Local amendment levying tax valid.

- A local amendment to Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. II of the 1945 Georgia Constitution, authorizing a county to levy a tax for water and sewerage purposes, was valid despite any conflict with the debt limitations clause. Copeland v. State, 268 Ga. 375, 490 S.E.2d 68 (1997).

Paragraph limits operation of former Civil Code 1910, § 442 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-82-3), and that section must be construed consistently with this paragraph. Chapman v. Sumner Consol. Sch. Dist., 152 Ga. 450, 109 S.E. 129 (1921); Cowart v. City of Waycross, 159 Ga. 589, 126 S.E. 476 (1925) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

This paragraph does not operate as a limitation upon taxing power of a municipality. Commissioners of Habersham County v. Porter Mfg. Co., 103 Ga. 613, 30 S.E. 547 (1898); City of Waycross v. Tomberlin, 146 Ga. 504, 91 S.E. 560 (1917) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

This paragraph applies to elections for bonds, and not to elections authorizing levy of an additional educational tax in local school districts under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. VII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I). Crye v. Pearce, 175 Ga. 85, 165 S.E. 121 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Purpose of Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36. - The Revenue Bond Law, Ga. L. 1937, p. 761 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), is designed to provide for self-liquidating projects and the revenue certificates contemplated are not to be a charge against the general credit of the county or municipality. The liability is to be satisfied only from revenues produced by the undertaking, and under specific terms of the statute the political division will never be required to aid in its retirement with funds derived from any other source, and is in fact prohibited from doing so. The article is not unconstitutional by virtue of violating the constitutional limitation on municipal debts. Miller v. Head, 186 Ga. 694, 198 S.E. 680 (1938), commented on in 1 Ga. B.J. 40 (1939).

Debts under Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36 not debts of political subdivision.

- Revenue anticipation certificates issued under the Revenue Bond Law, Ga. L. 1937, p. 761 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), do not subject the political subdivision of this state issuing the same to any pecuniary liability thereon and are therefore not debts against such political subdivision within the meaning of the constitutional provision limiting such indebtedness. Fort Oglethorpe v. Catoosa County, 80 Ga. App. 188, 55 S.E.2d 752 (1949).

Debt not regulated by this clause.

- County's promise to pay for the stadium project bonds was not a debt regulated by the Georgia Constitution's debt limitation clause as the promise was made as part of a constitutionally valid intergovernmental contract. Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 774 S.E.2d 624 (2015).

Taxpayers right to injunction.

- Taxpayers of the city have such an interest in the municipal funds arising from taxation that they may enjoin the creation of illegal debts by the corporation, or their payment. Hudson v. Mayor of Marietta, 64 Ga. 287 (1879), overruled on other grounds, City Council v. Dawson Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 719, 32 S.E. 916 (1899); Renfroe v. City of Atlanta, 140 Ga. 81, 78 S.E. 449, 45 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1173 (1913).

Construction of paragraph's exception clause.

- The following words, "except as in this Constitution provided for," lift out of the restrictions and limitations provided in this paragraph the full content of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I), as the constitutional authorization of debt not prohibited by the limitation and inhibition contained in this paragraph. Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

The County Building Authority Act did not violate Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I) as the Act and agreements entered into pursuant to it, in regard to the acquisition and construction of certain county buildings, were validated by the intergovernmental contracts provision, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I. Building Auth. v. State, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Import of 1927 constitutional amendment.

- The constitutional amendment of 1927 is not merely an addition to the "casual deficiency" provision of this paragraph, but it confers upon the counties the right to borrow money in an amount not exceeding the fixed limitation, to be used for any lawful county purpose, and not merely to supply casual deficiencies of revenue. Atlanta Distrib. Terms., Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 Ga. 250, 170 S.E. 52 (1933) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

"Casual deficiency" defined.

- The phrase, "casual deficiency" means some unforeseen or unexpected deficiency, or an insufficiency of funds to meet some unforeseen and necessary expense. Lewis v. Lofley, 92 Ga. 804, 19 S.E. 57 (1894); Hall v. County of Greene, 119 Ga. 253, 46 S.E. 69 (1903); Williams v. Sumter County, 21 Ga. App. 716, 94 S.E. 913, cert. denied, 21 Ga. App. 825 (1918); Citizens Bank v. Rockdale County, 152 Ga. 711, 111 S.E. 434 (1922); Atlanta Distrib. Terms., Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 Ga. 250, 170 S.E. 52 (1933).

Paragraph not self-executing.

- Since this paragraph, concerning the incurring of debts by a municipality is not self-executing, the General Assembly passed an enabling Act, former Code 1933, § 87-201 et seq., putting this provision into operation. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

O.C.G.A. § 36-82-3. - Former Code 1933, § 87-203 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-82-3), providing for elections to approve issue of bonds must be given effect, subject to change as made by this paragraph in reference to the proportion of qualified voters necessary to authorize a bond issue; and no further enabling Act is necessary. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946).

Former Code 1933, § 87-203 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-82-3) should be construed consistently with this paragraph as to the number of eligible voters required to approve the issuance of bonds. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Contract between county and cities.

- Trial court did not err in granting a county summary judgment in cities' action for breach of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) the parties entered into pursuant to the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act (HOST), O.C.G.A. § 48-8-100 et seq., because the IGA was not a valid intergovernmental contract under the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a) since the focus and clear purpose of the IGA was to provide a formula for the distribution of the HOST revenues, and the IGA could not be deemed an agreement for the provision of authorized "services"; the IGA was an agreement about how to divide and distribute HOST revenues between the county and the cities, with the cities agreeing to expend the monies disbursed solely for capital outlay projects to be located within the geographical boundaries of the county and to be owned, operated, or both either by the county, one or more cities or any combination thereof, and the fact that the IGA required the cities to expend the tax proceeds in accordance with the mandates of the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act, O.C.G.A. § 48-8-102, did not transform it into either a contract for services or one for the use of facilities. City of Decatur v. Dekalb County, 289 Ga. 612, 713 S.E.2d 846 (2011).

