obvious error in Washington

2021A court also acts illegally when it “‘has committed an obvious error that would render further proceedings useless’” or “‘has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of revisory jurisdiction by an appellant court.’” Id. (quoting Holifield, 170 Wn.2d at 244-45 ).

2012The county’s brief remained within the scope of our questions. 2 The statute reads “justice’s courts,” but this term has since been replaced by the term “district courts.” RCW 3.30.015 (“All references to justice courts ... in other titles of the Revised Code of Washington shall be construed as meaning district courts.”). 3 Our Supreme Court has recently defined “acted illegally” in this context to mean “when that tribunal, board, or officer (1) has committed an obvious error that would render further proceedings useless; (2) has committed probable error and the decision substantially alters t

2021App. 127, 135-36 , 382 P.3d 710 (2016) (citing State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 , 99- 100, 217 P.3d 756 (2009)); State v. Ramirez, 5 Wn.

2021App. 127, 135-36 , 382 P.3d 710 (2016) (citing State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 , 99- 100, 217 P.3d 756 (2009)); State v. Ramirez, 5 Wn.

2021App. 127, 135-36 , 382 P.3d 710 (2016) (citing State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 , 99- 100, 217 P.3d 756 (2009)); State v. Ramirez, 5 Wn.

2021App. 127, 135-36 , 382 P.3d 710 (2016) (citing State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 , 99- 100, 217 P.3d 756 (2009)); State v. Ramirez, 5 Wn.

2017State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220,231 , 95 P.3d 1225 (2004) (holding that "[t]o invoke the waiver analysis set forth in Goodwin, a defendant must first show on appeal ... that an error of fact or law exists within the four comers of his judgment and sentence"); Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 927-28 (requiring the defendant to show an obvious error of fact 5 No. 34038-4-111 State v. Jones or law within the four comers of the sentence); cf State v. Wilson, 170 Wn.2d 682 , 690 n.4, 244 P .3d 950 (2010) (indicating that the defendant is required to establish that an error in fact occurred, regardless of whether

2016In State v. Ross, a unanimous Supreme Court explained that “Goodwin turned on the fact that defendant’s sentence contained obvious errors,” and that “[t]o invoke the waiver analysis set forth in Goodwin, a defendant must [either] show on appeal or by way of a personal restraint petition that an error of fact or law exists within the four corners of his judgment and sentence.” 152 Wn.2d 220, 231 , 95 P.3d 1225 (2004) (emphasis added); accord Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 927-28 (citing Ross, 152 Wn.2d at 232 , and adding that “[s]ince neither defendant could show ... an obvious error in his sentence, i

2017State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220,231 , 95 P.3d 1225 (2004) (holding that "[t]o invoke the waiver analysis set forth in Goodwin, a defendant must first show on appeal ... that an error of fact or law exists within the four comers of his judgment and sentence"); Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 927-28 (requiring the defendant to show an obvious error of fact 5 No. 34038-4-111 State v. Jones or law within the four comers of the sentence); cf State v. Wilson, 170 Wn.2d 682 , 690 n.4, 244 P .3d 950 (2010) (indicating that the defendant is required to establish that an error in fact occurred, regardless of whether

2016In State v. Ross, a unanimous Supreme Court explained that “Goodwin turned on the fact that defendant’s sentence contained obvious errors,” and that “[t]o invoke the waiver analysis set forth in Goodwin, a defendant must [either] show on appeal or by way of a personal restraint petition that an error of fact or law exists within the four corners of his judgment and sentence.” 152 Wn.2d 220, 231 , 95 P.3d 1225 (2004) (emphasis added); accord Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 927-28 (citing Ross, 152 Wn.2d at 232 , and adding that “[s]ince neither defendant could show ... an obvious error in his sentence, i

2010After all, "the only method of review of interlocutory decisions in courts of limited jurisdiction is still the statutory writ." Williams, 101 Wash.2d at 455 , 680 P.2d 1051 . ¶ 29 We hold that, for purposes of RCW 7.16.040, an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, acts illegally when that tribunal, board, or officer (1) has committed an obvious error that would render further proceedings useless; (2) has committed probable error and the decision substantially alters the status quo or substantially *1169 limits the freedom of a party to act; or (3) has so far depa

