obvious error in Maryland

2019Frey v. Comptroller , 422 Md. 111 , 187, 29 A.3d 475 , 519 (2011) (emphasis added).

2019The Court explained that, when the Tax Court reviews the Comptroller's decision declining to abate interest in an assessment, the court's review "is deferential to the tax collector's discretion[,]" and the court must consider whether "the [complaining] party has demonstrated with affirmative evidence that reasonable cause exists or that the tax collector's decision was an obvious error." Id. at 187, 29 A.3d 475 .

2001(Informant indicated that Lewis would travel to Tennessee for a “cook of PCP.” The police subsequently observed, among other things, Lewis keeping company with Jeff Malcolm, who had a prior Tennessee address and a history of PCP involvement.); see Potts, 300 Md. 567 , 479 A.2d 1335 (upholding search warrant based on a reliable informant’s tip and police corroboration); see also Herod v. State, 311 Md. 288, 295-96 , 534 A.2d 362 (1987) (discussing corroboration of informant’s tip); Shrout v. *334 State, 238 Md. 170 , 208 A.2d 585 (1965) (upholding search warrant based on tip of informant and po

2001(Informant indicated that Lewis would travel to Tennessee for a “cook of PCP.” The police subsequently observed, among other things, Lewis keeping company with Jeff Malcolm, who had a prior Tennessee address and a history of PCP involvement.); see Potts, 300 Md. 567 , 479 A.2d 1335 (upholding search warrant based on a reliable informant’s tip and police corroboration); see also Herod v. State, 311 Md. 288, 295-96 , 534 A.2d 362 (1987) (discussing corroboration of informant’s tip); Shrout v. *334 State, 238 Md. 170 , 208 A.2d 585 (1965) (upholding search warrant based on tip of informant and po

1976This requirement is founded upon an obvious principle of justice.” 114 Md. at 21 , 78 A. at 988 .

1976This requirement is founded upon an obvious principle of justice.” 114 Md. at 21 , 78 A. at 988 .

2017As the Court of Special Appeals noted: "The court reporter made an obvious error in transcription and wrote ‘un-executed incarceration' instead of ‘on executed incarceration.' All parties were in absolute agreement that the judge said ‘on executed incarceration,’ exactly as it was written in the formal Memorandum.” Ray v. State, 230 Md.App. 157 , 192 n.4, 146 A.3d 1157 , 1177 n.4 (2016). 2 .

2017As the Court of Special Appeals noted: "The court reporter made an obvious error in transcription and wrote ‘un-executed incarceration' instead of ‘on executed incarceration.' All parties were in absolute agreement that the judge said ‘on executed incarceration,’ exactly as it was written in the formal Memorandum.” Ray v. State, 230 Md.App. 157 , 192 n.4, 146 A.3d 1157 , 1177 n.4 (2016). 2 .

2006Dairy, Inc. v. Chenowith, 180 Md. 236, 244 , 23 A.2d 660, 665 (1942)); Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass’n Inc., 361 Md. 371, 394 , 761 A.2d 899, 911 (2000).” Id. at 127, 803 A.2d at 534 .

2006Dairy, Inc. v. Chenowith, 180 Md. 236, 244 , 23 A.2d 660, 665 (1942)); Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass'n Inc., 361 Md. 371, 394 , 761 A.2d 899, 911 (2000)." Id. at 127, 803 A.2d at 534 .

2004It is also a most obvious principle of justice, that no man ought to be bound by proceedings to which he was a stranger." Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. 72, 79 , 1862 WL 2345 , *5 (1862).

2004It is also a most obvious principle of justice, that no man ought to be bound by proceedings to which he was a stranger.” Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. 72, 79 , 1862 WL 2345 , *5 (1862).

2004Thus, in its most rigid form, “the mutuality requirement provided a party who had litigated and lost in a previous action an opportunity to relitigate identical issues with new parties.” Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327 , 99 S.Ct. at 649 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 559-560 .

2004Thus, in its most rigid form, “the mutuality requirement provided a party who had litigated and lost in a previous action an opportunity to relitigate identical issues with new parties.” Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327 , 99 S.Ct. at 649 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 559-560 .

2001When one of these factors was lacking, the others were stronger, so that probable cause could be determined by “the totality of the circumstances.” In Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 232 , 550 A.2d 670 (1988), the Court of Appeals emphasized that “every aspect of the informant’s detailed tip was corroborated prior to the search, with the obvious exception of the drug distribution.” Id.

