Paragraph permits joinder of nonresident tortfeasor.

- This paragraph provides the right to bring an action in the county of the residence of a resident of Georgia and join as a defendant a tort-feasor who is a nonresident of the state if the nonresident can be lawfully served with process. Record Truck Line v. Harrison, 109 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E.2d 65, aff'd, 220 Ga. 289, 138 S.E.2d 578 (1964) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

This provision only comes into play when two resident defendants are involved. Bergen v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 245 Ga. 742, 267 S.E.2d 10 (1980) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

The constitutional provision regarding joint tort-feasors applies only to resident joint tort-feasors. Dodd v. Simpson, 191 Ga. App. 369, 381 S.E.2d 585 (1989).

General Assembly's authority to fix residence of corporation.

- The General Assembly may fix the residence of a corporation under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) and there appears to be no reason it cannot also fix the residence of a corporation under this paragraph. White v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 919, 213 S.E.2d 879 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Jurisdiction and venue distinguished.

- Jurisdiction means the power of a court to render a binding judgment in the case, and venue means the place of trial. Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979).

In a borrower's suit asserting various claims against a lender, which was a citizen of Delaware and California, and an appraiser in connection with a loan that encumbered the borrower's property with a debt that exceeded the property's value, jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 did not exist where the borrower and the appraiser were both citizens of Georgia; the fact that the borrower may have filed the suit in an inappropriate venue under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV did not render the appraiser's joinder fraudulent under the doctrine of fraudulent pleading because such a pleading of jurisdictional facts did not destroy diversity, as the appraiser was still a resident of Georgia. Austin v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2007).

The constitutional venue provisions may not be altered or changed by the legislature or the courts and the adoption of procedural devices for adjudicating claims of various parties in the same action does not effect a change in the venue requirements of the Constitution. Pemberton v. Purifoy, 128 Ga. App. 892, 198 S.E.2d 356 (1973); Haley v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 13, 232 S.E.2d 362 (1977).

"Trespass" broadly employed.

- The word "trespass" is employed in a broad sense, and comprehends any misfeasance, transgression, or offense which damages another person's health, reputation, or property. Cox v. Strickland, 120 Ga. 104, 47 S.E. 912, 1 Ann. Cas. 870 (1904); Williams v. Inman, 1 Ga. App. 321, 57 S.E. 1009 (1907).

Trespass includes libels. Howe v. Bradstreet Co., 135 Ga. 564, 69 S.E. 1082 (1911).

Threatened trespass enjoined pursuant to this paragraph. Baker v. Davis, 127 Ga. 649, 57 S.E. 62 (1907) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Where answer of resident defendant has been stricken and case is in default as to the resident defendant, a verdict against both the resident and nonresident defendant is authorized. Smith v. Ross, 168 Ga. App. 817, 310 S.E.2d 567 (1983).

Waiver of jurisdiction.

- Once a timely objection to jurisdiction and venue has been raised by a nonresident defendant in an action where Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV is the sole basis for the court's jurisdiction over the nonresident, affirmative conduct inconsistent with the objection is necessary to support a finding that it has been waived. Owens v. Pollock, 214 Ga. App. 107, 447 S.E.2d 325 (1994).

