Court may be presided over by more than one judge.

- There is only one superior court in each county, but the court may be presided over by more than one judge, and the court may be divided into divisions, each presided over by a different judge. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Section 9-10-31.1(a) is constitutional.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1(a) does not automatically divest a superior court of its jurisdiction, but to the contrary a transfer of venue under the statute occurs only after the trial court exercises initial jurisdiction over the case to determine whether, in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, a claim or action would be more properly heard in a forum outside the state; accordingly, § 9-10-31.1(a) remains constitutional under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I. Hawthorn Suites Golf Resorts, LLC v. Feneck, 282 Ga. 554, 651 S.E.2d 664 (2007).

Legislature and judges may not alter jurisdiction of superior court.

- The Constitution has vested all the judicial power in the courts of the state, and neither the legislature nor a judge, nor the judges of a superior court have authority to limit or expand the jurisdiction and authority of a superior court. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Judges in multi-judge circuits have coequal jurisdiction and authority, yet are subject to reasonable rules designed to expedite the business of the court by adopting a manner or method for distribution of the business of the court among the judges. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Superior courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction of actions involving injuries to the person, nor does any other court within the same territorial jurisdiction as the Municipal Court of Savannah have such exclusive jurisdiction. Goebel v. Hodges, 83 Ga. App. 574, 64 S.E.2d 207 (1951).

All superior courts have jurisdiction over subject matter of habeas corpus cases or cases in nature of habeas corpus. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 237 Ga. 845, 229 S.E.2d 751 (1976).

For jurisdiction of superior courts as to appeals from Department of Industrial Relations (now State Board of Workers' Compensation), see Department of Indus. Relations v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 669, 170 S.E. 883, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 553, 171 S.E. 169 (1933).

The superior courts have inherent authority to supervise the inferior courts in their respective jurisdictions. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983).

Designation of part-time and full-time judges.

- Legislative Act may require the judges of the superior courts to designate which judges of courts of limited jurisdiction are full-time and which are part-time for purposes of compensation and to approve a schedule of availability for issuing warrants. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983).

Superior courts retain exclusive jurisdiction as to declaratory judgment actions. EVI Equip., Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 178 Ga. App. 197, 342 S.E.2d 380 (1986), overruled on other grounds, 185 Ga. App. 870, 366 S.E.2d 179 (1988).

Subject-matter jurisdiction for judicial review of State Personnel Board decisions lies in the superior courts with venue in the county of the place of employment of the employee. Duval v. Department of Human Resources, 183 Ga. App. 726, 359 S.E.2d 756 (1987).

Subject matter jurisdiction over probate matter.

- Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court's decision under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8(4)(E) to deny probate of the decedent's 1988 will and the parties' waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to deny probate of the will. Mosley v. Lancaster, 296 Ga. 862, 770 S.E.2d 873 (2015).

Cited in Gwinnett County Ass'n of Justices of Peace v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Comm'rs, 251 Ga. 28, 302 S.E.2d 561 (1983); Hall v. State, 200 Ga. App. 585, 409 S.E.2d 221 (1991); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003); Bonner v. State, 302 Ga. App. 57, 690 S.E.2d 216 (2010); Long v. Long, 303 Ga. App. 215, 692 S.E.2d 811 (2010); Allifi v. Raider, 323 Ga. App. 510, 746 S.E.2d 763 (2013); Cook Pecan Company, Inc. v. McDaniel, 337 Ga. App. 186, 786 S.E.2d 852 (2016).

City courts without jurisdiction in divorce.

- Since the exclusive jurisdiction of questions of divorce and/or alimony is vested in the superior courts, city courts are without jurisdiction to entertain a suit for alimony in a case in which a judgment has previously been rendered in the superior court. Tyson v. Tyson, 176 Ga. 137, 167 S.E. 172 (1932).

A city court is without jurisdiction to entertain a suit for alimony and/or child support ancillary to such action in a case in which a judgment setting the sum payable has previously been rendered in a superior court. Mathews v. Mathews, 123 Ga. App. 81, 179 S.E.2d 547 (1970).

Reference to "divorce cases" does not include determination of custody of minor children. Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 220 Ga. 665, 141 S.E.2d 161 (1965).

Superior court has no jurisdiction in action on foreign alimony judgment.

- An action on a foreign judgment for alimony, being an action on a debt of record rather than for an allowance from the husband for support of the wife, does not come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior courts. Ryle v. Ryle, 130 Ga. App. 680, 204 S.E.2d 339 (1974).

Award of custody does not fix exclusive jurisdiction.

- It cannot be said that a judge of the superior court, by awarding the custody of minor children in a decree of divorce, acquires exclusive jurisdiction as to their future custody, under this paragraph and § 19-9-1. The interest and welfare of the minor children being the paramount issue, even in a contest between parents, or by other persons against the parents, the state is also parens patriae, and neither the child nor the state is finally concluded by the divorce proceedings. Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 35 S.E.2d 896 (1945).

Jurisdiction over custody dispute involving nonparent.

- Custody dispute between a child's grandmothers and the child's parents fell within the superior court's broad original jurisdiction. Barfield v. Butterworth, 323 Ga. App. 156, 746 S.E.2d 819 (2013).

O.C.G.A. § 19-5-13 does not divest state courts of jurisdiction over trover or conversion actions in which the alleged trover or conversion results from the defendant's retention of property awarded to the plaintiff in a final divorce decree. Dunlap v. Pope, 177 Ga. App. 539, 339 S.E.2d 662 (1986).

Subject matter jurisdiction.

- Allegations of fraud in a presentence report and improper consideration by the trial court of another pending charge against defendant did not constitute "fraudulent subject matter" and thus did not deprive the court of jurisdiction nor did it render defendant's sentence void. Broadwell v. State, 224 Ga. App. 193, 480 S.E.2d 215 (1996).

Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I vests superior courts with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over all felony trials. Goodrum v. State, 259 Ga. App. 704, 578 S.E.2d 484 (2003).

Jurisdiction proper.

- Because it was undisputed that the defendant's crimes took place in Fulton County and that the defendant was tried in Fulton County, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the convictions were void for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue. Brown v. State, 346 Ga. App. 245, 816 S.E.2d 111 (2018).

Effect of proceedings in juvenile court on jurisdiction.

- The superior court has constitutional jurisdiction to try a person accused of a felony if the person has reached the age of criminal responsibility. Nothing in Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 15) or in the proceedings of a juvenile court can abrogate this jurisdiction. Mathis v. State, 231 Ga. 401, 202 S.E.2d 73 (1973).

Statutory bar to a criminal prosecution and a statutory limitation upon a criminal prosecution (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(c)) are procedural prohibitions that do not affect jurisdiction in any way. Dorsey v. State, 237 Ga. 876, 230 S.E.2d 307 (1976).

Sheriff is not entitled to payment from county funds of sheriff's fees in misdemeanor cases disposed of in city court. Hubbard v. Henderson, 205 Ga. 438, 54 S.E.2d 271 (1949).

Sentence entered by a Superior Court in a felony case not void.

- State did not have the right to appeal sentences imposed by the trial court contrary to a plea agreement under O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(6) because the sentences were not void; the sentences were within the 20-year range of punishments for robbery and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b) and16-8-40(b), and the trial court had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8(1). State v. Harper, 279 Ga. App. 620, 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006) was overruled. State v. King, 325 Ga. App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (2013).

Effect of adjudication of guilt in superior court.

- A juvenile whose case is properly transferred to the superior court is subject to the criminal sanctions which may be imposed in that court. Thus, an adjudication of guilt of a juvenile in superior court is a criminal adjudication. Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976).

Jurisdictional parameters of courts over juveniles.

- This paragraph is authority and direction for the General Assembly to adopt implementing legislation defining the jurisdictional parameters of courts over juveniles. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

The juvenile court jurisdiction statute does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution, nor does it violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions. Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821, 462 S.E.2d 716 (1995); Murphy v. State, 267 Ga. 100, 475 S.E.2d 590 (1996).

Jurisdiction of superior court to try juvenile for felony.

