Definition of liberty.

- Liberty, as used in this paragraph, is not confined to detention of the person, but embraces every inalienable right of the citizen. Jenkins v. State, 14 Ga. App. 276, 80 S.E. 688 (1914).

Nolle prosequi entered after jeopardy attached amounts to acquittal. Reynolds v. State, 3 Ga. 53 (1847); Franklin v. State, 85 Ga. 570, 11 S.E. 876 (1890).

No applicability of former jeopardy concept to certain traffic violations.

- The constitutional concept of former jeopardy has a strict application to criminal prosecutions only, and will not be invoked when the traffic violations resulting in the mandatory suspension of a driver's license are subsequently included in a determination of the driver's status as a habitual offender. Williams v. State, 138 Ga. App. 662, 226 S.E.2d 816 (1976).

Distinction between successive prosecutions for speeding and for driving under influence.

- When a motorist is charged with speeding and driving under the influence in two counties, the motorist may be tried and convicted in both counties for speeding, but a conviction for driving under the influence in one county will bar prosecution in the other as this charge arises out of the same conduct in both counties. State v. Willis, 149 Ga. App. 509, 254 S.E.2d 743 (1979).

Statutes expand proscription of double jeopardy.

- The 1968 Georgia Criminal Code expanded the proscription of double jeopardy beyond that provided for in the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Therefore, questions of double jeopardy in Georgia must now be determined under the expanded statutory proscriptions of former Code 1933, §§ 26-505, 26-506, 26-507 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-6,16-1-7, and16-1-8). Consequently, previous Georgia decisions applying constitutional standards of double jeopardy will generally not be applicable. State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 206 S.E.2d 475 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006); State v. Warren, 133 Ga. App. 793, 213 S.E.2d 53 (1975).

Effect of jeopardy and statute of limitations on subsequent prosecutions when previous general accusation.

- When a case belongs to the class of cases, such as possession of nontax-paid liquor when the state by the generality of the indictment need not be confined to proof of any specific date or transaction within the period of limitation, the result is that a plea of nolo contendere for a prior particular crime will usually operate as a bar for any such offense committed within the period of limitation previously to the second indictment, since to hold otherwise would twice place the defendant in jeopardy. Key v. State, 83 Ga. App. 839, 65 S.E.2d 278 (1951).

Following defendant's conviction in superior court under an accusation which charged the defendant in general terms with the possession of alcoholic liquors, such conviction would operate as a bar to another prosecution for the same offense committed at any time within the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the accusation. Gilstrap v. State, 90 Ga. App. 12, 81 S.E.2d 872 (1954).

When the state by the generality of the accusation is not confined to proof of any specific date or transaction within the period of the statute of limitations, the result is that a prosecution for a particular crime operates as a bar for any such offense committed within the period of limitation prior to the return of the accusation. Hawks v. State, 94 Ga. App. 594, 95 S.E.2d 764 (1956).

Defendant in jeopardy for second time when trial for lesser included offense.

- When the conviction or acquittal is upon an indictment covering no more than one of the smaller crimes included within a larger, since it is impossible one should be convicted of the larger without being also convicted of the smaller, thus, if one has been so found guilty or not guilty of the smaller, one is, when on trial for the larger, in jeopardy a second time for the offense, namely, the smaller offense. Jordan v. State, 75 Ga. App. 815, 44 S.E.2d 821 (1947).

No error in proceeding upon subsequent indictment in criminal case while previous indictment is still pending. Lastinger v. State, 84 Ga. App. 760, 67 S.E.2d 411 (1951).

In a criminal proceeding, the pendency of a former indictment for the same offense is no ground for a plea in abatement or in bar, although the accused may have been arraigned thereon and have filed a plea, as when several indictments for the same offense are pending against the same person, it is immaterial upon which the accused is first tried. Whenever the accused has been acquitted or convicted upon any one of them, the accused can plead such acquittal or conviction in bar of a prosecution of the others. Lastinger v. State, 84 Ga. App. 760, 67 S.E.2d 411 (1951).

The pendency of a prior indictment for the same offense based on the same facts for which the defendant was arraigned on and entered a plea did not place the defendant in jeopardy. Defendant did not face a repeated prosecution simply because the defendant was tried on a subsequent indictment. Hubbard v. State, 225 Ga. App. 154, 483 S.E.2d 115 (1997).

No former jeopardy when trial under void accusation.

- A plea of former jeopardy cannot be predicated on the fact that the defendant has previously been put on trial under a void accusation, that accusation being an absolute nullity, the defendant could not waive defects therein and consent that the trial proceed. Culpepper v. State, 44 Ga. App. 351, 161 S.E. 849 (1931).

Constitutions control rights when successive prosecutions involved.

- When successive municipal and state prosecutions are involved, a criminal defendant's rights are controlled solely by the state and federal Constitutions. State v. Burroughs, 244 Ga. 288, 260 S.E.2d 5 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 448 U.S. 903, 100 S. Ct. 3044, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1134 (1980).

Double jeopardy does not preclude use of acquitted crime as ground for probation revocation.

- The principle of double jeopardy does not preclude the use of a crime, for which a probationer has been acquitted by a jury, as a ground for revocation of probation. Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 242 S.E.2d 53, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881, 99 S. Ct. 221, 58 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1978).

Retrial on count quashed for second time controlled by statute.

- Retrial of a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon would not itself violate double jeopardy or any other constitutional right since the right not to be prosecuted on a count which was quashed for the second time was purely statutory pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-53.1. Langlands v. State, 282 Ga. 103, 646 S.E.2d 253 (2007).

Venue.

- Venue is jurisdictional in Georgia so as to allow its being raised by general grounds of motion for new trial, but it does not go to guilt or innocence of accused and this is not substantive such that jeopardy attaches. Patterson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 455, 291 S.E.2d 567 (1982).

Because the state failed to prove the element of venue beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no indication in the record that the juvenile waived the requirement or that the court took judicial notice of venue as an element of the offenses charged, the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency had to be reversed. However, although the delinquency adjudications had to be reversed, the state was permitted to retry the juvenile without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, because there was otherwise sufficient evidence at trial to support the adjudications entered. In the Interest of J.B., 289 Ga. App. 617, 658 S.E.2d 194 (2008).

Obtaining controlled substance by theft and theft by taking.

- After the defendant's obtaining a controlled substance by theft conviction was reversed, the defendant's plea in bar to the state's subsequent indictment of the defendant for obtaining a controlled substance by theft was improperly denied because, although constitutional jeopardy did not attach to the obtaining a controlled substance by theft count in the former prosecution as that offense was not within the jurisdiction of the trial court as a result of the state's failure to indict it, constitutional jeopardy did attach to the misdemeanor theft by taking count, and thus double jeopardy prevented a subsequent prosecution of offenses arising from the same transaction, including the obtaining a controlled substance by theft count. Goodwin v. State, 341 Ga. App. 530, 802 S.E.2d 3 (2017).

Cited in Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206, 135 S.E. 748 (1926); Cliett v. State, 167 Ga. 835, 147 S.E. 35 (1929); Hall v. State, 41 Ga. App. 455, 153 S.E. 534 (1930); State v. B'Gos, 175 Ga. 627, 165 S.E. 566 (1932); Burns v. State, 191 Ga. 60, 11 S.E.2d 350 (1940); Williams v. State, 66 Ga. App. 93, 17 S.E.2d 83 (1941); Manry v. State, 77 Ga. App. 43, 47 S.E.2d 817 (1948); Dodd v. State, 85 Ga. App. 589, 69 S.E.2d 784 (1952); McGraw v. State, 85 Ga. App. 857, 70 S.E.2d 141 (1952); Massey v. State, 222 Ga. 143, 149 S.E.2d 118 (1966); Harwell v. State, 230 Ga. 480, 197 S.E.2d 708 (1973); Marchman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 677, 209 S.E.2d 88 (1974); Singer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 416, 274 S.E.2d 612 (1980); Walker v. State, 156 Ga. App. 478, 274 S.E.2d 680 (1980); State v. Abdi, 162 Ga. App. 20, 288 S.E.2d 772 (1982); Swafford v. State, 161 Ga. App. 139, 291 S.E.2d 3 (1982); Brooks v. State, 162 Ga. App. 485, 292 S.E.2d 89 (1982); State v. Hightower, 252 Ga. 220, 312 S.E.2d 610 (1984); Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 340 S.E.2d 263 (1986); Riley v. State, 181 Ga. App. 667, 353 S.E.2d 598 (1987); Eidson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 321, 355 S.E.2d 691 (1987); Cox v. State, 203 Ga. App. 869, 418 S.E.2d 133 (1992); Johnson v. State, 258 Ga. App. 33, 572 S.E.2d 669 (2002); Bentley v. State, 262 Ga. App. 541, 586 S.E.2d 32 (2003); Seymour v. State, 262 Ga. App. 823, 586 S.E.2d 713 (2003); Usher v. State, 290 Ga. App. 710, 659 S.E.2d 920 (2008); Freeman v. State, 329 Ga. App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631 (2014).

Prohibition against second jeopardy for same offense signifies same criminal act or omission.

- The words "same offense," in this paragraph, prohibiting a second jeopardy, do not signify the same offense eo nomine, but the same criminal act or omission. Crumley v. City of Atlanta, 68 Ga. App. 69, 22 S.E.2d 181 (1942).

Single act may constitute two or more distinct and separate offenses. Dutton v. Smart, 222 Ga. 35, 148 S.E.2d 396 (1966).

No violation when act results in injury to two or more persons.

- When an unlawful act is committed resulting in the injury or death of two or more persons in the operation of a motor vehicle, the accused may be convicted of two or more crimes if two or more persons are the victims, without violating the constitutional provisions as it relates to former jeopardy. Wellons v. State, 77 Ga. App. 652, 48 S.E.2d 922 (1948).

Upon conviction of defendant of three counts of homicide by vehicle under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393 through a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, the driving under the influence statute, it was not a violation of double jeopardy to sentence defendant to 15 years for each of the homicide counts. Cox v. State, 243 Ga. App. 668, 533 S.E.2d 435 (2000).

Offender may be convicted of both offenses when they are not same offense.

- If the offense is one of assault with intent to murder, and assault with intent to rob by an assault with an offensive or dangerous weapon or instrument, and the evidence supports an intent to murder and an intent to rob, the offender may be convicted of assault with intent to murder and assault with intent to rob. Under the provisions of this paragraph, the offenses are not the same offenses, although the offenses include the same occasion, time, and place. Martin v. State, 77 Ga. App. 297, 48 S.E.2d 485 (1948).

Even if a defendant is convicted for the same transaction as a matter of fact of both burglary and assault with intent to rape, the offenses are legally separate and distinct since not only are the elements of the crimes of burglary and assault with intent to rape substantially different, but the former crime is one against the habitation while the latter is a crime against the person, and, therefore, the defendant could not have been placed in former jeopardy. Dutton v. Smart, 222 Ga. 35, 148 S.E.2d 396 (1966).

When a defendant engaged in two separate courses of conduct, one, the attempt to sell marijuana to an undercover police officer, and two, possession of 12 pounds of marijuana at defendant's home, double jeopardy did not attach to the second prosecution, as these acts occurred at different times and locations, with distinct quantities of contraband, even though defendant might have at some earlier time possessed all the marijuana in defendant's home. Kinchen v. State, 265 Ga. App. 474, 594 S.E.2d 686 (2004).

Separate convictions for armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle did not violate the state and federal prohibitions against double jeopardy, as the latter constituted a separate offense warranting a separate sanction under Georgia law, thus warranting an additional punishment. Dumas v. State, 283 Ga. App. 279, 641 S.E.2d 271 (2007).