Cited in Powell v. Perry, 63 Ga. 417 (1879); Graham v. Marks & Co., 95 Ga. 38, 21 S.E. 986 (1894); Harrell v. Williams, 11 Ga. App. 552, 75 S.E. 904 (1912); Lee v. Perry, 19 Ga. App. 48, 90 S.E. 988 (1916); McConnon & Co. v. Martin, 33 Ga. App. 392, 126 S.E. 272 (1925); Georgia Creosoting Co. v. Moody, 41 Ga. App. 701, 154 S.E. 294 (1930); Felton v. Macon County, 43 Ga. App. 651, 159 S.E. 730 (1931); Wilson Bros. v. Heard, 46 Ga. App. 497, 167 S.E. 913 (1933); Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 9 S.E.2d 154 (1940); Hays v. Jones, 81 Ga. App. 597, 59 S.E.2d 404 (1950); A.K. Adams & Co. v. Douglas-Coffee County Hosp. Auth., 209 Ga. 62, 70 S.E.2d 730 (1952); Grimaud v. Knox-Georgia Homes, Inc., 210 Ga. 514, 81 S.E.2d 476 (1954); Rylee v. Abernathy, 210 Ga. 673, 82 S.E.2d 220 (1954); Schwarcz v. Charlton County, 211 Ga. 923, 89 S.E.2d 881 (1955); Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co., 215 Ga. 700, 113 S.E.2d 129 (1960); Trailmobile, Inc. v. Combs, 105 Ga. App. 699, 125 S.E.2d 574 (1962); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Concrete Coring Contractors v. Mechanical Contractors & Eng'rs, 220 Ga. 714, 141 S.E.2d 439 (1965); Hinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 221 Ga. 408, 144 S.E.2d 765 (1965); Byrd v. Moore Ford Co., 116 Ga. App. 292, 157 S.E.2d 41 (1967); Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., 225 Ga. 490, 169 S.E.2d 781 (1969); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 121 Ga. App. 427, 174 S.E.2d 211 (1970); J.H. Ewing & Sons v. Montgomery, 124 Ga. App. 836, 186 S.E.2d 335 (1971); Shell v. Watts, 125 Ga. App. 542, 188 S.E.2d 269 (1972); Bibb County v. McDaniel, 127 Ga. App. 129, 192 S.E.2d 544 (1972); Shell v. Watts, 127 Ga. App. 378, 193 S.E.2d 566 (1972); Carter v. Grogan, 230 Ga. 249, 196 S.E.2d 434 (1973); Williamson v. Perret's Farms, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 687, 197 S.E.2d 754 (1973); Jere Power Car Land, Inc. v. Moss, 134 Ga. App. 523, 215 S.E.2d 288 (1975); Graham v. Tallent, 235 Ga. 47, 218 S.E.2d 799 (1975); Daniel & Daniel, Inc. v. Cosmopolitan Co., 137 Ga. App. 383, 224 S.E.2d 44 (1976); Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga. App. 816, 232 S.E.2d 141 (1976); Logan Paving Co. v. Liles Constr. Co., 141 Ga. App. 81, 232 S.E.2d 575 (1977); Davis v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 143 Ga. App. 460, 238 S.E.2d 553 (1977); Sylvester Motor & Tractor Co. v. Farmers Bank, 153 Ga. App. 614, 266 S.E.2d 293 (1980); Fosgate v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 154 Ga. App. 510, 268 S.E.2d 780 (1980); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 159 Ga. App. 416, 283 S.E.2d 647 (1981); National Bank v. Moore, 159 Ga. App. 729, 285 S.E.2d 78 (1981); Cassells v. Bradlee Mgt. Servs., Inc., 161 Ga. App. 325, 291 S.E.2d 48 (1982); Trammell v. Eberhardt, 162 Ga. App. 753, 293 S.E.2d 32 (1982); Dennard v. Freeport Minerals Co., 250 Ga. 330, 297 S.E.2d 222 (1982); Georgia Power Co. v. Harrison, 253 Ga. 212, 318 S.E.2d 306 (1984); Unger v. Bryant Equip. Sales & Servs., Inc., 255 Ga. 53, 335 S.E.2d 109 (1985); Currahee Constr. Co. v. Rabun County Sch. Dist., 180 Ga. App. 471, 349 S.E.2d 487 (1986); Gay v. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc., 183 Ga. App. 175, 358 S.E.2d 468 (1987); Watkins v. M & M Clays, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 54, 404 S.E.2d 141 (1991); Calhoun County Hosp. Auth. v. Walker, 205 Ga. App. 259, 421 S.E.2d 777 (1992); Johnson v. Woodard, 208 Ga. App. 41, 429 S.E.2d 701 (1993); Zepp v. Toporek, 211 Ga. App. 169, 438 S.E.2d 636 (1994); Sikes v. Norton, 185 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); HD Supply, Inc. v. Garger, 299 Ga. App. 751, 683 S.E.2d 671 (2009).

Instance of lack of jurisdiction.

- Fact that plaintiff, as surety, guaranteed performance of a contract by a contracting company, as principal, would not give superior court of county of residence of contracting company jurisdiction on petition of the surety to hear and determine the controversy between contracting company and city for which the work was to be performed as to whether or not there had been a breach of contract on the part of the contracting company, nor would the fact that plaintiff and contracting company had entered into separate contract by application for performance bond give plaintiff any right to compel the city to join in a suit with reference to this separate contract, since the city was not a party to the application and had no interest therein. Maryland Cas. Co. v. City of Adel, 87 Ga. App. 138, 73 S.E.2d 237 (1952).

Reason jurisdiction of action by common carrier and insurance company lacking.

- Common carrier that negligently injured a person, and the insurance company that issued the carrier an indemnity policy under provisions of former Code 1933, § 68-612, were neither joint tort-feasors nor joint contractors, so as to bring them within the provisions of this paragraph, since the liability of the carrier to the injured person arose from a tort in the commission of which the insurance company was not concerned, while the insurance company's obligation to pay damages caused by the carrier's negligence was a contractual duty not assumed by the carrier. Bolin v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 92 Ga. App. 726, 89 S.E.2d 831 (1955) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Must be able to prove claim against resident defendant.

- In order to maintain suit against nonresident joint tort-feasor, it is necessary that a cause of action be alleged and proven against resident defendant. Chitty v. Jones, 210 Ga. 439, 80 S.E.2d 694 (1954); Stroud v. Doolittle, 213 Ga. 32, 96 S.E.2d 876 (1957), commented on in 20 Ga. B.J. 260 (1957).

Where suit is brought against two defendants, one of whom resides in the county, the court has no jurisdiction of nonresident defendant unless resident codefendant is liable in the action. Timberlake Grocery Co. v. Cartwright, 146 Ga. App. 746, 247 S.E.2d 567 (1978).

The test as to whether a verdict is authorized against a nonresident joint obligor is whether a verdict is authorized against the resident joint obligor. Woods v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 394, 138 S.E.2d 593 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Scarboro v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 364 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1966).

Where suit is brought against two alleged joint tort-feasors in county where one of them resides, the other being a nonresident, and where on trial of case resident defendant is found by jury not liable, the court is without jurisdiction to render a judgment against the nonresident defendant, and if such judgment is rendered it may be arrested or set aside upon motion. Southern Nitrogen Co. v. Manuel, 110 Ga. App. 597, 139 S.E.2d 453 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Crawford v. Randle, 191 Ga. App. 112, 381 S.E.2d 77 (1989).

Lack of jurisdiction defense when unable to prove claim against resident defendant.

- Only time defense of lack of jurisdiction over person of nonresident defendants because of their nonresidency would be valid in an action against joint tortfeasors is in event of judgment in favor of resident joint defendant, whereby the court would lose jurisdiction as to the nonresident joint defendants unless they expressly or impliedly waive this defense. Lansky v. Goldstein, 136 Ga. App. 607, 222 S.E.2d 62 (1975).

Proof needs to show jurisdiction in action against residents and nonresidents.