- Where a child has been indicted by a grand jury for murder, the superior court has constitutional jurisdiction to try the child, as any person accused of a felony, if the child has reached the age of criminal responsibility. Nothing in Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 15) or in the proceedings of a juvenile court can abrogate this jurisdiction. J.E. v. State, 127 Ga. App. 589, 194 S.E.2d 288 (1972).

This paragraph preserves superior court jurisdiction over criminal cases but also authorizes concurrent original jurisdiction to be placed in juvenile courts. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Superior court jurisdiction over juveniles not exclusive.

- This paragraph only provides that the jurisdiction of the superior courts over juvenile felony offenders is not exclusive, in the case of juvenile offenders as provided by law. J.W.A. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 102, 210 S.E.2d 24 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975).

Statutory scheme does not deprive juveniles of due process rights.

- Statutory scheme which contemplates trials of juveniles in felony cases that are punished by death or life imprisonment in either superior or juvenile court does not deprive juveniles of any substantive or procedural due process rights. Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 385 S.E.2d 661 (1989).

This paragraph does not preclude joint indictment and trial of capital and noncapital felonies. Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Indictment of juvenile for noncapital felony in superior court does not oust juvenile court of its first obtained jurisdiction. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975).

No jurisdiction in state court.

- As the superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction in cases respecting title to land, this issue cannot be tried in state court. Hyman v. Leathers, 168 Ga. App. 112, 308 S.E.2d 388 (1983).

Action must involve title directly.

- An action is not one respecting title to land where the title is not directly involved. Adair v. Spellman Sem., 13 Ga. App. 600, 79 S.E. 589 (1913); Kennedy v. Smith, 23 Ga. App. 724, 99 S.E. 318 (1919).

The phrase "cases respecting title to land," as that phrase is used in determining subject-matter jurisdiction of superior courts under this paragraph, refers to cases in which the plaintiff asserts the plaintiff's title to the land in question, and depends for a recovery upon the plaintiff's maintenance of it. Ingold, Inc. v. Adair, 247 Ga. 155, 274 S.E.2d 560 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Superior courts have jurisdiction in action to contest issue of delivery of deed and thereby try the title to the land described in the deed. Dobbs v. First Nat'l Bank, 65 Ga. App. 796, 16 S.E.2d 485 (1941).

Superior courts do have jurisdiction in action for recovery of value of land taken.

- An action in which it is alleged that the city appropriated certain land of the plaintiff to the use of the public as a sidewalk, and asking recovery for the value of the land so taken, is not an action respecting title to land. City of Atlanta v. West, 60 Ga. App. 269, 3 S.E.2d 755 (1939).

Superior courts do not have jurisdiction in actions to recover damages for trespass to land. Batson v. Higginbothem, 7 Ga. App. 835, 68 S.E. 455 (1910).

Superior court does not have jurisdiction in landlord's complaint for ejectment. Ingold, Inc. v. Adair, 247 Ga. 155, 274 S.E.2d 560 (1981).

Jurisdiction held proper.

- Upon finding that the trial court had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction, the court also properly ruled that a sibling had prescriptive title to certain property under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-164 by possessing the property under color of title for a period greater than seven years, satisfying the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161; the fraud alleged by the other siblings did not defeat said title, as they were unaware of the fraud from 1989 to 2002. Goodrum v. Goodrum, 283 Ga. 163, 657 S.E.2d 192 (2008).

Legal remedies not exhausted.

- Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a class action suit brought in equity by a class representative who had failed to exhaust the representative's available legal remedies in the juvenile court after the representative's request that counsel be appointed for the representative was denied. Patterson v. Ellerbee, 268 Ga. App. 826, 603 S.E.2d 308 (2004).

Whether action is equitable is determined by its allegations and prayers. Wellcraft Mfg., Inc. v. Troutman, 123 Ga. App. 321, 180 S.E.2d 588 (1971).

On appeal, whether complaint rests in equity and is beyond jurisdiction of court of origin is matter for determination by Court of Appeals. Wellcraft Mfg., Inc. v. Troutman, 123 Ga. App. 321, 180 S.E.2d 588 (1971).