Punishment by different governmental entities.

- One may be punishable by the state, the other by the municipality. Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405, 14 S.E. 564 (1892).

An acquittal under an indictment charging the accused with the offense of using obscene and vulgar language in the presence of a female will not operate to bar a prosecution for using opprobrious words and abusive language to and of another, even though both indictments related to the same act. McIntosh v. State, 116 Ga. 543, 42 S.E. 793 (1902).

One offense may be punishable by the state and the other by the federal government. Cooley v. State, 152 Ga. 469, 110 S.E. 449 (1922), appeal dismissed, 260 U.S. 760, 43 S. Ct. 251, 67 L. Ed. 501 (1923).

Multiple offenses may be punishable by the state. Two assault with murder convictions were not the same and in no sense involved any construction of the constitutional provision; and by determining that the trial court committed no error in that finding, there was no constitutional question to be decided. Fews v. State, 1 Ga. App. 122, 58 S.E. 64 (1907).

Financial transaction card theft not lesser included offense of financial transaction card fraud.

- Financial transaction card theft, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31, is not a lesser included offense of financial transaction card fraud, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-33; thus, defendant's prior conviction for the former offense did not preclude prosecution for the latter. Sword v. State, 232 Ga. App. 497, 502 S.E.2d 334 (1998).

Mere different descriptions in two indictments or two charges will not constitute different offenses. Crumley v. City of Atlanta, 68 Ga. App. 69, 22 S.E.2d 181 (1942).

Evidence must be sufficient to show distinct transactions when several counts contained in indictment.

- Where separate counts are contained in an indictment, the evidence must be sufficient as to each count and must be sufficient to show that the several counts relate to distinct transactions; otherwise, a defendant may be convicted more than once for the same offense in violation of this section. Estes v. State, 98 Ga. App. 521, 106 S.E.2d 405 (1958).

Multiple prosecutions barred when one offense included in another.

- When a person has been put in jeopardy of a conviction of an offense which is a necessary element in, and constitutes an essential part of, another offense, such jeopardy is a bar to subsequent prosecution for the latter offense, if founded upon the same act. Gully v. State, 116 Ga. 527, 42 S.E. 790 (1902).

Lesser included offense.

- A conviction based on a greater offense bars a subsequent conviction for a lesser included offense if both convictions are based on proof of the same facts. Bailey v. State, 184 Ga. App. 890, 363 S.E.2d 172 (1987).

A conviction based on a lesser included offense bars a subsequent conviction for a greater offense if both convictions are based on proof of the same facts. Bailey v. State, 184 Ga. App. 890, 363 S.E.2d 172 (1987).

In order for the rule that jeopardy for an offense ends after a jury convicts a defendant of a lesser-included offense to apply, there must be an unambiguous conviction of the lesser offense, and the trial court must have given the jury full opportunity to return a verdict on the greater charge. Potts v. State, 258 Ga. 430, 369 S.E.2d 746 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068, 109 S. Ct. 1347, 103 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1989).

Crimes separate for purposes of double jeopardy and multiple prosecution.

- As a matter of law, the crime of illegal possession of heroin is not included in the crime of illegal sale of heroin for the purposes of double jeopardy and multiple prosecution. Wilson v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 859, 218 S.E.2d 573 (1975).

Although both indictments against the defendant alleged similar schemes to defraud lending institutions, double jeopardy protections under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-7(b),16-1-8(b), and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII did not bar the second prosecution; the indictments involved different properties, different coconspirators, different real estate transactions, and, for the most part, different lenders, and the fact that the two separate conspiracies may have overlapped in time and resulted in violations of the same criminal statutes was not determinative. Harrison v. State, 282 Ga. App. 29, 637 S.E.2d 773 (2006).

Defendant's guilty pleas for aggravated assault with intent to rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and kidnapping in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) were not accepted in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because the offenses did not merge as a matter of law since each of the offenses was separate and required proof of different facts; the state asserted that the defendant had dragged the victim from the front of a laundromat facility into a bathroom in the back of the facility, which formed a basis for the kidnapping charge, and that the defendant had sexually assaulted the victim while holding the victim in the bathroom, which formed a basis for the aggravated assault with the intent to rape charge. Shelton v. State, 307 Ga. App. 599, 705 S.E.2d 699 (2011).

Hijacking of motor vehicle.

- The statute prohibiting the hijacking of a motor vehicle does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy since the double jeopardy clause of the Georgia Constitution does not prohibit additional punishment for a separate offense which the General Assembly has deemed to warrant separate sanction. Mathis v. State, 273 Ga. 508, 543 S.E.2d 712 (2001).

Multiple offenses for multiple viewings of obscene films.

- Double jeopardy rights are not denied when defendant is convicted of multiple offenses for numerous showings of obscene film. A separate offense occurs each time the obscene film is shown. Dyke v. State, 232 Ga. 817, 209 S.E.2d 166 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952, 95 S. Ct. 1687, 44 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1975).

Burglary and murder not lesser-included offenses.

- For substantive double-jeopardy purposes, neither a burglary conviction nor a murder conviction is a lesser-included offense within the other, since proof of additional elements must necessarily be shown to establish each crime. Cash v. State, 258 Ga. 460, 368 S.E.2d 756 (1988).

Effect of error in failing to require state to elect which indictment to proceed upon.

- An indictment for assault with intent to murder charging the commission of that offense on the part of the defendant by pointing, aiming at, and attempting to shoot and kill the prosecutor by pulling the trigger of a pistol, and the indictment charging the offense of pointing a pistol at another, being the same pointing essential to constitute the crime in each instance, the trial court erred in denying a timely motion of the defendant requiring the state to elect upon which of the two indictments it would proceed. The error was harmful to the defendant, who, on conviction under both indictments, was sentenced to two consecutive terms of imprisonment for the single offense. Davis v. State, 100 Ga. App. 308, 111 S.E.2d 116 (1959).

Defendant properly sentenced on separate counts of attempting to elude police.

- Trial court properly sentenced the defendant on five separate counts of attempting to elude a police officer because the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant willfully led police on a dangerous high speed chase after being given clear signals by five separate police vehicles to stop; it is the act of fleeing from an individual police vehicle or police officer after being given a proper visual or audible signal to stop from that individual police vehicle or officer, and not just the act of fleeing itself, that forms the proper "unit of prosecution" under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395. Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768, 723 S.E.2d 915 (2012).

Protection of right.

- The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the same cause is as sacred as the right of trial by jury, and is guarded with much care by the common law and by the Constitution. Hines v. State, 41 Ga. App. 294, 152 S.E. 616 (1930).

Double jeopardy is applied to criminal prosecutions alone. Keenan v. Hardison, 245 Ga. 599, 266 S.E.2d 205 (1980).

This constitutional provision has application only to crime and not to civil contempt. City of Macon v. Massey, 214 Ga. 589, 106 S.E.2d 23 (1958).

This paragraph is applicable only to a crime, but a contempt, whether it be civil or criminal, is not a crime within the purview of this section of the Constitution. Garland v. State, 101 Ga. App. 395, 114 S.E.2d 176 (1960).

Indictment must identify victim, if known.

- When the defendant was charged by indictment with crimes against a minor victim who was identified by initials only, the court found that such was insufficient because the defendant was entitled to be charged by an indictment in perfect form; failure to identify the victim with a full name, if known, violated the defendant's constitutional rights to due process under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I and U.S. Const., amend. 5, as well as the defendant's double jeopardy rights under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII and U.S. Const., amend. 5. Sellers v. State, 263 Ga. App. 144, 587 S.E.2d 276 (2003).

Accusation did not expose defendant to double jeopardy.

- Accusation was sufficient because if, after jeopardy had attached, any other proceedings were taken against the defendant arising out of a domestic incident, the defendant could plead a former acquittal or conviction because the accusation set forth specific acts and adequately defined the offenses of battery, family violence battery, and criminal trespass. The state would not be able to charge the defendant with a new offense simply by alleging that the defendant struck the victim or the victim's closet door with an object. State v. Leatherwood, 326 Ga. App. 730, 757 S.E.2d 434 (2014).

Determination must begin with criminal statute itself.

- Whether multiple punishment is permissible under the rubric of substantive double jeopardy requires examination of the legislative intent underlying the criminal statute because it is for the legislature to determine to what extent certain criminal conduct has demonstrated more serious criminal interest and damaged society and to what extent it should be punished; the question of whether a course of conduct can result in multiple violations of the same statute requires a determination of the "unit of prosecution," or the precise act or conduct that is being criminalized under the statute; thus, the starting point must be the statute itself. State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383, 589 S.E.2d 69 (2003).

Suspension of a driver's license at an administrative hearing was not punishment, nor was the hearing a prosecution for the purposes of double jeopardy thus, a subsequent criminal prosecution for driving under the influence was not barred. Nolen v. State, 218 Ga. App. 819, 463 S.E.2d 504 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018, 116 S. Ct. 2550, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1070 (1996).

Payment of the fee required for reinstatement of a driver's license after it was suspended following an arrest for driving under the influence was not punishment and did not bar a subsequent prosecution for driving under the influence. Thompson v. State, 229 Ga. App. 526, 494 S.E.2d 306 (1997); Morgan v. State, 229 Ga. App. 861, 495 S.E.2d 138 (1998).

Modification of bond conditions were not criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes.

- Conducting a hearing to modify the bond conditions of a third-time DUI offender and placing limitations upon the offender's driving privileges, predicated upon the necessity to protect the welfare and safety of the citizens of Georgia from a recidivist offender, was not punishment, nor was the hearing prosecution, for the purposes of double jeopardy. Strickland v. State, 300 Ga. App. 898, 686 S.E.2d 486 (2009).

Application of O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7. - Given that a charge of DUI served as the predicate act underlying a charge of serious injury by vehicle, thus constituting a lesser included crime of the serious injury by vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a) barred conviction of and punishment for both; hence, in light of this incongruence, defendant's DUI conviction and sentence, as well as the sentence for serious injury by vehicle, were vacated. Hannah v. State, 280 Ga. App. 230, 633 S.E.2d 800 (2006).

Ten-day suspension from school following defendant's arrest and indictment for armed robbery did not rise to the level of "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. Clark v. State, 220 Ga. App. 251, 469 S.E.2d 250 (1996).

Forfeiture proceedings not a bar to prosecution.

- Double jeopardy did not attach to bar prosecution of defendant on state drug charges following federal civil forfeiture proceedings because defendant's failure to contest the forfeiture meant the defendant was not placed in jeopardy in those proceedings and, also, Georgia constitutional and statutory provisions did not bar the prosecution because they apply only to criminal proceedings, not civil proceedings. Waye v. State, 219 Ga. App. 22, 464 S.E.2d 19 (1995).

A civil federal forfeiture action was neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. Battista v. State, 223 Ga. App. 369, 477 S.E.2d 665 (1996).

Forfeiture proceedings did not bar a criminal prosecution based on application of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII since such proceedings have been held to be primarily remedial in nature. Manley v. State, 224 Ga. App. 661, 482 S.E.2d 416 (1997); Cuellar v. State, 230 Ga. App. 203, 496 S.E.2d 282 (1998).

Civil commitment and life imprisonment did not constitute double jeopardy violation.

- Civil commitment, following finding that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity of malice murder, and a sentence of life imprisonment based on convictions for felony murder, with a finding of guilty but mentally ill, did not violate the defendant's double jeopardy rights under U.S. Const., amend. 5 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, as the civil commitment procedure under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 was not punitive in nature. Shepherd v. State, 280 Ga. 245, 626 S.E.2d 96 (2006).

