Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarities of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Paras. I and II and antecedent provisions, which set forth specific purposes for which taxation by counties and municipalities was authorized, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Purpose of paragraph.

- This paragraph was designed by the members of the constitutional convention to limit legislative power to authorize indiscriminate levies of taxes and prevent indebtedness, except as provided by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I). Butts v. Little, 68 Ga. 272 (1881); Adair v. Ellis, 83 Ga. 464, 10 S.E. 117 (1889) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

There is no limitation upon the taxing power of a county in regard to the amounts to be levied for the authorized purposes by this paragraph. Commissioners of Habersham County v. Porter Mfg. Co., 103 Ga. 613, 30 S.E. 547 (1898) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Tick Eradication Act (see now O.C.G.A. Part 4, Art. 1, Ch. 4, T. 4) valid. Townsend v. Smith, 144 Ga. 792, 87 S.E. 1039 (1916); Rowland v. Morris, 152 Ga. 842, 111 S.E. 389 (1923). See also Avera v. Clyatt, 152 Ga. 280, 109 S.E. 665 (1921).

This paragraph was not violated by Ga. L. 1913, p. 145, establishing the Municipal Court of Atlanta. McWilliams v. Smith, 142 Ga. 209, 82 S.E. 569 (1914) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Tax Equalization Law of 1913, § 48-5-311 does not violate this paragraph. McGregor v. Hogan, 153 Ga. 473, 112 S.E. 471 (1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 234, 44 S. Ct. 50, 68 L. Ed. 282 (1923) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Tax for educational purposes is dependent upon approval of voters pursuant to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. VII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I). Richter v. Bacon, 145 Ga. 408, 89 S.E. 367 (1916).

This paragraph is restriction on power of General Assembly to delegate to county certain rights to levy tax and has no application to a constitutional amendment. McLennan v. Aldredge, 223 Ga. 879, 159 S.E.2d 682 (1968) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

This paragraph does not impose any limitation upon power of state to levy taxes. It imposes limitation upon power of legislature to authorize counties to levy taxes. It in no way interferes with the general power of the state to impose taxes. Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Significance of Art. 4, Ch. 5, T. 3. - Uniform Beer Tax Act, Ga. L. 1974, p. 1447, does not impose a state tax for state purposes, which would invoke Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I) and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III); instead, it imposes a state tax for local purposes, and the counties' adherence to the tests of this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV) delineating the allowable scope of county purposes of taxation is all that is required. Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975).

Legislature has implied power to provide the machinery for levy and collection of taxes. Abbott v. Commissioners of Fulton County, 160 Ga. 657, 129 S.E. 38 (1925).

Georgia Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV) covers same purposes expressed in this paragraph. Richter v. Bacon, 145 Ga. 408, 89 S.E. 367 (1916) (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV).

For a distinction between taxes and assessments, see Hayden v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 (1883); Jones v. Sligh, 75 Ga. 7 (1885); Goolsby v. Board of Drainage Comm'rs, 156 Ga. 213, 119 S.E. 644 (1923).

Coroners.

- Fees of coroners are fixed by Ga. Penal Code 1895, § 1112 (see now O.C.G.A. § 45-16-9). Davis v. County of Bibb, 116 Ga. 23, 42 S.E. 403 (1902).

General Assembly does not need constitutional authorization to levy a tax or to authorize levy of a tax by a county. Board of Comm'rs v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980) (But see City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).)

Local option tax is not per se an impermissible delegation of legislative authority. Board of Comm'rs v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980).

County power of taxation limited.

- A county can only exercise the power of taxation as conferred upon it either directly by the Constitution or by the General Assembly when authorized by the Constitution. If there is any doubt as to the power of the county to tax in a particular instance, it must be resolved in the negative. Commissioners of Chatham County v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 215 Ga. 636, 112 S.E.2d 655 (1960).

List of purposes for which the state may tax in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I), and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. III) is the only purposes of taxation the state may validly delegate to its creatures' power to tax. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).

Though the purposes listed in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I) are capable of delegation, the right of the state to tax to grant funds to municipalities is not capable of delegation to counties or to any other subdivision of the state. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).

