obvious error in Michigan

2026Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8-9 .

2025In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445 , 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020); In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 9 ; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).

2021Thus, there is a “strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was strategic,” and “[w]e will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 242-243 .

2021Thus, there is a “strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was strategic,” and “[w]e will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 242-243 . 1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -4- Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.

2021Thus, there is a “strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was strategic,” and “[w]e will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 242-243 . 1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -4- Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.

2021Thus, there is a “strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was strategic,” and “[w]e will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 242-243 . 1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -4- Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.

2019Each of these-- as well as other-- pertinent factors should be assessed and weighed in the balance of characterizing 7 I do not disagree with the majority that proportions may be helpful in guiding an assessment of modularity; I take issue principally with its “percentage threshold” rule that anything less than 50.1% modularity properly establishes a dwelling as nonmodular. 10 a modular home.8 This assessment is necessarily undertaken along a spectrum rather than viewed as black or white.9 8 Of course, this Court must give deference to the trial court’s factual findings, Cooper, 349 Mich at 52

2019Each of these-- as well as other-- pertinent factors should be assessed and weighed in the balance of characterizing 7 I do not disagree with the majority that proportions may be helpful in guiding an assessment of modularity; I take issue principally with its “percentage threshold” rule that anything less than 50.1% modularity properly establishes a dwelling as nonmodular. 10 a modular home.8 This assessment is necessarily undertaken along a spectrum rather than viewed as black or white.9 8 Of course, this Court must give deference to the trial court’s factual findings, Cooper, 349 Mich at 52

2018While in some instances an obvious error may correlate with counsel’s ineffectiveness in responding to it and the prejudice resulting from that failure, in others instances it will not. [Id. at ___; slip op at 7-8 (citations omitted; ellipsis in original).] Furthermore, with respect to the prejudice requirement under both the plain error standard and the ineffective assistance of counsel standard, the Randolph Court stated that “a finding that a defendant failed to satisfy the prejudice prong when complaining about an error by the court will not necessarily mean that the defendant is unable to

2018While in some instances an obvious error may correlate with counsel’s ineffectiveness in responding to it and the prejudice resulting from that failure, in others instances it will not. [Id. at ___; slip op at 7-8 (citations omitted; ellipsis in original).] Furthermore, with respect to the prejudice requirement under both the plain error standard and the ineffective assistance of counsel standard, the Randolph Court stated that “a finding that a defendant failed to satisfy the prejudice prong when complaining about an error by the court will not necessarily mean that the defendant is unable to

2017People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82 (2006).

2017People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82 (2006).

2025To prevail under plain-error review, defendant must show that an obvious error occurred that “affected the outcome of the lower court proceeding.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “[R]eversal is warranted only if the error resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” King, 297 Mich App at 473 .

2025Id. “[A]n error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 9 .

2025Defendant appears to rely on Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 ; 83 S Ct 1194 ; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), for the proposition that the police and prosecutor have an obligation to develop potentially exculpatory evidence.

2025Defendant appears to rely on Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 ; 83 S Ct 1194 ; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), for the proposition that the police and prosecutor have an obligation to develop potentially exculpatory evidence.

2024As to initial fees, see, e.g., Sherrard v Stevens, 176 Mich App 650 ; 440 NW2d 622 (1988) (noting that the plaintiffs in a legal malpractice suit recovered attorney fees paid to the defendant-attorney, who had filed a frivolous claim on their behalf); Mallen, § 21:12 (“Similarly, if a statute of limitations was an obvious bar to the cause of action, a client could recover from the attorney the expenses incurred in needless litigation on a worthless cause of action.”). 43 John Kohl, 977 SW2d at 534 ; see also Moore v Michalski, 2018-Ohio-3021, ¶ 24 ; 107 NE3d 228 (Ohio App, 2018), quoting John

2024Washington, 283 Mich App at 672 .

