obvious error in Florida

1983Since the jurisdictional provision makes no distinction between the state's right to appeal and any other party litigant's, the state should enjoy the same rights as all others, with the obvious exception of the double jeopardy bar. [2] The court concluded, in W.A.M., supra, that although there have been changes in the constitution since the 1957 amendment relied on in Crownover, supra, [3] the state's constitutional right to appeal remains intact.

1983Since the jurisdictional provision makes no distinction between the state’s right to appeal and any other party litigant’s, the state should enjoy the same rights as all others, with the obvious exception of the double jeopardy bar. 2 The court concluded, in W.A.M., supra, that although there have been changes in the constitution since the 1957 amendment relied on in Crownover, supra, 3 the state’s constitutional right to appeal remains intact.

1983Since the jurisdictional provision makes no distinction between the state's right to appeal and any other party litigant's, the state should enjoy the same rights as all others, with the obvious exception of the double jeopardy bar. [2] The court concluded, in W.A.M., supra, that although there have been changes in the constitution since the 1957 amendment relied on in Crownover, supra, [3] the state's constitutional right to appeal remains intact.

1983Since the jurisdictional provision makes no distinction between the state’s right to appeal and any other party litigant’s, the state should enjoy the same rights as all others, with the obvious exception of the double jeopardy bar. 2 The court concluded, in W.A.M., supra, that although there have been changes in the constitution since the 1957 amendment relied on in Crownover, supra, 3 the state’s constitutional right to appeal remains intact.

1983Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments in favor of the state's right to appeal, the First District, in State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), held that the right of the state to appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case is entirely statutory in nature. [4] Accord State v. C.C., *788 (Fla. 3d DCA) (Case Nos. 81-2564, 82-666, 82-797, 82-1825, opinion filed March 24, 1983).

1983Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments in favor of the state’s right to appeal, the First District, in State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), held that the right of the state to appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case is entirely statutory in nature. 4 Accord State v. C.C., (Fla. 3d DCA) (Case Nos. 81-2564, 82-666, 82-797, 82-1825, opinion filed March 24, 1983).

2003Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 142 (Fla.2003); Blanco v. State, 849 So.2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Smith v. State, 842 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Nowells v. State, 840 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

2003Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 142 (Fla.2003); Blanco v. State, 849 So.2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Smith v. State, 842 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Nowells v. State, 840 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

2003Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 142 (Fla.2003); Blanco v. State, 849 So.2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Smith v. State, 842 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Nowells v. State, 840 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

2003Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 142 (Fla.2003); Blanco v. State, 849 So.2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Smith v. State, 842 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Nowells v. State, 840 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

2000In such a case the moving train is a more obvious warning to vehicles on the highway than a train standing across the road." Massey, 132 So.2d at 471 .

1997As Chief Judge Schwartz declared in reversing a murder conviction under identical circumstances in Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995): Our holding that overruling the attempted strike of Garcia was reversible error is essentially based upon the fact that there is no basis whatever for concluding that the challenge involved the evil proscribed by the Batson-Neil rule; that is, that it was based on a "constitutionally impermissible prejudice," State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), or racially motiv

1997As Chief Judge Schwartz declared in reversing a murder conviction under identical circumstances in Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995): Our holding that overruling the attempted strike of Garcia was reversible error is essentially based upon the fact that there is no basis whatever for concluding that the challenge involved the evil proscribed by the Batson-Neil rule; that is, that it was based on a "constitutionally impermissible prejudice," State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), or racially motiv

1997As Chief Judge Schwartz declared in reversing a murder conviction under identical circumstances in Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995): Our holding that overruling the attempted strike of Garcia was reversible error is essentially based upon the fact that there is no basis whatever for concluding that the challenge involved the evil proscribed by the Batson-Neil rule; that is, that it was based on a "constitutionally impermissible prejudice," State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), or racially motiv

1997As Chief Judge Schwartz declared in reversing a murder conviction under identical circumstances in Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995): Our holding that overruling the attempted strike of Garcia was reversible error is essentially based upon the fact that there is no basis whatever for concluding that the challenge involved the evil proscribed by the Batson-Neil rule; that is, that it was based on a "constitutionally impermissible prejudice," State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), or racially motiv

1989Smith v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania, 161 So.2d 903 (La.

1986In determining whether the error was harmful, we agreed with the court in Slinsky v. State, 232 So.2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), and reasoned: Any communication with the jury outside the presence of the prosecutor, the defendant, and defendant's counsel is so fraught with potential prejudice that it cannot be considered harmless.

1984The trial court, finding it was constrained to follow Randle and this court’s opinion in Carolina Casualty Co. v. General Truck Equipment & Trailer Sales, Inc., 407 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), applying Randle, denied relief.