Cited in Mayor of Milledgeville v. Jeanes, 42 Ga. App. 105, 155 S.E. 218 (1930); Anchor Duck Mills v. Maddox, 171 Ga. 495, 156 S.E. 192 (1930); Sharpe v. Alston Consol. Sch., 173 Ga. 345, 160 S.E. 374 (1931); Smith v. Board of Educ., 174 Ga. 735, 164 S.E.2d 41 (1932); City of Abbeville v. Eureka Fire Hose Mfg. Co., 177 Ga. 204, 170 S.E. 23 (1933); Madronah Sales Co. v. Wilburn, 180 Ga. 837, 181 S.E. 173 (1935); Moore v. Howard, 181 Ga. 605, 183 S.E. 495 (1936); Dortch v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 182 Ga. 633, 186 S.E. 685 (1936); West v. Trotzier, 185 Ga. 794, 196 S.E. 902 (1938); Westbrooks v. Suwanee Consol. School Dist., 58 Ga. App. 509, 199 S.E. 240 (1938); Pierce v. Powell, 188 Ga. 481, 4 S.E.2d 192 (1939); Wallace & Tiernan Co. v. Williams, 192 Ga. 149, 14 S.E.2d 747 (1941); Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699, 22 S.E.2d 592 (1942); DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942); Lumpkin v. State, 73 Ga. App. 229, 36 S.E.2d 123 (1945); Nelms v. Stephens County Sch. Dist., 201 Ga. 274, 39 S.E.2d 651 (1946); Alexander v. Fulton County, 202 Ga. 42, 41 S.E.2d 423 (1947); Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues v. Bond, 203 Ga. 558, 47 S.E.2d 511 (1948); Smith v. City Council, 203 Ga. 511, 47 S.E.2d 582 (1948); Cook v. Davis, 178 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1949); City of Atlanta v. Anglin, 209 Ga. 170, 71 S.E.2d 419 (1952); Smith v. Hospital Auth., 210 Ga. 801, 82 S.E.2d 827 (1954); Posey v. Dooly County Sch. Dist., 215 Ga. 712, 113 S.E.2d 120 (1960); State v. Chatham County, 103 Ga. App. 390, 119 S.E.2d 120 (1961); Cason v. State, 217 Ga. 339, 122 S.E.2d 232 (1961); Jamerson v. Campbell, 217 Ga. 766, 125 S.E.2d 205 (1962); Barrow v. Jefferson County, 218 Ga. 681, 130 S.E.2d 129 (1963); Stephenson v. State, 219 Ga. 652, 135 S.E.2d 380 (1964); Hollifield v. Vickers, 118 Ga. App. 229, 162 S.E.2d 905 (1968); City of Jonesboro v. Clayton County Water Auth., 136 Ga. App. 768, 222 S.E.2d 76 (1975); Frazer v. City of Albany, 245 Ga. 399, 265 S.E.2d 581 (1980).

Replication insufficient to prevent liability for debt.

- Where it is alleged that an undertaking would violate this paragraph it is not sufficient to reply that the project will be a self-liquidating one and none of the money borrowed will ever be paid from the public treasury or from taxation. City of Valdosta v. Singleton, 197 Ga. 194, 28 S.E.2d 759 (1944).

Instance of nonapplicability of case.

- Lettice v. American Nat'l Bank, 133 Ga. 874, 67 S.E. 187 (1910) is fundamentally sound, but not applicable to the question of allowing interest on a lawful liquidated demand. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

Payment of past-due legal indebtedness.

- County commissioners may lawfully apply any part of the money borrowed under this paragraph to payment of past-due legal indebtedness of the county represented by outstanding and unpaid warrants issued prior to the year in which the loan is obtained. Atlanta Distrib. Terms., Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 Ga. 250, 170 S.E. 52 (1933) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Donation of county funds to nonpublic organizations prohibited.

- When the applicable revenue statutes were construed together with this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. VI), it was held that they did not confer power or authority on a county board of commissioners to donate county funds derived from taxation or from other sources to a chamber of commerce, freight bureau, or convention and tourist bureau even if such donations were intended to accomplish a lawful purpose. Atlanta Chamber of Commerce v. McRae, 174 Ga. 590, 163 S.E. 701 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

City's disavowal of cash transaction not countenanced by court.

- Direction of verdict against defendant city in a suit by architect and engineer for services rendered where municipality claimed that account sued on was not within its power to enter into, or to create a debt, was proper where there was no indication that the transactions in question were other than cash transactions. Mayor of Butler v. Duncan, 56 Ga. App. 539, 193 S.E. 365 (1937).

County must plan its entire school program so as not to overreach constitutionally mandated debt ceiling, but such a requirement does not forbid a contract to accept and teach children from other counties. Wilson v. Strange, 235 Ga. 156, 219 S.E.2d 88 (1975).

Cause for declaring election void and illegal.

- A bond election in a municipality located in a county where former Code 1933, §§ 34-1914 through 34-1917 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-576 through21-2-579) had been adopted, which election totally disregarded provisions of the Secret Ballot Law, could not be treated as a mere irregularity or noncompliance, but must be held to be cause for declaring the election void and illegal. State v. Carswell, 78 Ga. App. 84, 50 S.E.2d 621 (1945).

Debt created against municipality in absence of liability.

- Principle that a debt may be created against a municipal corporation even though no liability is placed upon the municipality which may be enforced in the future by the compulsory levy of taxes was applied. Cartledge v. City Council, 183 Ga. 414, 188 S.E. 675 (1936).

Contract between the county and the airport authority, which managed the airport, qualified as an enforceable intergovernmental agreement (IGA) that did not violate the Debt Clause in the Georgia Constitution because the IGA was between appropriate governmental entities; the agreement's term did not exceed 50 years; the agreement related to both the provision of services and the joint use of facilities as the airport authority agreed to manage and maintain the expanded taxiway, and the county, in return, agreed to provide funding and manage the debt required to be incurred to complete the expansion; and the agreement dealt with services and facilities about which the county had the authority to enter contracts. Avery v. State of Ga., 295 Ga. 630, 761 S.E.2d 56 (2014).

Expenditures for county pension fund.

- County's inclusion of the sheriff in its pension plan with county funds did not create a debt without the consent of the voters in violation of this paragraph. Malcom v. Newton County, 244 Ga. App. 464, 535 S.E.2d 824 (2000) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Contractor's services approved by voters.

