Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1987).
Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitPublished opinionNo. Nos. 85-2753, 86-1031Oct 23, 1987

Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1987)

Quick Summary

A judge has an obligation not to recuse when no occasion exists and should not recuse based on unsupported speculation.

A plaintiff petitions for a writ of mandamus to disqualify a district judge, alleging bias, prejudice, and a financial interest in a defendant. The court reviews the denial of the recusal motion for abuse of discretion. Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, the affidavits are untimely and legally insufficient because they rely on conclusions and incorporate unrelated documents rather than stating specific facts of time, place, and circumstances. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, the court applies the test of whether a reasonable person would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. The court finds no basis for recusal, noting that a judge has an obligation not to recuse when no occasion exists and should not act on unsupported speculation. The court denies the petitions for writ of mandamus.

458 citation events (320 in the last 25 years) across 62 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Cited for
At page 939Sufficiency of affidavits for disqualification under statute211 citing casesA judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.6 citing courts put it this way · 190 listed here
  • Moyer, No. 5:25-cv-00429 (W.D. Okla. June 5, 2026).
    (A judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.)
  • Halvorsen, No. 2:25-cv-00909 (D. Utah Jan. 12, 2026). 3 cites
    (A judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.)
  • Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock, No. 1:22-cv-01143 (D. Colo. Feb. 3, 2025).
    (There is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so where there is.)
  • Tiernan v. IRS, No. 2:22-cv-00534 (D. Utah Apr. 25, 2023).
    (Under § 144, the only claim of bias to be considered is that against a party.)
  • Biers v. Dentons US, No. 2:22-cv-00298 (D. Utah June 29, 2022). 2 cites
    (A judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.)
  • Velasquez v. Baldock, No. 2:22-cv-00133 (D. Utah May 11, 2022). 2 cites
    (A judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.)
  • Zemaitiene v. Salt Lake Cnty., No. 2:17-cv-00007 (D. Utah May 25, 2021). 3 cites
    (A judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.)
  • State v. Connolly, 930 So. 2d 951 (La. 2006).published
    (There is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.)
  • Hill, No. 1:24-cv-02658 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2026).
    “whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality”
  • Neill, No. 5:26-cv-03136 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2026).
    The bias and prejudice must be personal, extrajudicial, and identified by “facts of time, place, persons, occasions, and circumstances.” Id. at 960 (quoting Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987)).
Show 180 more citing cases
At page 938Standard for motion to recuse and timeliness53 citing casesholding motion filed three and five months after movant discovered allegedly disqualifying facts was untimely2 citing courts put it this way · 46 listed here
  • Barnes, No. 1:24-cv-00538 (D. Colo. Apr. 15, 2026).
    Colo. May 25, 2006) (citing Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987)).
  • Gabriel, No. 4:21-cv-00493 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2026).
    Next, regarding the request for this Court to recuse, the Court notes that “[a] motion to recuse must be filed as soon as the movant learns of the facts demonstrating the basis for disqualification.” United States v. Walker, 838 F. App'x 3…
