McDonnell Douglas analysis in Minnesota

2024In Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1986), the supreme court described the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which requires a defendant to produce evidence of a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions,” by stating that a district court should “look for evidence presented by the [defendant] that its actions were related to some legitimate business purpose.” Id. at 720 .

2024In Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1986), the supreme court described the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which requires a defendant to produce evidence of a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions,” by stating that a district court should “look for evidence presented by the [defendant] that its actions were related to some legitimate business purpose.” Id. at 720 .

2024Randall v. No. Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. App. 1994) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973)); see also Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc. 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983) (holding that McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to retaliation claims in Minnesota).

2017Under the three- part McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of making a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S. Ct. at 1824 .

2024Randall v. No. Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. App. 1994) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973)); see also Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc. 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983) (holding that McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to retaliation claims in Minnesota).

2019See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc. , 330 N.W.2d 428 , 444 (Minn. 1983) (applying McDonnell Douglas test in review of summary-judgment decision in retaliatory-discharge claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act); Grundtner v. Univ. of Minn. , 730 N.W.2d 323 , 329 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying McDonnell Douglas test in review of summary-judgment decision in retaliatory-discharge claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act), review denied (Minn. July 17, 2007); cf. Cokley v. City of Otsego , 623 N.W.2d 625 , 630 (Minn. App. 2001) (applying McDonnell Douglas test to employer's posttrial motion

2025Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542 ; see Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., Inc., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing that “we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment” under the MHRA).

2025Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542 ; see Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., Inc., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing that “we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment” under the MHRA).

2001We adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework in Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.1978) to analyze disparate treatment claims brought under the MHRA.

2001We adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework in Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.1978) to analyze disparate treatment claims brought under the MHRA.

2025Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542 ; see Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., Inc., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing that “we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment” under the MHRA).

2025Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542 ; see Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., Inc., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing that “we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment” under the MHRA).

1995Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.1978); see also Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Mmn.1986). 3 The United States Supreme Court summarized the three-step framework of the McDonnell Douglas test in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981): First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.

1995Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.1978); see also Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Mmn.1986). 3 The United States Supreme Court summarized the three-step framework of the McDonnell Douglas test in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981): First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.

2015Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 999 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to FMLA claim); Grundtner v. University of Minn., 730 N.W.2d 323, 329 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to whistleblower claim); Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 572 (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy).

1993Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 , 571-72 (Minn.1987) (three-part McDonnell Douglas type analysis applied to common-law wrongful discharge claim where employee was discharged after refusing to violate a federal statute); Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427-28 (Minn.App. 1992), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 17, 1992) (three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis applied to wrongful discharge claim where employee was discharged after filing a workers’ compensation claim).

1987Bowen v. Superwood Corp., 395 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 2, 1987).

1987Bowen v. Superwood Corp., 395 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 2, 1987).

2001Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 710-11 (Minn.1992); see also Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn.1988) (“As the result of the substantial similarities existing between Title VII and [the MHRA], we have frequently applied principles which have evolved in the adjudication of claims under the federal act, and, specifically we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment.”).

2001Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 710-11 (Minn.1992); see also Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn.1988) (“As the result of the substantial similarities existing between Title VII and [the MHRA], we have frequently applied principles which have evolved in the adjudication of claims under the federal act, and, specifically we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment.”).

2024At the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse . . . action.” Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918 .

2024At the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse . . . action.” Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918 .

2025See Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542 (“Discrimination plaintiffs may prove discriminatory intent by direct evidence or by using circumstantial evidence in accordance with the three-part burden-shifting test set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.”); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at 21 121 (“[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.”).

2025See Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542 (“Discrimination plaintiffs may prove discriminatory intent by direct evidence or by using circumstantial evidence in accordance with the three-part burden-shifting test set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.”); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at 21 121 (“[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.”).

2011“Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, stray remarks, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by deci-sionmakers unrelated to the decisional process are insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” Smith v. DataCard Corp., 9 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1079 (D.Minn.1998); see Diez v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 564 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn.App.1997) (“Stray remarks made in the workplace cannot serve as direct evidence of discrimination.”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 1997).

2011“Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, stray remarks, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by deci-sionmakers unrelated to the decisional process are insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” Smith v. DataCard Corp., 9 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1079 (D.Minn.1998); see Diez v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 564 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn.App.1997) (“Stray remarks made in the workplace cannot serve as direct evidence of discrimination.”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 1997).

2012Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “stray remarks, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by deci-sionmakers unrelated to the decisional process are insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” Smith v. DataCard Corp., 9 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1079 (D.Minn.1998).

2012Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “stray remarks, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by deci-sionmakers unrelated to the decisional process are insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” Smith v. DataCard Corp., 9 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1079 (D.Minn.1998).

2006The purpose of part two of the McDonnell Douglas test is not only to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination, but also to “frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.” State v. Scientific Computers, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Minn.App.1986) (quotations omitted).