Superior court has jurisdiction of an equitable complaint seeking decree ordering sale of interest of contingent remaindermen. Kennedy v. Durham, 219 Ga. 859, 136 S.E.2d 343 (1964).

Superior court has jurisdiction where judgment for fraud sought.

- A judgment sought not merely against the corporation, but also against one of its officers who it is alleged obtained cash and other property for an inadequate consideration, which rendered defendant insolvent and by which plaintiff, a creditor, was defrauded, falls within the purview of this paragraph. Wellcraft Mfg., Inc. v. Troutman, 123 Ga. App. 321, 180 S.E.2d 588 (1971) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

In action to enjoin proceedings, the superior court has jurisdiction.

- City courts have no jurisdiction to grant affirmative equitable relief where an action is filed in a city court ordinarily a court of equity will entertain an application by the defendant to enjoin a proceeding, where it is made to appear that the defendant has such rights in the subject matter of the litigation as require the application of equitable remedies for the grant of full relief. Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774, 10 S.E.2d 859 (1940).

Where a surviving spouse had abandoned minor children and could not be found, the factual circumstances demanded the exercise of the court's equitable powers to preserve the rights of the minor children, the trial court should have allowed the minors, who had no remedy at law, to maintain an action for the wrongful death of their mother. Brown v. Liberty Oil & Ref. Corp., 261 Ga. 214, 403 S.E.2d 806 (1991).

No equity jurisdiction for garnishment.

- A trial court has no authority to modify the child support provisions of a final judgment and divorce decree in a garnishment action; such a modification must be accomplished by the filing of a petition in superior court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-18 or O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19. In addition, the court lacks equity jurisdiction in garnishment cases, even under unusual and exceptional circumstances. Davis v. Davis, 220 Ga. App. 745, 470 S.E.2d 268 (1996).

Former Code 1933, § 37-1104, providing for special verdicts in equity cases, has been repealed by the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9. Cawthon v. Douglas County, 248 Ga. 760, 286 S.E.2d 30 (1982).

Trustee in bankruptcy has right to maintain action in superior court.

- Where a bankrupt partnership, before becoming adjudicated a bankrupt, had a right to action against a third person to recover money of the partnership in the hands of the third person, the trustee in bankruptcy has the right to recover the money from the wrongdoer, in a court in which the bankrupt, before the adjudication in bankruptcy, could have maintained such suit; therefore the trustee had the right to maintain such action in the superior court. Brownlow v. Davis, 69 Ga. App. 111, 25 S.E.2d 150 (1943).

Breach of payment bond contract.

- Subcontractor's action against surety for breach of payment bond contract, bad faith, and attorney fees was within the superior court's subject matter jurisdiction. Harry S. Peterson Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 209 Ga. App. 585, 434 S.E.2d 778 (1993).

Conversion actions.

- The superior courts have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain conversion actions. Hughes v. Hughes, 193 Ga. App. 72, 387 S.E.2d 29 (1990).

Subject matter jurisdiction over employer case.

- Superior courts have subject matter jurisdiction over timely Title VII claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 filed pursuant to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notification to the claimant that, the federal prerequisites for suit having been fulfilled, suit may be filed. Collins v. DOT, 208 Ga. App. 53, 429 S.E.2d 707 (1993).

Subject matter jurisdiction of breach of contract and fraud action.

- The superior court had jurisdiction of an action for breach of contract and fraud involving an agreement between an employer and employee, even though the agreement provided that the parties "submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Courts." Bradley v. British Fitting Group, Plc, 221 Ga. App. 621, 472 S.E.2d 146 (1996).

When an out-of-state seller sued an in-state buyer in Georgia, despite a provision in the parties' contract for the jurisdiction of the courts of Texas, and the seller did not respond, the courts of Georgia had subject matter jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 15-7-4(a)(2); Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. I; Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I; and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I; the parties waived the forum selection clause by either filing suit in Georgia or not responding. Euler-Siac S.P.A. (Creamar Spa) v. Drama Marble Co., 274 Ga. App. 252, 617 S.E.2d 203 (2005).

Subject matter jurisdiction over business dispute.