2001When one of these factors was lacking, the others were stronger, so that probable cause could be determined by “the totality of the circumstances.” In Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 232 , 550 A.2d 670 (1988), the Court of Appeals emphasized that “every aspect of the informant’s detailed tip was corroborated prior to the search, with the obvious exception of the drug distribution.” Id.

2001The [trial] court properly struck the testimony and excluded any further surprise evidence from the paramedic on that subject.” “Maryland law is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy based on a party’s failure to abide by the rules of discovery.” Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34, 48 , 651 A.2d 908 (1994)(citing Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 398 , 456 A.2d 29 (1983)).

2001The [trial] court properly struck the testimony and excluded any further surprise evidence from the paramedic on that subject.” “Maryland law is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy based on a party’s failure to abide by the rules of discovery.” Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34, 48 , 651 A.2d 908 (1994)(citing Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 398 , 456 A.2d 29 (1983)).

2001The [trial] court properly struck the testimony and excluded any further surprise evidence from the paramedic on that subject.” “Maryland law is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy based on a party’s failure to abide by the rules of discovery.” Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34, 48 , 651 A.2d 908 (1994)(citing Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 398 , 456 A.2d 29 (1983)).

2001The [trial] court properly struck the testimony and excluded any further surprise evidence from the paramedic on that subject.” “Maryland law is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy based on a party’s failure to abide by the rules of discovery.” Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34, 48 , 651 A.2d 908 (1994)(citing Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 398 , 456 A.2d 29 (1983)).

1993Relying on Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354 , 478 A.2d 695 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 , 105 S.Ct. 1170 , 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985), Chapman argues that there was an obvious error on the face of the affidavit and, as such, it “cannot be said to have such indicia of reliability as would justify the abridgement of [his] right under the State and federal constitutions.” We disagree and reject his contention.

1993Relying on Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354 , 478 A.2d 695 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 , 105 S.Ct. 1170 , 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985), Chapman argues that there was an obvious error on the face of the affidavit and, as such, it “cannot be said to have such indicia of reliability as would justify the abridgement of [his] right under the State and federal constitutions.” We disagree and reject his contention.

1993Relying on Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354 , 478 A.2d 695 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 , 105 S.Ct. 1170 , 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985), Chapman argues that there was an obvious error on the face of the affidavit and, as such, it “cannot be said to have such indicia of reliability as would justify the abridgement of [his] right under the State and federal constitutions.” We disagree and reject his contention.

1993Relying on Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354 , 478 A.2d 695 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 , 105 S.Ct. 1170 , 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985), Chapman argues that there was an obvious error on the face of the affidavit and, as such, it “cannot be said to have such indicia of reliability as would justify the abridgement of [his] right under the State and federal constitutions.” We disagree and reject his contention.

1993Relying on Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354 , 478 A.2d 695 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 , 105 S.Ct. 1170 , 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985), Chapman argues that there was an obvious error on the face of the affidavit and, as such, it “cannot be said to have such indicia of reliability as would justify the abridgement of [his] right under the State and federal constitutions.” We disagree and reject his contention.

1992In Reynolds v. State, 219 Md. 319, 324 , 149 A.2d 774 (1959), the Court of Appeals was faced with an instructional error that did not fully define or explain the very offenses with which the defendant had been charged.

1992In Reynolds v. State, 219 Md. 319, 324 , 149 A.2d 774 (1959), the Court of Appeals was faced with an instructional error that did not fully define or explain the very offenses with which the defendant had been charged.

1991State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 218 , 411 A.2d 1035 (1980) (Smith, J. dissenting).

1991State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 218 , 411 A.2d 1035 (1980) (Smith, J. dissenting).

1983The final sentencing authority rests with the trial judge. [3] It is important to note that one of the three questions the sentencing jury in Texas must answer affirmatively before imposing the death penalty is "`whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.'" Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 458 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). [4] We pointed out in Bedford for the benefit of the generation of attorneys admitted to the bar in the last thirty years that it was long customary for counsel to

1983The final sentencing authority rests with the trial judge. [3] It is important to note that one of the three questions the sentencing jury in Texas must answer affirmatively before imposing the death penalty is "`whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.'" Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 458 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). [4] We pointed out in Bedford for the benefit of the generation of attorneys admitted to the bar in the last thirty years that it was long customary for counsel to