Questions of double jeopardy in Georgia must be determined under the expanded statutory proscriptions found in O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-6,16-1-7, and16-1-8, which place limitations upon multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal conduct. Stone v. State, 166 Ga. App. 245, 304 S.E.2d 94 (1983).

Failure to establish venue does not bar re-trial in a court where venue is proper and proven. Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 404 S.E.2d 436 (1991).

Absent sufficient proof to establish venue, the defendant's aggravated sexual battery and aggravated sodomy convictions were reversed; but, given that sufficient evidence otherwise existed to support the former charge, retrial on the sexual battery would not violate the defendant's double jeopardy rights. Melton v. State, 282 Ga. App. 685, 639 S.E.2d 411 (2006).

When the appellate court held in a juvenile delinquency case that the evidence supported the adjudication but that the state had not proven venue, the state could retry the defendant without violating the double jeopardy clause because there was otherwise sufficient evidence at trial to support the adjudication based on the crimes charged. In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga. App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007).

Plea of nolo contendere constitutes former jeopardy. Fortson v. Hopper, 242 Ga. 81, 247 S.E.2d 875 (1978).

Administrative convictions not double jeopardy.

- Suspension of defendant's operator's license pursuant to administrative proceedings did not constitute former punishment foreclosing prosecution for driving under the influence in violation of double jeopardy provisions. Jackson v. State, 218 Ga. App. 677, 462 S.E.2d 802 (1995).

State has no right to appeal from a verdict by a jury in a criminal case based on an error of law or of fact because this section prevents double jeopardy. Register v. State, 10 Ga. App. 623, 74 S.E. 429 (1911), later appeal, 12 Ga. App. 1, 76 S.E. 649 (1912), later appeal, 12 Ga. App. 688, 78 S.E. 142 (1913).

Retrial barred by successful appeal including finding that evidence did not authorize verdict.

- The reversal of the defendants' convictions for felony murder based upon armed robbery due to insufficient evidence not only raised a procedural double jeopardy bar for that particular crime, but also raised a procedural double jeopardy bar for the lesser-included offense of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Prater v. State, 273 Ga. 477, 541 S.E.2d 351 (2001).

Subsequent prosecution not barred since prosecutor had no earlier knowledge.

- Because the defendant failed to affirmatively show that the prosecutor had any actual knowledge regarding approximately $300,000 worth of jewelry items found in a toolbox located at the defendant's residence upon an eviction, which were the subject of a second theft prosecution involving jewelry the defendant had stolen, the second prosecution regarding those items was not barred on double jeopardy grounds. White v. State, 284 Ga. App. 805, 644 S.E.2d 903 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 564 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court erred in dismissing the defendant's charge for DUI, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(k), on double jeopardy grounds under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(b) based on the prior disposal online of a separate seat belt citation; there was no showing that the solicitor had actual knowledge of the DUI charge at the time the seat belt charge was handled. State v. Garlepp, 338 Ga. App. 788, 790 S.E.2d 839 (2016).

Conviction for violating municipal ordinance.

- Because conviction of a violation of a municipal ordinance subjects a person to stigma and punishment by incarceration or fine, a defendant prosecuted in a municipal court proceeding is in "jeopardy" in the constitutional sense. Holcomb v. Peachtree City, 187 Ga. App. 258, 370 S.E.2d 23 (1988).

Order barring the defendant's prosecution for aggravated assault and aggravated battery on double jeopardy grounds based on the defendant's prior guilty plea to violating a disorderly conduct ordinance, a charge arising from the same fight, was error because the defendant failed to set forth the elements of the ordinance, and failed to properly plead and prove the ordinance; Georgia courts were not allowed to take judicial notice of local ordinances, but, rather, they must have been alleged and proved by production of the original or of a properly certified copy. Further, because the defendant failed to prove below that the charges could have been brought within the jurisdiction of a single court and that the proper prosecuting attorney knew of the recorder's court proceedings, the trial court was not authorized to grant the plea in bar under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(b). State v. Jeffries, 298 Ga. App. 141, 679 S.E.2d 368 (2009).

Consideration of murder in federal sentencing not a bar to state prosecution.

- Double jeopardy did not bar the state from prosecuting defendant for murder even though the federal district court had considered the murder in its sentencing of defendant for bank robbery. Nance v. State, 266 Ga. 816, 471 S.E.2d 216 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S. Ct. 615, 136 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1996).

Mere overreaching or harassment by the prosecutor, without a finding the prosecutorial misconduct was intended to subvert the protections of the double jeopardy clause, would not bar retrial of defendant's case pursuant to Georgia law. State v. Oliver, 188 Ga. App. 47, 372 S.E.2d 256, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 47, 372 S.E.2d 256 (1988).

Prosecutor's failure to follow instruction of the trial court to avoid questions concerning a witness' credibility did not bar retrial since the prosecutor's mistakes were made in good faith and there was no intention to provoke a mistrial. State v. Oliver, 188 Ga. App. 47, 372 S.E.2d 256, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 47, 372 S.E.2d 256 (1988).

Waiver by plea agreement ineffectual.

- Since the defendant had already pled guilty, been sentenced, and completed sentence for certain crimes, an effort to re-indict the defendant based on the defendant's violation of a plea agreement that defendant would not seek public office was properly dismissed on the grounds of double jeopardy; defendant's agreement to submit to such prosecution by waiving any bar to prosecution, regardless of the failure to mention double jeopardy, was ineffectual. State v. Barrett, 215 Ga. App. 401, 451 S.E.2d 82 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 265 Ga. 489, 458 S.E.2d 620 (1995).

Improper revocation of bond.

- Incarceration of defendant resulting from the improper revocation of the defendant's bond was not a bar to prosecution for vehicular homicide and related offenses. Shaw v. State, 225 Ga. App. 193, 483 S.E.2d 646 (1997).

Extension of juvenile disposition order.

- Provision permitting the juvenile court to extend an order of disposition for two years did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy since it operated to further the accomplishment of the juvenile's treatment and rehabilitation. In re T.B., 268 Ga. 149, 486 S.E.2d 177 (1997).

Corporations.

- Georgia Supreme Court has declared that because a corporation is a person pursuant to Georgia law, the corporation is entitled to due process and equal protection from the state; thus, a corporation is entitled to the double jeopardy protection afforded by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII. Wilbros, LLC v. State, 294 Ga. 514, 755 S.E.2d 145 (2014).

Drug possession and multiple convictions.

- Trial court did not err when the court granted the defendant's plea in bar as to the second accusation for possession of Xanax because the state had charged the defendant with the identical crime of possession of an unspecified amount of Xanax on a prior date in two accusations, the second of which was brought after the defendant had pled guilty to the first. State v. Pruiett, 324 Ga. App. 789, 751 S.E.2d 579 (2013).

Trial court erred by granting the defendant's plea in bar as to the second accusation's charges for possession of methamphetamine, clonazepam, and marijuana because the defendant could not have been convicted of possession of those drugs in a former prosecution, which involved only Xanax. State v. Pruiett, 324 Ga. App. 789, 751 S.E.2d 579 (2013).

No double jeopardy found.

- Defendant's plea of double jeopardy failed because the directed verdict on the weapon possession count did not prevent retrial on the murder charges. Moody v. State, 272 Ga. 55, 525 S.E.2d 360 (2000).

Evidence at defendant's first trial was sufficient to sustain convictions for aggravated sodomy pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a), sexual battery pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.1, and aggravated sexual battery pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b); thus, double jeopardy did not prohibit a retrial granted on the ground that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Weldon v. State, 270 Ga. App. 574, 607 S.E.2d 175 (2004).

No double jeopardy if conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel.

- Because defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine was reversed due to a finding that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to the admission of cocaine without establishing an adequate chain of custody, and for failing to preserve objections to the jury instructions, retrial was not barred by the double jeopardy clause of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII and U.S. Const., amend. 5, as the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court, whether erroneous or not, would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict against the defendant. Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 359, 609 S.E.2d 703 (2005).

Defendant's conviction of hijacking a motor vehicle and armed robbery were properly entered, despite defendant's contention that the state used the same facts to establish both offenses and that defendant should have only been convicted of and sentenced for one of the offenses, as: (1) hijacking a motor vehicle was considered a separate offense and did not merge with any other offense; (2) O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1 superseded the double jeopardy provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7 in motor vehicle hijacking cases; (3) O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(d) did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, since the double jeopardy clause of the Georgia Constitution did not prohibit additional punishment for a separate offense which the legislature deemed to warrant separate sanction; and (4) defendant failed to offer any evidence in support of defendant's allegation that O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(d) otherwise violated defendant's double jeopardy rights. Holman v. State, 272 Ga. App. 890, 614 S.E.2d 124 (2005).

Variance between indictment and evidence did not pose risk of double jeopardy violation.

- Fact that an indictment charged the defendant with aggravated assault and battery by slicing the victim's neck with a knife, but the evidence showed the defendant used a box cutter, did not constitute a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof, because the defendant was sufficiently informed of the charges and faced no danger of further prosecution arising out of the incident. Lawson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 852, 630 S.E.2d 131 (2006).

Defendant's separate convictions for armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle did not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy as O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(d) provided that hijacking a motor vehicle was a separate offense and did not merge and it therefore superseded the state statutory double jeopardy provision; further, the Georgia Constitution did not prohibit additional punishment for a separate offense that the Georgia legislature warranted a separate sanction; the defendant failed to show how the hijacking statute violated the federal double jeopardy clause. Mullins v. State, 280 Ga. App. 689, 634 S.E.2d 850 (2006).

Discrepancy in presentment not double jeopardy violation.

- Trial court did not err in allowing the manufacturing methamphetamine offense to proceed to the jury under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b); despite the poor wording of the caption of the count at issue, which stated "trafficking in methamphetamine," because the body of the count clearly charged the defendant with manufacturing methamphetamine, and the defendant failed to show how the defendant was misled by the presentment, nor did it expose the defendant to double jeopardy in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 5 or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII. Gentry v. State, 281 Ga. App. 315, 635 S.E.2d 782 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0117, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 78 (Ga. 2007).

Because no evidence showed that the information concerning the defendant was known to the proper prosecuting officer in Gwinnett County, and because no basis otherwise existed for a charge of conspiracy to traffic based on what officers recovered in the search of the defendant's home, the appeals court refused to state that the defendant could have been convicted of conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine in Gwinnett County, or that Gwinnett County should have charged the defendant with this crime; hence, under these circumstances, the Dawson County indictment was not barred under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-6(b)(1) and16-1-7(b). Bradford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 75, 640 S.E.2d 630 (2006).

Because a plea of double jeopardy was found to be frivolous, the defendant's filing of a notice of appeal from the denial of an earlier double jeopardy plea did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, and hence the filing of a notice of appeal merely deprived the trial court of the court's power to execute the sentence; thus, because the sentence was not imposed against the defendant until after the remittitur was filed below, that sentence was upheld. DeSouza v. State, 285 Ga. App. 201, 645 S.E.2d 684 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 539 (Ga. 2007).

Prosecution under dual sovereignty doctrine of double jeopardy clause.

- As the defendant's theft by taking an automobile occurred in both Georgia and Kentucky, the fact that the defendant was prosecuted in Kentucky did not bar Georgia from also prosecuting the defendant under the dual sovereignty doctrine of the double jeopardy clause; further, O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(c) was inapplicable because there was not a federal prosecution for the same crime. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. 826, 672 S.E.2d 640 (2009).