- In a direct action brought by a shareholder against another, the trial court did not err by vacating a consent order that incorporated a settlement agreement allegedly reached by the parties as the trial judge to whom the case had been reassigned had subject matter jurisdiction to vacate the previously entered order when the trial judge heard the contempt motions since the trial judge had subject matter jurisdiction over the action, which involved a business dispute. Further, since no final order had been entered in the matter and the case remained pending, the trial court had authority to reconsider the ruling made on the consent order, vacate the order, and order that the matter proceed to trial, irrespective of whether the case has been reassigned to a different trial judge. Internal Med. Alliance, LLC v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 659 S.E.2d 668 (2008).

Subject matter jurisdiction over action seeking injunction on dockage issues.

- Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a landowner's action seeking an interlocutory injunction requiring neighbors to move the neighbors' dock because the neighbors did not point to any federal law that would preempt the trial court as an appropriate forum for adjudicating the rights and remedies of the parties; there was no Congressional intent to preclude state action concurrently with the statutory and regulatory scheme establishing the authority of the Army Corps of Engineers over docks on the lake where the parties lived. Dillon v. Reid, 312 Ga. App. 34, 717 S.E.2d 542 (2011).

Termination of parental rights.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C), the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the husband's parental rights because the biological father's petition to legitimate a child who was born in wedlock was a petition to terminate the parental rights of the legal father; after the superior court determined that the biological father had not abandoned his opportunity interest, the issue became whether the superior court could grant the petition to legitimate the child, and to grant the legitimation petition required the superior court to first terminate the parental rights of the husband, who was the legal father. Brine v. Shipp, 291 Ga. 376, 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012).

Custody dispute of orphaned children.

- In a custody dispute involving children orphaned by the murder-suicide of their parents, a trial court did not err in denying an aunt's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court correctly held that, in the absence of an earlier-filed action in juvenile court or probate court, it was the first court to take jurisdiction and it properly retained it. Stone-Crosby v. Mickens-Cook, 318 Ga. App. 313, 733 S.E.2d 842 (2012).

Powers limited to that of tribunal.

- Superior court as appellate court has no greater or broader powers in reference to subject matter than court or tribunal from which appeal is taken. Department of Indus. Relations v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 669, 170 S.E. 883, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 553, 171 S.E. 169 (1933).

Jurisdiction in workers' compensation appeals.

- The jurisdiction of the superior court in cases appealed from the Department of Industrial Relations (now State Board of Workers' Compensation) is not as provided in other laws relating to appeals, but is as defined in Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 59 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105). Department of Indus. Relations v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 669, 170 S.E. 883, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 553, 171 S.E. 169 (1933).

Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation had the authority to award a life estate to an employer because no dispute as to the title of land was foreseeable in the future, and the Board did not exercise authority reserved to the superior court alone, but rather, it simply exercised its broad authority to craft a reasonable remedy; the Board's Rehabilitation Guidelines require that all issues of ownership and maintenance be resolved before any construction begins. S. Concrete/Watkins Associated Indus. v. Spires, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Mar. 22, 2011).

Authority of court in employment actions.

- Trial court had such appellate jurisdiction as the law provided, and, thus, it could consider the county police sergeant's petition for writ of certiorari to review the county manager's affirmance of the police department's decision to demote the county police sergeant even though the county police sergeant could have appealed to the county board of commissioners as the county did not show any authority that the county police sergeant was required to do so or that the trial court did not have the authority to consider the petition. Crumpler v. Henry County, 257 Ga. App. 615, 571 S.E.2d 822 (2002).

Appeal to jury in justice's court not to take precedence of appeal to superior court.

- To allow an appeal to a jury in a justice's court to take precedence over an appeal to the superior court would be to deprive the latter court of the jurisdiction expressly provided by this paragraph. East Tenn., V. & Ga. R.R. v. Miles, 72 Ga. 252 (1884) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Proper and timely filing of notice of appeal is absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon appellate court. Cooper v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Educ., 157 Ga. App. 289, 277 S.E.2d 285 (1981).

Superior court has no jurisdiction where proper appellate procedure not followed.

