McDonnell Douglas framework in Tennessee

2017Further, our appellate courts have interpreted that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Rye essentially and indirectly abrogated the Court’s prior holding in Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), that had previously discarded the McDonnell Douglas framework for employment discrimination and retaliation causes of action in Tennessee.

2017Further, our appellate courts have interpreted that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Rye essentially and indirectly abrogated the Court’s prior holding in Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), that had previously discarded the McDonnell Douglas framework for employment discrimination and retaliation causes of action in Tennessee.

2012In Gossett , the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) burden-shifting analysis is not applicable to a claim for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Human Rights Act at the summary judgment stage “because it is incompatible with Tennessee summary judgment jurisprudence.” 3 Gossett, 320 *220 S.W.3d at 779; see also id. at 782 (reviewing the continued viability of the McDonnell Douglas standard in light of Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn.2008)).

2012In Gossett , the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) burden-shifting analysis is not applicable to a claim for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Human Rights Act at the summary judgment stage “because it is incompatible with Tennessee summary judgment jurisprudence.” 3 Gossett, 320 *220 S.W.3d at 779; see also id. at 782 (reviewing the continued viability of the McDonnell Douglas standard in light of Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn.2008)).

2014In Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Authority, 343 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tenn. 2011), the Supreme Court stated as follows regarding the summary judgment standard as applied to -6- retaliatory discharge cases that accrued before June 10, 2011: In the recent cases of Kinsler [v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796 (Tenn. 2010)] and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), this Court held that the Hannan summary judgment analysis is to be applied in retaliatory discharge actions in the same way as in other cases, and rejected the federal McDonnell Douglas framework of allocation of burdens and

2014In Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Authority, 343 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tenn. 2011), the Supreme Court stated as follows regarding the summary judgment standard as applied to retaliatory discharge cases: In the recent cases of Kinsler [v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796 (Tenn. 2010)] and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), this Court held that the Hannan summary judgment analysis is to be applied in retaliatory discharge actions in the same way as in other cases, and rejected the federal McDonnell Douglas framework of allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof of each

2015Accordingly, “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents *435 direct evidence of discrimination.” Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613 .

2015Accordingly, “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents *435 direct evidence of discrimination.” Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613 .

2014In Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Authority, 343 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tenn. 2011), the Supreme Court stated as follows regarding the summary judgment standard as applied to -6- retaliatory discharge cases that accrued before June 10, 2011: In the recent cases of Kinsler [v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796 (Tenn. 2010)] and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), this Court held that the Hannan summary judgment analysis is to be applied in retaliatory discharge actions in the same way as in other cases, and rejected the federal McDonnell Douglas framework of allocation of burdens and

2014In Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Authority, 343 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tenn. 2011), the Supreme Court stated as follows regarding the summary judgment standard as applied to retaliatory discharge cases: In the recent cases of Kinsler [v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796 (Tenn. 2010)] and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), this Court held that the Hannan summary judgment analysis is to be applied in retaliatory discharge actions in the same way as in other cases, and rejected the federal McDonnell Douglas framework of allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof of each

2002Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court explained the burden shift: The McDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case - i.e. the burden of “producing evidence” that the adverse employment actions were taken “for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” “The defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,” reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the

2002Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court explained the burden shift: The McDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case - i.e. the burden of “producing evidence” that the adverse employment actions were taken “for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” “The defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,” reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the

2001If the employer meets the burden of articulation, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason proffered by the employer was not its true reason but merely a pretext for discrimination. 6 W e note that, although the basic McDonnell Douglas framework applies to the case at bar, in the context of a suit alleging failure to promote based upon age discrimination, a plaintiff would have to show that the employee who received th e promo tion was youn ger than the p laintiff. -7- A plaintiff can prove pretext "by showing that the Company's r

2001If the employer meets the burden of articulation, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason proffered by the employer was not its true reason but merely a pretext for discrimination. 6 W e note that, although the basic McDonnell Douglas framework applies to the case at bar, in the context of a suit alleging failure to promote based upon age discrimination, a plaintiff would have to show that the employee who received th e promo tion was youn ger than the p laintiff. -7- A plaintiff can prove pretext "by showing that the Company's r

2016Williams, 465 S.W.3d at 113 n.15. 7 In Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tenn. 2011) and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the summary judgment analysis is (continued…) -6- At the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff employee bears the burden of presenting evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.