Second indictment, which was apparently filed to address the eventuality that the defendants' motion to withdraw a guilty plea would be granted, was returned while the defendant's jeopardy was ongoing, and, as such, the indictment did not violate U.S. Const., amend. V, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, or O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8. Phillips v. State, 298 Ga. App. 520, 680 S.E.2d 424 (2009).

Fact that the defendant had been convicted in federal court of possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922 did not bar a felony murder prosecution in state court on double jeopardy grounds as the state had to prove facts in the felony murder case that were not required to be proved in the federal case. Moreover, the federal offense, which required that a firearm be possessed in and affecting interstate commerce, was not within the concurrent jurisdiction of Georgia and under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(c) did not bar a subsequent prosecution for felony murder predicated on the underlying firearm possession charge. Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. 446, 689 S.E.2d 283 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated stalking based on the defendant's following and contacting the victim did not merge for sentencing purposes because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant, in violation of a protective order, both followed the victim to a hotel and then contacted the victim; the act of following was complete when the defendant arrived at the premises of the hotel because, at that time, the defendant violated the protective order by coming within 500 feet of a place where the victim was residing. Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga. App. 724, 706 S.E.2d 114 (2011).

Implied consent to mistrial waived right to double jeopardy plea.

- Although defense counsel had an opportunity to raise an objection after the court announced its intention to excuse the jurors and before the jurors returned to the courtroom, counsel failed to do so; therefore, the trial court was authorized to find that defendant, through counsel, impliedly consented to the grant of a mistrial and defendant's plea of double jeopardy made during the trial was properly denied. Howell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 480, 597 S.E.2d 546 (2004).

Trial court abused the court's discretion in declaring a mistrial and abridging defendant's constitutional right to be tried by the originally impaneled jury without first considering less drastic alternatives when the assigned courtroom was unavailable at the appointed time. The procedure the court used was flawed, not the result. A trial court is not categorically required to grant a continuance under similar circumstances; merely the court should consider a continuance as an alternative to declaring a mistrial. Since the trial court told defense counsel that if the defendant did not plead guilty, the court would declare a mistrial, the court took little or no heed to McGee's constitutional rights thereby constituting an abuse of discretion. McGee v. State, 287 Ga. App. 839, 652 S.E.2d 822 (2007).

Sentencing error corrected by Supreme Court of Georgia on appeal averted double jeopardy violation.

- While the defendant was correct in asserting that the trial court should not have imposed sentence on both felony murder guilty verdicts, the Supreme Court of Georgia corrected that error on appeal when it affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence only on the count 3 guilty verdict, and the defendant's argument was not based on what actually occurred, but upon speculation that, had the trial court imposed the correct sentence, it would have done so by merging count 3 into count 2. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that such speculation warranted a review of the sentence imposed, such presented no basis for reversal because nothing required the trial court to merge the two counts in the way the defendant proposed. Brady v. State, 283 Ga. 359, 659 S.E.2d 368 (2008).

Exclusion from drug court program did not violate double jeopardy ban.

- Denying a defendant access to the drug court program under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(a), which had been a condition of the defendant's guilty plea, was not a double jeopardy violation as the trial court did not involuntarily withdraw the guilty plea, but offered the defendant the option of withdrawing the plea or accepting one of several alternative sentences. Moreover, agreeing to attend drug court was not a "sentence," and completion of the drug court contract was dependent on the defendant's completing the drug court program. Evans v. State, 293 Ga. App. 371, 667 S.E.2d 183 (2008).

Failure to preserve for review.

- Court would not consider a pro se defendant's double jeopardy argument when the issue had not been raised below. Bruster v. State, 291 Ga. App. 490, 662 S.E.2d 265 (2008).

No jeopardy if original court lacked jurisdiction.

- Since the defendant's original trial was before a court which lacked jurisdiction, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's plea of former jeopardy. Jackett v. State, 209 Ga. App. 112, 432 S.E.2d 586 (1993).

No double jeopardy if prior judgment was void.

- Because a uniform traffic citation was deliberately withheld from filing, and the state did not authorize or participate in the prosecution of the case, the probate court lacked authority to accept defendant's plea to the proposed charge and impose a fine, making its resulting judgment void; hence, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's plea in bar based on double jeopardy, since the probate court's void judgment could not serve as the basis for barring the subsequent indictment and prosecution of defendant in the superior court. Roberts v. State, 280 Ga. App. 672, 634 S.E.2d 790 (2006).

Threshold question regarding jeopardy.

- The threshold question to be addressed in any case involving double jeopardy is whether jeopardy has attached to defendant during the proceedings which the defendant contends preclude further prosecution. Haynes v. State, 245 Ga. 817, 268 S.E.2d 325 (1980).

When jeopardy attaches.

- Jeopardy attached when the defendant is arraigned in a valid indictment. Conley v. State, 85 Ga. 348, 11 S.E. 659 (1890); Barrs v. State, 22 Ga. App. 642, 97 S.E. 86, cert. denied, 22 Ga. App. 803 (1918).

A defendant is placed in constitutional jeopardy when, in a court of competent jurisdiction with a sufficient indictment, a defendant has been arraigned, has pled, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn. State v. Martin, 173 Ga. App. 370, 326 S.E.2d 558 (1985).

Trial court's grant of a defendant's motion for a mistrial over two months after a guilty verdict had been returned was void as a mistrial could not be entered after the verdict was returned; motions for mistrial were not to be confused with motions for a new trial, which were appropriate after the verdict was returned, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, provided for double jeopardy protection except when a new trial had been granted after the conviction or in the case of a mistrial. State v. Sumlin, 281 Ga. 183, 637 S.E.2d 36 (2006).

Jeopardy attaches when jury impaneled and sworn or when court begins to hear evidence.

- In the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is impaneled and sworn. In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence. Franklin v. State, 85 Ga. 570, 11 S.E. 876 (1890); White v. State, 143 Ga. App. 315, 238 S.E.2d 247 (1977); Haynes v. State, 245 Ga. 817, 268 S.E.2d 325 (1980).

Jeopardy attaches when the issue is joined and the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and evidence is presented to the court sitting alone as the trier of the facts and the law. White v. State, 143 Ga. App. 315, 238 S.E.2d 247 (1977).

Defendants were not placed in jeopardy before the trial court granted the state's Batson challenge and dismissed a jury that was selected to try them on charges of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the jury was never empaneled and sworn, and the trial court did not err when it denied defendants' plea in bar and proceeded with trial. Garlington v. State, 268 Ga. App. 264, 601 S.E.2d 793 (2004).

Jeopardy did not attach at a motion to suppress hearing.

- Defendant's plea in bar based on double jeopardy was properly denied because a motion to suppress hearing in a recorder's court, even with sworn testimony, did not trigger double jeopardy safeguards. Tremelling v. State, 263 Ga. App. 418, 587 S.E.2d 785 (2003).

Jeopardy attaches after witness sworn.

- Allowing the solicitor more time to prepare for trial was not a proper basis for terminating a bench trial since the first witness had already been sworn and particularly since the case was completely terminated and then started anew before an entirely different judge. Due to this improper termination, double jeopardy attached. Puplampu v. State, 257 Ga. App. 5, 570 S.E.2d 83 (2002).

In a criminal matter wherein the state brought charges against defendant, a bench trial was commenced, witnesses were sworn in and testified, and the state thereafter terminated that case when it nolle prossed the charges over defendant's objection, jeopardy attached under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. 1, Para. XVIII, and under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(a)(2), the state could not thereafter retry defendant on the same charges; although the state's reason for nolle prossing the first set of charges was due to its inability to introduce DNA evidence as to defendant's identity, as it failed to include that information in the indictment in order to avoid a limitations issue, the reason was inconsequential because jeopardy had attached. State v. Aycock, 283 Ga. App. 876, 643 S.E.2d 249 (2007).

Double jeopardy for city court to stop trial and bind defendant over to superior court.

- When there is nothing in an Act establishing a city court which authorizes the judge of that court to discontinue a trial and bind over the accused to the next superior court, if, after hearing the evidence, the judge should be of the opinion that the defendant is guilty of an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of such criminal court, it constitutes double jeopardy for the judge to stop the trial and bind the defendant over to the superior court to be tried for a felony. Jordan v. State, 75 Ga. App. 815, 44 S.E.2d 821 (1947).

Jeopardy does not attach at a probation revocation hearing so as to invoke the double jeopardy clause. Smith v. State, 171 Ga. App. 279, 319 S.E.2d 113 (1984).

Admission of crimes at juvenile transfer hearing.

- Jeopardy did not attach so as to preclude further proceedings against a juvenile for crimes admitted at a transfer hearing since the juvenile court accepted the admission for the limited purpose of determining whether the case should be transferred to superior court. In re M.E.J., 260 Ga. 805, 401 S.E.2d 254 (1991).

Motion in limine hearing in recorder's court.

- When a recorder's court granted a defendant's motion in limine and dismissed DUI and failure to yield charges against the defendant, the state was not barred from bringing the same charges in a state court; the motion in limine hearing did not trigger double jeopardy safeguards, and because a ruling on a motion in limine was subject to modification at trial to prevent manifest injustice, it did not result in a final judgment limiting issues under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or bar another trial. Thomas v. State, 287 Ga. App. 124, 650 S.E.2d 793 (2007).

Aggravating circumstances in death penalty action.

- Trial court properly convicted and sentenced defendant on charges of armed robbery and burglary, because the fact that those acts served as aggravating circumstances in relation to defendant's murder charge pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b) did not trigger double jeopardy, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII. Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854, 622 S.E.2d 1 (2005).

Swearing in of jury required for jeopardy to attach.

- Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel's failure to object to the second trial on the ground of double jeopardy because the jury was never sworn in the first trial, and jeopardy did not attach. Neal v. State, 308 Ga. App. 551, 707 S.E.2d 503 (2011).

Trial court erred in holding that jeopardy had not attached on the previous charges filed against the defendant due to a mistrial because the defendant was placed in jeopardy when the jury was sworn in the first trial. Herrington v. State, 315 Ga. App. 101, 726 S.E.2d 625 (2012).

Burden of proof.

- The burden of proof under a special plea of former jeopardy is upon the defendant. Mance v. State, 5 Ga. App. 229, 62 S.E. 1053 (1908); Maher v. State, 53 Ga. 448, 21 Am. R. 269 (1874); Robinson v. State, 63 Ga. App. 490, 11 S.E.2d 414 (1940); Williams v. State, 63 Ga. App. 492, 11 S.E.2d 415 (1940).

Merits of plea of former jeopardy determined by what is known as "same transaction test." Moore v. State, 12 Ga. App. 576, 77 S.E. 1132 (1913).

Origin and approval of "same transaction test".

- In Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8, 58 Am. Dec. 528 (1853), the Supreme Court adopted the rule "that the plea of autrefois acquit or convict is sufficient whenever the proof shows the second case to be the same transaction with the first." In Gully v. State, 116 Ga. 527, 42 S.E. 790 (1902), the Supreme Court unqualifiedly approved the "same transaction test, " as laid down in the Roberts case. Harris v. State, 43 Ga. App. 485, 159 S.E. 603 (1931).

Defendant must plead and prove both transactions are same.

- When one is put on trial for an offense, and one's plea is that the same facts were involved in another charge against that person, for which one has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction, one may plead the final result of the former trial in bar of the second proposition. In determining whether the first case is a bar to the prosecution of the second, the test is whether or not the same transaction is involved; that is, whether both indictments and the investigation that may be had thereunder relate to the same offense. Hines v. State, 41 Ga. App. 294, 152 S.E. 616 (1930).