  • Waddle, No. 5:25-cv-00768 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2025).
    “be filed promptly after the allegedly disqualifying facts are discovered”
  • Velasquez, No. 2:25-cv-00674 (D. Utah Oct. 28, 2025).
    Dale Kimball, Bias of the Judge Against the Law,”10 he also failed to certify that the substantive factual allegations were filed in good 5 See ECF No. 19-1. 6 Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 7 Robertson…
  • Micheaux v. Am. Credit Acceptance, No. 6:24-cv-01102 (D. Kan. Apr. 2, 2025). 3 cites
    Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987).
  • Carter v. Genesis Alkali, No. 23-8079 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2024).unpublished
    Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
  • Davis v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 23-3244, 2024 WL 4003734 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2024).unpublished 4 cites
    United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
  • Ward v. Wesley Med. Ctr., LLC, No. 6:23-cv-01091 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2024). 3 cites
    Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987).
  • Ginsburg v. Evergreen Sec., Ltd. (In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd.), 570 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009).published
  • United States v. Stewart, 378 F. App'x 773 (10th Cir. 2010).unpublished
Show 36 more citing cases
At page 937Reviewing petitions for judge's disqualification under statute5 citing cases“the test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.”27 citing courts quote it
  • Christopher Fountain v. A-OK ENTERPRICES, LLC, No. 6:26-cv-01037 (D. Kan. May 27, 2026).
    Hinman, 831 F.2d at 937, 939).
  • Moore, No. 6:25-cv-01150 (D. Kan. Apr. 22, 2026).
    The bias and prejudice must be personal, extrajudicial, and identified by “‘facts of time, place, persons, occasions, and circumstances.’” Id. at 960 (quoting Hinman, 831 F.2d at 937, 939).
  • Cahail v. United States, The, No. 6:25-cv-01016 (D. Kan. July 23, 2025).
    The bias and prejudice must be personal, extrajudicial, and identified by “‘facts of time, place, persons, occasions, and circumstances.’” Id. at 960 (quoting Hinman, 831 F.2d at 937, 939).
  • Micheaux v. Am. Credit Acceptance, No. 6:24-cv-01102 (D. Kan. Apr. 2, 2025). 3 cites
    Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987).
  • Ward v. Wesley Med. Ctr., LLC, No. 6:23-cv-01091 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2024). 3 cites
    Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987).
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
  • Sallaj, No. 6:25-cv-01119 (D. Kan. May 4, 2026).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dr. Myra M. HINMAN
v.
Honorable Richard D. ROGERS, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, Respondent Dr. Myra M. HINMAN Tommy C. Ashley Frank D. Blackburn James L. Bolden Betty D. Commons Ola L. Drake Bobby J. Fair Floyd H. Garrett Noah L. Goddard Alan W. Jack Sherri L. Kelly Roy Laster Wayne A. Lewis Thomas McHan Anita Martin Dennis Joe Miller Michele Richards and Paula M. Williams v. Honorable Richard D. ROGERS, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas
Nos. 85-2753, 86-1031.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Oct 23, 1987.
Published opinion
831 F.2d 937
1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 14106
Margie J. Phelps of Phelps-Chartered, Topeka, Kan., for petitioners., Richard D. Rogers, U.S. Dist. Court for the D. Kansas, filed a response in his own behalf.
Baldock, Barrett, Seth.
Cited by 249 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