State may not grant to counties the right to tax and to give part of the proceeds to municipalities, and consequently this may not be "such other public purpose[s] as may be authorized by the General Assembly" within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I), or the similar language of this paragraph. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

It can never be a valid county purpose to provide revenue to a municipality because municipalities are not citizens of nor creatures of counties - they are an entirely different form of government. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).

Authority to collect occupation tax.

- Because a second city provided by local ordinance for the levy, assessment, and collection of an occupation tax on businesses and practitioners operating within that city's limits, the second city had the general authority to collect such a tax under O.C.G.A. § 48-13-6(b), and only the second city was authorized to levy, assess, and collect an occupation tax from businesses and practitioners at the airport that were located within the second city's limits to the extent consistent with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I, O.C.G.A. § 48-13-6(b), other applicable statutes, and that city's own charter, ordinances, and regulations; Atlanta, Ga., Charter, § 7-105(f) is ineffective to the extent it purports to divest College Park, Georgia of the authority to levy, assess, and collect an occupation tax on those businesses and practitioners operating at the airport and within the city limits of College Park. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 715 S.E.2d 158 (2011).

Reason General Assembly not prohibited from performing constitutional services differently.

- A constitutional provision which expressly prescribes the manner of doing a particular thing is exclusive in that regard and impliedly prohibits performance in a substantially different manner, however this paragraph does not come within this principle so as to impliedly restrict the General Assembly in directing local taxation because this paragraph is permissive, and because it relates to delegation of power and not to exercise of power. Blackmon v. Golia, 231 Ga. 381, 202 S.E.2d 186 (1973) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Action not within state Supreme Court jurisdiction.

- The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to review a judgment sustaining a demurrer (now motion to dismiss for failure . . .) to a petition against a county seeking a judgment, because of personal injuries, nor does the fact that the plaintiff in error excepts to such judgment upon ground that it offends Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II), and this paragraph of the Constitution which confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. Ayers v. Franklin County, 199 Ga. 835, 35 S.E.2d 455 (1945) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

County treasurer carries burden of proof of county's inability to become obligated on debt.

- Where a county treasurer in a mandamus suit to compel payment of a warrant issued by the county raises the issue of an attempt, to create a debt as inhibited by the Constitution, on the basis of insufficient funds on hand or inability to levy lawful tax during the year to raise funds for payment of the contract price of the machinery purchased with the warrant, the burden of proof is on the treasurer. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

Provision of former Rural Roads Authority Act (now Georgia Highway Authority, O.C.G.A. Art. 1, Ch. 10, T. 32) that required county authorities to maintain roads did not violate state constitutional provisions dealing with creation of debts, since counties are granted authority to build and maintain roads and to levy taxes for such purposes. State v. Georgia Rural Rds. Auth., 211 Ga. 808, 89 S.E.2d 204 (1955).

City not a local authority.

- In a declaration suit, a city was properly determined not to be a local authority as that term is used in O.C.G.A. § 48-13-13(5) and, thus, was subject to the levy of occupation taxes by another municipality for the city's proprietary operations at its airport, which was in the other municipality's city limits, because the terms local authority and municipality were not the same under the statute. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 292 Ga. 741, 741 S.E.2d 147 (2013).