In order to sustain a plea of former jeopardy, it is always incumbent upon the defendant to plead and prove that the transaction charged in the second indictment is the same as a matter of fact as that charged in the first indictment under which the defendant was put in jeopardy. Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941); Gilstrap v. State, 90 Ga. App. 12, 81 S.E.2d 872 (1954).

Sufficiency of plea of autrefois acquit.

- A plea of autrefois acquit is legally sufficient when it alleges that the offense in the second indictment is identical with the offense which was or could have been made the subject of investigation under the first indictment, and further alleges an acquittal under the first indictment in a court of competent jurisdiction. Lock v. State, 122 Ga. 730, 50 S.E. 932 (1905); Harris v. State, 43 Ga. App. 485, 159 S.E. 603 (1931).

Pleading and proof required for "same transaction test."

- In addition to pleading and proving that the transaction is the same as a matter of fact, it is also necessary to plead and prove either: (a) that the transaction charged in the second indictment is an offense which is identical in law with that charged in the first indictment, or else that under the actual terms of the first indictment proof of the second offense was made necessary as an essential ingredient of the offense as first charged; or (b) that the transaction charged in the second indictment is an offense which represents either a major or minor grade of the same offense, of which the defendant might be convicted under an indictment for the major offense; or (c) when the transactions are the same as a matter of fact, even though the offenses be not identical or in effect identical as a matter of law, so as to come within the scope of the preceding subsections (a) or (b), one may nevertheless, under the principles of res judicata which may be included in a plea under the broader doctrine of former jeopardy, show that one's acquittal on the first charge was necessarily controlled by the determination of some particular issue or issues of fact which would preclude one's conviction of the second charge. Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941).

Refusal to allow similar transaction evidence.

- Defendant's prosecution for a car hijacking was not barred by the double jeopardy provision of the Georgia Constitution as, even if the collateral estoppel doctrine was embodied in the Georgia Constitution, the refusal to admit evidence of the car hijacking as similar transaction evidence at defendant's trial for armed robbery was based on the lack of similarity between the car hijacking and the armed robbery incidents, not the lack of evidence of defendant's culpability for the car hijacking. Syas v. State, 273 Ga. App. 161, 614 S.E.2d 803 (2005).

Proof consists of evidence of record and evidence not of record.

- In all pleas of former acquittal or former conviction, proof of the plea has to consist partly of matter of record and partly of matter not of record. The identity of the two cases is the part of the plea which it is the peculiar business of the evidence, which is not of record, to make out. Harris v. State, 43 Ga. App. 485, 159 S.E. 603 (1931); Gower v. State, 71 Ga. App. 127, 30 S.E.2d 298 (1944).

Offenses charged in two prosecutions must be same in law and in fact, to entitle an accused to plead successfully former acquittal or conviction. Lunsford v. State, 60 Ga. App. 537, 4 S.E.2d 112 (1939).

Court determines whether defendant has established identity of two offenses charged.

- A plea of former conviction is good as against demurrer (now motion to dismiss) only when it sets out the record of the former trial and conviction and judgment, and such a state of facts as will show that the former conviction was for the same offense for which the defendant is about to be arraigned. Gresham v. State, 52 Ga. App. 77, 182 S.E. 416 (1935).

On a plea of autrefois convict the trial court, as trier of the facts, was authorized to find that the defendant, upon whom the burden of proof rested, had not established the identity of the two offenses charged. Gilstrap v. State, 90 Ga. App. 12, 81 S.E.2d 872 (1954).

Same transaction established.

- Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 was improper, as the defendant was also convicted of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) for the same transaction, and this would have subjected the defendant to multiple convictions and punishments for one crime, which would have placed the defendant in double jeopardy in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII and U.S. Const., amend. 5. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Because all of the facts used to prove the offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob were used up in proving the armed robbery, merger was required. Mercer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 606, 658 S.E.2d 173 (2008).

Necessity of proof of additional fact would bar successful plea.

- If the evidence required to convict under the first indictment would not be sufficient to convict under the second indictment, but proof of an additional fact would be necessary to constitute the offense charged in the second, the former conviction or acquittal could not be pled in bar to the second indictment. Price v. State, 76 Ga. App. 108, 45 S.E.2d 84 (1947).

Modified merger rule.

- Modified merger rule, which speaks to the validity of a verdict on a charge of felony murder when the jury also finds the accused guilty of voluntary manslaughter, is effective at the time the jury renders the jury's verdict and is not destroyed by the granting of a motion for new trial on the voluntary manslaughter charge; likewise, the presence or absence of a separate charge of aggravated assault in the indictment has no effect on a court's application of the modified merger rule because while the existence of a separate aggravated assault charge must be carefully considered in applying the rule and making determinations as to proper sentencing, its existence does not render the rule inapplicable. Williams v. State, 288 Ga. 7, 700 S.E.2d 564 (2010).

Vacation of verdict under modified merger rule.

- There is no meaningful distinction between an implicit acquittal based on a guilty verdict for a lesser included offense and the vacation of a verdict under the modified merger rule because in both cases the accused is placed in jeopardy, the jury is given a full opportunity to return a verdict on the greater charge, and the verdict rendered results in no conviction being entered; in both cases there can be no appeal because the accused's jeopardy has ended, and in both cases double jeopardy prevents retrial. Williams v. State, 288 Ga. 7, 700 S.E.2d 564 (2010).

Bad check and theft by deception.

- When the only way the state could prove theft by deception was by evidence of an act of which defendant had been acquitted and discharged, issuance of a bad check, the action was barred. Day v. State, 163 Ga. App. 839, 296 S.E.2d 145 (1982).

A second conviction in a different county.

- A prosecution for a lesser included offense, which includes the underlying felony in a felony murder case, after a conviction for the greater offense in a different county violates O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(a), Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, and the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Perkinson v. State, 273 Ga. 491, 542 S.E.2d 92 (2001).

Conviction for violating county ordinance did not bar conviction under Code.

- Defendant's pit bull mauled a child. The defendant's conviction in recorder's court of violating a county ordinance by failing to exercise ordinary care in controlling the defendant's pet for the protection of others was sufficiently separate from a misdemeanor reckless conduct charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b), which required proof of a gross deviation from the standard of care, that a successive prosecution for violating § 16-5-60(b) did not violate the double jeopardy ban. State v. Stepp, 295 Ga. App. 813, 673 S.E.2d 257 (2009).

Effect of bifurcation.

- Short delay between jury's verdicts on the counts of malice murder and felony murder due to the bifurcation of the trial at defendant's request did not constitute a termination of the prosecution, and, thus, defendant's trial for felony murder in a second, separate phase of trial did not violate defendant's double jeopardy rights because trial of the malice murder charge in the first phase of the trial did not involve the former prosecution necessary to bar the prosecution of the felony murder charge. Jones v. State, 276 Ga. 663, 581 S.E.2d 546 (2003).

Guilty plea based on single incident waived double jeopardy challenge.

- Because defendant pled guilty to four misdemeanor counts of public indecency based on one lewd act witnessed by several school children, and willingly and knowingly accepted the specified sentences as to the four counts, the defendant waived any claim before the habeas court that there was in fact only one act and that the resulting sentences were void on double jeopardy grounds. Turner v. State, 284 Ga. 494, 668 S.E.2d 692 (2008).

Impact on retrials when "prosecutorial overreaching."

- Reprosecution is barred by the double jeopardy clause when prosecutorial overreaching forces a defendant to the choice of giving up the substantial right that the defendant has to the trial before the present jury, or moving for a mistrial and giving the government a second chance before another jury with any additional advantage accrued by matter learned in the first trial. Studyvent v. State, 153 Ga. App. 161, 264 S.E.2d 695 (1980).

Trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to cross-examine the prosecutor at a hearing on the defendant's plea of double jeopardy amounted to legal error, as such not only amounted to a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation, but also foreclosed the opportunity for the defendant to prove whether the prosecutor intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Wright v. State, 284 Ga. App. 169, 643 S.E.2d 538 (2007).

"Prosecutorial overreaching" explained.

- "Prosecutorial overreaching" occurs and bars retrials when bad faith conduct by judge or prosecutor threatens the harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant. Studyvent v. State, 153 Ga. App. 161, 264 S.E.2d 695 (1980).

Discharge of accused by commitment court no bar to subsequent indictment and trial.

- The discharge of the appellant on an original burglary warrant by a commitment court does not bar a subsequent indictment and trial of the appellant for the offense of burglary in a court of competent jurisdiction to try the appellant. Wells v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 199, 200 S.E.2d 745 (1973).

State has right to file motion for rehearing in criminal case.

- Since the court, before the remittitur goes out, may on its own motion when it determines that it has committed error, alter, amend, or vacate its judgment by motion for rehearing, the state would merely be calling to the court's attention any errors or mistakes which the state believes the court has committed. Such a motion for rehearing would not amount to placing the defendant in double jeopardy. Ramsey v. State, 212 Ga. 381, 92 S.E.2d 866 (1956).

Scope of motion in arrest of judgment.

- A motion in arrest of judgment being narrow and restricted in its province is limited to the face of the pleadings in determining whether a violation of the constitutional provisions as to former jeopardy is presented by the record. Hall v. State, 202 Ga. 42, 42 S.E.2d 130 (1947).

Withdrawal of case from jury equivalent to acquittal in most instances.

- When a criminal case has been submitted to a jury upon a valid indictment and is withdrawn from their consideration by the judge for any reason other than the prisoner's consent, a necessity in some of its various forms one of which is mistrial, it is equivalent to an acquittal of the accused, and any subsequent prosecution on the same facts, even if in a higher court for a greater offense, the first prosecution being for a lesser included offense, constitutes jeopardy. Jordan v. State, 75 Ga. App. 815, 44 S.E.2d 821 (1947).

Failure to file plea.

- Failure to file a written plea of former jeopardy prior to trial will not defeat an accused's right to be free of multiple convictions for the same criminal act. Bailey v. State, 184 Ga. App. 890, 363 S.E.2d 172 (1987).

Improper termination of trial.

- Superior court erred in overruling defendant's plea of former jeopardy to a prosecution for driving under the influence when a recorder's court judge had improperly terminated the defendant's trial on the same charge in referring the case to the superior court. Phillips v. State, 197 Ga. App. 491, 399 S.E.2d 234 (1990).

The trial court properly granted the defendant's plea in bar and plea of former jeopardy in a burglary prosecution, as the state improperly terminated the first trial by dismissing the indictment after jeopardy attached without the defendant's consent, and the second burglary prosecution, although alleging a different date, residence, and accomplice, was based on the same material facts as the first indictment. State v. Jackson, 290 Ga. App. 250, 659 S.E.2d 679 (2008).

Jeopardy did not attach because there was no adjudication of guilt.

- Because the defendant's alleged mistake of fact regarding a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon required consideration of facts extrinsic to the accusation to be decided by a jury, the trial court erred in dismissing the charge, sua sponte; moreover, as such dismissal was not an adjudication of guilt, the state could appeal from the dismissal without violating the defendant's double jeopardy rights. State v. Henderson, 283 Ga. App. 111, 640 S.E.2d 686 (2006).

No prior prosecution when defendants entered pretrial intervention program.

