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Haw. Rev. Stat.Haw. Rev. Stat.Chapter 706

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-667 (2025)

 Young adult defendants

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laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included cited 1978–2022 27citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 27 opinions since 1978, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (3) (5 cases).

     §706-667  Young adult defendants.  (1)  Defined.  A young adult defendant is a person convicted of a crime who, at the time of the offense, is less than twenty-two years of age and who has not been previously convicted of a felony as an adult or adjudicated as a juvenile for an offense that would have constituted a felony had the young adult defendant been an adult.

     (2)  Specialized correctional treatment.  A young adult defendant who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding thirty days may be committed by the court to the custody of the department of corrections and rehabilitation and shall receive, as far as practicable, such special and individualized correctional and rehabilitative treatment as may be appropriate to the young adult defendant's needs.

     (3)  Special term.  A young adult defendant convicted of a felony, in lieu of any other sentence of imprisonment authorized by this chapter, may be sentenced to a special indeterminate term of imprisonment if the court is of the opinion that such special term is adequate for the young adult defendant's correction and rehabilitation and will not jeopardize the protection of the public.  When ordering a special indeterminate term of imprisonment, the court shall impose the maximum length of imprisonment, which shall be eight years for a class A felony, five years for a class B felony, and four years for a class C felony.  The minimum length of imprisonment shall be set by the Hawaii paroling authority in accordance with section 706-669.  During this special indeterminate term, the young adult shall be incarcerated separately from career criminals, when practicable.

     [(4)]  This section shall not apply to the offenses of murder or attempted murder. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1976, c 92, §8; am L 1980, c 295, §§2, 3; am L 1986, c 314, §44; am L 1987, c 338, §10; am L 1989, c 211, §8; gen ch 1993; am L 1997, c 318, §4; am L 2006, c 230, §25; am L 2022, c 278, §29]

 

Cross References

 

  Immaturity excluding penal conviction; transfer of proceedings to family court, see §704-418.

 

COMMENTARY ON §706-667

 

  This section provides for specialized treatment for young persons over whom family court jurisdiction has been waived and for those persons under the age of 22 years who are not subject to the jurisdiction of that court.

  It is clear that the age span encompassed in this section is a period of formative years and, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants are not subject to the jurisdiction of the family court, "[p]rudence and humanity... argue for a specialized and concentrated effort in this area."[1]

  Subsection (2) recognizes that specialized and concentrated effort includes penal institutions designed to meet the needs of young adult defendants.  The department of social services and housing should have among its various divisions, an agency which can provide the young adult defendant with such "special and individualized correctional and rehabilitative treatment as may be appropriate to his needs."  Subsection (2) provides that, regardless of whether a special term is imposed pursuant to subsection (3), when a young adult defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for more than 30 days (i.e., for a misdemeanor or felony) the young adult defendant may be committed to the department of social services and housing for special correctional and rehabilitative treatment.

  Subsection (3) provides for a special term of imprisonment for young adult defendants convicted of a felony.  Once again, the Code adopts a flexible approach in sentencing.  The court is not compelled to impose a special term in the case of a convicted young adult.  It may, according to the provisions of part II of this chapter, suspend the imposition of sentence or sentence the defendant to probation.  If the court determines that imprisonment is necessary, the court is free, within the limitations heretofore set forth, to choose between the special term authorized by this section and the ordinary and extended terms authorized by prior sections in this part.  Subsection (3) merely authorizes the employment of a special, more limited term of imprisonment "if the court is of the opinion that such special term is adequate for... [the defendant's] correction and rehabilitation and will not jeopardize the protection of the public."  Assuming the court is satisfied that this condition can be met, there seems no reason for not allowing the court, if it chooses, to protect the young offender from the longer maxima provided for felonies.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §706-667

 

  The legislature in enacting the Code in 1972 changed subsection (2) by making it discretionary with the court, rather than mandatory, to commit the young adult defendant to the custody of the department of social services and housing for specialized treatment.