Cited in Commissioners of Rds. & Revenues v. Martin, 161 Ga. 220, 130 S.E. 569 (1925); Bank of Chatsworth v. Hagedorn Constr. Co., 162 Ga. 488, 134 S.E. 310 (1926); McGinnis v. McKinnon, 165 Ga. 713, 141 S.E. 910 (1928); Templeman v. Jeffries, 172 Ga. 895, 159 S.E. 248 (1931); J.G. McCrory Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 177 Ga. 242, 170 S.E. 18 (1933); Swoger v. Glynn County, 179 Ga. 768, 177 S.E. 723 (1934); Griner v. Board of Comm'rs, 180 Ga. 619, 180 S.E. 118 (1935); Howell v. Bankston, 181 Ga. 59, 181 S.E. 761 (1935); Mosley v. Garrett, 182 Ga. 810, 187 S.E. 20 (1936); Lumpkin County v. Davis, 185 Ga. 393, 195 S.E. 169 (1938); Vincent v. MacNeill, 186 Ga. 427, 198 S.E. 68 (1938); Miller v. Head, 186 Ga. 694, 198 S.E. 680 (1938); McCook v. Long, 193 Ga. 299, 18 S.E.2d 488 (1942); DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942); MacNeill v. Wood, 198 Ga. 150, 31 S.E.2d 14 (1944); Kelley v. Newton County, 198 Ga. 483, 32 S.E.2d 99 (1944); Bibb County v. Garrett, 204 Ga. 817, 51 S.E.2d 658 (1949); Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 70 S.E.2d 360 (1952); Troutman v. Aiken, 213 Ga. 55, 96 S.E.2d 585 (1957); Commissioners of Rds. & Revenues v. Davis, 213 Ga. 792, 102 S.E.2d 180 (1958); Fortson v. Clarke County, 97 Ga. App. 410, 103 S.E.2d 597 (1958); Cason v. State, 217 Ga. 339, 122 S.E.2d 232 (1961); Jamerson v. Campbell, 217 Ga. 766, 125 S.E.2d 205 (1962); Seago v. Richmond County, 218 Ga. 151, 126 S.E.2d 657 (1962); Oconee County v. Rowland, 107 Ga. App. 108, 129 S.E.2d 373 (1962); Ferguson v. Leggett, 226 Ga. 333, 174 S.E.2d 913 (1970); Bradfield v. Hospital Auth., 226 Ga. 575, 176 S.E.2d 92 (1970); Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Decatur Tax Payers League, Inc. v. Adams, 236 Ga. 871, 226 S.E.2d 69 (1976); Martin v. Ellis, 242 Ga. 340, 249 S.E.2d 23 (1978); In re Board of Twiggs County Comm'rs, 249 Ga. 642, 292 S.E.2d 673 (1982).

Editor's notes.

- For decisions regarding legislative power to impose occupation taxes, see the annotations under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III.

Worker's compensation.

- Trial court properly determined that a county could not provide workers compensation coverage to Georgia superior court judges, as the judges were not county employees; counties were specifically authorized by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220 to provide workers compensation to "county officials," such as a sheriff, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1, but judges were deemed state employees. Freeman v. Barnes, 282 Ga. App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611 (2006).

Construction of bridges.

- This paragraph broadens taxing power which the legislature may confer upon counties sufficiently to embrace all expenses for constructing and maintaining bridges and roads. Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890), distinguishing Smith v. Wilkes & McDuffie Counties, 79 Ga. 125, 4 S.E. 20 (1887), and Monroe County v. Flint, 80 Ga. 489, 6 S.E. 173 (1888) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

This paragraph broadens the taxing power of counties to include taxation to pay a judgment for personal injuries caused by unrepaired bridge. Dearing v. Shepherd, 78 Ga. 28 (1886) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

There is no limitation on amount of taxes which may be assessed and collected within the year for building and repairing bridges within counties of this state, excepting the cost of erecting the bridges. Settle v. Howell, 174 Ga. 792, 164 S.E. 189 (1932).

Extent of legislature's powers in building or locating public roads.

- This provision does not deny the right of counties to build and maintain public roads, nor is the power of the legislature limited by this or other provisions of the Constitution in the matter of building or locating public roads, or their width or character; but all such matters are left to the wisdom of the legislature and are proper subject matters for legislation. This provision is only a limitation as to the purposes for which taxes may be levied. Swoger v. Glynn County, 179 Ga. 768, 177 S.E. 723 (1934) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Legislature is empowered to delegate to counties "the right to levy a tax to support paupers."

- In pursuance of such authority, the General Assembly has granted counties the right to levy taxes for support of paupers of the county, the right to provide medical or other care and hospitalization for the indigent sick of the county, and the authority thus conferred is not limited "to personal administration by officers or agents" of the governing authority, but such authority "may, except as otherwise limited by law, enter into contract with a corporation having appropriate charter power, under terms of which the latter corporation will care for the poor in the matter of medical and surgical treatment." Brock v. Chappell, 196 Ga. 567, 27 S.E.2d 38 (1943).

Authority of municipality to collect occupation tax.

- First city lacked authority to collect an occupation tax on professional or business activities within a second city's limits because the first city did not identify any constitutional provision or general law that authorized the first city to levy, assess, and collect an occupation tax on businesses and practitioners that were not located in that city's limits, and to the extent an agreement between the cities purported to vest in the first city the authority to collect an occupation tax on businesses located within the second city's limits, the contract was unenforceable; a contract between municipalities, however, is not a general law. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 715 S.E.2d 158 (2011).

