obvious error in Maine

2000P. 52(b); see also State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318, 1320 (Me.1994); State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467-69 (Me.1981) (discussing the obvious error standard generally). .

1996M.R.Crim.P. 52(b); State v. Weisbrode, 653 A.2d 411, 415 (Me.1995) (“Obvious error is error so highly prejudicial that it taints the proceedings and virtually deprives the defendant of a fair trial.”) (citing State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 468 (Me.1981)).

2025When reviewing for obvious error, we must determine whether there was “(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. . . . [W]e will exercise our discretion to notice an unpreserved error only if we also conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29 , 28 A.3d 1147 . [¶22] Our analysis of whether any deficiency in the court’s instructions rises to the level of obvious error begins with Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶¶ 10-18 , 114 A.3d 214 .

2025When reviewing for obvious error, we must determine whether there was “(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. . . . [W]e will exercise our discretion to notice an unpreserved error only if we also conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29 , 28 A.3d 1147 . [¶22] Our analysis of whether any deficiency in the court’s instructions rises to the level of obvious error begins with Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶¶ 10-18 , 114 A.3d 214 .

2025Although the State committed prosecutorial error in its closing, it did not rise to the level of obvious error. [¶38] Although not every use of the phrase “I think” constitutes prosecutorial error, see Dolloff, 2012 ME 130 , ¶ 57 n.16, 58 A.3d 1032 , here, as the State conceded at oral argument, the prosecutor’s use of the phrase in this case was error.

2025Although the State committed prosecutorial error in its closing, it did not rise to the level of obvious error. [¶38] Although not every use of the phrase “I think” constitutes prosecutorial error, see Dolloff, 2012 ME 130 , ¶ 57 n.16, 58 A.3d 1032 , here, as the State conceded at oral argument, the prosecutor’s use of the phrase in this case was error.

2025The crux of the obvious error analysis is “whether the obviousness of the error and the seriousness of the injustice done to the defendant thereby are so great the Law Court cannot in good conscience let the conviction stand.” State v. Daley, 440 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Me. 1982) (quotation marks omitted).

2023Given the jury instructions as a whole, the trial court did not commit obvious error by reciting a portion of the self-defense statute that was not generated by the evidence. [¶14] Relying on State v. Daley, 440 A.2d 1053 (Me. 1982), Bonfanti argues that the trial court committed obvious error by instructing the jury on the third-party-provocation exception to the justified use of deadly force when 2Bonfanti did not claim until oral argument before us that he would have presented his defense differently if the statement had been suppressed. 8 that exception was not generated by the evidence.

1995An obvious error is a “seriously prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me.1981) (quoting State v. Baker, 409 A.2d 216, 219 (Me.1979)).

1994An obvious error is “a seriously prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me.1981) (quoting State v. Baker, 409 A.2d 216, 219 (Me.1979)).

2017In that case, we identified “two structural flaws that, taken together, rise to the level of obvious error.” Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added); see Weaver, 2016 ME 12, ¶ 12 , 130 A.3d 972 (“In Baker ... we concluded that a defendant had met [the] high burden [of showing obvious error] based on the combined effect of two structural flaws.” (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)).

2017In that case, we identified “two structural flaws that, taken together, rise to the level of obvious error.” Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added); see Weaver, 2016 ME 12, ¶ 12 , 130 A.3d 972 (“In Baker ... we concluded that a defendant had met [the] high burden [of showing obvious error] based on the combined effect of two structural flaws.” (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)).

2008This is particularly true because prosecutors are “cloaked with the authority of the State, and [are] duty-bound to see that justice is done.” State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me.1994).

1998See *123 State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 107 (Me.1995) (jury instruction not to attach any significance to defendant’s decision not to testify minimized jury speculation as to why an accused would remain silent); see also State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me.1994) (obvious error is error “so highly prejudiced that it taints the proceedings and virtually deprives the defendant of a fair trial”) (citing State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 468 (Me.1981)). 5 V. [¶8] In addition, Lewis challenges his sentences.

2023Obvious error occurs “when jury instructions, viewed as a whole, are affected by ‘highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’” State v. Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11 , 114 A.3d 214 (quoting State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 106-07 (Me. 1995)).

2008Obvious error is that error “so highly prejudicial it virtually deprives the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.” Ashley, 666 A.2d at 105 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 16] “We have repeatedly held that it is improper for a prosecutor to express an opinion on the credibility of a defendant.” State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 122 (Me.1993).

2017See Dorr v. Woodard, 2016 ME 79, ¶ 7 , 140 A.3d 467 (explaining that the burden is on the person challenging the constitutionality of a statute to establish its infirmity).

