12 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1842–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Larry C. Perry, Jr. v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2017See Perry, 78 N.E.3d at 8 . 5 We note that, in a footnote in her reply brief, Wife states that “the reason for [Wife’s] testimony on that issue was to afford the Trial Court the opportunity to correct the obvious error.” Reply Br. at 15 n.6. | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. Strunkgreen1 sentence2009(Appellant’s Br. 20-21, quoting Rice v. Strunk, 632 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), affd, 670 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind.1996). also citing King v. Terry, 805 N.E.2d 397 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).) For instance, Cooper cites both Shideler v. Dwyer and Rice, in which the plaintiffs had malpractice claims but crafted their complaints in a way to describe claims carrying a longer statute of limitation than the more obvious claim of malpractice. | 1 | 1 |
Nehring v. Raikosgreen1 sentence1999See also Horsley, 448 N.E.2d at 43 ; Nehring v. Raikos, 413 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind.Ct.App.1980); Protective Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Pinkston v. Livingstongreen1 sentence1999In Pinkston v. Livingston, 554 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), we found “an obvious error” when a default judgment was entered by a trial court on the same day the defendant failed to appear when no notice of an application for *1278 default was sent. | 1 | 1 |
Horsley v. Lewisgreen1 sentence1999See also Horsley, 448 N.E.2d at 43 ; Nehring v. Raikos, 413 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind.Ct.App.1980); Protective Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hampton v. Douglass
green
2 sentences1991In addition, in Hampton v. Douglass (1983), Ind. App., 457 N.E.2d 618 , we held that when the defendant has filed a responsive pleading, a default judgment is improper, even if the defendant fails to appear for trial. 1991In addition, in Hompton v. Douglass (1983), Ind.App., 457 N.E.2d 618 , we held that when the defendant has filed a responsive pleading, a default judgment is improper, even if the defendant fails to appear for trial. | 2 | 1990–1991 |
In Re the Marriage of Osborne
green
2 sentences1982In re Marriage of Osborne, (1977) Ind.App., 369 N.E.2d 653 , tr. denied. 1980In re Marriage of Osborne, (1977) Ind.App., 369 N.E.2d 653 , tr. denied. | 2 | 1980–1982 |
King v. Terry
green
1 sentence2009(Appellant’s Br. 20-21, quoting Rice v. Strunk, 632 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), affd, 670 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind.1996). also citing King v. Terry, 805 N.E.2d 397 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).) For instance, Cooper cites both Shideler v. Dwyer and Rice, in which the plaintiffs had malpractice claims but crafted their complaints in a way to describe claims carrying a longer statute of limitation than the more obvious claim of malpractice. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Rice v. Strunk
green
1 sentence2009(Appellant’s Br. 20-21, quoting Rice v. Strunk, 632 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), affd, 670 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind.1996). also citing King v. Terry, 805 N.E.2d 397 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).) For instance, Cooper cites both Shideler v. Dwyer and Rice, in which the plaintiffs had malpractice claims but crafted their complaints in a way to describe claims carrying a longer statute of limitation than the more obvious claim of malpractice. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Gaglione
green
2 sentences1997It appears from the professional literature, however, that other factors bearing on eyewitness identification may be known only to some jurors, or may be imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of most.'" 32 Cal. Rptr.2d at 174 . 1997It appears from the professional literature, however, that other factors bearing on eyewitness identification may be known only to some jurors, or may be imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of most.’” 32 Cal.Rptr.2d at 174 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
School City of East Chicago v. East Chicago Federation of Teachers, Local Number 511
neutral
2 sentences1993The Court of Appeals opinion reported at 607 N.E.2d 400 clearly and correctly sets out the mathematical calculation which shows an obvious error in the arbiter’s figures. 1993The Court of Appeals opinion reported at 607 N.E.2d 400 clearly and correctly sets out the mathematical calculation which shows an obvious error in the arbiter's figures. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Smith v. State
neutral
2 sentences1979Smith v. State (1974) 160 Ind.App. 622 , 312 N.E.2d 896 . 1979Smith v. State (1974) 160 Ind.App. 622 , 312 N.E.2d 896 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Fetter v. Powers
neutral
2 sentences1965Wilson, Admx. v. Rollings, supra. It is an obvious rule of evidence that: “If a fact in issue is established by competent and relevant evidence, it matters not which party introduces the evidence or for what other purpose the evidence was offered.” Fetter v. Powers (1948), 118 Ind. App. 367, 381 , 78 N. E. 2d 555 . (citing cases) In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant proved the defendant’s case in that the former showed by parol and written evidence (especially by the contract), that the defendant was entitled to an award of damages for the brick which were recovered by appellant before the 1965Wilson, Admx. v. Rollings, supra. It is an obvious rule of evidence that: “If a fact in issue is established by competent and relevant evidence, it matters not which party introduces the evidence or for what other purpose the evidence was offered.” Fetter v. Powers (1948), 118 Ind. App. 367, 381 , 78 N. E. 2d 555 . (citing cases) In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant proved the defendant’s case in that the former showed by parol and written evidence (especially by the contract), that the defendant was entitled to an award of damages for the brick which were recovered by appellant before the | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Muchmore v. Bates
neutral
1 sentence1842This obvious principle is adverted to and recognized in the case of Muchmore v. Bates, 1 Blackf., 248 . | 1 | 1842–1842 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.