2006The purpose of part two of the McDonnell Douglas test is not only to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination, but also to “frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.” State v. Scientific Computers, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Minn.App.1986) (quotations omitted).

1997Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427-28 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. June 17, 1992).

1993Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 , 571-72 (Minn.1987) (three-part McDonnell Douglas type analysis applied to common-law wrongful discharge claim where employee was discharged after refusing to violate a federal statute); Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427-28 (Minn.App. 1992), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 17, 1992) (three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis applied to wrongful discharge claim where employee was discharged after filing a workers’ compensation claim).

2009See Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 721-22 (requiring express findings on each stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Bersie v. Zycad Corp., 399 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Minn.App.1987) (remanding for further McDonnell Douglas findings).

2009See Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 721-22 (requiring express findings on each stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Bersie v. Zycad Corp., 399 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Minn.App.1987) (remanding for further McDonnell Douglas findings).

2019See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc. , 330 N.W.2d 428 , 444 (Minn. 1983) (applying McDonnell Douglas test in review of summary-judgment decision in retaliatory-discharge claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act); Grundtner v. Univ. of Minn. , 730 N.W.2d 323 , 329 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying McDonnell Douglas test in review of summary-judgment decision in retaliatory-discharge claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act), review denied (Minn. July 17, 2007); cf. Cokley v. City of Otsego , 623 N.W.2d 625 , 630 (Minn. App. 2001) (applying McDonnell Douglas test to employer's posttrial motion

2015Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 999 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to FMLA claim); Grundtner v. University of Minn., 730 N.W.2d 323, 329 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to whistleblower claim); Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 572 (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy).

2016Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999) (“In construing the MHRA, we apply law developed in federal cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act . . . .”); Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1988) (“As the result of the substantial similarities existing between Title VII and [the MHRA], we have frequently applied principles which have evolved in the adjudication of claims under the federal act, and, specifically we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment.”).

2016Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999) (“In construing the MHRA, we apply law developed in federal cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act . . . .”); Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1988) (“As the result of the substantial similarities existing between Title VII and [the MHRA], we have frequently applied principles which have evolved in the adjudication of claims under the federal act, and, specifically we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment.”).

2015Thus, at the third step of the McDonnell- Douglas test, the issue is the same, regardless of the nature of the claim: whether the employer’s “proffered reason was not the true reason for the employer’s actions.” Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 557 .

2015Thus, at the third step of the McDonnell- Douglas test, the issue is the same, regardless of the nature of the claim: whether the employer’s “proffered reason was not the true reason for the employer’s actions.” Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 557 .

1993No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114 , 119 n. 7 (Minn.1991) the supreme court cited *806 Phipps as authority for the statement that the McDonnell Douglas analysis must be used to analyze a retaliatory discharge claim.

1993No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114 , 119 n. 7 (Minn.1991) the supreme court cited *806 Phipps as authority for the statement that the McDonnell Douglas analysis must be used to analyze a retaliatory discharge claim.

1987In affirming the trial court’s original findings and conclusions of law, this court noted that although the trial court did not specifically refer to the McDonnell Douglas analysis, it was “clear that the court used this three-step process to arrive at its decision.” Sigurdson, 363 N.W.2d at 480-481 .

1987In affirming the trial court’s original findings and conclusions of law, this court noted that although the trial court did not specifically refer to the McDonnell Douglas analysis, it was “clear that the court used this three-step process to arrive at its decision.” Sigurdson, 363 N.W.2d at 480-481 .

2024Randall v. No. Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. App. 1994) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973)); see also Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc. 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983) (holding that McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to retaliation claims in Minnesota).

2024Randall v. No. Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. App. 1994) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973)); see also Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc. 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983) (holding that McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to retaliation claims in Minnesota).

2016As to this issue, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, which has explained that “[i]n a pretext case,” even stray remarks are “surely the kind of fact which could cause a reasonable trier of fact to raise an eyebrow, thus providing additional threads of evidence that are relevant to the jury.” Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 610 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted).

2016As to this issue, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, which has explained that “[i]n a pretext case,” even stray remarks are “surely the kind of fact which could cause a reasonable trier of fact to raise an eyebrow, thus providing additional threads of evidence that are relevant to the jury.” Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 610 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted).

2016“To survive summary judgment at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of evidence of some additional facts that would allow a jury to find that the defendant’s proffered reason is pretext and that the 9 real reason for its action was intentional discrimination.” Krenik v. Cty. of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1995).

2016“To survive summary judgment at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of evidence of some additional facts that would allow a jury to find that the defendant’s proffered reason is pretext and that the 9 real reason for its action was intentional discrimination.” Krenik v. Cty. of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1995).

2015Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 999 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to FMLA claim); Grundtner v. University of Minn., 730 N.W.2d 323, 329 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to whistleblower claim); Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 572 (applying McDonnell-Douglas test to claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy).