McDonnell Douglas framework in Massachusetts

2012Id.; Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 420 (2003); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 432 Mass. 107, 116 (2000).

2009Wal-Mart does not dispute that the plaintiff met her burden of establishing all the elements in the first stage of the three-stage McDonnell Douglas analysis. 14 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 118 (2000).

2009Wal-Mart does not dispute that the plaintiff met her burden of establishing all the elements in the first stage of the three-stage McDonnell Douglas analysis. 14 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 118 (2000).

2006Under the McDonnell Douglas test, a claimant may make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainants qualifications.” Id. at 802 .

2003Of late, the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has recognized the difficulties involved in using the McDonnell Douglas analysis in jury instructions, and recommended that trial judges formulate instructions to “focus the jury’s attention on the ultimate issues of harm, discriminatory animus and causation.” Lipchitz v. Raytheon, 434 Mass. 493, 508 (2001).

2003Of late, the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has recognized the difficulties involved in using the McDonnell Douglas analysis in jury instructions, and recommended that trial judges formulate instructions to “focus the jury’s attention on the ultimate issues of harm, discriminatory animus and causation.” Lipchitz v. Raytheon, 434 Mass. 493, 508 (2001).

2012Id.; Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 420 (2003); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 432 Mass. 107, 116 (2000).

2012Id.; Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 420 (2003); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 432 Mass. 107, 116 (2000).

2003In the context of summary judgment, however, the McDonnell Douglas framework remains appropriate to “give judges a method of organizing evidence and assigning the burdens of production and persuasion in a discrimination case.” Id., quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979).

2003In the context of summary judgment, however, the McDonnell Douglas framework remains appropriate to “give judges a method of organizing evidence and assigning the burdens of production and persuasion in a discrimination case.” Id., quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979).

2025See Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 50 (employer has burden of production, not persuasion, at stage two of McDonnell Douglas framework and therefore "need not prove that the reasons were nondiscriminatory" [citation omitted]).

2018Sullivan , 444 Mass. at 46 n.17 ("We proceed with the McDonnell Douglas analysis because it remains 'a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination' "), quoting from Furnco Constr.

2018Corp . v. Waters , 438 U.S. 567 , 577 (1978).

2018Corp . v. Waters , 438 U.S. 567 , 577 (1978).

2023The full context from Reeves shows that the Supreme Court simply meant that when deciding judgment as a matter of law, courts should avoid weighing evidence: "[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. . . . 'Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).] Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it

2023The full context from Reeves shows that the Supreme Court simply meant that when deciding judgment as a matter of law, courts should avoid weighing evidence: "[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. . . . 'Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).] Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it

2021“Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of . . . discrimination.” Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 128 (1997).

2021See, e.g., Yee, 481 Mass. at 294 (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to discrimination claim asserted under G.L. c. 151B); Taite v. Bridgewater State Univ., Bd. Of Trs., 999 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2021) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to discrimination claim asserted under Title VII).

2016See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160-161 .

2016See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160-161 .

2013Where the employer meets its burden, the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to establish that the basis of the employer’s decision was unlawful discrimination “by adducing evidence that the reasons given by [the employer] for its actions were mere pretexts to hide such discrimination.” Lewis v. Boston, 321 F.3d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 2003).

2013Where the employer meets its burden, the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to establish that the basis of the employer’s decision was unlawful discrimination “by adducing evidence that the reasons given by [the employer] for its actions were mere pretexts to hide such discrimination.” Lewis v. Boston, 321 F.3d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 2003).

2005Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993).

2005Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993).

2000In McDonnell Douglas and Burdine , the United States Supreme Court recognized that there is often no direct evidence of discrimination; it adopted a three-stage approach to proof that would enable a plaintiff to prevail in the absence of direct evidence if other evidence is sufficient to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant has discriminated. 21 In other words, the McDonnell-Burdine allocation of evidentiary burdens “presupposed that the evidence of unlawful discrimination would be circumstantial.” Johansen v. NCR Comten, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 294, 298 (1991),