1980This Court recently held in Armour v. Allen, 377 So.2d 798 (Fla.1st DCA 1979), that the enforcement of support judgments is equitable in nature and is not barred by the statute of limitations.

1974The State, in its petition for rehearing, makes no charge that we were wrong on the law or that there is *32 any argument that can be made in support of this judgment. ..." * * * * * * "If perchance the State's insistence on this technicality shall culminate in the reversal of our decision, Davis should file in this court a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to Baggett v. Wainwright, Fla. 1969, 229 So.2d 239 , seeking delayed appellate review.

1968Quattrocchi v. MacVicar, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 873, 874 ; City of Punta Gorda v. Morningstar, Fla. App. 1959, 110 So.2d 449, 454 . [2] Ibid. pp. 270 and 272. [3] Fla.App.3rd 1967, 200 So.2d 624, 626 . [4] Fla. 1965, 172 So.2d 820 . [5] Lawley v. Town of Golfview, Fla.App. 2nd 1965, 174 So.2d 767, 770 . [6] Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281 , 284: "`We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as applied to the factual situation meanwhile keeping before us the accepted rules that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the

1968Quattrocchi v. MacVicar, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 873, 874 ; City of Punta Gorda v. Morningstar, Fla. App. 1959, 110 So.2d 449, 454 . [2] Ibid. pp. 270 and 272. [3] Fla.App.3rd 1967, 200 So.2d 624, 626 . [4] Fla. 1965, 172 So.2d 820 . [5] Lawley v. Town of Golfview, Fla.App. 2nd 1965, 174 So.2d 767, 770 . [6] Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281 , 284: "`We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as applied to the factual situation meanwhile keeping before us the accepted rules that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the

1968Quattrocchi v. MacVicar, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 873, 874 ; City of Punta Gorda v. Morningstar, Fla. App. 1959, 110 So.2d 449, 454 . [2] Ibid. pp. 270 and 272. [3] Fla.App.3rd 1967, 200 So.2d 624, 626 . [4] Fla. 1965, 172 So.2d 820 . [5] Lawley v. Town of Golfview, Fla.App. 2nd 1965, 174 So.2d 767, 770 . [6] Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281 , 284: "`We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as applied to the factual situation meanwhile keeping before us the accepted rules that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the

1968Quattrocchi v. MacVicar, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 873, 874 ; City of Punta Gorda v. Morningstar, Fla. App. 1959, 110 So.2d 449, 454 . [2] Ibid. pp. 270 and 272. [3] Fla.App.3rd 1967, 200 So.2d 624, 626 . [4] Fla. 1965, 172 So.2d 820 . [5] Lawley v. Town of Golfview, Fla.App. 2nd 1965, 174 So.2d 767, 770 . [6] Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281 , 284: "`We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as applied to the factual situation meanwhile keeping before us the accepted rules that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the

1968Quattrocchi v. MacVicar, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 873, 874 ; City of Punta Gorda v. Morningstar, Fla. App. 1959, 110 So.2d 449, 454 . [2] Ibid. pp. 270 and 272. [3] Fla.App.3rd 1967, 200 So.2d 624, 626 . [4] Fla. 1965, 172 So.2d 820 . [5] Lawley v. Town of Golfview, Fla.App. 2nd 1965, 174 So.2d 767, 770 . [6] Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281 , 284: "`We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as applied to the factual situation meanwhile keeping before us the accepted rules that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the

1968Quattrocchi v. MacVicar, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 873, 874 ; City of Punta Gorda v. Morningstar, Fla. App. 1959, 110 So.2d 449, 454 . [2] Ibid. pp. 270 and 272. [3] Fla.App.3rd 1967, 200 So.2d 624, 626 . [4] Fla. 1965, 172 So.2d 820 . [5] Lawley v. Town of Golfview, Fla.App. 2nd 1965, 174 So.2d 767, 770 . [6] Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281 , 284: "`We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as applied to the factual situation meanwhile keeping before us the accepted rules that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the

1968Quattrocchi v. MacVicar, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 873, 874 ; City of Punta Gorda v. Morningstar, Fla. App. 1959, 110 So.2d 449, 454 . [2] Ibid. pp. 270 and 272. [3] Fla.App.3rd 1967, 200 So.2d 624, 626 . [4] Fla. 1965, 172 So.2d 820 . [5] Lawley v. Town of Golfview, Fla.App. 2nd 1965, 174 So.2d 767, 770 . [6] Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281 , 284: "`We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as applied to the factual situation meanwhile keeping before us the accepted rules that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the

1967Finally, I am not sure which principle set forth in Provus v. Provus, Fla. 1950, 44 So.2d 656, 657 , the trial judge is held to have violated, but if he did violate one, then this Court should follow the procedure followed in Provus and remand the cause with directions to the trial judge to arrive at a fee consistent with the general views expressed.