2016Williams, 465 S.W.3d at 113 n.15. 7 In Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tenn. 2011) and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the summary judgment analysis is (continued…) -6- At the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff employee bears the burden of presenting evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.

2017See Barnes, 48 S.W.3d at 698; Yount v. FedEx Express, No. W2015-00389-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1056958 , at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Mar. 17, 2016) (“in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Rye to overrule Hannan, we conclude that the McDonnell Douglas framework once again applies in Tennessee to analyze discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage.”).

2017See Barnes, 48 S.W.3d at 698; Yount v. FedEx Express, No. W2015-00389-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1056958 , at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Mar. 17, 2016) (“in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Rye to overrule Hannan, we conclude that the McDonnell Douglas framework once again applies in Tennessee to analyze discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage.”).

2010See e.g., Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir.2007) (Hartz, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe that we should not apply the framework of McDonnell Douglas ... to review a summary judgment when the existence of a prima facie case is not disputed....

2010See e.g., Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir.2007) (Hartz, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe that we should not apply the framework of McDonnell Douglas ... to review a summary judgment when the existence of a prima facie case is not disputed....

2010We then stated that her employer “is entitled to summary judgment if it can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Allen and if Allen is unable to present evidence that raises a genuine dispute over whether the proffered reason is pretextual.” Id. (citing Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.2006)).

2010We then stated that her employer “is entitled to summary judgment if it can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Allen and if Allen is unable to present evidence that raises a genuine dispute over whether the proffered reason is pretextual.” Id. (citing Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.2006)).

2010Applying that framework is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority, adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis, and is too likely to cause us to reach a result contrary to what we would decide if we focused on 'the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.' ” (citations omitted)); Wright v. Mmray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 716-21 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., concurring) (concluding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is "ill suited to the analysis of mixed-motive claims” at summary judgment and stating that "[ijnquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer’s decision are very fac

2010Applying that framework is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority, adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis, and is too likely to cause us to reach a result contrary to what we would decide if we focused on 'the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.' ” (citations omitted)); Wright v. Mmray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 716-21 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., concurring) (concluding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is "ill suited to the analysis of mixed-motive claims” at summary judgment and stating that "[ijnquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer’s decision are very fac

2010Applying that framework is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority, adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis, and is too likely to cause us to reach a result contrary to what we would decide if we focused on 'the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.' ” (citations omitted)); Wright v. Mmray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 716-21 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., concurring) (concluding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is "ill suited to the analysis of mixed-motive claims” at summary judgment and stating that "[ijnquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer’s decision are very fac

2010Applying that framework is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority, adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis, and is too likely to cause us to reach a result contrary to what we would decide if we focused on 'the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.' ” (citations omitted)); Wright v. Mmray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 716-21 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., concurring) (concluding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is "ill suited to the analysis of mixed-motive claims” at summary judgment and stating that "[ijnquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer’s decision are very fac

2010See e.g., Mills, 300 S.W.3d at 631 .

2010See e.g., Mills, 300 S.W.3d at 631 .

2010For an example of the current state of the McDonnell Douglas framework in federal courts, White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. provides a survey of the "widely differing approaches to the question of how to analyze summary judgment challenges in Title VII mixed-motive cases” among the federal courts of appeals. 533 F.3d 381, 398-99 (6th Cir.2008)

2010For an example of the current state of the McDonnell Douglas framework in federal courts, White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. provides a survey of the "widely differing approaches to the question of how to analyze summary judgment challenges in Title VII mixed-motive cases” among the federal courts of appeals. 533 F.3d 381, 398-99 (6th Cir.2008)

2010See, e.g., Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.1990).

