Power to issue injunctions.

- Superior courts are empowered to issue injunctions, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV and O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8, and nothing in O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(1) deprives the superior courts of that power in the arena of redemption of property following a tax sale. Am. Lien Fund, LLC v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 562, 690 S.E.2d 415 (2010).

This paragraph does not give any right to issue distress warrants. Woolsey v. Lawshe, 1 Ga. App. 817, 57 S.E. 1039 (1907) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV).

Mandate of this paragraph and provisions of former Code 1933, § 64-101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20) gave judge of superior court power to issue writs of mandamus, and made it the judge's duty to do so from any cause whereby a defect of legal justice would ensue if a mandamus was not issued, and if there was no other specific legal remedy. Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 189 S.E. 5 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV).

Rights conferred by this paragraph need not be mentioned in local Act creating city court. Daughtry v. State, 115 Ga. 819, 42 S.E. 248 (1902) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV).

Enjoining arbitration proceeding on res judicata grounds.

- Trial court was empowered to protect a judgment it entered by enjoining an arbitration proceeding on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Mitcham v. Blalock, 268 Ga. 644, 491 S.E.2d 782 (1997). But see Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 523 S.E.2d 1 (1999).

Probate court.

- Probate court erred by allowing the objections of a bank and a decedent's parents solely on the basis of adverse title and by denying a year's support to the widow when the widow failed to meet the resulting burden of proof, because the probate court lacked the jurisdiction under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 15-9-30 to determine that the relevant money-market account and real property were not part of the estate; despite the jurisdictional limitation and the lack of an appropriate objection, the probate court proceeded to conduct a hearing as to the amount necessary for the widow's support, thereby inappropriately placing upon the widow a burden of proof that was contrary to O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7(a) and otherwise lacking in the absence of the jurisdictionally defective objections to the petition. In re Mahmoodzadeh, 314 Ga. App. 383, 724 S.E.2d 797 (2012).

Petition seeking to require superior court judge to enter order.

- Although there may occasionally appear to be a need to file an original petition in the Supreme Court to issue process in the nature of mandamus, and perhaps quo warranto or prohibition, where a superior court judge is named as the respondent, such as where the petitioner seeks to require the judge to enter an order in a matter allegedly pending more than 30 days in violation of O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21(a), such a petition may in fact be filed in the appropriate superior court. Being the respondent, the superior court judge will disqualify, another superior court judge will be appointed to hear and determine the matter, and the final decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court for review. Brown v. Johnson, 251 Ga. 436, 306 S.E.2d 655 (1983).

Excessive fines findings required.

- Where the trial court did not make findings regarding, or even specifically mentioning, the factors that must be considered in analyzing an excessive fines claim, vacation and remand for a new order including findings of fact and conclusions of law on those factors was required. Mitchell v. State, 236 Ga. App. 335, 511 S.E.2d 880 (1999).

Power to review when question cannot be raised in trial court.

- When a question cannot be raised in the trial court, the Court of Appeals has inherent power to review to avoid clear injustice where it appears prejudicial error has occurred necessitating reversal of the trial court's judgment. Evans v. Belth, 193 Ga. App. 757, 388 S.E.2d 914 (1989).

Discretion in reviewing allegation of error.

- For the purpose of protecting its judgments on appellate review, the Court of Appeals may, in the exercise of sound discretion, elect to review any one or more of the several assertions of error contained within a single enumeration and to treat the remaining assertions of error therein as abandoned.but see West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825, 397 S.E.2d 567 (1990); Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 523 S.E.2d 1 (1999).

Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV is not authority for an appellate court to protect an appellate adjudication from further appellate review by declining to reach the merits of an allegation of error sufficiently set forth pursuant to the Appellate Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-40 et seq. Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 523 S.E.2d 1 (1999).

Appellate court lacked authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction where recent case law made it no longer appropriate for the appellate court to invoke the broad inherent and constitutional power of a court to take those acts necessary in aid of its jurisdiction under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV. St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Ross, 254 Ga. App. 190, 561 S.E.2d 489 (2002).

Order to comply with settlement agreement.

- State court order declaring that defendants had not defaulted with respect to a settlement agreement and ordering the parties to comply with the terms of the agreement did not constitute a final judgment where the order did not expressly provide either that the action was dismissed or that plaintiffs receive judgment in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Zeitman v. McBrayer, 201 Ga. App. 767, 412 S.E.2d 287 (1991).

