11 Nebraska opinions name it 3 courts 1902–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., Inc.green2 sentences2015See McLaughlin Freight Lines, supra. Our Supreme Court has stated that this element “‘is of course only another way of stat- ing an obvious principle of circumstantial evidence: that the event must be such that in the light of ordinary experience it gives rise to an inference that someone must have been negli- gent.’” Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., 240 Neb. 873, 880 , 485 N.W.2d 170, 175 (1992). [10] As a general rule, the mere occurrence of a fire, with resultant damage, does not raise a presumption of negligence, although the circumstances under which a fire occurs may sometimes be suc 2015See McLaughlin Freight Lines, supra. Our Supreme Court has stated that this element “‘is of course only another way of stat- ing an obvious principle of circumstantial evidence: that the event must be such that in the light of ordinary experience it gives rise to an inference that someone must have been negli- gent.’” Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., 240 Neb. 873, 880 , 485 N.W.2d 170, 175 (1992). [10] As a general rule, the mere occurrence of a fire, with resultant damage, does not raise a presumption of negligence, although the circumstances under which a fire occurs may sometimes be suc | 2 | 3 |
Swierczek v. Lynchgreen2 sentences2001Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., 240 Neb. 873, 880 , 485 N.W.2d 170, 175 (1992). “ ‘The essence of res ipsa loquitur is that the facts speak for themselves and lead to a proper inference of negligence by the fact finder without further proof.’ ” Swierczek v. Lynch, 237 Neb. 469, 477 , 466 N.W.2d 512, 517 (1991). 2001Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., 240 Neb. 873, 880 , 485 N.W.2d 170, 175 (1992). “ ‘The essence of res ipsa loquitur is that the facts speak for themselves and lead to a proper inference of negligence by the fact finder without further proof.’ ” Swierczek v. Lynch, 237 Neb. 469, 477 , 466 N.W.2d 512, 517 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
County of Douglas v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraskagreen2 sentences1983See, Douglas County v. Board of Regents , 210 Neb. 573 , 316 N.W.2d 62 (1982). 1983See, Douglas County v. Board of Regents , 210 Neb. 573 , 316 N.W.2d 62 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Burlen v. Shannongreen1 sentence1908See, also, Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200 , 96 Am. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hopkins v. Hopkins
green
1 sentence2016M ajority’s Overruling of Watkins Is Contrary to the Legislature’s Intent (a) Majority Misconstrues § 43-2933 as Creating Only One Presumption of Risk Applying Watkins here would avoid an interpretative incon- sistency and a conflict with rule 301 by giving effect to the obvious requirement in § 43-2933 that someone produce evi- dence to support a court’s finding of “no significant risk.” But Watkins also presents a serious obstacle to the result that the majority wants to reach: i.e., that § 43-2933(1)(c) creates - 447 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports HOPKINS v. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Pettijohn v. State
neutral
1 sentence1979The concurring opinion in Banks, which is extensively quoted in the majority opinion in Pettijohn v. State, ante p. 271, 281 N. W. 2d 901 , reflected the traditional assumption that the value of “improvements” to the school lands at the time of termination of the lease would be less than the original cost of the “improvements.” Obviously that assumption is not always valid. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Hinkson v. Lorenzo Independent School Dist.
neutral
1 sentence1956App.), 109 S. W. 2d 1008 , it is said: “ ‘The general rule is that an attack of the character here made by appellant upon assessment valuations made by a board *631 of equalization cannot be justified in the absence of allegations and proof of fraud, or something equivalent thereto, such as lack of jurisdiction, an obvious violation of the law, or the adoption of a principle or method of establishing valuations or making assessments that is fundamentally wrong and which results in a substantial injury to the complainant. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Hanson v. Hanson
neutral
2 sentences1942This court in Hanson v. Hanson, 64 Neb. 506 , 90 N. W. 208 , said: “It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis upon which it stands, on the obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion.” This court has also held: “Where a judgment is necessarily based on certain premises, such premises are equally conclusive, in a subsequent action between the same parties, as the judgment itself.” Shelby v. Creighton, 65 Neb. 485 , 91 N. W. 369 . 1942This court in Hanson v. Hanson, 64 Neb. 506 , 90 N. W. 208 , said: “It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis upon which it stands, on the obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion.” This court has also held: “Where a judgment is necessarily based on certain premises, such premises are equally conclusive, in a subsequent action between the same parties, as the judgment itself.” Shelby v. Creighton, 65 Neb. 485 , 91 N. W. 369 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Shelby v. Creighton
neutral
2 sentences1942This court in Hanson v. Hanson, 64 Neb. 506 , 90 N. W. 208 , said: “It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis upon which it stands, on the obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion.” This court has also held: “Where a judgment is necessarily based on certain premises, such premises are equally conclusive, in a subsequent action between the same parties, as the judgment itself.” Shelby v. Creighton, 65 Neb. 485 , 91 N. W. 369 . 1942This court in Hanson v. Hanson, 64 Neb. 506 , 90 N. W. 208 , said: “It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis upon which it stands, on the obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion.” This court has also held: “Where a judgment is necessarily based on certain premises, such premises are equally conclusive, in a subsequent action between the same parties, as the judgment itself.” Shelby v. Creighton, 65 Neb. 485 , 91 N. W. 369 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Sanderson v. Huffman
neutral
2 sentences1941It is well-settled law that, “Instructions which state conflicting propositions of law and tend to confuse the jury are erroneous.” Bryant v. Modern Woodmen of America, 86 Neb. 372 , 125 N. W. 621 ; Sanderson v. Huffman, 132 Neb. 321 , 271 N. W. 870 . 1941It is well-settled law that, “Instructions which state conflicting propositions of law and tend to confuse the jury are erroneous.” Bryant v. Modern Woodmen of America, 86 Neb. 372 , 125 N. W. 621 ; Sanderson v. Huffman, 132 Neb. 321 , 271 N. W. 870 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Bryant v. Modern Woodmen of America
green
2 sentences1941It is well-settled law that, “Instructions which state conflicting propositions of law and tend to confuse the jury are erroneous.” Bryant v. Modern Woodmen of America, 86 Neb. 372 , 125 N. W. 621 ; Sanderson v. Huffman, 132 Neb. 321 , 271 N. W. 870 . 1941It is well-settled law that, “Instructions which state conflicting propositions of law and tend to confuse the jury are erroneous.” Bryant v. Modern Woodmen of America, 86 Neb. 372 , 125 N. W. 621 ; Sanderson v. Huffman, 132 Neb. 321 , 271 N. W. 870 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Lombard v. Lombard
neutral
1 sentence1902Lindsay v. Lindsay, 47 Ind., 283 ; Lombard v. Lombard, 57 Miss., 171 ; Reed v. Ownby, 44 Mo., 204 ; Kearny v. Buttles, 1 Ohio St., 362 . | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Reed v. Ownby
neutral
1 sentence1902Lindsay v. Lindsay, 47 Ind., 283 ; Lombard v. Lombard, 57 Miss., 171 ; Reed v. Ownby, 44 Mo., 204 ; Kearny v. Buttles, 1 Ohio St., 362 . | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Lindsay v. Lindsay
green
1 sentence1902Lindsay v. Lindsay, 47 Ind., 283 ; Lombard v. Lombard, 57 Miss., 171 ; Reed v. Ownby, 44 Mo., 204 ; Kearny v. Buttles, 1 Ohio St., 362 . | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.