obvious error in Texas

2022Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. 2018) (citing Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011)). “[U]nambiguous statutes are the current law and should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word . . . or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result.” Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted).

2014Under the plain meaning rule, we begin with the text of the statute, and we must determine the legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the words chosen “unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result.” Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999) (internal citations omitted); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 2013); Fresh Coat, Inc:, 318 S.W.3d at 901 ; Comyn v. Universe Life Ins.

2013However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined such unassigned error as “a claim that was preserved in the trial below but was not raised on appeal,” and it has noted that “many, if not most, of the types of error that would prompt sua sponte appellate attention need not be assigned because the error involved constitutes an obvious violation of established rules.” See Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Tex. Crim.

2012An appellate court raising on its own a novel point of error not briefed by the parties should first afford the parties an opportunity to brief the issue, although "[w]e recognize that many, if not most, of the types of error that would prompt sua sponte appellate attention need not be assigned because the error involved constitutes an obvious violation of established rules." Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 136-38 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). [17] Carter, 656 S.W.2d at 468 (quoting The Republic v. Smith, Dallam 407 (Tex.1841)). [18] 119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). [19] Id. at 807 . [20] Id. at 806

2009Trades Council, 149 Tex. 457 , 234 S.W.2d 857, 863 (1950); Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999) (“These specific, unambiguous statutes are the current law and should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word, see City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 , 428 n. 1 (Tex.1998), or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result, see id. (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-J

2009Trades Council, 149 Tex. 457 , 234 S.W.2d 857, 863 (1950); Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) ("These specific, unambiguous statutes are the current law and should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word, see City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 , 428 n. 1 (Tex. 1998), or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result, see id. (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn

2009Trades Council, 149 Tex. 457 , 234 S.W.2d 857, 863 (1950); Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999) (“These specific, unambiguous statutes are the current law and should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word, see City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 , 428 n. 1 (Tex.1998), or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result, see id. (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-J

2009Trades Council, 149 Tex. 457 , 234 S.W.2d 857, 863 (1950); Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999) (“These specific, unambiguous statutes are the current law and should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word, see City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 , 428 n. 1 (Tex.1998), or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result, see id. (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-J

2016The State’s perception of prejudice hangs on the difficulty of re-trying Mr. Talamantes if this conviction were overturned.4 1 Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) 2Id. at 215 “We reaffirm Carrio’s holding…alter[ing it]…only to the extent that we now apply Texas common law, rather than the federal standard to define the parameters of the doctrine of laches in Texas habeas corpus cases.” 3 Id. at 219 4 State’s Brief, pp. 13-17 !4 The State stipulated that the arresting officer was still with the Austin Police department,5 and the obvious presumption is that he would be avail

2016The State’s perception of prejudice hangs on the difficulty of re-trying Mr. Talamantes if this conviction were overturned.4 1 Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) 2Id. at 215 “We reaffirm Carrio’s holding…alter[ing it]…only to the extent that we now apply Texas common law, rather than the federal standard to define the parameters of the doctrine of laches in Texas habeas corpus cases.” 3 Id. at 219 4 State’s Brief, pp. 13-17 !4 The State stipulated that the arresting officer was still with the Austin Police department,5 and the obvious presumption is that he would be avail

2008See In re Canales , 52 S.W.3d 698 , 702 (Tex. 2001); see also Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander , 6 S.W.3d 278 , 284 (Tex. 1999) (stating that a court should not construe a "specific, unambiguous" statute "to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word . or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result" (citing City of Amarillo v. Martin , 971 S.W.2d 426 , 428 n. 1 (Tex. 1998)).

2008See In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. 2001); see also Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (stating that a court should not construe a "specific, unambiguous" statute "to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word ... or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result" (citing City ofAmarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 ,428 n.l (Tex. 1998)).

2004See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22 , 25 (Tex. 2003) ("If a statute's meaning is unambiguous, we generally interpret the statute according to its plain meaning."); Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander , 6 S.W.3d 278 , 284 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted) (unambiguous statutes "should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word, or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result"); Wolfe v. Sta

2004See City of San Antonio v. City ofBoerne, 111 S.W.3d 22,25 (Tex. 2003) (“If a statute’s meaning is unambiguous, we generally interpret the statute according to its plain meaning.“); Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted) (unambiguous statutes “should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word, or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result”); Wolfe v. State, 12

2004See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22 , 25 (Tex. 2003) ("If a statute's meaning is unambiguous, we generally interpret the statute according to its plain meaning."); Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander , 6 S.W.3d 278 , 284 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted) (unambiguous statutes "should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word, or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result"); Wolfe v. Sta

2004See City of San Antonio v. City ofBoerne, 111 S.W.3d 22,25 (Tex. 2003) (“If a statute’s meaning is unambiguous, we generally interpret the statute according to its plain meaning.“); Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted) (unambiguous statutes “should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word, or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result”); Wolfe v. State, 12

1979It has been noted in Druesdow v. Baker, 229 S.W. 493, 495 (Tex.Comm’n App.1921, opinion adopted), aff’d, 263 U.S. 137 , 44 S.Ct. 460 , 68 L.Ed. 212 (1923), that decisions of the Tax Board are quasi-judicial in nature and a collateral attack cannot be justified in the absence of fraud, or something equivalent, such as lack of jurisdiction, an obvious violation of the law, or the adoption of a fundamentally wrong princi- pie or method which substantially injures the complainant.

1960Druesdow v. Baker, Tex.Com.App., 229 S.W. 493 ; Doneghy v. State, Tex.Civ.

2013Bison, — S.W.3d at -, 2012 WL 3870493, at *4 (discussing Werline, 307 S.W.3d at 270-71 ).