2024As to initial fees, see, e.g., Sherrard v Stevens, 176 Mich App 650 ; 440 NW2d 622 (1988) (noting that the plaintiffs in a legal malpractice suit recovered attorney fees paid to the defendant-attorney, who had filed a frivolous claim on their behalf); Mallen, § 21:12 (“Similarly, if a statute of limitations was an obvious bar to the cause of action, a client could recover from the attorney the expenses incurred in needless litigation on a worthless cause of action.”). 43 John Kohl, 977 SW2d at 534 ; see also Moore v Michalski, 2018-Ohio-3021, ¶ 24 ; 107 NE3d 228 (Ohio App, 2018), quoting John

2024As to initial fees, see, e.g., Sherrard v Stevens, 176 Mich App 650 ; 440 NW2d 622 (1988) (noting that the plaintiffs in a legal malpractice suit recovered attorney fees paid to the defendant-attorney, who had filed a frivolous claim on their behalf); Mallen, § 21:12 (“Similarly, if a statute of limitations was an obvious bar to the cause of action, a client could recover from the attorney the expenses incurred in needless litigation on a worthless cause of action.”). 43 John Kohl, 977 SW2d at 534 ; see also Moore v Michalski, 2018-Ohio-3021, ¶ 24 ; 107 NE3d 228 (Ohio App, 2018), quoting John

2024As to initial fees, see, e.g., Sherrard v Stevens, 176 Mich App 650 ; 440 NW2d 622 (1988) (noting that the plaintiffs in a legal malpractice suit recovered attorney fees paid to the defendant-attorney, who had filed a frivolous claim on their behalf); Mallen, § 21:12 (“Similarly, if a statute of limitations was an obvious bar to the cause of action, a client could recover from the attorney the expenses incurred in needless litigation on a worthless cause of action.”). 43 John Kohl, 977 SW2d at 534 ; see also Moore v Michalski, 2018-Ohio-3021, ¶ 24 ; 107 NE3d 228 (Ohio App, 2018), quoting John

2023See People v Swenor, 336 Mich App 550 , 569; 971 NW2d 33 (2021) (holding that a trial court’s alleged error on an unpreserved, nonstructural constitutional issue was “not plainly or obviously wrong” because there was “no binding caselaw” directly addressing the issue); United States v Finnesy, 953 F3d 675, 696-697 (CA 10, 2020) (same); United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 734 ; 113 S Ct 1770 ; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993) (“At a minimum, court of appeals cannot correct an error [under plain-error review] unless the error is clear under current law.”); Henderson v United States, 568 US 266, 278 ; 133 S

2023See People v Swenor, 336 Mich App 550 , 569; 971 NW2d 33 (2021) (holding that a trial court’s alleged error on an unpreserved, nonstructural constitutional issue was “not plainly or obviously wrong” because there was “no binding caselaw” directly addressing the issue); United States v Finnesy, 953 F3d 675, 696-697 (CA 10, 2020) (same); United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 734 ; 113 S Ct 1770 ; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993) (“At a minimum, court of appeals cannot correct an error [under plain-error review] unless the error is clear under current law.”); Henderson v United States, 568 US 266, 278 ; 133 S

2021If trial counsel had no valid strategic reason for the failure to object, it was incumbent on defendant to establish “the factual predicate” to that effect, Hoag, 460 Mich at 6 , and he has failed to do so.

2015The district court reasoned that, based on a review of the proceedings as a whole, there was not a deviation from the court rule affecting defendant’s substantial rights that would constitute a miscarriage of justice as required to set aside defendant’s plea after conviction and sentencing under People v Ward, 459 Mich 602, 614 ; 594 NW2d 47 (1999), opinion corrected on denial of reh 460 Mich 1204 (1999).

2015The district court reasoned that, based on a review of the proceedings as a whole, there was not a deviation from the court rule affecting defendant’s substantial rights that would constitute a miscarriage of justice as required to set aside defendant’s plea after conviction and sentencing under People v Ward, 459 Mich 602, 614 ; 594 NW2d 47 (1999), opinion corrected on denial of reh 460 Mich 1204 (1999).

2015“In order to have appellate standing, the party filing an appeal must be ‘aggrieved.’ ” Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637, 643 ; 753 NW2d 48 (2008).

2015“In order to have appellate standing, the party filing an appeal must be ‘aggrieved.’ ” Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637, 643 ; 753 NW2d 48 (2008).

2012The most obvious rule available to guide courts in exercising this discretion is MRE 403. 80 Emphasis added. 81 Browder v Int’l Fidelity Ins Co, 413 Mich 603, 612 ; 321 NW2d 668 (1982). 31 By contrast, MCL 768.27b contains no permissive language.

2012The most obvious rule available to guide courts in exercising this discretion is MRE 403. 80 Emphasis added. 81 Browder v Int’l Fidelity Ins Co, 413 Mich 603, 612 ; 321 NW2d 668 (1982). 31 By contrast, MCL 768.27b contains no permissive language.