- Where, in appeal from decision of board of education discharging a teacher, no notice of appeal was filed with the State Board of Education but, instead, appellant filed an appeal directly in the superior court, proper appellate procedure was not followed. Therefore, the superior court did not have jurisdiction to review the decision sought to be appealed. Cooper v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Educ., 157 Ga. App. 289, 277 S.E.2d 285 (1981).

Judicial review of local government's zoning appeal board.

- Property owner properly filed a writ of mandamus challenging a county's denial of a business license because the county had no ordinance directing an alternative method of judicial review from a decision by the zoning appeal board, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I did not provide a form of appeal. Haralson County v. Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc., 291 Ga. 321, 729 S.E.2d 357 (2012).

Judicial review of disability determination.

- Superior court lacked jurisdiction for direct appellate review of the denial of a state employee's application for retirement disability benefits under O.C.G.A. § 47-2-123(b)(1). O.C.G.A. § 47-2-3 was inapplicable because the employee was not discharged from employment. Employees' Ret. Sys. of Ga. v. Harris, 303 Ga. App. 191, 692 S.E.2d 798 (2010).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. V and antecedent provisions, relating to writs of certiorari to superior courts, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Right to correct errors by certiorari conferred by this paragraph and former Civil Code 1910, § 5180 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 5) cannot be taken away by legislative Acts. Moore v. City of Winder, 10 Ga. App. 384, 73 S.E. 529 (1912); Taylor v. Georgia Power Co., 44 Ga. App. 326, 161 S.E. 669 (1931); City Inv. Co. v. Crawley, 187 Ga. 48, 199 S.E. 747 (1938); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 209 Ga. 274, 71 S.E.2d 659 (1952); Morman v. Pritchard, 108 Ga. App. 247, 132 S.E.2d 561 (1963) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

General Assembly may provide that certiorari is available only after defendant has exhausted the defendant's remedies in municipal court. Rose v. Mayor of Thunderbolt, 86 Ga. App. 867, 72 S.E.2d 823 (1952).

Right of certiorari is constitutional right which exists independently of any statute. City Inv. Co. v. Crawley, 187 Ga. 48, 199 S.E. 747 (1938).

Effect of constitutional amendment authorizing General Assembly to provide for procedure in justice of the peace courts.

- The constitutional amendment of 1927 to Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. X, Para. I, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. I), authorizing the General Assembly, as to certain courts established in lieu of justice courts, to make "such provisions as to rules and procedure in such courts (that is, in the courts substituted) and as to new trials and the correction of errors in and by said courts, and with such further provision for the correction of errors by the superior court or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may, from time to time, in its discretion, provide or authorize," is not to be construed as conferring authority upon the General Assembly to prevent the granting of writs of certiorari as to such courts under this paragraph. Aspironal Labs., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 180 Ga. 544, 179 S.E. 709 (1935) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

City court judge cannot issue writ of certiorari. Kieve v. Ford, 111 Ga. 30, 36 S.E. 293 (1900).

Local Act an exception to this paragraph.

- Georgia Laws 1929, p. 367, providing that cases decided in the Municipal Court of Atlanta without a jury must first be appealed to a jury before seeking certiorari to the superior court, is an exception to the general power of the superior court to grant certiorari and not unconstitutional. Von Schmidt v. Noland Co., 176 Ga. 784, 169 S.E. 11 (1933).

Approval of certiorari bond by superior court judge not to come when bond not passed on by trial judge.

- The judge of the superior court, at the time of sanctioning a petition for certiorari, has no authority to approve the certiorari bond where the bond has not been approved or disapproved by the judge who tried the case. Clark v. Morris Plan Bank, 194 Ga. 522, 22 S.E.2d 147, answer conformed to, 68 Ga. App. 174, 22 S.E.2d 415 (1942).

Writ of certiorari to superior court is constitutional as well as statutory remedy available where a party is dissatisfied with a decision or judgment of an inferior judicatory exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Flacker v. Berr-Nash Corp., 157 Ga. App. 638, 278 S.E.2d 180 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. Elder, 174 Ga. App. 316, 329 S.E.2d 511 (1985), overruled on other grounds as stated in, Norris v. Henry County, 255 Ga. App. 718, 566 S.E.2d 428 (2002).