- While in most cases a bare allegation of the defendant's residence within the county will suffice to meet the requirements of alleging the facts upon which venue depends, in an action against residents and nonresidents where venue as to the nonresidents depends upon the relief sought against the residents, a plea to the jurisdiction will be sustained where the petition does not set forth a cause of action against the resident defendant. Martin v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 224 Ga. 550, 163 S.E.2d 885 (1968), overruled on other grounds, Cochran v. McCollum, 233 Ga. 104, 210 S.E.2d 13 (1974).

Allegation sufficient by nonresidents to raise question of jurisdiction.

- Where two alleged tort-feasors are sued jointly and severally, the demurrer (now failure to state a claim) of the nonresident defendant that the petition sets out no cause of action against the nonresident defendant is sufficient to raise the question of whether the nonresident should be dismissed from the suit on a jurisdictional ground that no cause of action is set out against the resident defendant and that the nonresident defendant is accordingly entitled to be sued in the county of the nonresident defendant's own residence. Harrell v. Gardner, 115 Ga. App. 171, 154 S.E.2d 265 (1967).

Joint tort-feasors may be sued residing in different counties or may be sued together in the county of either.

- But in order to maintain such a suit where one of the defendants is a nonresident, it is essential that a cause of action be alleged and proven against the resident defendant. Richards & Assocs. v. Studstill, 212 Ga. 375, 93 S.E.2d 3 (1956), later appeal, 96 Ga. App. 270, 99 S.E.2d 558 (1957).

Facts rendering motion to arrest judgment proper.

- Where the only two defendants against whom a verdict was rendered resided out of the county, and the finding of the jury was in favor of the one defendant on account of whose residence in the county of the suit the court acquired jurisdiction, it was proper to arrest the judgment, on motion of the defendants against whom the verdict was returned. Pickron v. Garrett, 73 Ga. App. 61, 35 S.E.2d 540 (1945).

Motion in arrest of judgment proper remedy where jurisdiction lost.

- Where action is brought in county of residence of one defendant, and on trial of case no judgment is taken against the resident defendant, the court loses jurisdiction as to any nonresident defendant unless jurisdiction thereof is waived, either expressly or impliedly by the conduct of the defendant. A motion in arrest of judgment has been held to be a proper remedy where jurisdiction has been lost, and not waived. Berger v. Noble, 81 Ga. App. 759, 59 S.E.2d 761 (1950).

Jurisdiction against nonresident defendant lost.

- Where joint tort-feasors residing in different counties are sued in county of one, and on trial of case the resident defendant is discharged and a verdict returned solely against the nonresident defendant, the court is without jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the nonresident defendant. O'Neill v. Western Mtg. Corp., 153 Ga. App. 151, 264 S.E.2d 691 (1980).

An action may be maintained against joint tortfeasors who reside in different counties in the county of residence of either, but if there is no liability against the resident defendant, the latter necessarily is not a joint tortfeasor or a joint obligor with the nonresident defendant, and the court, with respect to the person of the nonresident defendant, has no jurisdiction to render a verdict and judgment against the nonresident. Register v. Sanders, 103 Ga. App. 368, 119 S.E.2d 294 (1961).

Must be able to obtain jurisdiction.

- Where there is an inability to obtain jurisdiction over the only one of two or more defendants alleged to be resident of forum county because of nonresidency, there is no jurisdiction. Register v. Sanders, 103 Ga. App. 368, 119 S.E.2d 294 (1961).

Suits against joint tortfeasor, joint obligors, or joint trespassers, may be brought in county of residence of any, but if no judgment is taken against a resident defendant, the court loses venue as to the nonresident defendant unless the issue of venue is waived. Timberlake Grocery Co. v. Cartwright, 146 Ga. App. 746, 247 S.E.2d 567 (1978).

Loss of jurisdiction of nonresident defendants occasioned by finding of nonliability of resident defendants.

- Where a single suit is brought against several joint tort-feasors in a county where one of them is a resident, and where the others reside outside the county, and, where on the trial of the case, the resident defendant is found not liable by the jury, and the nonresident defendants are found liable, the court is without jurisdiction to enter judgment against the nonresident defendants. Southeastern Truck Lines v. Rann, 214 Ga. 813, 108 S.E.2d 561 (1959).

Petition dismissible for want of jurisdiction where the interests of the plaintiff and the resident defendant are identical and the allegations of the petition fail to show any justiciable controversy between the plaintiff and the resident defendant in which the nonresident defendant has any substantial interest, on motion of the nonresident defendant, setting out that it is a resident of a named county in this state and subject to suit only in the superior court of that county, the petition will be dismissed as to such nonresident defendant for want of jurisdiction. Maryland Cas. Co. v. City of Adel, 87 Ga. App. 138, 73 S.E.2d 237 (1952).

Court without jurisdiction to enter declaratory judgment.

- Superior Court of Murray County did not have jurisdiction to entertain a case for declaratory judgment where all parties defendant except one, against whom no substantial equitable relief was prayed, were nonresidents of Murray County; the equitable feature of the case is removed, leaving the action solely one at law under Ga. L. 1945, p. 137, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2). The venue of such an action is in the county where the defendant resides, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI). The nonresident defendants not being of the class of persons who may be sued in counties other than the counties of their residence as permitted in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Paras. IV and V (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Paras. IV and V), the court was without jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment as to their rights. Harper v. Gunby, 215 Ga. 466, 111 S.E.2d 85 (1959).

Default judgment insufficient basis for jurisdiction.