2010See, e.g., Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.1990).

2010Applying that framework is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority, adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis, and is too likely to cause us to reach a result contrary to what we would decide if we focused on 'the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.' ” (citations omitted)); Wright v. Mmray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 716-21 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., concurring) (concluding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is "ill suited to the analysis of mixed-motive claims” at summary judgment and stating that "[ijnquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer’s decision are very fac

2010Applying that framework is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority, adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis, and is too likely to cause us to reach a result contrary to what we would decide if we focused on 'the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.' ” (citations omitted)); Wright v. Mmray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 716-21 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., concurring) (concluding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is "ill suited to the analysis of mixed-motive claims” at summary judgment and stating that "[ijnquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer’s decision are very fac

2010“The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the ‘[employee] has his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.’ ” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)).

2010“The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the ‘[employee] has his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.’ ” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)).

2010Our analysis of this argument requires that we first describe the McDonnell Douglas framework, this Court’s similar but distinct framework adopted in Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tenn.1993), and the frameworks’ application in Tennessee.

2010Our analysis of this argument requires that we first describe the McDonnell Douglas framework, this Court’s similar but distinct framework adopted in Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tenn.1993), and the frameworks’ application in Tennessee.

2010While opinions of federal intermediate appellate courts are only persuasive authority and not binding on us, see Leggett v. Duke Energy Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843, 871 (Tenn.2010), we observe that the McDonnell Douglas framework has been the subject of much confusion and criticism in the federal circuit courts of appeals.

2010While opinions of federal intermediate appellate courts are only persuasive authority and not binding on us, see Leggett v. Duke Energy Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843, 871 (Tenn.2010), we observe that the McDonnell Douglas framework has been the subject of much confusion and criticism in the federal circuit courts of appeals.

2013Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089 .

2013Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089 .

2020Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must prove that: “(1) he was a member of the protected class; (2) he was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) he was replaced by a younger person.” Id. at 584 .

2020Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must prove that: “(1) he was a member of the protected class; (2) he was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) he was replaced by a younger person.” Id. at 584 .

2016See id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000)). -8- Between 1993 and 2008, the Tennessee Supreme Court and this Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment stage in at least eighteen published decisions.

2016See id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000)). -8- Between 1993 and 2008, the Tennessee Supreme Court and this Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment stage in at least eighteen published decisions.

2010We then stated that her employer “is entitled to summary judgment if it can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Allen and if Allen is unable to present evidence that raises a genuine dispute over whether the proffered reason is pretextual.” Id. (citing Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.2006)).

2010We then stated that her employer “is entitled to summary judgment if it can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Allen and if Allen is unable to present evidence that raises a genuine dispute over whether the proffered reason is pretextual.” Id. (citing Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.2006)).

2010Furthermore, the McDonnell Douglas framework was designed to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent, see, e.g., Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 , 103 S.Ct. 1478 , 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), not to remove genuine issues of material fact from a trier of fact.

2010Furthermore, the McDonnell Douglas framework was designed to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent, see, e.g., Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 , 103 S.Ct. 1478 , 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), not to remove genuine issues of material fact from a trier of fact.

2010Allen, 240 S.W.3d at 819 (summary judgment); Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn.2000); Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No. L07, 974 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tenn.1998) (summary judgment); Marpaka v. Hefner, 289 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tenn.Ct.App.2008) (summary judgment); Bundy v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 266 S.W.3d 410, 416-17 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007) (summary judgment); Frye v. St.

2010Allen, 240 S.W.3d at 819 (summary judgment); Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn.2000); Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No. L07, 974 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tenn.1998) (summary judgment); Marpaka v. Hefner, 289 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tenn.Ct.App.2008) (summary judgment); Bundy v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 266 S.W.3d 410, 416-17 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007) (summary judgment); Frye v. St.

2001Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, [ 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)]; Street v. J.C.

2001Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, [ 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)]; Street v. J.C.