  Act 295, Session Laws 1980, amended this section to establish a more equitable and just system of sentencing young adults.  Conference Committee Report No. 34-80 (42-80).  Subsection (1) was amended by changing the definition of a young adult defendant so as to exclude repeat felony offenders from the class of young persons entitled to specialized treatment.  Subsection (3) was amended to provide for different terms of imprisonment depending upon whether the offense involved is a class A, B, or C felony.  Subsection (3) was also amended by the addition of an express provision that young adults be incarcerated separately from career criminals when practicable.  Lastly, the section was amended to provide that it does not apply to the offense of murder.

  Act 318, Session Laws 1997, amended this section by defining a young adult defendant as a person convicted of a crime who, at the time of sentencing, is less than twenty-two years of age.  The legislature found that immediate action was necessary for the protection and safety of the community from the growing number of minors who commit violent, serious, or multiple felonies.  Senate Standing Committee Report No. 1561.

  Act 230, Session Laws 2006, amended this section to, among other things, require that the young adult defendant be less than twenty-two years at the time of the offense, rather than at the time of sentencing.

  Act 278, Session Laws 2022, amended this section to replace references to "department of public safety" with "department of corrections and rehabilitation" to reflect the provisions in Act 278 that:  (1) reestablished the department of public safety as an independent department of corrections and rehabilitation to administer the corrections, rehabilitation, and reentry of the inmate population; and (2) established a department of law enforcement to consolidate and administer certain criminal law enforcement and investigative functions of the department of public safety, department of transportation, department of the attorney general, and office of homeland security.  The legislature found that the goals and functions of corrections and law enforcement are distinct, and separating the functions of the department of public safety into two departments would advance these distinct goals and objectives while allowing the corrections arm to more fully integrate strategies for rehabilitation.  The legislature further found that reorganizing certain state law enforcement functions into a single entity with consistent training opportunities would allow for the efficient use of resources in administering correctional programs and improve decision making, promote accountability, streamline communication, decrease costs, reduce duplication of efforts, provide uniform training and standards, and promote uniform standards of law enforcement services.  House Standing Committee Report No. 200-22, Senate Standing Committee Report No. 3292.

 

Case Notes

 

  Not repealed by implication by §706-606.1.  67 H. 46, 677 P.2d 463 (1984).

  Defendant did not fall within definition of a young adult defendant.  71 H. 609, 801 P.2d 553 (1990).

  Reasonable inference could be drawn that sentencing court considered special eight-year term prior to sentencing young adult defendant to twenty-year term under §706-659.  73 H. 259, 831 P.2d 523 (1992).

  A sentencing court must afford a defendant his or her right of presentence allocution before ruling on the applicability of the young adult defendants statute.  90 H. 280, 978 P.2d 718 (1999).

  Defendant, who was age-eligible for sentencing under this section, the young adult defendant statute, at the time defendant's deferred acceptance of guilty plea was granted, but age-ineligible at the time it was revoked, could not thereafter be sentenced as a young adult defendant; specialized treatment under this section is afforded only to those who are less than the prescribed twenty-two years of age at the time of sentencing.  93 H. 362, 3 P.3d 1239 (2000).

  Sentencing court did retain the discretion to sentence petitioner defendant, who was convicted of violating §712-1240.8, to a special five-year indeterminate term of imprisonment under this section.  Specifically, the phrase "[n]otwithstanding sections 706-620, 706-640, 706-641, 706-660, 706-669, and any other law to the contrary", found in the sentencing provision of §712-1240.8(3), did not override sentencing petitioner defendant under this section as "contrary".  130 H. 21, 305 P.3d 437 (2013).

  Referred to:  56 H. 75, 527 P.2d 1269 (1974); 61 H. 1, 594 P.2d 1078 (1979).