2017See Dorr v. Woodard, 2016 ME 79, ¶ 7 , 140 A.3d 467 (explaining that the burden is on the person challenging the constitutionality of a statute to establish its infirmity).

2011See State v. Nelson, 2010 ME 40, ¶ 14 , 994 A.2d 808 ; Perry, 2006 ME 76, ¶ 15 , 899 A.2d 806 ; State v. Walker, 512 A.2d 354, 356 (Me.1986); State v. Michaud, 473 A.2d 399, 404 (Me.1984); State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d 860, 865 (Me.1983); State v. Childs, 388 A.2d 76, 81-82 (Me.1978); State v. Deveau, 354 A.2d 389, 392 (Me.1976); State v. McDonough, 350 A.2d 556, 564 (Me.1976). [¶ 23] However, the obvious error standard that we employ should recognize that where the trial court has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on a defense, as was the case here, it necessarily fo

2011See State v. Nelson, 2010 ME 40 , *1153 ¶ 14, 994 A.2d 808 ; Perry, 2006 ME 76, ¶ 15 , 899 A.2d 806 ; State v. Walker, 512 A.2d 354, 356 (Me.1986); State v. Michaud, 473 A.2d 399, 404 (Me.1984); State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d 860, 865 (Me.1983); State v. Childs, 388 A.2d 76, 81-82 (Me. 1978); State v. Deveau, 354 A.2d 389, 392 (Me.1976); State v. McDonough, 350 A.2d 556, 564 (Me.1976). [¶ 23] However, the obvious error standard that we employ should recognize that where the trial court has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on a defense, as was the case here, it necessa

2006See, e.g., State v. Dube, 522 A.2d 904, 907 (Me.1987).

1995We address whether the court abused its discretion when it refused to grant the defendants’ motions for mistrial, State v. Dube, 522 A.2d 904, 908 (Me.1987), and whether any of the 40 unpre-served allegations of error rise to the level of obvious error.

2026See State v. Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 20 , 211 A.3d 205 (“The Court will not undertake an obvious error review when a litigant affirmatively approves or consents to a court action.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).

2026See State v. Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 20 , 211 A.3d 205 (“The Court will not undertake an obvious error review when a litigant affirmatively approves or consents to a court action.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).

2017See Reckards, 2015 ME 31, ¶ 4 , 113 A.3d 589 , Gessner has not met his burden of demonstrating that the court committed obvious error.

2017See Reckards, 2015 ME 31, ¶ 4 , 113 A.3d 589 , Gessner has not met his burden of demonstrating that the court committed obvious error.

2022Obvious error is present if an error is “plain,” “affect[ed] substantial rights,” and “seriously affect[ed] the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Fahnley, 2015 ME 82 , ¶ 15, 119 A.3d 727 (quotation marks omitted).

2022Obvious error is present if an error is “plain,” “affect[ed] substantial rights,” and “seriously affect[ed] the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Fahnley, 2015 ME 82 , ¶ 15, 119 A.3d 727 (quotation marks omitted).

2022“To prevail under the obvious error standard, [a defendant] must demonstrate that (1) there is an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and, if so, (4) that it is error that seriously affects the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

2020State v. Lajoie, 2017 ME 8, ¶ 15 , 154 A.3d 132 (citations and quotation marks omitted). [¶33] In State v. Hodgdon, we found that an instruction functionally identical to the one at issue in this case did not rise to the level of obvious error, 17 “considering the instructions as a whole, as we must do,” because “[t]he court on several occasions informed the jury of the requirement that to return a guilty verdict . . . [it] must find that the victim was under the age of fourteen years at the time the offenses occurred.” 2017 ME 122, ¶¶ 11, 16 , 164 A.3d 959 .

2019She now contends on appeal that the homeowner's testimony "irretrievably tainted the jury's view of [her] and every piece of evidence, and thus requires ... a new trial." [¶19] Although Scott argues that the admission of the homeowner's statement was an obvious error that affected her substantial rights, we have previously cautioned that "[w]e do not review alleged errors that resulted from a party's trial strategy," State v. Rega , 2005 ME 5 , ¶ 17, 863 A.2d 917 , because "[o]bvious error review provides no invitation to change trial and instruction request strategy when the results of the or

2019She now contends on appeal that the homeowner's testimony "irretrievably tainted the jury's view of [her] and every piece of evidence, and thus requires ... a new trial." [¶19] Although Scott argues that the admission of the homeowner's statement was an obvious error that affected her substantial rights, we have previously cautioned that "[w]e do not review alleged errors that resulted from a party's trial strategy," State v. Rega , 2005 ME 5 , ¶ 17, 863 A.2d 917 , because "[o]bvious error review provides no invitation to change trial and instruction request strategy when the results of the or

2020In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 9-10 , 776 A.2d 1240 ; see Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice, § 402(a) at 310 (5th ed. 2018); see also MP Assocs. v. Liberty, 2001 ME 22, ¶ 18 , 771 A.2d 1040 . 12 Obvious error is that which deprives a party of a fair trial or otherwise treats a party unjustly.