Action in nature of judicial proceeding always subject to review by certiorari. Heath v. City of Atlanta, 67 Ga. App. 85, 19 S.E.2d 746 (1942).

Certiorari lies from city court having direct right to writ of error (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49,5-6-50) to appellate court. Walker v. State, 8 Ga. App. 214, 68 S.E. 873 (1910).

Certiorari will lie from conviction of policeman under city ordinance.

- A trial and conviction of a policeman, pursuant to a city ordinance, on charges of conduct unbecoming an officer and with violation of police department rule, is a judicial proceeding from the final judgment in which the writ of certiorari will lie. Heath v. City of Atlanta, 67 Ga. App. 85, 19 S.E.2d 746 (1942).

Any decision rendered by city's recorder under former Code 1933, § 72-401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-2-5) may be reviewed by certiorari in superior court pursuant to this paragraph. City of East Point v. Henry Chanin Corp., 210 Ga. 628, 81 S.E.2d 812 (1954) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Certiorari available from revocation of certificate of qualification to practice as architect. Beckanstin v. Dougherty County Council of Architects, 215 Ga. 543, 111 S.E.2d 361 (1959).

No certiorari from order directing sheriff to take charge of room occupied by justice of the peace.

- The action of county authorities in ordering a sheriff to take charge of the room in the courthouse occupied by a justice of the peace is a mere exercise of administrative power, and possesses no such attribute of a judicial function as to permit certiorari therefrom under this paragraph. McDonald v. Marshall, 185 Ga. 438, 195 S.E. 571 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I).

Intent and effect of paragraph.

- This paragraph was not intended to and does not have any effect other than to permit the General Assembly to create certain exceptions from the superior court's otherwise exclusive jurisdiction. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-179.

Except in case of capital crimes, juvenile courts generally have exclusive original jurisdiction of children and may not transfer them to other courts for criminal proceedings unless the child is 15 or older; a person will not come to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Department of Corrections) under the exceptions of Ga. L. 1974, p. 1455, § 1 (see former O.C.G.A. § 49-5-7(a)(5)), unless the person is less than 17, and unless the person is at least 13 in the case of a capital crime or is at least 15 in the case of other crimes. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-88.

Ga. L. 1974, p. 1455, § 1 (see former paragraph (a)(5) of O.C.G.A. § 49-5-7) providing for the custody of convicted misdemeanants and felons under the age of 17 is not unconstitutional. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-3.

Effect of section on power of superior court to try juvenile offender.

- Ga. L. 1974, p. 1455, § 1 (see former paragraph (a)(5) of O.C.G.A. § 49-5-7) sets apart a defined class of offenders and directs how they shall be punished for the offense; in doing this, the power of any superior court to try an individual under the age of 17 for any given crime is in no way affected. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-3.

Justice of the peace without jurisdiction to issue bill of peace.

- Since the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over equity matters and a bill of peace is an equitable remedy, justices of the peace do not have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for such relief; it follows that any such bill of peace issued by a justice of the peace would be void and of no effect. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 66.

Superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from justice of the peace/magistrate courts; such jurisdiction having a constitutional basis until July 1, 1983, and a statutory one thereafter. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-27.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, §§ 16 et seq., 53 et seq. 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 170 et seq.

ALR.

- Jurisdiction of state court over divorce suit by resident of United States reservation, 46 A.L.R. 993.

Jurisdiction of state courts of actions in relation to interstate shipments, 64 A.L.R. 333.

Jurisdiction of state court over actions involving patents, 167 A.L.R. 1114.

Adjudication of property rights of spouses in action for separate maintenance, support, or alimony without divorce, 74 A.L.R.2d 316.

Anticipatory relief in federal courts against state criminal prosecutions growing out of civil rights activities, 8 A.L.R.3d 301.

Power of divorce court to deal with real property located in another state, 34 A.L.R.3d 962.

Modern status of rule relating to jurisdiction of state court to try criminal defendant brought within jurisdiction illegally or as result of fraud or mistake, 25 A.L.R.4th 157.