 

__________

§706-667 Commentary:

 

1.  M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 7, comments at 24 (1957).

 

 

The 20 cases that cite Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-667 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Casugay-Badiang. , 305 P.3d 437 (Haw. 2013).
cites § 706-667 367×subsections: (3) 18×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“2006) (the “Young Adult Defendants” statute).2 Specifically, the issue is whether the 1 That statute currently states, as it did at the time of the alleged offense, the following: (1) A person commits the offense of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree if the person…”
2
GREENState v. Putnam, 3 P.3d 1239 (Haw. 2000).
cites § 706-667 57×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“Thus, we disagree with the argument of Defendant-Appellant Reyna Putnam (Defendant) to the contrary and affirm the ruling of the circuit court of the third circuit (the court) that Defendant, who was age-eligible for sentencing under the young adult defendant statute, HRS §…”
The case’s holding
The young adult defendant statute applies only to defendants who are under twenty-two years of age at the time of sentencing rather than at the time of the original plea.
Later courts cite it for
“hrs 706-667 is based on the young adult offender statute, section 6.05 of the model penal code, and is in relevant part similarly worded.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Lora., 465 P.3d 745 (Haw. 2020).
cites § 706-667 38×subsections: (3) 10× (1) 6× (2) 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“8 At the 8 HRS § 706-667 (2014) provides in relevant part as follows: (1) Defined.”
4
GREENState v. Carvalho, 978 P.2d 718 (Haw. 1999).
cites § 706-667 10×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“The defense also noted that, inasmuch as Carvalho’s twenty-second birthday fell on March 27, 1998, if sentencing were to be delayed beyond that date in order for the prosecution to complete an assessment of dangerousness, Carvalho would no longer be eligible for sentencing…”
Later courts cite it for
“a prime reason for allowing a defendant the right of allocution is to provide the defendant an opportunity to plead for mitigation of the sentence.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Loa, 926 P.2d 1258 (Haw. 1996).
cites § 706-667 4×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“Loa, in turn, moved to be sentenced as a “young adult defendant,” pursuant to HRS § 706-667 (1993). 5 At the sentencing hearing, during which the trial court considered the motions for extended term imprisonment and for sentencing as a youthful offender, the prosecution offered…”
The case’s holding
A trial court's determination regarding the necessity of a foundation for admitting evidence is discretionary and is not overturned absent a showing of clear abuse.
Later courts cite it for
“when a question arises regarding the necessary foundation for the introduction of evidence, 'the determination of whether proper foundation has been established lies within the discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be overturned absent a showing of clear abuse.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Lau, 831 P.2d 523 (Haw. 1992).
cites § 706-667 6×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“HRS § 706-667. 2 *261 At the sentencing hearing on June 3, 1991, the State urged the court to impose a twenty year sentence on the grounds that appellant was convicted of a class A felony.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court is not required to state its reasons for imposing a sentence but must consider all available sentencing alternatives.
Later courts cite it for
“wjhenever a defendant is qualified for sentencing alternatives and the sentence imposed is unsatisfactory to the defendant, we strongly encourage and recommend that ... the sentencing court ... state its reasons for imposing the particular sentence.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Pacariem, 677 P.2d 463 (Haw. 1984).
cites § 706-667 10×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“) § 706-667. 1 The State appeals from the sentence, arguing that the court had no authority to sentence under that statute, but should have sentenced under H.”
The case’s holding
Repeals by implication are disfavored, so a later statute mandating life imprisonment for attempted murder does not impliedly repeal a young adult sentencing statute that excludes only murder.
Later courts cite it for
“. . . in lieu of any other sentence of imprisonment authorized by this chapter.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Casugay-Badiang, 289 P.3d 1006 (Haw. App. 2012).
cites § 706-667 15×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“8, the circuit court sentenced Ca-sugay-Badiang as a young adult offender to a maximum term of imprisonment of five years pursuant to HRS § 706-667 (Supp. 2011). 3 The court stated: *372 Okay.”
Later courts cite it for
“erred in disregarding the plain language of hrs 712-1240.8. . . .” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Carmichael, 53 P.3d 214 (Haw. 2002).
cites § 706-667 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“3d at 1247-48 (construing HRS §§ 706-667 and -625, both of which relate to sentencing); State v.”
The case’s holding
A court determines whether conduct is a de minimis infraction by considering the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the conduct and the attendant circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“for example, in a case where the evidence demonstrates that a defendant had knowingly recovered a quantity of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it to the police as evidence of a crime when he was arrested and charged for possessing any amount' of a dangerous drug, dismissal as a de minimis offense would clearly be warranted.” · 2 citing courts
10
YELLOWState v. Sinagoga, 918 P.2d 228 (Haw. App. 1996).
cites § 706-667 4×cited by 48 cases
Overruled by State v. Veikoso on other grounds: 8 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 706-667
“2d 523, 525 (1992), concerned the sentencing of a young adult under the age of twenty-two years who could have been sentenced under the special provisions of HRS § 706-667 (1985). Such a sentence would reduce the length of incarceration for a young adult defendant.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court may not rely on prior uncounseled felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor convictions to impose or enhance a prison sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) uncounseled, (2) otherwise invalidly entered, and/or (3) not against the defendant.” · 3 citing courts
11
REDState v. Jumila, 950 P.2d 1201 (Haw. 1998).
cites § 706-667 4×cited by 46 cases
Overruled by State v. Brantley on other grounds: 1 citing opinion limits it to other grounds and 1 says overruled outright.
Where it cites § 706-667
