 761 S.E.2d 56 (2014).

Amendment intended to enumerate services county and municipality may provide.

- The constitutional amendment set forth in this paragraph was intended to supplement and enumerate services which counties and municipalities may provide, and to permit them to combine to provide the services, but the ordinances which counties may enact to provide these services are subject to the general terms and restrictions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I), including the prohibition against the enactment of criminal sanctions by counties. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-96.

General Assembly has authority to regulate, restrict, or limit exercise of these powers by general law. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-102.

Municipality cannot expend municipal funds for "straw vote" on issue of local importance absent local law authorizing such referendum. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-72.

Funding of "straw vote" prohibited.

- The expenditure of public funds for a county wide "straw vote" or public opinion referendum, absent some statutory or constitutional premise, is prohibited. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-20.

Assessing fee for services to Board of Regents.

- While a municipality cannot "tax" the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia on its property or operations, this does not preclude the municipality from charging a fee for optional services furnished to the Board of Regents or its various educational institutions. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-75.

Municipalities are not prohibited by Georgia's Constitution or laws from enacting ordinances regarding enforcement of traffic control devices by the use of cameras. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U2000-7.

Municipality may legally place parking meters within its limits on streets which are a part of the State Highway System. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 261.

County is fully authorized to use county equipment and to expend county funds in maintenance of watershed improvement structures where such projects are in furtherance of the county's authorization to conserve natural resources, serves a flood prevention need, and provides additional public benefits. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-29.

Building codes.

- The General Assembly can lawfully mandate a particular code or codes from which local governments wishing to adopt and enforce building codes must choose. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-7.

Local governments choosing to have a building code can be required to enforce the state code. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-7.

Evacuation for protecting lives and property is exercise of government's inherent "police powers." 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-60.

Fire ordinances for day care centers.

- The authority of local governments to enact fire ordinances for day care centers is preempted by former O.C.G.A. § 49-5-14 which gives the Board of Human Resources authority to adopt fire safety codes for day care centers. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-9.

Municipal contributions to day care center.

- Unless a provision in the city charter allows such an expenditure, a city may not contribute to a day care center. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-14.

Local regulation of air pollutants.

- While local governments are not preempted from regulating in the area of air quality control, any ordinance in this area which contradicts or detracts from the Georgia Air Quality Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-9-1 et seq., would be unconstitutional and void. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-22.

Municipal home rule power not violated by World Congress Center's regulations.

- O.C.G.A. § 10-9-14, empowering the Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority to regulate activities on the sidewalks and streets immediately adjacent to the World Congress Center's projects during an event period, does not violate the City of Atlanta's home rule power under the Georgia constitution and O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(a). 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U94-4.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 163 et seq., 369 et seq., 381, 495 et seq. 83 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning, § 8 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 143 et seq.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statutory provisions as to political corporations or divisions which shall bear cost of establishing or maintaining highways, 2 A.L.R. 746; 123 A.L.R. 1462.

What are "public utilities" within constitutional or statutory provisions relating to purchase, construction, or repair of same by municipal corporation, 9 A.L.R. 1033; 35 A.L.R. 592.

Validity of building regulation requiring areas or open spaces for light and air, 9 A.L.R. 1040; 59 A.L.R. 518.

Validity of statutory or municipal regulation as to garbage, 15 A.L.R. 287; 72 A.L.R. 520; 135 A.L.R. 1305.

Statutory or municipal regulation of removal of ashes or other rubbish, 15 A.L.R. 309.

Liability of one maintaining electric wire over or near highway for injury due to breaking of wire by fall of tree or limb, 19 A.L.R. 801.

Power to forbid or restrict repair of wooden building within fire limits, 26 A.L.R. 1219; 56 A.L.R. 878.

Power of state to exact fee or require license for taking water from stream, 29 A.L.R. 1478.

Use of public funds or exercise of taxing power to promote patriotism, 30 A.L.R. 1035.

Applicability of municipal building regulation to state or county buildings, 31 A.L.R. 450.

Validity of municipal ordinance prohibiting or regulating keeping of live stock, 32 A.L.R. 1372; 40 A.L.R. 566.

Validity of regulations as to plumbers and plumbing, 36 A.L.R. 1342; 22 A.L.R.2d 816.

Power of municipal corporation to purchase or charter a boat or barge, 39 A.L.R. 1332; 63 A.L.R. 388.

Revocability of municipal building permit or license, 40 A.L.R. 928.

Population as basis of classification or discrimination in legislation respecting water companies, 45 A.L.R. 1170.

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property owners to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883.

Duty of public utility to duplicate service, 52 A.L.R. 1111.

Extension of police power of municipal corporation beyond territorial limits, 55 A.L.R. 1182; 14 A.L.R.2d 103.

Power to forbid or restrict repair of wooden building within fire limits, 56 A.L.R. 878.

Rights in respect of street number of street name, 57 A.L.R. 461; 98 A.L.R. 1213.

Liability of municipality where sewer originally of ample size has become inadequate by growth or development of territory, 70 A.L.R. 1347.

Validity of automobile parking ordinances or regulations, 72 A.L.R. 229; 108 A.L.R. 1152; 130 A.L.R. 316.

Power of municipality as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 72 A.L.R. 465.