- Default with judgment based thereon, which is unsupported by a verdict, and which carries no finding of damages as to a resident defendant, is insufficient to furnish a venue base on which the verdict against the nonresident can rest. Woods v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 150 Ga. App. 499, 258 S.E.2d 592 (1979), cert. denied, 245 Ga. 162, 264 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Verdict against both resident and nonresident defendant is authorized where resident defendant is in default. Woods v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 394, 138 S.E.2d 593 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Scarboro v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 364 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1966).

Default of nonresident defendant irrelevant.

- The default of the nonresident defendants, which otherwise would have constituted a waiver of the defenses specified in paragraph (b)(1) of Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 12 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12) was irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction of nonresident defendants, and would not estop them from asserting the fact of their nonresidency in the event of a judgment in favor of the resident defendant. Lansky v. Goldstein, 136 Ga. App. 607, 222 S.E.2d 62 (1975).

A nonresident defendant, even if in default, will not be subject to a final judgment until the resident defendant is found liable. Woods v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 150 Ga. App. 499, 258 S.E.2d 592 (1979), cert. denied, 245 Ga. 162, 264 S.E.2d 230 (1980).

Jurisdiction issue waived by nonresident defendant invoking ruling of court.

- Want of jurisdiction of the person is waived and such jurisdiction is admitted where nonresident defendant, after discharge of resident defendant, invokes ruling of the court on the merits of case. A ruling by the trial court on a motion for a new trial made by such nonresident defendant is such a ruling on the merits. Berger v. Noble, 81 Ga. App. 759, 59 S.E.2d 761 (1950).

Effect of voluntary submission of person to court's jurisdiction.

- An equitable petition instituted against a nonresident of a county and against the sheriff of the county in which suit is brought, seeking to set aside a judgment obtained by such nonresident against petitioner in the same superior court, on ground that the judgment is void, and seeking to cancel the execution issuing on such judgment and to restrain the sheriff from proceeding with levy thereof and the sale of petitioner's property thereunder, is properly brought in the superior court of the county of residence of the sheriff, in which was rendered the judgment sought to be set aside, the nonresident having submitted itself to jurisdiction of the court by institution of suit therein against petitioner, and the petitioner not seeking any relief as to matters outside of such litigation. Napier v. Bank of La Fayette, 183 Ga. 865, 189 S.E. 822 (1937).

O.C.G.A.

§ 15-21-56 does not overrule constitutional provisions. - The provisions of Ga. L. 1949, p. 1168, §§ 4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-21-56) are not sufficient to overrule provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI), providing that civil actions shall be brought in county of the defendant's residence. However, where there are joint defendants, such an action may be brought in the county of residence of either. Banks County v. Stark, 88 Ga. App. 368, 77 S.E.2d 33 (1953).

O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-13(g) and9-11-14 are not in conflict with this paragraph; of course, even if they were, the venue provisions of the Constitution would be controlling and cannot be extended or limited by those sections. Lester Witte & Co. v. Cobb Bank & Trust Co., 248 Ga. 235, 282 S.E.2d 296 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Actions to which paragraph applicable.

- This paragraph determines the venue of an action to restrain joint defendants from cutting timber and committing other waste, and to secure the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the timber already cut. McPhaul v. Fletcher, 111 Ga. 878, 36 S.E. 938 (1900); Burch v. King, 14 Ga. App. 153, 80 S.E. 664 (1914) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Proper service required to achieve venue.

- Equity will grant relief against a judgment where the joint defendant on a note who was sued at the defendant's residence was not properly served. Austell v. McLarin, 51 Ga. 467 (1874).

This paragraph applies to cases in which one or more joint obligors are railroad companies. Waycross Air-Line R.R. v. Offerman & W.R.R., 114 Ga. 727, 40 S.E. 738 (1902) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Applies to actions for injuries against a foreign railroad company operating in this state and an engineer in its employment. Southern Ry. v. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735, 53 S.E. 244, 110 Am. St. R. 191 (1906).

This paragraph applies to joint assaults on a passenger by a conductor and a third person. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Brown, 113 Ga. 414, 38 S.E. 989, 84 Am. St. R. 250 (1901) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Venue of separate actions not determined by this paragraph, hence guarantor by separate contract could not be joined with debtor. Sims v. Clark, 91 Ga. 302, 18 S.E. 158 (1893) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Venue between maker and party promising to sign note is not determined by this paragraph. Adams v. Williams, 125 Ga. 430, 54 S.E. 99 (1906) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Venue for action against owner of realty and contractor placing improvements thereon is not determined by this paragraph. Mauch v. Rosser, 126 Ga. 268, 55 S.E. 32 (1906); Atkinson v. Wingate Plumbing Co., 20 Ga. App. 480, 93 S.E. 122 (1917) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

An individual defendant who lives outside the state does not "reside" in Georgia so as to be subject to the joint obligor venue provisions, and venue against the nonresident individual is proper only where authorized by the long-arm statute. Goodman v. Vilston, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 718, 399 S.E.2d 241 (1990).

Multiple claims arising from same transaction.

- Where a plaintiff brings suit in the same county on two claims arising from the same transaction and the Georgia Constitution designates that county as the venue for one of those claims, the trial court has the discretion to entertain both claims. Natpar Corp. v. E.T. Kassinger, Inc., 258 Ga. 102, 365 S.E.2d 442 (1988).

Where a joint obligor claim and an equitable claim arose from the same transaction, and involved the same parties and witnesses and substantially the same proof, venue with regard to both claims was proper in the county where only one of the joint obligors lived, despite the fact that the other joint obligor was the only defendant against whom equitable relief was prayed. Natpar Corp. v. E.T. Kassinger, Inc., 258 Ga. 102, 365 S.E.2d 442 (1988).