No conflict in taxing powers.

- There is no conflict between taxing powers of a county as set forth in this paragraph with the authority contained in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. III). 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 39 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I).

General Assembly's residuum constitutional powers.

- If the General Assembly has the right to delegate power of taxation to political subdivisions, the General Assembly has within its residuum of constitutional powers right to exercise such power for benefit of political subdivisions. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 189.

Legislature not empowered to authorize municipal corporation to engage in ordinarily private enterprise.

- In absence of special circumstances, it is not within constitutional power of a legislature to authorize a municipal corporation (county) to engage in a business which can be and ordinarily is carried on by private enterprise for purpose of obtaining an income or deriving a profit therefrom, but it should be allowed to go into business only on the theory that thereby the public welfare will be subserved. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-176.

It is proper to levy and collect county school tax without deduction as payment for preparation of a separate school digest. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-62.

A county and municipal school system may provide by contract for continued operation of such school by and for the county school system. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-7.

Transfer of county property upon annexation.

- In the absence of an express intent on part of the legislature to the contrary, or, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary on the part of the interested parties, the annexation of property containing buildings and school facilities of a county school system by a municipality having an independent school system results in a transfer of ownership and control of such building and facilities to the municipal school system; however, it would be possible for such school buildings and facilities to continue to be operated or owned by the county school system either where the legislature so provides in the annexation legislation, or, where the interested parties, i.e. the county and municipal school systems, so agree. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-7.

Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta is not subject to DeKalb County property taxation because it is owned by the state. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-205.

Cooperative financial endeavor between city and county legal.

- Assuming that a city possesses legal authority to borrow funds via a 20-year loan for the purpose of constructing a library building, it would be legal for the city and county to enter into the proposed agreement whereunder the building would be leased to the county for the term of the loan at an annual rental sufficient to meet the loan payments; it would also be legal for the county to levy taxes for the purpose of making the rental payments. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-120.

Tax for vocational trade schools.

- Governing authorities of counties or municipalities desiring to establish and maintain area vocational trade schools are authorized to levy a tax for such purposes; the circumstances under which the tax could be levied would be where the participating subdivisions have entered into an agreement for establishment and maintenance of an area vocational trade school. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-153.

Absent any appropriate legislation, a county cannot levy a tax for general fire protection. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U71-100.

County cannot impose a tax for industrial development. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-13.

County is not authorized to levy a tax to repair a building used by the public, but owned by private individuals. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 575.

Imposition of municipal business license fee on businesses operating at State Farmer's Market. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-36.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, §§ 58, 67 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 156.

ALR.

- Power to exact license fees or impose a penalty for benefit of private individual or corporation, 13 A.L.R. 828; 19 A.L.R. 205.

Appropriation or raising of public funds for distribution by chamber of commerce, 31 A.L.R. 495.

Authority of county to employ tax ferret, 32 A.L.R. 88.

Scope and effect of express constitutional provisions prohibiting Legislature from imposing taxes for county and corporate purposes, or providing that Legislature may invest power to levy such taxes in the local authorities, 46 A.L.R. 609; 106 A.L.R. 906.

Validity of municipal ordinance requiring indemnity insurance as condition of operating taxicab, 95 A.L.R. 1224.

Limitation of power to tax as limitation of power to incur indebtedness or vice versa, 97 A.L.R. 1103.

Validity of legislative delegation of taxing power to school districts in absence of express constitutional provision authorizing such delegation, 113 A.L.R. 1416.

Validity, construction, and application of license regulations as to masons, plasterers, painters, and paper hangers, 123 A.L.R. 471.

Existing sinking fund as a factor in determining whether indebtedness or proposed indebtedness of municipality or other political subdivision exceeds constitutional or statutory limit, 125 A.L.R. 1393.

Validity of statute or municipal ordinance which provides generally that occupations or businesses for which no specific license tax has been imposed, shall be subject to a license tax of a specified amount or rate, 134 A.L.R. 841.

Power of municipality or other governmental unit to make contract or covenant exempting or releasing property from special assessment, 47 A.L.R.2d 1185.