Validity of statutory or municipal regulations as to garbage, 72 A.L.R. 520; 135 A.L.R. 1305.

Constitutionality and construction of statutes and ordinances for protection of municipal water supply, 72 A.L.R. 673.

Establishment of grade as jurisdictional requisite of improvement of street at expense of property benefited, 79 A.L.R. 1317.

Imposition of wharfage or dockage fees, by state or municipality, as tonnage duty, 80 A.L.R. 388.

Validity of public regulations as to garages, 84 A.L.R. 1147.

At what stage does a statute or ordinance pass beyond the power of legislative body to reconsider or recall, 96 A.L.R. 1309.

Municipal regulation of electricians and the installation of electrical work, 96 A.L.R. 1506.

Implied power of municipality to operate nursery, quarry, gravel pit, etc., for production of material needed for carrying out powers expressly conferred upon it, 104 A.L.R. 1342.

Power of state to require changes in buildings previously erected in order to comply with new requirements and standards for protection of health and safety, 109 A.L.R. 1117.

Power of municipality to classify for purposes of taxation as affected by classification made by state or its failure to classify, 110 A.L.R. 1203.

Power of exclusion or regulation of vehicles in parks or park boulevards, 121 A.L.R. 566.

Validity of regulations excluding or restricting automobile traffic in certain streets, 121 A.L.R. 573.

Municipal ordinance relating to persons engaged in specified occupations or professions as applicable to officials or employees of state or political subdivision other than the municipality, 123 A.L.R. 1383.

Constitutionality of statutory provisions as to political corporations or divisions which shall bear cost of establishing or maintaining highway, 123 A.L.R. 1462.

Municipal license as affecting municipality's exercise of police power adversely to licensee, 124 A.L.R. 523.

Validity of automobile parking ordinances or regulations, 130 A.L.R. 316.

Use of streets or parks for religious purposes, 133 A.L.R. 1402.

Validity of statutory or municipal regulations as to garbage, 135 A.L.R. 1305.

Validity of building regulations as against objection of indefiniteness, 140 A.L.R. 1210.

Waters: right of municipality, as riparian owner, to use of water for public supply, 141 A.L.R. 639.

Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance which precludes recovery of rent in case of occupancy of building which does not conform to building and health regulations, or where certificate of conformity has not been issued, 144 A.L.R. 259.

Validity, construction, and application of municipal ordinances relating to loading or unloading passengers by interurban buses on streets, 144 A.L.R. 1119.

Auditorium or stadium as public purpose for which public funds may be expended or taxing power exercised, 173 A.L.R. 415.

Validity of municipal ordinance imposing requirements on outside producers of milk to be sold in city, 14 A.L.R.2d 103.

Validity, construction, and effect of statute, ordinance, or other measure involving chemical treatment of public water supply, 43 A.L.R.2d 453.

Validity of prohibition or regulation of bathing, swimming, boating, fishing, or the like, to protect public water supply, 56 A.L.R.2d 790.

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Liability of state, municipality, or public agency for vehicle accident occurring because of accumulation of water on street or highway, 61 A.L.R.2d 425.

Power of municipality to sell, lease, or mortgage public utility plant or interest therein, 61 A.L.R.2d 595.

Permissible use of funds from parking meters, 83 A.L.R.2d 625.

Pledging parking-meter revenues as unlawful relinquishment of governmental power, 83 A.L.R.2d 649.

Regulation and licensing of private garbage or rubbish removal services, 83 A.L.R.2d 799.

Prohibiting or regulating removal or exploitation of oil and gas, minerals, soil, or other natural products within municipal limits, 10 A.L.R.3d 1226.

Authorization, prohibition, or regulation by municipality of the sale of merchandise on streets or highways, or their use for such purpose, 14 A.L.R.3d 896.

Power of municipal corporation to submit to arbitration, 20 A.L.R.3d 569.

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves, 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

Liability of municipality or other governmental unit for failure to provide police protection, 46 A.L.R.3d 1084.

Air pollution control: validity of legislation permitting administrative agency to fix permissible standards of pollutant emission, 48 A.L.R.3d 326.

Validity of regulations restricting size of free standing advertising signs, 56 A.L.R.3d 1207.

Right of municipality to refuse services provided by it to resident for failure of resident to pay for other unrelated services, 60 A.L.R.3d 714.

Validity and construction of regulation by municipal corporation fixing sewer-use rates, 61 A.L.R.3d 1236.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance prohibiting commercial exhibition of malformed or disfigured persons, 62 A.L.R.3d 1237.

Validity of state statutory provision permitting administrative agency to impose monetary penalties for violation of environmental pollution statute, 81 A.L.R.3d 1258.

Validity of municipality's ban on construction until public facilities comply with specific standards, 92 A.L.R.3d 1073.

Validity of ordinance restricting number of unrelated persons who can live together in residential zone, 12 A.L.R.4th 238.

Parking facility proprietor's liability for criminal attack on patron, 49 A.L.R.4th 1257.

Validity of local regulation of hazardous waste, 67 A.L.R.4th 822.

Liability for injury or death from collision with guy wire, 8 A.L.R.5th 177.

Retaliatory eviction of tenant for reporting landlord's violation of law, 23 A.L.R.5th 140.