- Prosecution of the defendants for theft by taking and criminal trespass in Calhoun County, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21(b) and16-8-2, was not prohibited by double jeopardy based on their prior entry into a pretrial intervention program under O.C.G.A. § 15-18-80(b) following charges of theft by receiving stolen property, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), in Irwin County because there was no prosecution in Irwin County within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-3(14) and16-1-8(a)(1)-(2). Palmer v. State, 341 Ga. App. 433, 801 S.E.2d 300 (2017).

Breach of plea agreement.

- Trial court did not err in granting the state's motion to set aside and disregard defendant's plea agreement and retry the defendant for the crimes covered by that agreement, as defendant breached the agreement by agreeing to testify truthfully in exchange for a lesser sentence and then falsely testifying at a codefendant's trial that defendant was not involved in an armed robbery that defendant had admitted being involved in at defendant's plea agreement hearing; defendant could not argue that trying defendant on the crimes that were the subject of the plea agreement violated double jeopardy principles since defendant chose to voluntarily violate the plea agreement and a double jeopardy argument was not available to shield defendant from the consequences of defendant's voluntary choice. Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 582 S.E.2d 13 (2003).

Direction to continue deliberation.

- Protection against double jeopardy was not violated when the trial court directed the jury to continue deliberating after it returned the second of its three verdicts since the jury's second verdict indicated that it failed to comply with the trial court's instructions and remained undecided as to the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter. Easley v. State, 262 Ga. App. 144, 584 S.E.2d 629 (2003).

Bench trial and jury trial on separate offenses.

- Even assuming arguendo that the defendant's position that O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395 set out two distinct offenses, wilful failure to stop and fleeing and eluding a police officer, the defendant was tried, first in a bench trial and again on remand after an appeal, on an accusation charging the defendant with fleeing and eluding an officer and was found guilty and sentenced both times for fleeing and eluding; hence, because the defendant was not tried on the offense of wilful failure to stop, the defendant's contention that double jeopardy considerations prohibited a jury trial on that charge, was moot. Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga. 775, 631 S.E.2d 351 (2006).

Unsworn jury.

- Retrial after not guilty finding returned by an unsworn jury was not barred by the double jeopardy principles under both the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions, as the jury lacked any authority to pass upon any of the issues at trial and, hence, could not make any determinations whatsoever as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Spencer v. State, 281 Ga. 533, 640 S.E.2d 267, cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1103, 127 S. Ct. 2914, 168 L. Ed. 2d 243 (2007).

Prior consent order did not amount to criminal punishment to which double jeopardy prohibitions applied.

- Trial court properly denied a solid waste facility operator's double jeopardy plea in bar of prosecution because even though the parties stipulated that the consent order and the criminal action alleged the same nuisance conduct and each proceeding had the same goals of restraint, deterrence, and abatement, the criminal action was not barred by the sanctions imposed in the consent order since the consent order did not amount to criminal punishment to which double jeopardy prohibitions applied. Wilbros, LLC v. State, 294 Ga. 514, 755 S.E.2d 145 (2014).

No double jeopardy when mistrial declared on motion of or with consent of defendant.

- The double jeopardy proscription of the United States and Georgia Constitutions generally does not prevent reprosecution of a defendant when a mistrial occurs on the motion of, or with the consent of, the defendant. Studyvent v. State, 153 Ga. App. 161, 264 S.E.2d 695 (1980).

When, after a jury was impaneled, the defendant moved for severance and a mistrial, and the trial court granted the motion for severance and elected to go forward with the trial of the codefendant, but, instead of granting a mistrial, continued defendant's case, the grant of the continuance was equivalent to the grant of a mistrial, and the defendant's plea of double jeopardy was properly rejected since the defendant had sought and consented to the severance. Stone v. State, 218 Ga. App. 350, 461 S.E.2d 548 (1995).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's plea in bar based on double jeopardy under U.S. Const., amend. 5 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, seeking to prevent a retrial of criminal charges against defendant after the motion for a mistrial under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(e)(1) was granted in the first trial upon the jury's advisement to the trial court judge that they were hopelessly deadlocked due to the refusal by two jurors to consider the direct evidence; the mistrial was properly declared and there was no improper conduct shown by the trial court or the state but rather, the defendant's counsel admitted that defendant hoped that another jury would be more sympathetic to the defendant upon a retrial, as the first jury was deadlocked 10-2 in favor of conviction. Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 476, 638 S.E.2d 865 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's plea in bar on the grounds of double jeopardy because the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did not intend to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial was not clearly erroneous since the defendant's character was put in evidence by the witness's unresponsive answer to a question and not by any improper conduct of the prosecutor; the trial court was authorized to find that the state would have nothing to gain from delay and that the prosecutor was aggressively seeking a conviction, not a mistrial because the trial was at an early stage when the defendant's motion for a mistrial was granted, and the state had not yet presented the testimony of numerous other witnesses, including the alleged victims. Appling v. State, 305 Ga. App. 633, 700 S.E.2d 627 (2010).

No double jeopardy on retrial following judge's or prosecutor's misconduct.

- In the context of a granted motion for mistrial, governmental misconduct will support a plea in bar based on double jeopardy if the prosecutor or trial judge intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial. In the context of a reversal or grant of a motion for new trial, on the other hand, double jeopardy may bar a retrial when the prosecutor intended to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor, or the trial judge accused of misconduct, believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of the judge's misconduct. Paul v. State, 266 Ga. App. 126, 596 S.E.2d 670 (2004).

After a mistrial was declared due to the prosecutor's improper comments during closing, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for acquittal and discharge, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, as the prosecutor had not intended to subvert the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause, at Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII and U.S. Const., amend. 5, in the prosecutor's reference to defendant's financial status due to discussions that occurred on that issue, although the prosecutor later realized that such discussions were held outside of the presence of the jury; defendant failed to make the requisite showing of a purposeful subversion of double jeopardy, nor did defendant show an improper motive, a benefit to the state to retry the case, or conduct that gave rise to a presumption of unlawful intent. Mathis v. State, 276 Ga. App. 587, 623 S.E.2d 674 (2005).

It was error to grant the defendants' plea in bar based on double jeopardy after granting the defendants' motion for a mistrial when the prosecutor told the defense that a rifle could not be located; even if the conduct of the prosecutor's staff in not telling the prosecutor that the rifle was missing could be imputed to the prosecutor, there was no evidence that those persons intended to goad the defendants into moving for a mistrial. State v. Traylor, 281 Ga. 730, 642 S.E.2d 700 (2007).

No double jeopardy when mistrial proper.

- Defendant was not improperly placed in double jeopardy given that the mistrial was properly entered on the judge's rightful determination of a hopeless deadlock in light of the jury's continued divided status after 12 hours of deliberation over the course of two days. Hurston v. State, 206 Ga. App. 570, 426 S.E.2d 196 (1992).

When the only verdict returned and read in open court was that the jury could not reach a verdict on a murder count, a grant of a mistrial was proper and the state could try the defendant again for murder and the lesser included offense of manslaughter. State v. Lane, 218 Ga. App. 126, 460 S.E.2d 550 (1995).

Since the jury in the defendant's first trial on drug charges was hopelessly deadlocked, and the trial court's decision in that trial that the jury deadlock created a manifest necessity for a mistrial, it was not an abuse of discretion, and since the trial court in the first trial provided the jury with more time to deliberate after the defendant moved for a mistrial based on the jury being deadlocked, a second trial on the same drug charges was not barred by double jeopardy; the manifest necessity of the mistrial prevented double jeopardy from attaching to the defendant's second trial. Leonard v. State, 275 Ga. App. 667, 621 S.E.2d 599 (2005).

Defendant could be retried on a kidnapping charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(b) after the defendant was acquitted of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) and a mistrial was declared on the underlying felony of kidnapping; the jury could have based the jury's acquittal on the felony murder charge on factors other than the defendant's participation in the crimes that preceded the homicide. State v. Lambert, 276 Ga. App. 668, 624 S.E.2d 174 (2005).

Trial court's declaration of a mistrial as to all counts in an earlier trial, based on evidence that at least one juror had been improperly contacted during the trial, did not bar a retrial of the defendant on double jeopardy grounds, despite the fact that the jury had reached a verdict of not guilty as to one of the counts in the earlier trial. Smith v. State, 278 Ga. App. 315, 628 S.E.2d 722 (2006).

As the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in declaring a mistrial sua sponte on the basis that evidence inadvertently taken to the jury room which contained the defendant's exculpatory statement had irreparably prejudiced the state's right to a fair trial, and that curative instructions would be insufficient, the defendant's retrial was not barred by double jeopardy. Varner v. State, 285 Ga. 334, 676 S.E.2d 209 (2009).

After the trial court excused a juror who had been left a telephone message stating that the defendant was a good person, the juror discussed the evidence with the other jurors and made negative comments in an apparent effort to discredit the prosecution. As the trial court concluded that the excused juror may have had a bias that affected the other jurors, the court properly declared a mistrial; therefore, the defendant's retrial did not violate the double jeopardy ban. Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 676 S.E.2d 221 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's plea in bar because the evidence authorized the court's determination that the complained-of inquiry by the prosecutor was not intended to goad the defense into seeking a mistrial, and the record contained evidentiary support for the trial court's determination that the prosecutor's direct examination of a police officer did not show that the prosecutor was intentionally trying to abort the trial; since the evidence authorized the trial court to find that the person in control of the prosecution did not instigate any misconduct, either directly or through collusion, in order to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial, double jeopardy did not bar retrial. Brown v. State, 303 Ga. App. 814, 694 S.E.2d 385 (2010).

There was no error in denying the defendant's plea in bar of former jeopardy because the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in declaring a mistrial in the defendant's first trial because the record supported the court's finding that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked; the jurors informed the trial court early in their deliberations that their vote was nearly evenly split between conviction and acquittal, and at least three separate times, the jury also told the trial court that the jury was deadlocked and that further deliberations would not result in a verdict. Mattox v. State, 305 Ga. App. 600, 699 S.E.2d 887 (2010).

There was no double jeopardy violation, as the trial court's decision to grant a mistrial was authorized, even if the mistrial was not strictly necessary, because under the totality of the attendant circumstances, reasonable judges could differ as to the type of disposition required to protect the fair trial rights of the parties after the case went longer than expected, requiring either a mistrial or a three-week continuance, which upset many jurors, who would likely have blamed one of the parties. Laguerre v. State, 301 Ga. 122, 799 S.E.2d 736 (2017).

Prosecutor goading defendant into motion for mistrial.

- The double jeopardy clause stands as a bar to retrial when "the prosecutor has goaded the defense into making a motion for a mistrial" to avoid a reversal of the conviction based on prosecutorial or judicial error. In that situation, the defendant must show that the prosecutor engaged in intentional misconduct to secure a second opportunity to try the case. Defendant did not show that the prosecutor's questioning of the state's witness rose to the level of intentional misconduct necessary to bar a retrial under the double jeopardy clause. Ritter v. State, 269 Ga. 884, 506 S.E.2d 857 (1998).

When actions of prosecutor cause mistrial.

- Because a prosecutor's conduct violated one of the most basic rules of prosecutorial procedure, specifically, producing documents in discovery showing that the defendant refused to speak with police and requested a lawyer after being advised of Miranda, and hence intentionally goading the defendant into moving for a mistrial, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds. Anderson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 166, 645 S.E.2d 647 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's plea of former jeopardy because the court's finding that the prosecution's question on cross-examination was an unintentional reference to the defendant's right to remain silent was not clearly erroneous; the record contained evidence to support the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's question was not intended to goad the defense into seeking a mistrial. Demory v. State, 313 Ga. App. 265, 721 S.E.2d 93 (2011).

Retrial after mistrial caused by judge's inability to disregard evidence.