Rule to protect appellate judgments.

- As a general appellate rule adopted as necessary to protect or effectuate appellate judgments, it is the state of an appellate record and transcript duly before the appellate court at the time of the original disposition of the appeal, and not the state of the record as amended in an attempt to support an appellate position argued on motion for reconsideration, that is controlling as to the adequacy of the record for purposes of appellate review. Williams v. Food Lion, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 865, 446 S.E.2d 221 (1994); Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 533 S.E.2d 136 (2000).

Appellate order reinstated.

- Trial court's failure to comply with Court of Appeals' order to reach final determination of the merits of appellant's appeal by the dismissal thereof warranted remand to the superior court for compliance with the directions originally mandated by the court. Walton v. State, 207 Ga. App. 787, 429 S.E.2d 158 (1993).

Standing.

- Citizen lacked standing to seek to have the State Bar institute disciplinary action against attorney in a case where the Office of General Counsel had decided not to proceed. Scanlon v. State Bar, 264 Ga. 251, 443 S.E.2d 830, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1018, 115 S. Ct. 581, 130 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1994).

Magistrate court lacks injunctive relief authority.

- As injunctive relief was only within the jurisdiction of appellate and superior courts, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV, and magistrate courts had jurisdiction in matters that were not vested in the superior courts, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-10-2, a magistrate court exceeded its authority when it imposed injunctive relief against property owners upon finding that they violated a county zoning ordinance, which allowed the owners to seek relief from the void sentence at any time in the superior court; the owners had illegally operated a paving business on their property, and the magistrate had ordered the removal of all of the paving equipment within a set time in order to avoid a daily fine. Adams v. Madison County Planning & Zoning, 271 Ga. App. 333, 609 S.E.2d 681 (2005).

Dismissal of petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition.

- In an original action brought before the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court dismissed a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition filed by a prosecutor regarding a criminal prosecution because the prosecutor was not entitled to use the writs to circumvent the statutory limitations on the State's ability to appeal under O.C.G.A. §§ 5-7-1 and5-7-2. Howard v. Fuller, Ga. , S.E.2d (Nov. 30, 2007).

Contempt finding improper.

- Order holding an attorney in contempt pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 and otherwise was improper because, inter alia, the trial court immediately imposed punishment and did not provide the attorney the opportunity to speak in the attorney's own behalf, the attorney was not put on notice that a continuation of the offending conduct would have constituted contempt, it was highly unlikely that the attorney's allegedly offending conduct should have had any impact on the deliberations of the factfinder, a juvenile judge, and the trial court acted without warning and had obviously lost the court's patience with the attorney and the attorney's client and imposed sanctions for contempt when other actions might have achieved the same result without the disruption to the case that these contempt citations had caused. In re Hughes, 299 Ga. App. 66, 681 S.E.2d 745 (2009).

Dismissal of petition required under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-14. - Georgia Supreme Court dismissed an inmate's petition for a writ of mandamus because the inmate was not incarcerated in Georgia, thus, the filing requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-14(b) were not applicable to the inmate and the inmate should have filed the petition initially with a Georgia superior court. Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 738 S.E.2d 614 (2013).

Constitutionality of Service Delivery Strategy Act.

- Trial court erred by finding that the Service Delivery Strategy Act, O.C.G.A. § 36-70-20 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 36-70-25.1(d)(2), was unconstitutional because it did not permit the trial court to direct that the parties enter into a particular agreement and, therefore, did not invade the province of the legislative branch by imposing a tax or allocating the proceeds of that tax. City of Union Point v. Greene County, 303 Ga. 449, 812 S.E.2d 278 (2018).

Cited in Graham v. Cavender, 252 Ga. 123, 311 S.E.2d 832 (1984); Talley v. State, 200 Ga. App. 442, 408 S.E.2d 463 (1991); Queen v. State, 207 Ga. App. 138, 427 S.E.2d 107 (1993); In re Siemon, 264 Ga. 641, 449 S.E.2d 832 (1994); Ellerbee v. State, 215 Ga. App. 312, 450 S.E.2d 443 (1994); Thorp v. State, 217 Ga. App. 275, 457 S.E.2d 234 (1995); Rabern v. State, 221 Ga. App. 874, 473 S.E.2d 547 (1996); Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 (2000); Holmes v. State, 273 Ga. 644, 543 S.E.2d 688 (2001); Giles v. Vastakis, 262 Ga. App. 483, 585 S.E.2d 905 (2003); Bynum v. State, 289 Ga. App. 636, 658 S.E.2d 196 (2008); In re Jefferson, 283 Ga. 216, 657 S.E.2d 830 (2008); Clark v. Chapman, 301 Ga. App. 117, 687 S.E.2d 146 (2009); Owens v. Hill, 295 Ga. 302, 758 S.E.2d 794 (2014); Holman v. State, 329 Ga. App. 393, 765 S.E.2d 614 (2014).