2010After all, “the only method of review of interlocutory decisions in courts of limited jurisdiction is still the statutory writ.” Williams, 101 Wn.2d at 455 . ¶29 We hold that, for purposes of RCW 7.16.040, an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, acts illegally when that tribunal, board, or officer (1) has committed an obvious error that would render further proceedings useless; (2) has committed probable error and the decision substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; or (3) has so far departed from the accepted a

2009Id. at 232, 95 P.3d 1225 . ¶ 28 Finally, in State v. Bergstrom , we remanded for resentencing where the lower court erroneously relieved the State of its burden to establish the defendant's criminal history. 162 Wash.2d 87, 89 , 169 P.3d 816 (2007).

2009Id. at 232. ¶28 Finally, in State v. Bergstrom, we remanded for resentencing where the lower court erroneously relieved the State of its burden to establish the defendant’s criminal history. 162 Wn.2d 87, 89 , 169 P.3d 816 (2007).

2009Id. at 232, 95 P.3d 1225 . ¶ 28 Finally, in State v. Bergstrom , we remanded for resentencing where the lower court erroneously relieved the State of its burden to establish the defendant's criminal history. 162 Wash.2d 87, 89 , 169 P.3d 816 (2007).

2009Id. at 232. ¶28 Finally, in State v. Bergstrom, we remanded for resentencing where the lower court erroneously relieved the State of its burden to establish the defendant’s criminal history. 162 Wn.2d 87, 89 , 169 P.3d 816 (2007).

1999See Opp'n to State's Mot. to Redesignate at 1 (stating that "the state may be correct in arguing that the proper method of seeking review of the trial court's recommitment decision is not by direct appeal"). [10] RAP 2.3(b) provides that "discretionary review will be accepted only: "(1) If the superior court has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; "(2) If the superior court has committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; or "(3) If the superior c

1999See Opp'n to State's Mot. to Redesignate at 1 (stating that "the state may be correct in arguing that the proper method of seeking review of the trial court's recommitment decision is not by direct appeal"). [10] RAP 2.3(b) provides that "discretionary review will be accepted only: "(1) If the superior court has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; "(2) If the superior court has committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; or "(3) If the superior c

1991RAP 2.3(b)(1); Sea-Pac Co. v. United Food & Comm'l Workers Local Union 44, 103 Wn.2d 800, 802 , 699 P.2d 217 (1985).

1991RAP 2.3(b)(1); Sea-Pac Co. v. United Food & Comm'l Workers Local Union 44, 103 Wn.2d 800, 802 , 699 P.2d 217 (1985).

2026RAP 2.3(b) allows for discretionary review (1) where “[t]he superior court has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless,” or (2) where “[t]he superior court has committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act.” Citing Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484 , 834 P.2d 6 (1992), 7 No. 40833-7-III Sanger v. MNM Entertainment the Sangers argue we should grant discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(1) because the trial court committed an obvious err

2026RAP 2.3(b) allows for discretionary review (1) where “[t]he superior court has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless,” or (2) where “[t]he superior court has committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act.” Citing Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484 , 834 P.2d 6 (1992), 7 No. 40833-7-III Sanger v. MNM Entertainment the Sangers argue we should grant discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(1) because the trial court committed an obvious err

2021These standards are not alleged here. 7 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2021These standards are not alleged here. 7 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2021Division Two of this court addressed a similar argument in State v. Kalebaugh, 179 Wn.

2020This court will grant discretionary review only in four narrow circumstances set forth in RAP 2.3(b): (1) The superior court has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; (2) The superior court has committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; (3) The superior court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by an inferior court or administrative agency, as to call for review by t

2020App. at 201 . 11 Howland, 180 Wn.

2019We are not aware of a Washington court that has reviewed denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, and Snohomish does not call such a case to our attention “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” DeHeer v. Seattle Post-lntelliqencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126 , 372 P.2d 193 (1962).