- Multi-year contract a school district entered into with a contractor was enforceable and constitutionally valid because the contractor's breach of contract complaint alleged that the contractor's services under the contract were for projects that the county's voters had approved in a referendum for Educational Local Option Sales Tax funding. Greene County Sch. Dist. v. Circle Y Constr., Inc., 308 Ga. App. 837, 708 S.E.2d 692 (2011).

Borrowing power absolute grant.

- The exercise of the borrowing power is not conditioned upon there being a casual deficiency of revenue, but it is an absolute grant of power. Mayer v. Adams, 182 Ga. 524, 186 S.E. 420 (1936).

Difference in money owed.

- There is a difference between borrowing money to meet present or anticipated current expense, and discharging by tax levy liabilities for necessary past current expense, no matter how the liability arose. Southern Ry. v. Fulton County, 170 Ga. 248, 152 S.E. 567 (1930).

Majority required of actual voters.

- When this provision is viewed in the light of its background, it seems perfectly clear that it was intended to require only a majority of those actually voting, and not a majority of all the qualified voters of the county or municipality. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Voters ratification clause interpreted.

- The provision that no county, municipality, or division shall incur any new debt except for a temporary loan, "without the assent of a majority of the qualified voters of the county, municipality or other political subdivision voting in an election for that purpose to be held as prescribed by law," requires only that in order to authorize a proposed bond issue, a majority of those actually voting shall vote in favor thereof. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946).

Result in each case must be determined by a count of the ballots cast, and not by an inquiry as to the number not cast. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946).

Non-voters must abide by will of majority of voters.

- The general rule as to popular elections is that those who abstain from exercising the franchise are not regarded in declaring the results. By staying away from the polls, they virtually agree to abide by the will of the majority of those who attend and vote. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946).

Such are the plain words of it, and doubtless that was its true intent and meaning; otherwise, it would have said a majority of all of the qualified voters of such town or city, instead of saying, after a majority of the qualified voters of such town or city voting at an election held for the purpose. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946).

Proper test of the number of persons entitled to vote is the result of the election as determined by the ballot box. The courts will not go outside of that to inquire whether there were other persons entitled to vote who did not do so. McKnight v. City of Decatur, 200 Ga. 611, 37 S.E.2d 915 (1946).

Necessary determination in response to election fraud.

- Under former Code 1933, § 34-3101 (now O.C.G.A. § 21-2-522), providing that no election should be defeated for noncompliance with the requirements of the law, if held at the proper time and place by persons qualified to hold it, unless it was shown that, by such noncompliance, the result was different from what it would have been had there been proper compliance, and where it was not contended that the result of the election would have been different, it was unnecessary to determine whether an unspecified number of persons, whose names did not appear on the voters list for the last general election, were properly or improperly denied the right to vote in an election held for the purpose of authorizing a bond issue within a county school district. Pinion v. Walker County Sch. Dist., 203 Ga. 99, 45 S.E.2d 405 (1947).

Evidence insufficient to invalidate otherwise valid election.

- Where the election is regularly called and regularly held, and the voters freely and voluntarily exercise their right to vote, the election will not be invalidated simply because some of them may have been misled by someone interested in the result of the election. Burns v. Decatur County, 178 Ga. 275, 173 S.E. 127 (1934).

Bond election unaffected by allegations.

- Where there was submitted to the voters of a county the proposition of "issuing $500,000 bonds for paving," and an election properly called for the purpose of voting upon this question resulted in an approval by the voters of the issuance of these bonds, when there was not included in the submission any condition, or any assurance as to how the money should be spent, excepting it should be spent for paving the roads of the county, the people did not condition their support of the bond issue upon any representation contained in the submission, and any aliunde statement by members of the Board of Roads and Revenues (now County Commissioners) in no wise affected the validity of the vote for bonds, nor did the assurances of such board afford any ground of relief against the use of the bonds for the purpose stated in the submission, after the election had carried. Burns v. Decatur County, 178 Ga. 275, 173 S.E. 127 (1934).

Effect of contract not sanctioned by voters.

- A municipal water supply contract, not sanctioned by popular vote, is operative from year to year so long as neither party renounces or repudiates it. City Council v. Dawson Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696, 32 S.E. 907 (1899); Renfroe v. City of Atlanta, 140 Ga. 81, 78 S.E. 449, 45 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1173 (1913); McCrary Co. v. City of Glennville, 149 Ga. 431, 100 S.E. 362 (1919).

School districts are political divisions of the state, and therefore this paragraph is applicable to bond elections in school districts. There can be no valid state election, or any county or school district election for bonds, without registration. Terrell v. Forest Park Consol. Sch. Dist., 175 Ga. 88, 165 S.E. 122, answer conformed to, Terrell v. Forest Park Consol. Sch. Dist., 45 Ga. App. 713, 165 S.E. 757, and Yaeger v. Valley Point Consol. Sch. Dist., 45 Ga. App. 717, 165 S.E. 759 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Qualified voters having been ascertained under law, the constitution is mandatory that two-thirds (now majority) of them shall assent. Kacoonis v. City of Mt. View, 224 Ga. 151, 160 S.E.2d 364 (1968).

"Registered voter" defined.

- A registered voter under this paragraph is one who had been lawfully registered and who has the present right to vote. Persons merely entitled to be registered or those lawfully registered who have been disqualified to vote are not included. Daniel v. City of Claxton, 35 Ga. App. 107, 132 S.E. 411 (1926) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Unearned interest is not included. Epping v. City of Columbus, 117 Ga. 263, 43 S.E. 803 (1903), overruled on other grounds, Harrell v. Town of Whigham, 141 Ga. 322, 80 S.E. 1010 (1914).

Facts rendering contract void from inception.

- Where the continued existence of a contract is based upon the continued approval of the public authority making the contract, then such a contract does not clash with constitutional and statutory authority; but where the effect of the contract results in creating a debt, other than to supply casual deficiencies, without the approval of the voters and binds the future governing authorities, the contract is void from its inception. McElmurray v. Richmond County, 223 Ga. 47, 153 S.E.2d 427 (1967).

Voters' approval required for new debt.

- Agreement, which arranged a loan from the contractor to the city for funds necessary to construct a road, created a new debt which the city was obligated to repay regardless of whether the city had sufficient impact fees to reimburse the contractor and, thus, the unpaid debt obligation constituted a "new debt" which extended beyond the fiscal year and required voter approval. Fairgreen Capital, LLC v. City of Canton, 335 Ga. App. 719, 782 S.E.2d 46 (2016).