“…for misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors (HRS § 706-663), and specialized treatment for young adult defendants (HRS § 706-667). Thus, the statutory scheme of chapter 706 deals with sentencing and penalties. Consistent with this scheme, HRS § 706-660.1 should be…”
The case’s holding
The felony underlying a firearm offense is, as a matter of law, an included offense of that firearm offense.
Later courts cite it for
“the felony underlying an hrs 134-6(a) offense is, as a matter of law, an included offense of the hrs 134-6(a) offense.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Hussein. , 229 P.3d 313 (Haw. 2010).
cites § 706-667 2×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“In Mersberg , this court said that [i]n the instant case we are satisfied that the trial court did consider all possible alternative sentences, including the provisions of HRS § 706-667. However, in order to forestall any claims that the court failed to do so, the trial court…”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court must state its reasons on the record at the time of sentencing for imposing a consecutive sentence rather than a concurrent one.
Later courts cite it for
“circuit courts must state on the record at the time of sentencing the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.” · 17 citing courts
13
GREENCarter, Bowie, McCullough v. State, 192 A.3d 695 (Md. 2018).
cites § 706-667 1×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“Penal Code, § 3051 (parole eligibility for offender younger than 25); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-667 ("young adult defendants" under age of 22).”
The case’s holding
A lengthy term-of-years sentence that precludes parole consideration for fifty years or more is the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no constitutional requirement that a state have a parole system per se, so long as the state provides a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Huelsman, 588 P.2d 394 (Haw. 1978).
cites § 706-667 2×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“There we dealt with the discretion granted to a sentencing judge by HRS § 706-667 to reduce the statutory sentence of a young adult defendant to a special maximum term of four years, “if the court is of the opinion that such special term is adequate for his correction and…”
The case’s holding
A statute authorizing extended sentences for multiple offenders is unconstitutionally vague unless the sentence is limited to what is necessary for the protection of the public.
Later courts cite it for
“that the defendant is a multiple offender, which finding may not be made unless the defendant is being sentenced for two or more felonies or is under sentence for a felony and the maximum terms of imprisonment authorized for the defendant's crimes meet certain requisites.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Cornelio, 935 P.2d 1021 (Haw. 1997).
cites § 706-667 2×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“5(3) (1993) relates to persons previously sentenced to "special terms” for felony convictions as "young adult defendants" under HRS § 706-667 (1993). That subsection is not implicated in this appeal.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court lacks the authority to impose consecutive mandatory minimum prison terms for multiple felony counts charged within the same indictment or complaint.
Later courts cite it for
“that hrs 706-606.5(3)24 743 divests a sentencing court of the authority to impose consecutive mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment on a defendant convicted of multiple felony counts charged in the same indictment or complaint.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREEND'ambrosio v. State, 146 P.3d 606 (Haw. App. 2006).
cites § 706-667 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“Youth Adult Offender: The person was sentenced as a young adult offender under Section 706-667, HRS. The criteria for Level III punishment, which will lead to a presumptive twenty- to fifty-year minimum term where a defendant was sentenced by the court to life imprisonment with…”
The case’s holding
The paroling authority exercises significant discretionary power over felony sentencing, making a defendant's minimum-term hearing a critical stage for effective assistance of counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“it is the hpa, not the courts, that exercises most of the state's felony sentencing discretion.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Masaniai, 628 P.2d 1018 (Haw. 1981).
cites § 706-667 2×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“HRS § 706-667. The court also could have suspended the imposition of a sentence or sentenced the appellant to probation.”
The case’s holding
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of formal adversary judicial proceedings and does not extend to pre-indictment lineups.
Later courts cite it for
“the weight of the identification testimony and the credibility of the witnesses were for the jury to determine. the defense counsel could cross-examine the witnesses, and point out any suggestibility in the identification procedure.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENIn the Interest of Dinson, 574 P.2d 119 (Haw. 1978).
cites § 706-667 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“” These findings are of essentially the same character as those required by HRS § 706-667, pursuant to which a young adult defendant may be sentenced to a special intermediate term of imprisonment “if the court is of the opinion that such special term is adequate for his…”
The case’s holding
In a juvenile waiver proceeding, the family court may consider hearsay in dispositional reports if disclosed to counsel for challenge, without violating due process.
19
NO FLAGState v. Casugay-Badiang, No. SCWC-11-0000802 (Haw. June 28, 2013).
cites § 706-667 158×subsections: (3) 8×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“2006) (the “Young Adult Defendants” statute).2 Specifically, the issue is whether the 1 That statute currently states, as it did at the time of the alleged offense, the following: (1) A person commits the offense of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree if the person…”
20
GREENState v. Auld., 361 P.3d 471 (Haw. 2015).
cites § 706-667 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 706-667
“(3) If a person was sentenced for a prior felony conviction to a special term under section 706-667, then the person shall not be sentenced to a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment under this section unless the instant felony offense was committed during such period as…”
The case’s holding
The state must allege and prove prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to impose a mandatory minimum sentence for repeat offenders.
Later courts cite it for
“excepts the 'fact of prior conviction' from the requirement that a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, those facts increasing the penalty for a crime.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197820002022