- In a bench trial, the judge's inability to disregard evidence the judge ruled inadmissible constituted a manifest necessity for a mistrial and the defendant's double jeopardy rights would not be violated by a retrial to a jury. Bailey v. State, 219 Ga. App. 258, 465 S.E.2d 284 (1995).

Motion for mistrial as removing barrier to reprosecution.

- When circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error. Studyvent v. State, 153 Ga. App. 161, 264 S.E.2d 695 (1980).

Granting of mistrial upon defendant's own motion never acts as bar to further prosecution; this is true even if the defendant's motion for mistrial is necessitated by error of the prosecutor or of the court. Haynes v. State, 245 Ga. 817, 268 S.E.2d 325 (1980).

Defendant did not carry defendant's burden of showing that the state goaded defendant into moving for a mistrial when the state failed to provide the defense with one of two statements that the victim provided to police regarding the charges brought against defendant for child molestation and statutory rape, and, thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's plea of former jeopardy under either the state or federal constitution after the trial court granted defendant's motion for a mistrial. Beach v. State, 260 Ga. App. 399, 579 S.E.2d 808 (2003).

Procedure amounts to jeopardy for second time.

- If a judge capriciously or erroneously declares a mistrial, and the accused is again put upon trial, the accused will be placed in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. Brindle v. State, 125 Ga. App. 298, 187 S.E.2d 310 (1972).

Consent of accused needed for declaring mistrial.

- When the representative of the state fails to exercise ordinary diligence and therefore does not discern a juror's relationship to the defendant, the representative impliedly waives any cause for complaint by the state, in respect to which, once the accused has been put in jeopardy by the state, the trial judge cannot interfere by declaring a mistrial without the consent of the accused. Brindle v. State, 125 Ga. App. 298, 187 S.E.2d 310 (1972).

Moral or physical necessity for mistrial.

- To justify grant of a mistrial without the consent of the accused, there must either be moral or physical necessity. Nolan v. State, 55 Ga. 521, 21 Am. R. 281 (1875).

When a person accused has been put upon trial, and a jury, selected by the person and the state, charged with the case, there must be a verdict either for the person or against the person, unless there is an absolute moral or physical necessity for a mistrial, or the person consents to the mistrial. Brindle v. State, 125 Ga. App. 298, 187 S.E.2d 310 (1972).

Defense counsel's error resulting in mistrial.

- In a prosecution for malice murder, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial when defense counsel injected the prejudicial issue of the victim's violent acts without having first made a prima facie showing of justification and the state could try defendant again. Laster v. State, 268 Ga. 172, 486 S.E.2d 153 (1997).

Mistrial during prosecution of multiple offenses.

- When the state seeks to prosecute a defendant for two offenses in a single prosecution, one of which is included in the other, and the defendant receives a mistrial on the greater offense, the remaining conviction of the lesser offense does not bar retrial of the greater offense. Taylor v. State, 238 Ga. App. 753, 520 S.E.2d 267 (1999).

Retrial permissible only when "manifest necessity" existed for declaration of mistrial.

- The test to be applied by the trial court hearing a double jeopardy plea is that retrial is permissible only if a manifest necessity existed for the declaration of the mistrial lest otherwise the end of public justice be defeated; the existence of "manifest necessity" is to be determined by weighing the defendant's right to have the defendant's trial completed before the particular tribunal against the interest of the public in having fair trials designed to end in just judgments; and the decision must take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances. Chatham v. State, 155 Ga. App. 154, 270 S.E.2d 274 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 247 Ga. 95, 274 S.E.2d 473 (1981).

At defendant's trial for various sexual offenses based on allegations by defendant's stepdaughter, which were later recanted, there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial over defendant's objection when a child abuse investigator mentioned, in violation of the trial court's ruling on a motion in limine based on O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, that the stepdaughter had viewed pornographic movies even though the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting the state's motion in limine to exclude the evidence; defense counsel's question to the investigator did not call for the improper response, and, once the issue had been injected, the defense was entitled to clarify that the defendant bore no responsibility for the victim's viewing of the pornographic movies. Thus, defendant's plea in bar based on double jeopardy should have been granted. Payne v. State, 267 Ga. App. 498, 600 S.E.2d 422 (2004).

Since the jury in defendant's first trial on drug charges was hopelessly deadlocked, and the trial court's decision in that trial that the jury deadlock created a manifest necessity for a mistrial, it was not an abuse of discretion, and since the trial court in the first trial provided the jury with more time to deliberate after defendant moved for a mistrial based on the jury being deadlocked, a second trial on the same drug charges was not barred by double jeopardy; the manifest necessity of the mistrial prevented double jeopardy from attaching to defendant's second trial. Leonard v. State, 275 Ga. App. 667, 621 S.E.2d 599 (2005).

Retrial of a criminal defendant after a mistrial caused by the inability of the jury to reach a verdict does not constitute double jeopardy if there is manifest necessity for declaring the mistrial; the determination as to whether the jury is in fact hopelessly deadlocked is a matter somewhat in the discretion of the trial court. Leonard v. State, 275 Ga. App. 667, 621 S.E.2d 599 (2005).

Because the evidence showed that the trial court did not consider any less drastic alternatives to declaring a mistrial for what, essentially, was the state's objection to one of the court's evidentiary rulings, the trial court erred in denying defendant's plea in bar of former jeopardy under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII. Freeman v. State, 299 Ga. App. 564, 683 S.E.2d 124 (2009).

Defendant's plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds was properly denied because the trial court did not err in finding a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial after defense counsel, despite being warned, argued in closing statements that the jury should distrust the breath test administered by the state trooper because the machine used had problems. McCabe v. State, 318 Ga. App. 720, 734 S.E.2d 539 (2012).

A retrial after a mistrial caused by the failure of the jury to reach a verdict does not constitute double jeopardy under the doctrine of "manifest necessity." Murff v. State, 165 Ga. App. 808, 302 S.E.2d 697, rev'd on other grounds, 251 Ga. 478, 306 S.E.2d 267 (1983).

Jeopardy attaches when court grants mistrial over defendant's objections in some instances.

- When the prosecutor begins the prosecutor's case without sufficient evidence to convict and the court grants a mistrial over defendant's objection, defendant's plea of former jeopardy should be sustained, should the state attempt to call the case again. Haynes v. State, 245 Ga. 817, 268 S.E.2d 325 (1980).

Retrial after mistrial caused by failure of the jury to reach a verdict does not constitute double jeopardy. Kelly v. State, 145 Ga. App. 780, 245 S.E.2d 20 (1978).

If a jury cannot agree upon a verdict in a criminal case, the trial judge may declare a mistrial, and the accused may then be tried a second time for the same offense. The declaration of a mistrial under such circumstances precludes an accused from successfully invoking the constitutional principle of double jeopardy at the accused's second trial. Cameron v. Caldwell, 232 Ga. 611, 208 S.E.2d 441 (1974).

Since the jury in defendant's first trial on drug charges was hopelessly deadlocked, and the trial court's decision in that trial that the jury deadlock created a manifest necessity for a mistrial, it was not an abuse of discretion, and since the trial court in the first trial provided the jury with more time to deliberate after defendant moved for a mistrial based on the jury being deadlocked, a second trial on the same drug charges was not barred by double jeopardy; the manifest necessity of the mistrial prevented double jeopardy from attaching to defendant's second trial. Leonard v. State, 275 Ga. App. 667, 621 S.E.2d 599 (2005).

Retrial after acquittal on single charge but deadlock on other charges.

- Since the defendant was acquitted of a charge of malice murder, and the jury was deadlocked as to other offenses before them, retrial on the lesser included unindicted offense of voluntary manslaughter was not barred, as long as the jury did not know about the murder charge. State v. Archie, 230 Ga. App. 253, 495 S.E.2d 581 (1998).

Plea of former jeopardy not sustained when court declared mistrials.

- Plea of former jeopardy could not be sustained on the ground that on two former trials of the accused, under the same indictment, the court had declared mistrials on account of the inability of the juries to agree upon a verdict, since it is a matter somewhat in the discretion of the court when and under what circumstances a jury will be discharged from further consideration in criminal cases. Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943).

Defendant's introduction of prohibited evidence.

- Defendant's introduction of evidence that was prohibited by the rape shield statute gave the court grounds to find manifest necessity for a mistrial; therefore, state and federal double jeopardy provisions did not bar reprosecution. Banks v. State, 230 Ga. App. 258, 495 S.E.2d 877 (1998).

Acquittal on some offenses did not bar retrial on other offenses with different elements.

- Although a defendant was acquitted of charges relating to the beating death and kidnapping of a robbery victim in a first trial, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and assault of the victim. On the defendant's retrial, granted due to the state's failure to prove venue in the first trial, the state was not barred from re-prosecuting the defendant for armed robbery and assault. Patmon v. State, 303 Ga. App. 151, 693 S.E.2d 120 (2010).

Defendant's acquittal on felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 did not bar retrial on a voluntary manslaughter charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) as the collateral estoppel doctrine under the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const., amend. V, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, did not apply because voluntary manslaughter required proof of an element not found in felony murder or aggravated assault, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and voluntary manslaughter were mutually exclusive. Roesser v. State, 316 Ga. App. 850, 730 S.E.2d 641 (2012).

Procedurally it matters not how defendant obtains a new trial, by direct appeal from the judgment of conviction or after the denial of the defendant's motion for new trial, should the defendant choose to file one. Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 367, 268 S.E.2d 418 (1980); Daniels v. State, 165 Ga. App. 397, 299 S.E.2d 746 (1983).

No bar to second trial when motion for new trial by defendant granted.

- Jeopardy provision does not prohibit a second trial on the same charge when the defendant has been successful in the defendant's motion for new trial in having the conviction set aside for want of sufficient evidence. Staggers v. State, 120 Ga. App. 875, 172 S.E.2d 462 (1969).

One who procures a new trial on one's own motion will not be heard to complain that to try the person again places the person in double jeopardy in violation of the state Constitution, even if the reversal was for insufficiency of evidence. Staggers v. State, 225 Ga. 581, 170 S.E.2d 430 (1969).

Defendant by securing a new trial defeats a plea of former jeopardy. Waller v. State, 104 Ga. 505, 30 S.E. 835 (1898); Taylor v. State, 110 Ga. 150, 35 S.E. 161 (1900); Pride v. State, 125 Ga. 750, 54 S.E. 688 (1906).

When a defendant in a criminal case secures a new trial by the defendant's own efforts, the defendant waives the right to plead former jeopardy because of the former trial. Arnold v. State, 88 Ga. App. 710, 77 S.E.2d 550 (1953).

When the defendant is tried on a new indictment other than the indictment on which the defendant was first tried and convicted, the defendant's plea of former jeopardy is without merit, as the defendant waived the right to plead former jeopardy when the defendant secured a new trial through the defendant's own efforts. Staggers v. State, 225 Ga. 581, 170 S.E.2d 430 (1969).

When defendant obtains reversal based upon "trial error," double jeopardy does not bar retrial. Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86, 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979).

Because the reversal of the defendant's conviction was based on trial error, double jeopardy did not prevent retrial. Daniels v. State, 165 Ga. App. 397, 299 S.E.2d 746 (1983).

Prosecutorial misconduct did not bar a retrial of the defendant under the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const., amend. V, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, when the defendant alleged that the state made many statements of fact outside the record during closing argument in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 as the defendant did not allege that the prosecutor intended to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct. Wadley v. State, 317 Ga. App. 333, 730 S.E.2d 536 (2012).