Municipal contract for property valuation.

- Paragraph is not violated by municipal contract for special services in valuing property for taxation. Such contract was held not to constitute a debt within the meaning of the section. Tietjen v. Mayor of Savannah, 161 Ga. 125, 129 S.E. 653 (1925) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Illegal diversion of bond money to purpose other than that specified, restrained. City of Fayetteville v. Huddleston, 165 Ga. 899, 142 S.E. 280 (1928). See Mathews v. Darby, 165 Ga. 509, 141 S.E. 304 (1928).

Issuance of notes in excess of limit.

- An issue of notes in excess of the limit allowed by this paragraph is void since the tax digest of the county will show the assessed valuation. The county cannot make recitals which will estop it from denying that the loan is in excess of the limit. Baker v. Rockdale County, 161 Ga. 245, 130 S.E. 814 (1925) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Anticipated income to be received by a county from the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) is not a tax of the character contemplated by this paragraph. Taylor v. Lovett, 184 Ga. 295, 191 S.E. 113 (1937) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Debt held created.

- Upon a proper construction of the proposed contract, giving due consideration to its substance and looking to the intention of the parties as revealed from the paper in its entirety, the obligations of the city would amount to the creation of a debt within the meaning of this paragraph. Byars v. City of Griffin, 168 Ga. 41, 147 S.E. 66 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Circumstance rendering sale of electric equipment debt of city.

- Where the proposed contract contemplates the sale of electric service, and the sale and installation by the company of electrical equipment, the electric service to be paid for monthly and the price of the equipment and installation with interest thereon to be paid monthly by the city giving credit each month on the franchise taxes due by the company, the sale of the equipment and its installation at a time when "the city has no surplus funds with which to pay and has not levied any tax for such purpose" would create a debt by the city within the meaning of this paragraph. Morton v. City of Waycross, 173 Ga. 298, 160 S.E. 330 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Contract between county and airport authority.

- Even though, under a contract between the county and an airport authority for use by the county of an expanded airport facility, the consideration to be paid by the county was not expressed in terms of a definite dollar amount, it was not an unconstitutional "new debt". The contract was a valid intergovernmental contract and the consideration represented the authority's lawful "revenue pledged to the payment of" the bonds. Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State, 265 Ga. 24, 453 S.E.2d 8 (1995).

Contract for construction of municipal lighting plant, payable by series of annual notes creates a debt. McCrary Co. v. City of Glennville, 149 Ga. 431, 100 S.E. 362 (1919); Dobbs v. Brumby, 150 Ga. 599, 104 S.E. 440 (1920).

Debt created.

- A contract by the governing officials of a county to purchase property for the county and to pay therefor with interest-bearing warrants falling due for several years in the future is a debt within the meaning of this paragraph. Dancer v. Shingler, 147 Ga. 82, 92 S.E. 935 (1917) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Debt created by implied promise.

- A cash contract for current supplies to carry on a legitimate business of a city may be enforced upon theory of an implied promise. Town of Whigham v. Gulf Ref. Co., 20 Ga. App. 427, 93 S.E. 238 (1917).

O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13, which authorizes municipalities to enter into multiyear lease purchase contracts for the acquisition of goods so long as the contract provides that it shall terminate absolutely and without further obligation at the close of the calendar year unless renewed, is constitutional. Barkley v. City of Rome, 259 Ga. 355, 381 S.E.2d 34 (1989).

Short term loan valid.

- Short term loan from bank was a valid exercise of the city's temporary borrowing powers under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. XI, Sec. V, Para. V since none of the enumerated limitations on the constitutional authority of a municipality to engage in temporary borrowing precluded the city from executing the tax anticipation note as security for the loan from the bank, and since the city certified in the loan package that loan proceeds would be used to pay its then current expenses. City of Bremen v. Regions Bank, 274 Ga. 733, 559 S.E.2d 440 (2002).

Sewer project.

- After a trial court required two intervenors to post a bond of $625,000 with regard to their challenge to the public improvement bond approved by a city's building authority for a sewer project, the trial court properly validated the bond by following all necessary procedural requirements and the bond did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a) since the city's payment for the use of the sewer project was a debt specifically authorized under the constitution pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a). Berry v. City of E. Point, 277 Ga. App. 649, 627 S.E.2d 391 (2006).

County treasurer carries burden of proof of county's inability to become obligated on debt.

- Where a county treasurer in a mandamus suit to compel payment of a warrant issued by the county raises the issue of an attempt, to create a debt as inhibited by the Constitution, on the basis of insufficient funds on hand or inability to levy lawful tax during the year to raise funds for payment of the contract price of the machinery purchased with the warrant, the burden of proof is on the treasurer. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

Legitimate expenses.

- An expense may be incurred without creating a debt provided there are sufficient funds in the treasury, or the current tax will produce that amount. Butts County v. Jackson Banking Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S.E. 149, 121 Am. St. R. 244, 15 L.R.A. (n.s.) 567 (1907); Tate v. Elberton, 136 Ga. 301, 71 S.E. 420 (1911); City of Jeffersonville v. Cotton States Belting & Supply Co., 30 Ga. App. 470, 118 S.E. 442 (1923); Rawls v. City of Jonesboro, 212 Ga. 734, 95 S.E.2d 657 (1956).

Nonallegation of dischargeable debt out of taxes for year in which liability incurred results in nonviolation of paragraph.

- Where it is not alleged anywhere in the petition that the liability created by the contracts cannot be discharged in full out of taxes which could be lawfully levied and collected by the defendant city during the current year in which the liability was incurred, there is no violation of this paragraph. Rawls v. City of Jonesboro, 212 Ga. 734, 95 S.E.2d 657 (1956) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Prohibited debt not created.

- No prohibited debt is created if obligation of county can be met during year either by money on hand which can lawfully be used, or by levy of sufficient tax for the purpose, the tax being one which the county itself may levy, calculated to raise a definite sum, and uncertain only in the possible failure to collect. Austin-Western Rd. Mach. Co. v. Fayette County, 99 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1938).

Money cannot be borrowed on ground that other sources of revenue exist. Tate v. Elberton, 136 Ga. 301, 71 S.E. 420 (1911).

Contracting debt with anticipated non-tax revenues prohibited.

- County officers have no right to contract a debt on the ground that anticipated revenues from sources other than taxation can be used to discharge such indebtedness. Vincent v. MacNeill, 186 Ga. 427, 198 S.E. 68 (1938).

Note given for money borrowed in anticipation of taxes is not enforceable against a county. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Wilcox County, 284 F. 856 (S.D. Ga. 1922), aff'd, 287 F. 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 755, 43 S. Ct. 703, 67 L. Ed. 1217 (1923).

Incurring debt for construction of public roads.

- County commissioners may incur a debt, when too late to levy a tax, for purchase of necessary tools or implements to aid in construction of a public road. Pennington v. Gammon, 67 Ga. 456 (1881); Garrison v. Perkins, 137 Ga. 744, 74 S.E. 541 (1912).

County authorities have power to install telephones or to cause them to be installed at courthouses, jails, or pauper farms. Wright v. Floyd County, 1 Ga. App. 582, 58 S.E. 72 (1907); Wood v. Vienna Tel. Co., 8 Ga. App. 209, 68 S.E. 872 (1910).

County may, without being said to create a debt, contract for materials and machinery for necessary improvement of public roads to be paid for out of the available funds in the hands of the treasurer, or out of the proceeds of taxes that have been, or may be lawfully levied during the year in which the contract is made. Taylor v. Lovett, 184 Ga. 295, 191 S.E. 113 (1937).

Former Rural Roads Authority Acts.

- Provision of former Rural Roads Authority Act (now Georgia Highway Authority Act, O.C.G.A. Art. 1, Ch. 10, T. 32) that required county authorities to maintain roads did not violate this paragraph dealing with the creation of debts, since counties are granted authority to build and maintain roads and to levy taxes for such purposes. State v. Georgia Rural Rds. Auth., 211 Ga. 808, 89 S.E.2d 204 (1955) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

A contract by city made in pursuance of Ga. L. 1937, p. 697, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 8) does not create a debt within the meaning of this paragraph which prevents a municipality, except under certain conditions, from incurring a debt. Williamson v. Housing Auth., 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Contract does not necessarily constitute incurring a debt within the meaning of the debt limitation provision of the Constitution, even if the contract calls for the rendering of service beyond the year in which the contract is made. Macon Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Snow Properties, Inc., 218 Ga. 262, 127 S.E.2d 598 (1962).

Available proceeds of bond issue at time of contract sufficient to prevent debt.

- Where a contract for construction of power dam was within the powers of a county power commission as prescribed in a local constitutional amendment, and at the time of its making the commission had available the entire proceeds of a bond issue authorized for the construction, the contract created no debt against the county in the sense of the Constitution. Crisp County v. S.J. Grove & Sons Co., 73 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1934) (decided under Ga. Const., Art. VII, Sec. VII, Para. I of Const. of 1877).

Municipality liable under the common honesty rule.

- Where it appears that a municipality was authorized to contract with a power company to furnish water services for the benefit of the municipality, but no valid, express contract was entered into between the parties, although the municipality over a period of years received such services for which it was authorized to contract, the municipality is liable for the reasonable value of such services so received for a period of years, next preceding the filing of the suit, not barred by the statute of limitations. In such event, under what is generally known as "the common honesty rule" the law implies a promise to pay for the reasonable value of the services received. City of Eastman v. Georgia Power Co., 69 Ga. App. 182, 25 S.E.2d 47 (1943).

Municipality liability based on new promise to pay old debt.

- Where a city and a power company attempted to extend a yearly contract for electrical service over a period of years and neither party repudiated the contract, but the power company furnished the electricity for street lighting purposes and the municipality accepted and used the services, the municipality is liable for the value, the contract price, for each year the current was received and used. The execution and delivery of a warrant covering the value of the amount so used over a period of years, while having some elements of accord and satisfaction, was not the creation of a debt prohibited by this paragraph, but a new promise to pay the same old debt. City of Eastman v. Georgia Power Co., 69 Ga. App. 182, 25 S.E.2d 47 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Assets or indebtedness due a municipality cannot be deducted from its bonded indebtedness and taken into consideration in computing its total bonded indebtedness under this paragraph limiting such bonded indebtedness to 7 percent of the assessed value of the taxable property within the municipality. Miles v. State, 96 Ga. App. 610, 101 S.E.2d 173 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Rule governing total bonded indebtedness of school district.

- In computing total bonded indebtedness of a school district for determining whether it exceeds the limitation imposed by this paragraph, outstanding bonded indebtedness cannot be reduced by the amount credited against it in a sinking fund for the purpose of redeeming outstanding bonds, but which has not actually been used for that purpose. Miles v. State, 96 Ga. App. 610, 101 S.E.2d 173 (1957).

County-wide school districts as successors to local school districts can incur bonded indebtedness independently.

- Upon the merger by the General Assembly of local school districts, in harmony with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I) into county-wide school districts, the new county-wide district would likewise constitute a separate political entity and could do so as a unit that which its previous component parts could have done separately, and could therefore incur a bonded indebtedness independent of any indebtedness for general authorized county purposes. Pinion v. Walker County Sch. Dist., 203 Ga. 99, 45 S.E.2d 405 (1947).

Consolidated county school district is a separate political division of this state such as is authorized to incur a bonded indebtedness up to 7 percent of the assessed valuation of its taxable property, independent of and in addition to any outstanding bonded indebtedness incurred by any of its component former local school districts prior to their merger into a county-wide school district. Pinion v. Walker County Sch. Dist., 203 Ga. 99, 45 S.E.2d 405 (1947).

Construction of percentage of assessed valuation of taxable property ceiling.

- While the Constitution does not specifically say so, yet the frequently applied construction of this provision is that each separate political division of the state which has authority to issue bonds is authorized to incur an indebtedness up to 7 percent (10 percent) of the assessed valuation of its taxable property independently of any existing indebtedness of another district and separate municipality or other political body whose territory might be coextensive in whole or in part with that of its own. Pinion v. Walker County Sch. Dist., 203 Ga. 99, 45 S.E.2d 405 (1947).

County-wide school district in computing amount of indebtedness authorized to incur not required to consider former local districts' ceilings.

- Since it was not contended that county school district incurred the bonded indebtedness of its former local school districts, and in the absence of specific legal statutory or constitutional provision requiring the new county-wide school district to assume payment of any outstanding bonded indebtedness of its former local school districts, it follows that the county school district was not required to take into account any indebtedness of its former local school districts in computing the amount of indebtedness which it was authorized to incur, and as an independent political entity, it could incur indebtedness independent of and in addition to that outstanding in its former local school districts. Pinion v. Walker County Sch. Dist., 203 Ga. 99, 45 S.E.2d 405 (1947).

Payment to competing company to cease operation not debt.

- Georgia Laws 1906, p. 846 did not authorize the board, after it had built and equipped an electric-light and waterworks plant, to pay $15,000.00 to a competing company to "quit operating its electric-light plant in the city." Brumby v. Board of Lights & Waterworks, 147 Ga. 592, 95 S.E. 7 (1918).

Payment for city street paving not debt.

- Under the allegations of the petition as amended, the city did not create a debt in providing for the payment of the cost of paving the streets in violation of this paragraph. City Council v. Thomas, 159 Ga. 435, 126 S.E. 144, 39 A.L.R. 1317 (1924); Faver v. Mayor of Washington, 159 Ga. 568, 126 S.E. 464 (1925). See also Citizens Bank v. Rockdale County, 152 Ga. 711, 111 S.E. 434 (1922) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Lease purchase agreement to finance new courthouse not a debt.

- There is no distinction in O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 between real and personal property and the strictures on leases for each class of property are the same; similarly, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a), providing for popular vote on the assumption of debt, makes no distinction between the two classes of property. Therefore, a county's decision to enter a lease purchase agreement with the Association of County Commissioners of Georgia to finance and construct a new courthouse was not a debt requiring a vote under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a) and was in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 because it did not require future county commissioners to renew the contract, it allowed the county to terminate its financial obligations at the end of each calendar year, and it would never require the county to expend more than would be legally available under O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13. Bauerband v. Jackson County, 278 Ga. 222, 598 S.E.2d 444 (2004).

Implied debt not raised upon void contract.

- When property is received by a municipality or its commission under a contract which is void and unenforceable, by reason of a violation of this paragraph, the law does not raise an implied undertaking to pay therefor. Board of Lights & Waterworks v. Niller, 155 Ga. 296, 116 S.E. 835 (1923); A.L. Greenburg Iron Co. v. City of Abbeville, 2 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1924). Compare Butts County v. Jackson Banking Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S.E. 149, 121 Am. St. R. 244, 15 L.R.A. (n.s.) 567 (1907) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Instance of no debt created by expending county funds.

- A county may, without being said to create a debt within the meaning of the Constitution, contract for materials, consisting of machinery, for use in the necessary improvement of a public road, to be paid for out of available funds in the hands of the treasurer, or out of the proceeds of taxes that have been or may be lawfully levied during the year in which the contract is made. Neal & Son v. Burch, 173 Ga. 840, 162 S.E. 135 (1931); Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

Interest accruable on county warrant issued to vendor incidental and not debt.

- Where purchase price of machinery for necessary improvement of public roads becomes a liquidated demand, as by issuance of a county warrant drawn on the county treasurer by the county commissioners, payable to the vendor for the purchase price, interest which may thereafter lawfully accrue upon the warrant is incidental, and is not to be counted as part of the debt for which the warrant was issued. Marion County v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 Ga. 263, 18 S.E.2d 475 (1942).

Southwest Georgia Regional Housing Authority was not a county, municipality, or political division within meaning of this paragraph, and, therefore, its obligations would not be debts of a county, municipality, or political division within the purview of that provision. Stegall v. Southwest Ga. Regional Hous. Auth., 197 Ga. 571, 30 S.E.2d 196 (1944) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Municipality not liable for indebtedness contracted pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I and Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36. - Liability against a municipality arising out of and by virtue of any contract made by such municipality with an engineering company, entered into pursuant to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I) and the Revenue Bond Law, Ga. L. 1937, p. 761 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), is not an indebtedness of the municipality which can be paid and satisfied out of the general tax fund or other general funds of the municipality. City of Royston v. Littrell Eng'g Co., 87 Ga. App. 903, 75 S.E.2d 678 (1953).

Municipality not liable under nonexistent community improvement district.

- Municipality was not liable in a three-party arrangement among itself, a bank, and a land developer for breach of a mere agreement to create a community improvement district where the municipality had never been officially designated by the legislature as its administrative body, and where in any event, no such improvement plan existed. Circle H Dev., Inc. v. City of Woodstock, 206 Ga. App. 473, 425 S.E.2d 891 (1992).

This paragraph was not violated by Ga. L. 1905, p. 100, increasing salary of city judge. Clark v. Eve, 134 Ga. 788, 68 S.E. 598 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Former Code 1933, Ch. 23-25, authorizing creation of drainage districts, did not violate this paragraph. Almand v. Pate, 143 Ga. 711, 85 S.E. 909 (1915) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Ga. L. 1921, p. 676, extending city limits of Atlanta, did not violate this paragraph. Davidson v. Town of Kirkwood, 152 Ga. 357, 110 S.E. 154 (1921) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Ga. L. 1919, p. 821, authorizing issuance of street improvement bonds, did not violate this paragraph. City of Valdosta v. Harris, 156 Ga. 490, 119 S.E. 625 (1923); Walthour v. City of Atlanta, 157 Ga. 24, 120 S.E. 613 (1925) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Executions for paving assessments valid.

- Because under the law the city was authorized to issue executions for paving assessments due and payable in installments upon installments becoming due and unpaid, and was not authorized or required to issue executions to enforce the collection of such installments before they became in default; and the general statutes relating to dormancy of executions not having application until arrival of the time for issuance of executions on such assessments, and the executions in the instant case having been issued and levied, and the injunction suit brought to restrain their enforcement, within seven years from the arrival of the time for the issuance of such executions, they are not dormant, but are of full force and effect. Webb v. City of Atlanta, 186 Ga. 430, 198 S.E. 50 (1938).

Municipality contracting to lease land to corporation provided lessee supply medical and surgical treatment to city's indigents not unconstitutional.

- A contract between a municipality and another corporation for a lease, for a term of 35 years, of land owned by the municipality, in consideration of care of the poor of the city by the lessee to the extent of supplying specified medical and surgical treatment in a clinic or hospital existing on such land, is not unlawful as violating any of the provisions of the Constitution. Aven v. Steiner Cancer Hosp., 189 Ga. 126, 5 S.E.2d 356 (1939).