Venue under Child Custody Intrastate Jurisdiction Act.

- Boyfriend, who had been appointed temporary guardian of child, was not the child's "legal custodian" as that term was used in the Georgia Child Custody Intrastate Jurisdiction Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-20 et seq., and, thus, the provisions of the Act, including its venue provisions, did not apply; accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the grandmother's petition for custody of the child on the ground that venue was not proper in the county where the mother was incarcerated but would have been proper where the temporary guardian, the boyfriend, resided, as application of the general venue rules governing venue in civil cases, contained in the Georgia Constitution, showed that since the mother was a necessary party to the grandmother's custody action, filing the action in the county where the mother was incarcerated was proper. Gordon v. Gordon, 269 Ga. App. 224, 603 S.E.2d 732 (2004).

Dismissal on venue proper.

- In suits by classes of former and current members of distribution electric membership corporations (EMCs) seeking to recover millions of dollars in patronage capital from two wholesale EMCs, in which the members lacked privity with the wholesale EMCs which were the only defendants as to whom venue was proper, dismissal of the distribution EMCs was proper. Walker v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 341 Ga. App. 647, 802 S.E.2d 643 (2017).

Dismissal warranted.

- If upon trial of a joint action plaintiff fails to prove a joint undertaking, and dismisses as to the resident defendant, the other defendant may secure a dismissal of the action although the defendant has pleaded to the merits. Maddox v. Brooks, 17 Ga. App. 644, 87 S.E. 911 (1916).

Joint tortfeasors and joint trespassers synonymous for venue purposes.

- Joint trespassers having been held to be synonymous with joint tortfeasors, venue lies under this paragraph against all joint tortfeasors in the county of residence of any of the joint tortfeasors. Lester Witte & Co. v. Cobb Bank & Trust Co., 248 Ga. 235, 282 S.E.2d 296 (1981) (decided prior to insertion in paragraph of specific reference to "joint tortfeasors"; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

It does not matter whether joint tortfeasors are cross-defendants, third-party defendants, or both.

- This paragraph does not concern itself with whether joint tortfeasors are cross-defendants, third-party defendants, or a combination of the two. It merely provides that suits against joint tort-feasors residing in different counties may be brought in either county. Lester Witte & Co. v. Cobb Bank & Trust Co., 248 Ga. 235, 282 S.E.2d 296 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

A state department or agency can be considered a joint tortfeasor with other resident defendants for venue purposes. Gault v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 134, 430 S.E.2d 63 (1993).

Department of Transportation employee as joint tortfeasor.

- Venue against an employee of the Department of Transportation may be had in a county only if the employee is an alleged joint tortfeasor with a defendant resident in that county. Gault v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 134, 430 S.E.2d 63 (1993).

Injury created joint tortfeasors.

- Although liability insurance carrier was not a joint tortfeasor for venue purposes because the cause of action against it arose in contract, and the alleged negligent acts of its client and others were separate, where the injury or death was single and indivisible, the tortfeasors were joint, and venue proper as to one tortfeasor was proper as to all. Gault v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 134, 430 S.E.2d 63 (1993).

Estate not nominal party despite its insolvency.

- Defendant tortfeasor did not constitute a "nominal party" for venue purposes merely because of insolvency; although an estate named in a suit as a defendant and a joint tortfeasor with a city was insolvent, the estate was not a nominal party on this basis, and venue was proper in the county of residence of the estate's administrator. Banks v. City of Hampton, 280 Ga. App. 432, 634 S.E.2d 192 (2006).

An individual defendant may be sued in a county other than the county of residence when sued as a joint tortfeasor with a foreign corporation operating as a motor common carrier in this state and having an agent, office, and place of doing business in the county where the suit is brought, as a foreign corporation doing business in this state may be treated for the purpose of being sued, as a resident of any county in which it has an agent, office, and place of doing business, and venue of a suit against such joint tort-feasors may be laid in the county of either of them. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953).

Suit against joint wrongdoers together and in county of either permissible.

- Where the defendant carrier and the individual defendant were joint tort-feasors, venue of the suit as to both could be laid in the county of either of them pursuant to this paragraph and under such circumstances, the provision of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) to the effect that a defendant is entitled to be sued in the county of the defendant's residence does not apply. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Where one seeks to sell property of another at public auction under no authority for doing so other than power therefor which is contained in a forged security deed, one's act is a positive wrong against the owner of such property, and all who participate in such an unlawful undertaking are joint wrongdoers and they may be sued together for the purpose of preventing consummation of the wrong in any county of this state where one of them resides. Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. George, 214 Ga. 312, 104 S.E.2d 434 (1958).

Where a third-party complaint is sued out in main case against two alleged tort-feasors in county of residence of one of them, this paragraph gives county of residence of either tort-feasor jurisdiction of the action. Shell v. Watts, 127 Ga. App. 378, 193 S.E.2d 566 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

In an automobile collision case, the trial court properly denied the known defendant's motion to transfer venue to the known defendant's home county because the John Doe defendant was alleged to have played a vital role in causing the plaintiffs' alleged injuries; and, in a tort action, if venue in a particular county was proper as to one joint tort-feasor, it was proper as to the other joint tort-feasor as well; thus, because venue was proper in Bibb County as to the John Doe defendant, it was likewise proper as to the known defendant in that county. Carpenter v. McMann, 341 Ga. App. 791, 802 S.E.2d 74 (2017).

Venue when one defendant an unknown.

- Venue provisions of the uninsured motorist statute, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d)(1), were held to apply in a suit related to an automobile collision brought against a known Georgia resident and an unknown defendant under a joint tortfeasor theory. Carpenter v. McMann, Ga. , S.E.2d (Aug. 2, 2018).