Double jeopardy does not bar retrial.

- Double jeopardy clause in U.S. Const., amend. V and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII did not bar a second trial on the same charges because the defendant's motion for new trial was granted due to an erroneous evidentiary ruling. State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 728 S.E.2d 171 (2012).

Reversal for trial error explained.

- Reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case; it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant; it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect. Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86, 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979).

Reversal for insufficiency of evidence, but not for trial error, bars retrial.

- Once a reviewing court reverses a conviction solely for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of guilty, double jeopardy bars retrial; however, if a defendant obtains a reversal based upon "trial error," double jeopardy does not bar retrial. Osborne v. State, 166 Ga. App. 439, 304 S.E.2d 416 (1983).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery reversed for insufficient evidence.

- Reversal of defendant's convictions for felony murder based on the felony of armed robbery due to insufficient evidence raises a procedural double jeopardy bar to any reprosecution for armed robbery. Prater v. State, 273 Ga. 477, 541 S.E.2d 351 (2001).

When reversal for erroneous admission of evidence not excludable on retrial, retrial allowed.

- When the testimony of a lab technician was not inadmissible because it was incompetent, but because the defense had not been furnished a copy of the laboratory report as required by former O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211, it would not be excluded automatically on retrial. Thus, when the original conviction was reversed due to a trial error, rather than insufficiency of the evidence, a retrial is not barred by the double jeopardy provisions of the Georgia and United States Constitutions. Osborne v. State, 166 Ga. App. 439, 304 S.E.2d 416 (1983).

New trial granted due to erroneous evidentiary ruling.

- Trial court erred in granting the defendant's plea in bar because double jeopardy did not bar a second trial on the same charges since the retrial was granted due to an erroneous evidentiary ruling; the order granting a new trial did not find the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the verdict, but instead, the second trial judge granted the new trial based on the original trial court's error in admitting an exhibit to prove that the defendant had a prior felony conviction after the defendant offered to stipulate that the defendant was a convicted felon. State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 728 S.E.2d 171 (2012).

Death sentence unavailable on retrial following jury sentence of life imprisonment.

- If the convicting jury sentences the defendant to life imprisonment, this constitutes an acquittal of the charge that the evidence supports a finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and in any retrial the double-jeopardy clause prohibits the defendant from being given the death sentence. Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 821, 301 S.E.2d 269 (1983).

No authority for judge to grant new trial on own motion.

- A trial judge has no authority in this state on the judge's own motion, and in the absence of such motion by the defendant, to grant the defendant a new trial of a crime, and such action will be reversed on appeal. Crymes v. State, 52 Ga. App. 195, 182 S.E. 856 (1935).

Amendment of orally pronounced sentence so as to increase it.

- Court is authorized to amend its oral pronouncement in order to change sentence from 12 months on probation to 12 months in jail when there was no suggestion of vindictiveness against the defendant for having exercised any legal right, but rather it was only the trial court's effort to make the punishment fit the crime of which the jury had found the defendant to be guilty. Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 281 S.E.2d 604 (1981).

Increase of sentence after defendant begins serving sentence.

- Oral declaration as to what sentence shall be is not the sentence of the court; the sentence signed by the judge is. However, oral declaration of a sentence may not be increased after the defendant has begun to serve the sentence. Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 281 S.E.2d 604 (1981).

Sentence which has been reduced to writing and signed by a judge may not be increased after the defendant has begun to serve that sentence. Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 281 S.E.2d 604 (1981).

Juvenile defendant's voluntary manslaughter sentence was vacated, and a resentencing was ordered, when the trial court erred by increasing the sentence after the defendant had already begun serving it, because the original sentence was final at the time it was imposed, and defendant had no reason to believe otherwise; hence, the trial court's increased sentence constituted double jeopardy and could not stand. Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 42, 614 S.E.2d 146 (2005).

Multiple convictions and punishments for single crime improper.

- Appeals court agreed that because there was only one homicide victim, only one life sentence, and not three, could be imposed, because such improperly subjected the defendant to multiple convictions and punishments for one crime. Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 487, 640 S.E.2d 25 (2007).

Prosecution for separate municipal and state offenses arising in single transaction not barred.

- An accused arrested for separate non-included offenses arising out of a single transaction, which violate municipal ordinances and state law, respectively, may be prosecuted first in the recorder's court for the municipal ordinance violations, and then transferred to the superior court to be prosecuted for the separate state violations, without violating statutory or constitutional double jeopardy prohibitions. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-32.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 275 et seq., 620 et seq., 633 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 295, 299 et seq.

ALR.

- Occurrences during a view as warranting the jury's discharge without letting in plea of former jeopardy upon subsequent trial, 4 A.L.R. 1266.

Plea of former jeopardy or of former conviction or acquittal where jury was not sworn, 12 A.L.R. 1006.

Conviction or acquittal of larceny as bar to prosecution for burglary, 19 A.L.R. 626.

Pendency in one county of charge of larceny as bar to subsequent charge in another county of offense which involves both felonious breaking and felonious taking of same property, 19 A.L.R. 636.

Substitution of juror after completion of panel as sustaining plea of double jeopardy, 28 A.L.R. 849; 33 A.L.R. 142.

Forgery of names of several individuals to the same instrument as more than one offense, 33 A.L.R. 562.

Plea of double jeopardy where jury was discharged because of inability of the prosecution to present testimony, 74 A.L.R. 803.

Conviction or acquittal under charge of assault with intent to rob as bar to prosecution for assault with intent to kill based on the same transaction or on closely connected transactions, 81 A.L.R. 701.

Constitutionality and construction of statute enhancing penalty for second or subsequent offense, 82 A.L.R. 345; 116 A.L.R. 209; 132 A.L.R. 91; 139 A.L.R. 673.

Discharge on habeas corpus after conviction as affecting claim or plea of former jeopardy, 97 A.L.R. 160.

Identity, as regards former jeopardy, of offenses charged in different indictments or informations for conspiracy, 112 A.L.R. 983.

Conviction or acquittal upon charge of murder of, or assault upon, one person as bar to prosecution for like offenses against other person at the same time, 113 A.L.R. 222.

Constitutionality of statute permitting appeal by state in criminal case, 113 A.L.R. 636; 157 A.L.R. 1065.

Plea of former jeopardy as affected by declaration of mistrial after impaneling and swearing of jury on original trial because of errors, or supposed errors, regarding examination or challenging of jurors, 113 A.L.R. 1428.

Former jeopardy as regards successive prosecutions for perjury charged to have been committed in the same action or proceeding, 120 A.L.R. 1171; 29 A.L.R.2d 925.

Plea of former jeopardy where jury is discharged because of illness or insanity of juror, 125 A.L.R. 694.

Income tax: year as of which interest should be returned by taxpayer who makes return on accrual basis, 150 A.L.R. 754.

Double jeopardy where jury is discharged before termination of trial because of illness of accused, 159 A.L.R. 750.

Acquittal or conviction of one offense in connection with operation of automobile as bar to prosecution for another, 172 A.L.R. 1053.

Former jeopardy as ground for habeas corpus, 8 A.L.R.2d 285.

What amounts to habitual intemperance, drunkenness, and the like within statute relating to substantive grounds for divorce, 29 A.L.R.2d 925.

Acquittal on homicide charge as bar to subsequent prosecution for assault and battery, or vice versa, 37 A.L.R.2d 1068.

Conviction or acquittal in criminal prosecution as bar to action for statutory damages or penalty, 42 A.L.R.2d 634.

Conviction of lesser offense as bar to prosecution for greater on new trial, 61 A.L.R.2d 1141.

Conviction from which appeal is pending as bar to another prosecution for same offense, 61 A.L.R.2d 1224.

What constitutes accused's consent to court's discharge of jury or to grant of state's motion for mistrial which will constitute waiver of former jeopardy plea, 63 A.L.R.2d 782.

Plea of guilty as basis of claim of double jeopardy in attempted subsequent prosecution for same offense, 75 A.L.R.2d 683.

Constitutionality and construction of statute or court rule relating to alternate or additional jurors or substitution of jurors during trial, 84 A.L.R.2d 1288; 15 A.L.R.4th 1127; 88 A.L.R.4th 711; 10 A.L.R. Fed. 185; 115 A.L.R. Fed. 381; 119 A.L.R. Fed. 589.

Propriety, and effect as double jeopardy, of court's grant of new trial on own motion in criminal case, 85 A.L.R.2d 486.

Former jeopardy as ground for prohibition, 94 A.L.R.2d 1048.

Conviction or acquittal in previous criminal case as bar to revocation or suspension of driver's license on same factual charges, 96 A.L.R.2d 612.

Conviction or acquittal of one offense, in court having no jurisdiction to try offense arising out of same set of facts, later charged in another court, as putting accused in jeopardy of latter offense, 4 A.L.R.3d 874.

Subsequent trial, after stopping former trial to try accused for greater offense, as constituting double jeopardy, 6 A.L.R.3d 905.

Modern status of doctrine of res judicata in criminal cases, 9 A.L.R.3d 203.

Earlier prosecution for offense during which homicide was committed as bar to prosecution for homicide, 11 A.L.R.3d 834.

Propriety of increased punishment on new trial for same offense, 12 A.L.R.3d 978.

When does jeopardy attach in a nonjury trial, 49 A.L.R.3d 1039.

Prosecution for robbery of one person as bar to subsequent prosecution for robbery of another person committed at the same time, 51 A.L.R.3d 693.

Former jeopardy: propriety of trial court's declaration of mistrial or discharge of jury, without accused's consent, on ground of prosecution's disclosure of prejudicial matter to, or making prejudicial remarks in presence of jury, 77 A.L.R.3d 1143.

Multiple instances of forcible intercourse involving same defendant and same victim as constituting multiple crimes of rape, 81 A.L.R.3d 1228.

Acquittal as bar to prosecution of accused for perjury committed at trial, 89 A.L.R.3d 1098.

Double jeopardy as bar to retrial after grant of defendant's motion for mistrial, 98 A.L.R.3d 997.

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 A.L.R.4th 234.

Conviction or acquittal in federal court as bar to prosecution in state court for state offense based on same facts - modern view, 6 A.L.R.4th 802.

Validity, propriety, and effect of allowing or prohibiting media's broadcasting, recording, or photographing court proceedings, 14 A.L.R.4th 121.

Retrial on greater offense following reversal of plea-based conviction of lesser offense, 14 A.L.R.4th 970.

What constitutes "manifest necessity" for state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having attached, 14 A.L.R.4th 1014.

Power of state court, during same term, to increase severity of lawful sentence - modern status, 26 A.L.R.4th 905.

Power of court to increase severity of unlawful sentence - modern status, 28 A.L.R.4th 147.

Former jeopardy as bar to retrial of criminal defendant after original trial court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial - state cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 741.

Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator's license for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.

Double jeopardy: various acts of weapons violations as separate or continuing offense, 80 A.L.R.4th 631.

Determination that state failed to prove charges relied upon for revocation of probation as barring subsequent criminal action based on same underlying charges, 2 A.L.R.5th 262.

Conviction or acquittal in federal court as bar to prosecution in state court for state offense based on same facts - Modern view, 97 A.L.R.5th 201.

Double jeopardy considerations in federal criminal cases - Supreme Court cases, 162 A.L.R. Fed. 415.

What constitutes accused's consent to court's discharge of jury or to grant of motion for mistrial which will constitute waiver of former jeopardy plea - silence or failure to object or protest, 103 A.L.R.6th 137.

Double jeopardy considerations in state criminal cases - Supreme Court cases, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 477.