McDonnell Douglas test in West Virginia

1988The McDonnell Douglas analysis of the evidence was accepted by this Court in Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Department v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 172 W.Va. 627 , 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983).

1988The McDonnell Douglas analysis of the evidence was accepted by this Court in Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Department v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 172 W.Va. 627 , 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983).

2018Va. 475 , 457 S.E.2d 152 (1995), pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first create an inference of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case.

2018Va. 475 , 457 S.E.2d 152 (1995), pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first create an inference of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case.

1989After noting that the Supreme Court never intended the McDonnell Douglas test "to be a panacea to correct all discrimination wrongs," this Court formulated a new test to deal with general cases of discrimination. 358 S.E.2d at 429 .

1989After noting that the Supreme Court never intended the McDonnell Douglas test "to be a panacea to correct all discrimination wrongs," this Court formulated a new test to deal with general cases of discrimination. 358 S.E.2d at 429 .

1988After analyzing the McDonnell Douglas test and the standard enunciated in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.1979), 8 this Court developed the following test applicable to cases involving discriminatory discharge and a protected class: (1) That the plaintiff is a member of a protected class. (2) That the employer made an adverse decision concerning the plaintiff. (3) But for the plaintiffs protected status, the adverse decision would not have been made. 178 W.Va. at 170 , 358 S.E.2d at 429 .

1988After analyzing the McDonnell Douglas test and the standard enunciated in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.1979), 8 this Court developed the following test applicable to cases involving discriminatory discharge and a protected class: (1) That the plaintiff is a member of a protected class. (2) That the employer made an adverse decision concerning the plaintiff. (3) But for the plaintiffs protected status, the adverse decision would not have been made. 178 W.Va. at 170 , 358 S.E.2d at 429 .

1997See n. 4, supra (discusses the McDonnell Douglas test). [11] We understand the EEOC's argument; however, we cannot reconcile its argument in CNA Insurance Companies, supra and in similar cases with the plain meaning of the West Virginia Human Rights Act and the rules promulgated thereunder.

1997See n. 4, supra (discusses the McDonnell Douglas test). [11] We understand the EEOC's argument; however, we cannot reconcile its argument in CNA Insurance Companies, supra and in similar cases with the plain meaning of the West Virginia Human Rights Act and the rules promulgated thereunder.

1997Obviously, language changes to the Act and rules are within the purview of the legislature and the Commission. [12] 29 U.S.C. § 794 , as quoted in Beauford, 831 F.2d at 770 n. 1 states, in relevant part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]" [13] We note that in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir.1996) the court was confr

1997Obviously, language changes to the Act and rules are within the purview of the legislature and the Commission. [12] 29 U.S.C. § 794 , as quoted in Beauford, 831 F.2d at 770 n. 1 states, in relevant part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]" [13] We note that in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir.1996) the court was confr

1997Obviously, language changes to the Act and rules are within the purview of the legislature and the Commission. [12] 29 U.S.C. § 794 , as quoted in Beauford, 831 F.2d at 770 n. 1 states, in relevant part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]" [13] We note that in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir.1996) the court was confr

1997Obviously, language changes to the Act and rules are within the purview of the legislature and the Commission. [12] 29 U.S.C. § 794 , as quoted in Beauford, 831 F.2d at 770 n. 1 states, in relevant part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]" [13] We note that in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir.1996) the court was confr

1996But once the employer meets this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the “inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95 , 67 L.Ed.2d at 216 . 24 The Barefoot/McDonnell Douglas framework and its attendant burdens and presumption cease to be relevant at that point, and the onus is once again on the employee to prove that the proffered legitimate reason is a mere pretext rather than the true reason for the challenged employment action.

1996But once the employer meets this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the “inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95 , 67 L.Ed.2d at 216 . 24 The Barefoot/McDonnell Douglas framework and its attendant burdens and presumption cease to be relevant at that point, and the onus is once again on the employee to prove that the proffered legitimate reason is a mere pretext rather than the true reason for the challenged employment action.

1996As noted above, the United States Supreme Court took up the matter of mixed motives in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra, and concluded that when a plaintiff proves that a discriminatory motive entered into an employment decision, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the defendant to show that the same decision would have been made in the absence of the discriminatory motive. 490 U.S. at 231-58 , 109 S.Ct. at 1780-95 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 276-93 .

1996As noted above, the United States Supreme Court took up the matter of mixed motives in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra, and concluded that when a plaintiff proves that a discriminatory motive entered into an employment decision, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the defendant to show that the same decision would have been made in the absence of the discriminatory motive. 490 U.S. at 231-58 , 109 S.Ct. at 1780-95 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 276-93 .

1985In designating the elements of a prima facie case for use in a disparate treatment, discriminatory discharge claim, the court in Burdette v. FMC, supra, eliminated the second and fourth of the McDonnell Douglas factors.

1985In designating the elements of a prima facie case for use in a disparate treatment, discriminatory discharge claim, the court in Burdette v. FMC, supra, eliminated the second and fourth of the McDonnell Douglas factors.