Joint tort-feasors required to show proof of status.

- Joint tort-feasors residing in different counties of the state may be sued together in the county of either, but in order to maintain such a suit, it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove that the defendants are in fact joint tort-feasors. Richards & Assocs. v. Studstill, 212 Ga. 375, 93 S.E.2d 3 (1956), later appeal, 96 Ga. App. 270, 99 S.E.2d 558 (1957).

Allegation and proof of action against resident defendant necessary.

- While joint tort-feasors residing in different counties of this state may be sued in the county of residence of either, the cause of action must be alleged and proved against the resident defendant, and the nonresident defendant has standing to raise these questions. Ryder Auto. Leasing Co. v. Tates, 112 Ga. App. 18, 143 S.E.2d 411 (1965).

Defendants jointly liable for conversion can be sued in county of either residence.

- A foreign railroad company operating in this state and an engineer in its employment may be jointly sued in the county in which the cause of action originated, even though the residence of the engineer is in another county in this state. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953).

Where the petition in a trover action alleges that named defendants have possession of described articles of personal property to which the plaintiff claims title and refuse to deliver the same to plaintiff, such averments directly and in express terms charge defendants jointly with the tortious act of conversion, and hence, all defendants may be sued together in a county where any of them resides. Screven Oil Mill v. Crosby, 94 Ga. App. 238, 94 S.E.2d 146 (1956).

Suit against nonresident corporation can be brought in county corporation doing business.

- Although a motor common carrier may be a nonresident corporation, yet since it is engaged in doing business in this state, and has agents in the state for that purpose, it is, as in the case of a nonresident railroad corporation doing business in this state, so far as the right to sue is concerned, a resident of this state, and a resident of the county in which the cause of action originated, so far as the right to bring a suit against it for a cause of action originating in that county is concerned, and, being a resident of that county for the purpose of suit, a joint tort-feasor, notwithstanding that the tort-feasor may reside in another county of this state, may be sued, jointly with the motor common carrier, in said county under this provision of the state Constitution. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

It is not essential that joint tort-feasors owed same duty or should be guilty of same act of negligence, but it is sufficient if each owed a separate and distinct duty to person injured, provided only that the separate acts of negligence concurred in proximately causing the injury. Albany Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shiver, 63 Ga. App. 755, 12 S.E.2d 114 (1940), later appeal, 67 Ga. App. 359, 20 S.E.2d 181 (1942); Brooks v. Douglas, 154 Ga. App. 54, 267 S.E.2d 495 (1980).

Suits against joint obligors may be tried in the county wherein either defendant resides. Midtown Properties, Inc. v. George F. Richardson, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 182, 228 S.E.2d 303 (1976).

Although a judgment was not taken against a nonresident defendant, resident defendants waived any issue regarding venue by failing to raise it even after the verdict. Parker v. Kennon, 242 Ga. App. 627, 530 S.E.2d 527 (2000).

Suit appropriate in any venue where jurisdiction can be obtained over nonresident.

- Where residents and nonresidents are joint obligors or joint tort-feasors, suit against them may be brought in any county in state in which jurisdiction can be obtained over nonresident defendant. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Residence of Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority varies.

- Under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI), the General Assembly may fix the residence of Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority for venue purposes when it is sued alone, but this paragraph provides the venue when MARTA is sued as a joint tort-feasor. Glover v. Donaldson, 243 Ga. 479, 254 S.E.2d 857 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Venue in county of codefendant's residence permissible.

- Despite the provision of Ga. L. 1965, p. 2243, as amended by Ga. L. 1971, p. 2092, that suits may be brought against MARTA only in the Superior Court of Fulton County where MARTA is sued as a joint tort-feasor, venue may be proper in another county where a codefendant resides. Glover v. Donaldson, 243 Ga. 479, 254 S.E.2d 857 (1979).

An ex-spouse filed a tort action against the defendants in a county where two of them did not reside. As one defendant admitted that venue was proper as to that defendant, venue was proper as to the other defendants as well. Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008).

County of original action venue of suit against nonresident third-party defendant.

- Where a third-party complaint is brought against two alleged joint tort-feasors, one of whom is a resident of the county in which the original action was brought, the nonresident third-party defendant may be jointly sued in the county of the original action. Shell v. Watts, 229 Ga. 474, 192 S.E.2d 265 (1972).

Venue lost following dismissal of party.

- In a personal injury action by the passenger against the estate of the driver of the vehicle in which the passenger was riding and the owner of a truck, venue over the nonresident truck owner vanished when the passenger dismissed the owner from the main action, notwithstanding a pending cross-claim for wrongful death against the owner by the estate, a joint tortfeasor which had consented to judgment against it. Airgrowers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 230 Ga. App. 415, 496 S.E.2d 528 (1998).

Trial court, in a tort case, lacked venue when it granted summary judgment in favor of the security interest holder on the same day that it dismissed the insurer from the action with prejudice; once the resident insurer was dismissed from the action, venue under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV could not be maintained against the nonresident bank. Colony Bank Worth v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 281 Ga. App. 397, 636 S.E.2d 119 (2006).

Teenager's motion to remand was properly denied as: (1) a police officer was the only defendant who resided in Toombs County; (2) venue in Toombs County "vanished" when the officer was granted summary judgment, so the teenager could not rely on the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the Georgia Constitution; (3) the newspaper defendants did not have an office in Toombs County so as to preclude venue there pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(3); (4) although the newspaper defendants transacted business in Toombs County, they did not maintain an office there; and (5) venue was not properly based on O.C.G.A. § 14-11-1108(b), even though some defendants were limited liability companies. Torrance v. Morris Publ'g Group, LLC, 281 Ga. App. 563, 636 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 160 (Ga. 2007).