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2013. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Haw.21Haw. App.5Md.1
By subsection
(1)3 cases
State v. Lora., 465 P.3d 745 (Haw. 2020).“8 At the 8 HRS § 706-667 (2014) provides in relevant part as follows: (1) Defined.”
State v. Lau, 831 P.2d 523 (Haw. 1992).“HRS § 706-667. 2 *261 At the sentencing hearing on June 3, 1991, the State urged the court to impose a twenty year sentence on the grounds that appellant was convicted of a class A felony.”
State v. Daugherty, 801 P.2d 553 (Haw. 1990).
(2)1 case
State v. Lora., 465 P.3d 745 (Haw. 2020).
(3)5 cases
State v. Casugay-Badiang. , 305 P.3d 437 (Haw. 2013).“2006) (the “Young Adult Defendants” statute).2 Specifically, the issue is whether the 1 That statute currently states, as it did at the time of the alleged offense, the following: (1) A person commits the offense of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree if the person…”
State v. Lora., 465 P.3d 745 (Haw. 2020).
State v. Putnam, 3 P.3d 1239 (Haw. 2000).“Thus, we disagree with the argument of Defendant-Appellant Reyna Putnam (Defendant) to the contrary and affirm the ruling of the circuit court of the third circuit (the court) that Defendant, who was age-eligible for sentencing under the young adult defendant statute, HRS §…”
State v. Casugay-Badiang, No. SCWC-11-0000802 (Haw. June 28, 2013).“2006) (the “Young Adult Defendants” statute).2 Specifically, the issue is whether the 1 That statute currently states, as it did at the time of the alleged offense, the following: (1) A person commits the offense of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree if the person…”
State v. Casugay-Badiang. , No. SCWC-11-0000802 (Haw. June 19, 2013).
(4)1 case

Show all 27 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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