City's multiyear lease purchase contract for equipment did not constitute a "debt" within the meaning of this paragraph and, therefore, did not require voter approval. Barkley v. City of Rome, 259 Ga. 355, 381 S.E.2d 34 (1989) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Property owners not due abatement on street improvement contract accepted by city because of defect in repair.

- Where repaving is done on city streets, and the city accepts the repaving, and by reason of a "latent" defect the paving becomes broken and cracked, and the contractor repairs the pavement under the contract guaranteeing the pavement for five years, and the city accepts the pavement as repaired, such acceptance, in the absence of fraud, is binding upon the property owners; and the presence of such defects in the paving will not be cause for abatement of the balance of the installments of the assessments for the cost of repaving them unpaid, on ground that the property owners have paid all that the repaving is worth. Webb v. City of Atlanta, 186 Ga. 430, 198 S.E. 50 (1938).

Construction of school administration, maintenance, and storage facilities.

- Proceeds of general obligation bonds issued under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-430 and20-2-431 may not be used for school administration, maintenance, and storage facilities, but bonds may be issued for such purposes upon compliance by the county school board with the notice and purpose requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-82-1 et seq. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-12.

"Debt" defined.

- Debt, as used in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. I) and this paragraph, which forms the basis of the restriction upon public debt, means incurring of a fiscal liability not to be discharged by taxes levied within the year in which the liability is undertaken. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-19 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Revenue anticipation obligations are not subject to debt limitation clause in this paragraph. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-54.

Word "casual" means that which happens by accident or is brought about by an unknown cause; the framers of the Constitution, in using this language, meant some unforeseen or unexpected deficiency, or an insufficiency of funds to meet some unforeseen and necessary expense. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 138 (decided under Ga. Const. 1945, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Para. I).

Creation of pension and retirement plans as prior service obligations of cities and counties is constitutional; a prior obligation of a municipality does or does not constitute a "debt" within the debt limitation placed upon municipalities under this paragraph. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 355.

Environmental loans exempt from debt limitations.

- Loans made by the Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority to local governments pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a), the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause, are not subject to the debt limitations of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-6.

Debts cannot be secured for periods exceeding one year.

- A county or other political subdivision may not legally incur ordinary indebtedness, secured or unsecured, for periods exceeding one year, without assent of a majority of the qualified voters of the county or other political subdivision voting in an election for that purpose to be held as prescribed by law. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-160.

School bond election called by a county board of education may be held concurrently with the general election. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-9.

Counties and municipalities may incur debts, including bank loans, if approved by a majority of the qualified voters. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-51.

Approval of majority of qualified voters participating in election is required to incur debt, rather than approval of majority of all qualified voters. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 491.

"Special" and "general" registration defined.

- The Supreme Court of this state has defined special registration in the following terms: ". . . A special registration as distinguished from a general registration is one designed for a particular election and which becomes functus officio when the election under which it was held has been had, that is to say, when the registration cannot be used for any other purpose. A general registration is one made up under general rules . . . ." 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 217.

Four year contract created debt.

- A city cannot legally enter into a contract with the Superintendent of Schools for a period or term of four years without creating a debt of the municipality in violation of this paragraph; however, a city may enter into a contract with the Superintendent for a period of one year, provided that at the time there is a sufficient sum in the treasury which may be lawfully used to pay the liability incurred, or if a sufficient amount to discharge the liability can be raised by taxation during the current year. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 186.

Single year lease payable from anticipated income not debt.

- A lease agreement for a term of a single year involving nothing more than expenditure of income anticipated during the year from taxes and appropriations would not under this paragraph create a "debt." 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-33 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Rental payments grossly in excess of reasonably considered fair rental value indicative of disguised conditional sale.

- A lease agreement whereunder a county school board leases school buses for a single year is not on its face illegal because such agreement also gives the school board three one-year renewal options coupled with a purchase option exercisable at the end of the final renewal period; such an agreement might be subject to attack, however, the yearly "rental payments" are so grossly in excess of what reasonably could be considered to be the "fair rental value" of the buses as to lead to a conclusion that the transaction, while disguised as a lease plus purchase option, is essentially a "conditional sale." 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-33.

Extending payment beyond fiscal year.

- Area Vocational-Technical School Board may not borrow money to be repaid to lender over period of time extending beyond fiscal year in which loan was made. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-19.

City governing authorities cannot obligate city for equipment in an amount in excess of their annual anticipated revenue. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 492.

Inclusion of personal property in assessing value of taxable property.

- In computing the assessed value of taxable property for the purpose of determining the amount of bonds a municipal corporation may issue, personal property above the $300.00 exemption should be included. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 411.

"The assessed value of all the taxable property therein" refers to net digest of county or other political subdivision and not to gross digest minus personal property exemptions. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-54.

Limitations on total debt.

- This paragraph through Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. V) create limitations on total debt which may be incurred by any county, and no debt may be incurred which exceeds those limitations. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-12 (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Paras. I through IV; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I).

Loans by Department of Natural Resources and Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority.

- Loans by the Department of Natural Resources pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-5-38.1 and loans by the Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-23-1 et seq. do not cause a city or county to incur debt in accordance with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I. The constitutional underpinning of these programs is in the intergovernmental contract clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a). Thus, the procedural requirements in O.C.G.A. § 48-8-111 for submitting a debt question are not triggered where proceeds derived from the sales tax are to be applied to repayment of the loans by the Department of Natural Resources or Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-7.

Authority of Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority and city of Atlanta regarding loans.

- The Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority is statutorily empowered to make the administrative and policy determinations requiring the city of Atlanta to pledge its full faith and credti as security for a loan from the Authority, there are no constitutional prohibitions upon the city pledging its full faith and credit for such a loan, and a referendum is not required prior to the city making the pledge. 2004 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-8.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 522, 541, 567 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 304 et seq. 64A C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 2030 et seq.

ALR.

- Obligation for local improvements as within municipal debt limit, 33 A.L.R. 1415.

Application to permanent improvements of constitutional or statutory provision against county or municipality exceeding current revenue, 41 A.L.R. 790.

Power of municipality to mortgage or pledge its property or income therefrom, 71 A.L.R. 828.