Claims involving third parties.

- If a claim asserted against codefendants or third parties is essentially independent rather than one ancillary to main action, it must satisfy within itself constitutional venue requirements. Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., 122 Ga. App. 335, 177 S.E.2d 92 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 227 Ga. 123, 179 S.E.2d 68 (1971), commented on in 23 Mercer L. Rev. 667 (1972).

Suit by defendant seeking contribution from third-party plaintiff must be brought in third-party defendant's residence.

- Even though this paragraph allows actions against joint trespassers to be brought in county of residence of either, a defendant seeking contribution as a third-party plaintiff cannot bring the action in a county other than that of the residence of the third-party defendant. Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., Inc., 227 Ga. 123, 179 S.E.2d 68 (1971), commented on in 23 Mercer L. Rev. 667 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Directed verdict for resident tort-feasor.

- Where a party is sued outside the party's county of residence as an alleged joint tort-feasor, a directed verdict in favor of the resident alleged joint tort-feasor makes the venue improper and the party must be sued again in the party's county of residence. Smith v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 169 Ga. App. 751, 315 S.E.2d 265 (1984).

Action against company in county where agent resides.

- Where evidence presented at trial supported the conclusion that appellant, through agents residing in various counties of the state, was the nexus of a conspiracy involving all the individual defendants and calculated to damage appellee's business, the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the suit for improper venue since civil conspirators are liable as joint tort-feasors and suits against joint tort-feasors residing in different counties may be tried in any of those counties. American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Queen, 171 Ga. App. 870, 321 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

Consent judgment.

- Where a single suit is brought against several joint tortfeasors in a county where one of them is a resident, and the others reside outside the county, a consent judgment and an agreement not to enforce it constitute a finding that the resident is liable and do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants in the county where suit was brought. Motor Convoy, Inc. v. Brannen, 194 Ga. App. 795, 391 S.E.2d 671, aff'd, 260 Ga. 340, 393 S.E.2d 262 (1990).

Waiver of venue.

- Where a nonresident defendant waived its existing venue defense to facilitate entry of judgment, it could not withdraw that waiver because its expectations were subsequently disappointed. Robinson v. Star Gas of Hawkinsville, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 112, 533 S.E.2d 97 (2000).

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(c) was not a proper exercise of the legislature's authority to enact laws which allowed the superior and state courts to change venue; furthermore, because O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1(a) vested power to change venue in the court, and not in a defendant, as did O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(c), O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1(a) was proper under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VIII, and did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV. EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333, 626 S.E.2d 482 (2006).

Constitutional joint tortfeasor venue provision did not apply.

- In a mortgage broker's breach of contract action against a limited liability company, the trial court erred in denying a motion to transfer to a proper venue filed by the mortgage broker president, who was added as a defendant, because the constitutional joint tortfeasor venue provision, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV, did not apply to subject the president to trial with the broker on the LLC's counterclaim in Coweta County since the broker did not reside in Coweta County; as an individual resident of DeKalb County, the president was entitled under the constitutional venue provisions to be sued in DeKalb County, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI. M&M Mortg. Co. v. Grantville Mill, LLC, 302 Ga. App. 46, 690 S.E.2d 630 (2010).

One partner must reside in county regardless of where doing business.

- A partnership may be sued in any county in which one partner resides but it cannot be sued in a county where none of the partners reside even if the partnership may be doing business in the latter county. King Bros. & Co. v. Passmore, 18 Ga. App. 514, 89 S.E. 1103 (1916); Farmers Hdwe. of Athens, Inc. v. L.A. Properties, Ltd., 136 Ga. App. 180, 220 S.E.2d 465 (1975).

Citizenship is not controlling factor.

- A partnership may be sued in any county in which one of the partners has such a residence as will confer upon courts of that county jurisdiction over the partner's person, regardless of the place of the partner's citizenship. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

There is no basis for a distinction as to partners who may be sued in county of either. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Suit was not proper where nonresidents' business transacted.

- In the case of a suit brought against six members of a joint venture, four of whom were Georgians and two of whom were Texans, as to the resident joint defendants, suit was not proper in the county where the business of the nonresidents was transacted but had to be brought in the county where residents resided. The Texans were not "residents" for venue purposes and "nonresidents" for long-arm purposes; they were simply nonresidents. Weitzel v. Griffin & Assocs., 192 Ga. App. 89, 383 S.E.2d 653 (1989).

Residence of nonresident corporation for suit purposes.

- A nonresident corporation is for purposes of suit a resident of the county in Georgia in which it has an office, agent, and place of business and a joint action lies against it and a resident of Georgia in the county in which the corporation has an agent, office, and place of business even though the joint defendant resides in another county. Quinton v. American Thread Co., 74 Ga. App. 436, 40 S.E.2d 95 (1946); Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Place of venue for enjoining continuing nuisance.

- Where corporation which owned rendering plant in first county, and its president and sole owner were residents of second county, but main foreman at rendering plant was a resident of first county and the foreman gave all orders and directions for work to be done at rendering plant during absence of president, superior court of first county had jurisdiction of action against corporation, president, and main foreman at rendering plant, as alleged joint tort-feasors, to enjoin operation of rendering plant as an alleged continuing nuisance. Bennett v. Bagwell & Stewart, Inc., 214 Ga. 115, 103 S.E.2d 561 (1958), commented on in 21 Ga. B.J. 564 (1959).

Resident defendant acting under direction of another.