Legislature barred from interfering with courts in power to grant new trials.

- This paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III) constitute insuperable barriers to legislative control or interference with courts in exercise of their powers to grant new trials. CTC Fin. Corp. v. Holden, 221 Ga. 809, 147 S.E.2d 427 (1966) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV).

New trials are granted by superior court as a court, and not by the presiding judge in capacity as a judge. Allen v. State, 102 Ga. 619, 29 S.E. 470 (1897).

Municipal courts may hear motions for new trial.

- In a dispossessory action, a municipal court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a motion for new trial under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-1. The municipal's court enacting legislation, 1983 Ga. Laws 4453-4454, § 33, as well as Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV, gave it such jurisdiction. Nelson v. Powell, 293 Ga. App. 227, 666 S.E.2d 598 (2008).

No appeal from jury verdict in county court to jury in superior court.

- As this section is not self-executing, an appeal does not lie from the verdict of a jury in the county court to a jury in the superior court. Davison v. Bush, 8 Ga. App. 34, 68 S.E. 495 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV).

Until approval of trial judge is given, a verdict does not become binding in a case where a motion for a new trial contains the general grounds. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944).

Appellate court must assume knowledge on trial judge's part as to duty to approve verdict.

- In interpreting the language of an order overruling a motion for a new trial, an appellate court must presume that the trial judge knew the rule as to the obligation to approve the jury's verdict devolving upon the judge, and that in overruling the motion the judge did exercise this discretion, unless the language of the order indicates to the contrary and that the court agreed to the verdict against the judge's own judgment and against the dictates of the judge's own conscience, merely because the judge did not feel that the judge had the duty or authority to override the findings of the jury upon disputed issues of fact. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944).

Rules of discretion of judge and jury independent of each other.

- The rules of law governing (1) the right of the jury to originally fix the damages; (2) the right of the appellate court to grant a new trial where the verdict is alleged to be excessive or inadequate; and (3) the right of a trial judge to grant a new trial where in the judge's discretion the judge thinks the verdict "unfair, unjust, contrary to the evidence, excessive, or too small," exist apart from and independent of each other. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944).

General rule of noninterference with refusal to order new trial on ground of inadequate damages.

- Where a trial judge refuses to order a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages in a tort action, the appellate court will interfere with that discretion only in case of manifest abuse. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944).

Appellate court must approve when no evidence of bias or mistake.

- Where the amount of a verdict, though less than an appellate court would have approved, did not afford such evidence of bias, passion, prejudice, or mistake as to justify setting it aside as inadequate, the appellate court must affirm it. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944).

When jury verdict to be set aside for inadequate damages.

- Where the item of damage complained of in a motion for a new trial could only be measured by the enlightened conscience of intelligent jurors, and the amount assessed is substantial, the appellate court ought not to set aside the verdict of the jury on the ground of inadequacy simply because the damages are inadequate, unless it clearly appears that the verdict is so small as to afford evidence of a gross mistake or undue bias, or so small as to support a convincing inference of gross mistake or undue bias, or so small as to justify an inference of gross mistake or undue bias. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944).

Magistrate courts are not courts of record with the power to grant new trials; thus, a motion for a new trial in the magistrate court did not toll the time for filing an appeal to state or superior court. Bowen v. Ball, 215 Ga. App. 640, 451 S.E.2d 502 (1994).

Power to order pre-sentence psychological evaluations.

- A superior court may order psychological evaluations of criminal defendants prior to sentencing and at county expense. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-29.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 14 Am. Jur. 2d, Certiorari, § 1 et seq. 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Mandamus, §§ 1 et seq., 11 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- Adequacy of remedy by appeal in criminal cases to preclude prohibition sought on the ground of lack or loss of jurisdiction, 141 A.L.R. 1262.

Discretion of appellate court to refuse exercise of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, 165 A.L.R. 1431.

Jury trial waiver as binding on later state civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.