Lease of property by municipality or other political subdivision, with option to purchase same, as evasion of constitutional or statutory limitation of indebtedness, 71 A.L.R. 1318; 145 A.L.R. 1362.

Pledge or appropriation of revenue from utility or other property in payment therefor, as indebtedness within constitutional or statutory limitation of indebtedness of municipality or other political subdivision, 72 A.L.R. 687; 96 A.L.R. 1385; 146 A.L.R. 328.

Power of state or municipality to appropriate funds or incur indebtedness, in excess of poor fund, for relief of distress due to general unemployment or other unusual conditions, 73 A.L.R. 699; 87 A.L.R. 371.

Referendum of general legislative act to people in absence of constitutional requirement in that regard, 76 A.L.R. 1053.

Constitutionality, construction, application, and effect of statute requiring judicial approval before issuance or sale of municipal or county bonds or obligations, 87 A.L.R. 706; 102 A.L.R. 90.

Obligation to meet which money is appropriated at the time of its creation as an indebtedness within limitation of indebtedness, 92 A.L.R. 1299; 134 A.L.R. 1399.

Constitutional or statutory debt limit as affected by existence of separate political units with identical or overlapping boundaries, 94 A.L.R. 818.

Constitutional or statutory limitation of municipal indebtedness or tax rate for municipal purposes as applied to liability for tort or judgment based on tort, 94 A.L.R. 937.

Allowance to contractor for extras in accordance with provisions of contract made before debt limit was reached, as creation of indebtedness within meaning of debt limit provisions, 96 A.L.R. 397.

Validity of municipal bond issue for purpose of paying employees, 96 A.L.R. 1204.

Pledge or appropriation of revenue from utility or other property in payment therefor as indebtedness within constitutional or statutory limitation of indebtedness of municipality or other political subdivision, 96 A.L.R. 1385; 146 A.L.R. 328; 146 A.L.R. 328.

Funding or refunding obligations as subject to conditions respecting limitation of indebtedness or approval by voters, 97 A.L.R. 442.

Limitation of power to tax as limitation of power to incur indebtedness or vice versa, 97 A.L.R. 1103.

Liability imposed upon municipality or its property by an independent political unit on account of the benefit to the former's property from a local improvement as a debt of the municipality within constitutional debt limit, 98 A.L.R. 749.

Interest on indebtedness of municipality as part of debt within constitutional or statutory debt limitation, 100 A.L.R. 610.

Constitutionality, construction, application, and effect of statute requiring or authorizing judicial or administrative approval before issuance or sale of municipal bonds, 102 A.L.R. 90.

Limitation of municipal indebtedness as affected by combination or merger of two or more municipalities, 103 A.L.R. 154.

Installments payable under continuing service contract as present indebtedness within organic limitation of municipal indebtedness, 103 A.L.R. 1160.

Municipal debt limit as affected by obligations to municipality, 105 A.L.R. 687.

Power of Legislature to add to or make more onerous the conditions or limitations prescribed by Constitution upon incurring public debts, 106 A.L.R. 231.

Constitutional or statutory provision limiting state or municipal indebtedness or taxation or regulating issuance of bonds as affecting bonds or other obligations authorized but not delivered prior to adoption or effective date of the provision, 109 A.L.R. 961.

Debts incurred for school purposes as part of municipal indebtedness, for purposes of debt limitation, 111 A.L.R. 544.

Aggregate of rent for entire period of lease of property to municipality as present indebtedness for purposes of condition of incurring, or limitation of amount of, municipal debt, 112 A.L.R. 278.

What are "necessary expenses" within exception in constitutional or statutory provision requiring vote of people to authorize contracting of debt by municipality, county, or other political body, or limiting amount of such indebtedness, 113 A.L.R. 1202.

Existing sinking fund as a factor in determining whether indebtedness or proposed indebtedness of municipality or other political subdivision exceeds constitutional or statutory limit, 125 A.L.R. 1393.

Construction and application of constitutional or statutory provision which limits public indebtedness with reference to period of usefulness of purpose or object, 127 A.L.R. 1216.

Constitutionality of statute validating bonds or other obligations of public body in excess of debt limitation, 132 A.L.R. 1388.

Lease of property by municipality or other political subdivision, with option to purchase same, as evasion of constitutional or statutory limitation of indebtedness, 145 A.L.R. 1362.

Pledge or appropriation of revenue from utility or other property in payment therefor, as indebtedness within constitutional or statutory limitation of indebtedness of municipality or other political subdivision, 146 A.L.R. 328.

Meaning of term "assessment" or "assessed valuation" when used as basis of tax or debt limit, 156 A.L.R. 594.

Subsequent exhaustion of funds as affecting contract validly entered into by political subdivision under constitutional provision limiting indebtedness to revenues for current year, 159 A.L.R. 1261.

What constitutes separate and independent political units within the rule permitting separate computation of constitutional debt limit notwithstanding overlapping or identical boundaries, 171 A.L.R. 729.

Right of creditor of public body to full or pro rata payment when fund out of which obligation is payable is insufficient to pay all like obligations of equal dignity, 171 A.L.R. 1033.

Validity, within authorized debt, tax, or voted limit, of bond issue in excess of amount permitted by law, 175 A.L.R. 823.

Validity of municipal bond issue as against owners of property annexation of which to municipality became effective after date of election at which issue was approved by voters, 10 A.L.R.2d 559.

Presumptions and burden of proof as to violation of or compliance with public debt limitation, 16 A.L.R.2d 515.

Inclusion of tax-exempt property in determining value of taxable property for debt limit purposes, 30 A.L.R.2d 903.

Power of legislative body to amend, repeal, or abrogate initiative or referendum measure, or to enact measure defeated on referendum, 33 A.L.R.2d 1118.

Rescission of vote authorizing school district or other municipal bond issue, expenditure, or tax, 68 A.L.R.2d 1041.

Construction and application of constitutional or statutory provisions expressly excepting certain laws from referendum, 100 A.L.R.2d 314.

Validity of governmental borrowing or expenditure for purposes of acquiring, maintaining, or improving stadium for use of professional athletic team, 67 A.L.R.3d 1186.

Requirement that public contract be awarded on competitive bidding as applicable to contract for public utility, 81 A.L.R.3d 979.