- Where a petition for injunction, brought in county where one defendant resides, seeks relief against joint trespasses by all defendants, the court is not without jurisdiction, even though all except the one defendant are residents of other counties of the state. This is true even though the resident defendant may have been acting only as agent of or under the command, direction, or authority of the other defendants in the commission of the trespasses. Hoch v. Candler, 190 Ga. 390, 9 S.E.2d 622 (1940); Baggett v. Linder, 208 Ga. 590, 68 S.E.2d 469 (1952).

Temporary presence of nonresident tort-feasor in state is not such residence within meaning of state Constitution as will authorize joining in suit against the nonresident in county where the nonresident is found and served, other joint tort-feasors who reside in a different county or counties of this state. Benton Rapid Express v. Johnson, 202 Ga. 597, 43 S.E.2d 667 (1947).

When corporation sued as joint tort-feasor deemed of different county.

- Corporation which is sued as a joint tort-feasor and is deemed to be a resident of the same county as other joint tort-feasors which it is joined with and is also considered to be a resident of another county in which neither of the other joint tort-feasors reside is a resident of a "different" county within the meaning of this paragraph. Richards v. Johnson, 219 Ga. 771, 135 S.E.2d 881 (1964) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Venue in a borrower's action for fraud against a corporate lender was proper in Coffee County where the lender was a foreign corporation registered to do business in Georgia, and although its registered office was in Fulton County, it transacted business in Coffee County. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Brown, 198 Ga. App. 653, 402 S.E.2d 753 (1991).

Facility operated in county.

- Trial court's order that venue was proper in Twiggs County was proper in a declaratory judgment action between an owner and a corporation arising from leases between the parties for facilities because one of the facilities at issue was located in Twiggs County and the corporation's subsidiary, a co-defendant, had an office and transacted business in Twiggs County. Mariner Healthcare, Inc. v. Foster, 280 Ga. App. 406, 634 S.E.2d 162 (2006).

Intent.

- The constitutional venue provision as to joint trespassers was evidently intended to declare what might be venue in suits where persons were jointly liable for tort. Georgia Power Co. v. Blum, 80 Ga. App. 618, 57 S.E.2d 18 (1949).

Meaning of word "trespass."

- The meaning of word "trespass" is broad enough so that an action against persons jointly maintaining a nuisance can be brought in the county of the residence of either under this paragraph. J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 226 Ga. 480, 175 S.E.2d 847 (1970) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

A suit against joint trespassers, residing in different counties, may be tried in either county. Minhinnett v. Jackson, 45 Ga. App. 207, 164 S.E. 96 (1932).

As where it was sufficiently alleged that defendants were joint trespassers; and the venue of the suit as to both defendants was in the county of the residence of either. Flowers, Inc. v. Chamblee, 165 Ga. 703, 141 S.E. 907 (1928).

Trespass to acquire timber.

- One who makes a written instrument purporting to convey to another sawmill rights in certain timber on lands of a third person may be sued as a joint trespasser with person taking the conveyance who enters upon the land under the writing and cuts the sawmill timber thereon. Pickron v. Garrett, 73 Ga. App. 61, 35 S.E.2d 540 (1945).

Joint action against county and Department of Transportation permitted.

- Where a county and Department of Transportation joined in damaging private property for use of public without first paying adequate compensation, a right of action arose in favor of the owner of the property, and the owner could have brought a joint action against the County and the Department of Transportation. State Hwy. Bd. v. Ward, 42 Ga. App. 220, 155 S.E. 384 (1930).

Principal sued in county of surety's residence.

- Under this paragraph, principal and surety may be sued together in the county of the surety's residence. White v. Hart, 35 Ga. 269 (1866); Lumpkin v. Calloway, 101 Ga. 226, 28 S.E. 622 (1897) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

A surety who pays the note is entitled to the same rights as to venue as is the principal. Anderson v. Armistead, 18 Ga. App. 387, 89 S.E. 525 (1916).

Pursuant to this paragraph, proper venue of building contractor and surety on bond was determined. O'Connell v. Stoddard, 27 Ga. App. 452, 108 S.E. 622 (1921) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV).

Venue in an action against the guarantor of unpaid promissory notes was not lost merely because no final judgment for money damages was entered against resident joint obligors where summary judgment was granted against all joint obligors and final judgment for money damages was entered against only the guarantor, who resided in another county, and the others could not satisfy the liability of their debt. Hodge Residential, Inc. v. Bankers First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 199 Ga. App. 474, 405 S.E.2d 302 (1991).

Waiver of defense.

- In an action against joint obligors residing in different counties, a nonresident's failure to object to improper venue prior to the entry of summary judgment against the nonresident constituted a waiver of the defense that the court lacked jurisdiction following the entry of summary judgment for the resident joint obligor. Taylor v. Career Concepts, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 551, 362 S.E.2d 128 (1987).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, §§ 33, 34.

ALR.

- Plaintiff's bona fide belief in cause of action against defendant whose presence in action is necessary to justify venue as against another defendant as sustaining venue against latter notwithstanding failure to establish cause of action, or dismissal of action, against former, 93 A.L.R. 949.

Venue of action for partnership dissolution, settlement, or accounting, 33 A.L.R.2d 914.

Venue of claim for contribution or indemnity arising from payment of a judgment or claim in a motor vehicle accident case, 84 A.L.R.2d 994.

Sufficiency of contractual designation of place of performance to fix venue at that place, under statute authorizing or requiring such venue, 97 A.L.R.2d 934.

Independent venue requirements as to cross complaint or similar action by defendant seeking relief against a codefendant or third party, 100 A.L.R.2d 693.