2019We are not aware of a Washington court that has reviewed denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, and Snohomish does not call such a case to our attention “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” DeHeer v. Seattle Post-lntelliqencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126 , 372 P.2d 193 (1962).

2019Bd., 43 Wn.

2018Id. at 16 n.3.

2018App. 1983) (momentary separation, and it appeared no one had talked to jurors about the case); and that a discharged jury can be reassembled to correct what is an obvious error in form, 14 A.L.R.5th, § 10 at 137-41; e.g., Serio v. City of Brookhaven, 208 Miss. 620 , 45 So. 2d 257 (1950) (original verdict form contained a textual error corrected in second form).

2018App. 1983) (momentary separation, and it appeared no one had talked to jurors about the case); and that a discharged jury can be reassembled to correct what is an obvious error in form, 14 A.L.R.5th, § 10 at 137-41; e.g., Serio v. City of Brookhaven, 208 Miss. 620 , 45 So. 2d 257 (1950) (original verdict form contained a textual error corrected in second form).

2018Finally, a 2016 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dietz v. Bouldin, which recognized the inherent authority of federal courts to rescind a discharge order and recall a jury in a civil case,8 also recognized and rejected outdated common law. 8 The Supreme Court observed that “[g]iven additional concerns in criminal cases, such as attachment of the double jeopardy bar, we do not address here whether it would be appropriate to recall a jury after discharge in a criminal case.” Dietz v. Bouldin, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 , 195 L.

2018Finally, a 2016 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dietz v. Bouldin, which recognized the inherent authority of federal courts to rescind a discharge order and recall a jury in a civil case,8 also recognized and rejected outdated common law. 8 The Supreme Court observed that “[g]iven additional concerns in criminal cases, such as attachment of the double jeopardy bar, we do not address here whether it would be appropriate to recall a jury after discharge in a criminal case.” Dietz v. Bouldin, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 , 195 L.

2017For this court to decide to review it under RAP 2.5(a), Cheng must also show the error was "manifest." This "requires a showing of actual prejudice," meaning "the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial.'"40 This court recently held, in response to an identical challenge in State v. Hood, [T]he error he alleges was not manifest, i.e., it was not an obvious error that the trial court would be expected to correct even without 40 State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting State v. VVVVJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595

2017For this court to decide to review it under RAP 2.5(a), Cheng must also show the error was "manifest." This "requires a showing of actual prejudice," meaning "the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial.'"40 This court recently held, in response to an identical challenge in State v. Hood, [T]he error he alleges was not manifest, i.e., it was not an obvious error that the trial court would be expected to correct even without 40 State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting State v. VVVVJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595

2017For this court to decide to review it under RAP 2.5(a), Cheng must also show the error was "manifest." This "requires a showing of actual prejudice," meaning "the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial.'"40 This court recently held, in response to an identical challenge in State v. Hood, [T]he error he alleges was not manifest, i.e., it was not an obvious error that the trial court would be expected to correct even without 40 State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting State v. VVVVJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595

2017For this court to decide to review it under RAP 2.5(a), Cheng must also show the error was "manifest." This "requires a showing of actual prejudice," meaning "the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial.'"40 This court recently held, in response to an identical challenge in State v. Hood, [T]he error he alleges was not manifest, i.e., it was not an obvious error that the trial court would be expected to correct even without 40 State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935 , 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting State v. VVVVJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595

2016In State v. Ross, a unanimous Supreme Court explained that “Goodwin turned on the fact that defendant’s sentence contained obvious errors,” and that “[t]o invoke the waiver analysis set forth in Goodwin, a defendant must [either] show on appeal or by way of a personal restraint petition that an error of fact or law exists within the four corners of his judgment and sentence.” 152 Wn.2d 220, 231 , 95 P.3d 1225 (2004) (emphasis added); accord Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 927-28 (citing Ross, 152 Wn.2d at 232 , and adding that “[s]ince neither defendant could show ... an obvious error in his sentence, i