2020In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 9-10 , 776 A.2d 1240 ; see Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice, § 402(a) at 310 (5th ed. 2018); see also MP Assocs. v. Liberty, 2001 ME 22, ¶ 18 , 771 A.2d 1040 . 12 Obvious error is that which deprives a party of a fair trial or otherwise treats a party unjustly.

2026Obvious error is a “seriously prejudicial error tending to produce a manifest injustice.” In re Child of Kaysean M., 2018 ME 156, ¶ 8 , 197 A.3d 525 (quotation marks omitted). [¶31] We see nothing in the record to indicate a lack of impartiality requiring recusal.

2019See In re Child of Kaysean M. , 2018 ME 156 , ¶ 8, 197 A.3d 525 (stating that when a party "objects to ... evidence for the first time on appeal, we apply the obvious error standard of review" (alteration and quotation marks omitted) ).

2025Even after the assault, she remained in the victim’s home and slept on the victim’s couch. 14 that she did not act in self-defense solely because she had the opportunity to retreat and did not. [¶24] Accordingly, as in Laverty, “the omission of [a dwelling-place exception to the duty to retreat rule] instruction [is] an obvious error affecting [Bernier’s] substantial right[s],” requiring that the judgment of conviction be vacated.6 495 A.2d at 833 ; see State v. Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 13 , 187 A.3d 576 (discussing “structural flaws” in self-defense instructions amounting to obvious error).

2019See Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 20 , 187 A.3d 576 (concluding that an instructional error rose to the level of obvious error “particularly given that 8In addition to the error discussed in the text, the instructions also deviated from 29-A M.R.S. § 2431(3) in another respect.

2025Even after the assault, she remained in the victim’s home and slept on the victim’s couch. 14 that she did not act in self-defense solely because she had the opportunity to retreat and did not. [¶24] Accordingly, as in Laverty, “the omission of [a dwelling-place exception to the duty to retreat rule] instruction [is] an obvious error affecting [Bernier’s] substantial right[s],” requiring that the judgment of conviction be vacated.6 495 A.2d at 833 ; see State v. Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 13 , 187 A.3d 576 (discussing “structural flaws” in self-defense instructions amounting to obvious error).

2019See Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 20 , 187 A.3d 576 (concluding that an instructional error rose to the level of obvious error “particularly given that 8In addition to the error discussed in the text, the instructions also deviated from 29-A M.R.S. § 2431(3) in another respect.

2013See, e.g., State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170, 172 (Me.1995) (“[0]bvious error results when the court fails to instruct the jury on a statutory defense generated by the evidence.”); *78 State v. Davis, 528 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Me.1987) (“[0]nce the issue is generated in the record, an instruction [on the defense] must be given, and, where [the defense] is an issue essential to the defendant’s case, a failure to so instruct amounts to obvious error....”); State v. Begin, 652 A.2d 102, 106 (Me.1995) (“[I]t is ... obvious error to fail to instruct the jury on ... a statutory defense generated by the evide

1997We concluded, in State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170 (Me.1995), that the trial court committed obvious error by failing to instruct the jury regarding defendant’s statutory defense pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(3)(A) (Supp. 1996) 1 and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction of Class B manslaughter.

2024“Obvious error is error that is seriously prejudicial error tending to produce a manifest injustice.” In re Child of Lacy H., 2019 ME 110, ¶ 9 , 212 A.3d 320 (quotation marks omitted). [¶19] “The state must use procedures that align with due process requirements when terminating parental rights.” In re Child of Kenneth S., 2022 ME 14, ¶ 16 , 269 A.3d 242 .

2024“Obvious error is error that is seriously prejudicial error tending to produce a manifest injustice.” In re Child of Lacy H., 2019 ME 110, ¶ 9 , 212 A.3d 320 (quotation marks omitted). [¶19] “The state must use procedures that align with due process requirements when terminating parental rights.” In re Child of Kenneth S., 2022 ME 14, ¶ 16 , 269 A.3d 242 .