After examining the petitions for writ of mandamus and other documents filed in connection with these cases, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of these petitions. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.8(c) and 27.1.2. The causes are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

These matters come on for consideration of two petitions for writ of mandamus seeking the disqualification of the Honorable Richard D. Rogers, United States District Court for the District of Kansas, from further proceedings in two cases, DistCt. Nos. 79-4049 and 79-4069, in which petitioner, Dr. Myra Hinman, is the plaintiff. We have previously denied the petition with respect to the copetitioners in No. 86-1031.

Petitioner claims that the judge is biased and prejudiced against her and her attorneys, biased and prejudiced in favor of the defendants, has a financial interest in one defendant in No. 79-4049, and that she cannot obtain a fair trial or the appearance of impartiality. For these reasons, petitioner contends the judge is disqualified under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. All proceedings below were stayed by the district judge pending resolution of these petitions.

The decision to recuse is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge. We review the denial of a motion to recuse only for abuse of that discretion. Varela v. Jones, 746 F.2d 1413, 1416-1417 (10th Cir.1984); See also, United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1481 (10th Cir.1987).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, an affidavit of bias and prejudice must be timely, sufficient, made by a party, and accompanied by a certificate of good faith of counsel. The affidavits of Dr. Hinman also seek to incorporate numerous other affidavits, court orders, transcripts, and newspaper articles, most of which are not directly related to Dr. Hinman’s allegations of bias and prejudice. We have concluded as follows:

1. Both affidavits are untimely. The only factual allegations personal to petitioner refer to events, the latest of which occurred three months prior to the filing of the affidavit in No. 79-4049, and five months before the affidavit was filed in No. 79-4069. A motion to recuse must be filed promptly after the allegedly disqualifying facts are discovered. United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir.1979). Although the affidavit in No. 79-4069 seeks to incorporate reference to events occurring a few weeks before that affidavit was filed, these alleged “facts” have nothing to do with petitioner.

[*939] 2. Also under 28 U.S.C. § 144, the affidavits are legally insufficient. In assessing the affidavit’s sufficiency, the judge may not consider the truth of the facts alleged. United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d at 511; Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir.1978). However, conclusions, rumors, beliefs, and opinions are not sufficient to form a basis for disqualification. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 34, 41 S.Ct. 230, 233, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921) (construing predecessor statute). The affidavit must state with required particularity the identifying facts of time, place, persons, occasion, and circumstances. The doctrine of incorporation by reference has no place in a § 144 affidavit. Hall v. Burkett, 391 F.Supp. 237, 242 (W.D.Okla.1975). The affidavit is strictly construed against the affiant, and there is a substantial burden on the moving party to demonstrate the judge is not impartial. United States v. Hall, 424 F.Supp. 508, 534 (W.D.Okla.1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 313, 50 L.Ed.2d 285 (1976). See also United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 728 (10th Cir.1982). At most, the statements petitioner recites the judge made were intemperate. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999, 101 S.Ct. 1704, 68 L.Ed.2d 200 (1981). There is no indication, however, that the judge had formed an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what he had learned from his participation in the case. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966).

3. Under § 144, the only claim of bias to be considered is that against a party. United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir.1985); Gilbert v. Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1398 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972, 104 S.Ct. 2347, 80 L.Ed.2d 820 (1984). Our holdings in Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1978) and United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951, 97 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed.2d 319 (1976) are not to the contrary.

4. We must also consider petitioner’s claims of bias and prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 455, which is considerably broader in scope, while lacking in procedural hurdles. Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d at 728. The test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality. United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d at 728. See also United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1481; Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983); United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d at 511.

Under this section, factual allegations do not have to be taken as true. United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir.1985); Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee, 637 F.2d 1014, 1019-1020 n. 6 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960, 102 S.Ct. 2035, 72 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982). Nor is the judge limited to those facts presented by the challenging party. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F.Supp. 706, 721, 723 (D.Idaho 1981) (judge considers all circumstances, both public and in hidden view); Gilbert v. Little Rock, 722 F.2d at 1399.

There is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is. Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139 n. 360 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977); see also United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir.1976); Danielson v. Winnfield Funeral Home, Inc., 634 F.Supp. 1110, 1116 (E.D.La.1986), aff'd in part without opinion sub nom, Dulaney v. Winnfield Funeral Home, 820 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir.1987); In re A.H. Robins, Co., 602 F.Supp. 243, 245 (D.Kan.1985). A judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation. United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir.1986); see also Davis [*940] v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 1302, 1303 (8th Cir.1984) (affidavits based on conclusions, opinions, and rumors are insufficient for recusal); In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir.1981) (though public confidence may be as shaken by published inferences of bias that are false as by those which are true, judge considering disqualification must ignore rumors, innuendos, and erroneous information).

5. Finally, the allegations in the recusal requests do not support the claim that the judge has a financial interest in defendant Kansas University Endowment Association. See, e.g., Lidstone v. Block, 773 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir.1985); Department of Energy v. Brimmer, 673 F.2d 1287, 1294-1295 (Em.Ct.App.1982); Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982).

Based on all the factors attendant to these cases, we have determined that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to disqualify himself from hearing the matters. Accordingly, the petitions for writ of mandamus are DENIED.