2012We also reasoned that a limited rehearing to correct a problem — such as an instance in which “an arbitration award is unclear or incomplete or contains an obvious error”— is not a final decision on the issue “but merely a deferral of final ruling until the arbitration was complete.” Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added).

2008Bd. of Adjustment v. Wende , 92 S.W.3d 424 , 430 (Tex. 2002); see also Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander , 6 S.W.3d 278 , 284 (Tex. 1999) (stating that statutes should not be construed to mean something other than what their plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one or if construing a statute according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result); State v. Cowsert , 207 S.W.3d 347 , 350 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (stating that a court focuses attention on a statute's literal text and tries to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the *Pa

2008Bd. ofAdjustment v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424,430 (Tex. 2002); see also Fleming Foods ofTex. , Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (stating that statutes should not be construed to mean something other than what their plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one or if construing a statute according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result); State v. Cowsert, 207 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. Crim.

2008Bd. of Adjustment v. Wende , 92 S.W.3d 424 , 430 (Tex. 2002); see also Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander , 6 S.W.3d 278 , 284 (Tex. 1999) (stating that statutes should not be construed to mean something other than what their plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one or if construing a statute according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result); State v. Cowsert , 207 S.W.3d 347 , 350 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (stating that a court focuses attention on a statute's literal text and tries to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the *Pa

2008Bd. ofAdjustment v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424,430 (Tex. 2002); see also Fleming Foods ofTex. , Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (stating that statutes should not be construed to mean something other than what their plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one or if construing a statute according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result); State v. Cowsert, 207 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. Crim.

2008Bd. of Adjustment v. Wende , 92 S.W.3d 424 , 430 (Tex. 2002); see also Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander , 6 S.W.3d 278 , 284 (Tex. 1999) (stating that statutes should not be construed to mean something other than what their plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one or if construing a statute according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result); State v. Cowsert , 207 S.W.3d 347 , 350 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (stating that a court focuses attention on a statute's literal text and tries to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the *Pa

2008App. 2006) (stating that a court focuses attention on a statute's literal text and tries to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the The Honorable Jeff Wentworth - Page 5 (GA-0622) time of its enactment) (citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim.

2022With respect to ambiguity, “[i]f an agency’s construction of an ambiguous statute it is charged with administering is reasonable . . . it is improper for a court to overturn that interpretation.” Railroad Comm’n v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 624-25 (Tex. 2011).

2022Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. 2018) (citing Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011)). “[U]nambiguous statutes are the current law and should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word . . . or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result.” Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted).

2022Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. 2018) (citing Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011)). “[U]nambiguous statutes are the current law and should not be construed by a court to mean something other than the plain words say unless there is an obvious error such as a typographical one that resulted in the omission of a word . . . or application of the literal language of a legislative enactment would produce an absurd result.” Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted).

2015Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim.

2014Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 378-79 (TexApp.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).

2014In State v. Mercado, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated the obvious principle of fairness, “Ordinary notions of procedural default should apply equally to the defendant and the State.” 15 Further, as Judge Cochran has explained, “The purpose of the contemporaneous-objection rule is to provide both the trial judge and the opposing party an opportunity to avoid or correct 15 972 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim.

2013Bison, — S.W.3d at -, 2012 WL 3870493, at *4 (discussing Werline, 307 S.W.3d at 270-71 ).

2012PROC. art. 44.01(d). [26] Id. art. 44.01(e). [27] Id. art. 44.01(f). [28] The State cannot, under Article 44.01(c), appeal any legal ruling that is not encompassed within the "judgment" that the defendant is appealing. [29] 805 S.W.2d 791, 793-94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (holding that State could raise a "cross appeal" on the legal question of whether the defendant's prior conviction used for enhancement was "void" as the trial judge had ruled, but concluding that the State was not entitled to have that issue resolved because the defendant did not prevail on appeal; because the defendant's convict

2012An appellate court raising on its own a novel point of error not briefed by the parties should first afford the parties an opportunity to brief the issue, although "[w]e recognize that many, if not most, of the types of error that would prompt sua sponte appellate attention need not be assigned because the error involved constitutes an obvious violation of established rules." Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 136-38 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). [17] Carter, 656 S.W.2d at 468 (quoting The Republic v. Smith, Dallam 407 (Tex.1841)). [18] 119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). [19] Id. at 807 . [20] Id. at 806

2012PROC. art. 44.01(d). [26] Id. art. 44.01(e). [27] Id. art. 44.01(f). [28] The State cannot, under Article 44.01(c), appeal any legal ruling that is not encompassed within the "judgment" that the defendant is appealing. [29] 805 S.W.2d 791, 793-94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (holding that State could raise a "cross appeal" on the legal question of whether the defendant's prior conviction used for enhancement was "void" as the trial judge had ruled, but concluding that the State was not entitled to have that issue resolved because the defendant did not prevail on appeal; because the defendant's convict

2012An appellate court raising on its own a novel point of error not briefed by the parties should first afford the parties an opportunity to brief the issue, although "[w]e recognize that many, if not most, of the types of error that would prompt sua sponte appellate attention need not be assigned because the error involved constitutes an obvious violation of established rules." Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 136-38 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). [17] Carter, 656 S.W.2d at 468 (quoting The Republic v. Smith, Dallam 407 (Tex.1841)). [18] 119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). [19] Id. at 807 . [20] Id. at 806

2012An appellate court raising on its own a novel point of error not briefed by the parties should first afford the parties an opportunity to brief the issue, although "[w]e recognize that many, if not most, of the types of error that would prompt sua sponte appellate attention need not be assigned because the error involved constitutes an obvious violation of established rules." Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 136-38 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). [17] Carter, 656 S.W.2d at 468 (quoting The Republic v. Smith, Dallam 407 (Tex.1841)). [18] 119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). [19] Id. at 807 . [20] Id. at 806