McDonnell Douglas test (New Mexico) · Go Syfert
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McDonnell Douglas test in New Mexico

18 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 6 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

CaseFollowedCited
Smith v. FDC Corp.green
nm · 1990 · cited in 6 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 1990–2024
2 sentences

2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context).

2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context).

46
Juneau v. Intel Corp.green
nm · 2005 · cited in 4 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2023–2025
2 sentences

2025See Cates, 1998- NMSC-002, ¶ 16 (describing the McDonnell-Douglas analysis in the context of a discrimination claim); Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 9 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell-Douglas framework to retaliation claims).

2025See Cates, 1998- NMSC-002, ¶ 16 (describing the McDonnell-Douglas analysis in the context of a discrimination claim); Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 9 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell-Douglas framework to retaliation claims).

24
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen
scotus · 1973 · cited in 5 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 1992–2005
2 sentences

1998In Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 517-18 , 787 P.2d 433, 436-37 (1990), we used the evidentiary methodology developed in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to provide guidance in interpreting the New Mexico Human Rights Act. [2] In Smith we *70 recognized that the McDonnell-Douglas test was a useful framework to employ in analyzing discrimination claims.

1998In Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 517-18 , 787 P.2d 433, 436-37 (1990), we used the evidentiary methodology developed in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to provide guidance in interpreting the New Mexico Human Rights Act. [2] In Smith we *70 recognized that the McDonnell-Douglas test was a useful framework to employ in analyzing discrimination claims.

15
Cates v. Regents of the New Mexico Institute of Mining & Technologygreen
nm · 1998 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context).

2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context).

11
Alexander v. Delgado Ex Rel. Delgadogreen
nm · 1973 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023See Alexander v. Delgado, 1973-NMSC-030 , ¶ 9, 84 N.M. 717 , 507 P.2d 778 (“[T]he Court of Appeals is to be governed by the precedents of [the New Mexico Supreme Court].”). {5} Nevertheless, we consider the additional facts Plaintiff has set forth in his memorandum in opposition to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case.

2023See Alexander v. Delgado, 1973-NMSC-030 , ¶ 9, 84 N.M. 717 , 507 P.2d 778 (“[T]he Court of Appeals is to be governed by the precedents of [the New Mexico Supreme Court].”). {5} Nevertheless, we consider the additional facts Plaintiff has set forth in his memorandum in opposition to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case.

11
Self v. United Parcel Service, Inc.green
nm · 1998 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See, e.g., Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC- 14 046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (“Summary judgment is appropriate where there 15 are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 16 matter of law.”).

2017See, e.g., Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC- 14 046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (“Summary judgment is appropriate where there 15 are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 16 matter of law.”).

11
Piazza v. Cinemark, USA, Inc.green
texapp · 2005 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging a claim of reverse discrimination prove that he or she belongs to a class rather than requiring “the plaintiff to show the existence of background circumstances which support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (2004) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a reverse discrimination p

2015Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging a claim of reverse discrimination prove that he or she belongs to a class rather than requiring “the plaintiff to show the existence of background circumstances which support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (2004) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a reverse discrimination p

11
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.green
scotus · 1976 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 (holding that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they [members of a racial minority]” and noting that the specification of the prima facie proof required under McDonnell Douglas “is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations”). {21} Courts recognize that a strict application of the McDonnell Douglas framework would preclude reverse discrimination claims because the first prong would disqualify majority plaintiffs.

2015McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 (holding that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they [members of a racial minority]” and noting that the specification of the prima facie proof required under McDonnell Douglas “is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations”). {21} Courts recognize that a strict application of the McDonnell Douglas framework would preclude reverse discrimination claims because the first prong would disqualify majority plaintiffs.

11
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Watersgreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the prima facie case, as stated in McDonnell Douglas, “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” and that the “central focus of the inquiry in a [discrimination] case ... is always whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 n.8 (1976) (holding that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioner

2015See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the prima facie case, as stated in McDonnell Douglas, “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” and that the “central focus of the inquiry in a [discrimination] case ... is always whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 n.8 (1976) (holding that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioner

11
Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo.green
mowd · 1990 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (W.D.Mo. 1990) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework was “a procedural embodiment of the recognition that employment discrimination is difficult to prove with only circumstantial evidence” and that “Parker shifts the entire burden back to the plaintiff in one fell swoop”). {28} It should also be noted that imposing a heightened burden on majority plaintiffs is difficult to reconcile with United States Supreme Court precedent.

2015Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (W.D.Mo. 1990) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework was “a procedural embodiment of the recognition that employment discrimination is difficult to prove with only circumstantial evidence” and that “Parker shifts the entire burden back to the plaintiff in one fell swoop”). {28} It should also be noted that imposing a heightened burden on majority plaintiffs is difficult to reconcile with United States Supreme Court precedent.

11
Lind v. City of Battle Creekgreen
mich · 2004 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging a claim of reverse discrimination prove that he or she belongs to a class rather than requiring “the plaintiff to show the existence of background circumstances which support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (2004) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a reverse discrimination p

2015Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging a claim of reverse discrimination prove that he or she belongs to a class rather than requiring “the plaintiff to show the existence of background circumstances which support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (2004) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a reverse discrimination p

11
cluster 761508green
ca11 · 1999 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001See, e.g., Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir.1999).

2001See, e.g., Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir.1999).

11
Colombo A. SPAGNUOLO, Appellee, v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Appellantgreen
ca4 · 1981 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
2 sentences

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

11
Frank L. LOEB, Plaintiff, v. TEXTRON, INC., Et Al., Defendantsgreen
ca1 · 1979 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
2 sentences

1990See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1018-19 (1st Cir.1979).

1990See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1018-19 (1st Cir.1979).

11
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurstongreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
2 sentences

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Martinez v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. green
nm · 1992
2 sentences

1998Cf. Smith, 109 N.M. at 518 , 787 P.2d at 437 , see also Martinez v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 113 N.M. 366 , 370 n. 8, 826 P.2d 962 , 966 n. 8 (1992).

1998Cf. Smith, 109 N.M. at 518 , 787 P.2d at 437 , see also Martinez v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 113 N.M. 366 , 370 n. 8, 826 P.2d 962 , 966 n. 8 (1992).

21998–1998
Cates v. REGENTS NMIM & T green
nm · 1998
2 sentences

2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context).

2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context).

12024–2024
Silverman v. Progressive Broadcasting, Inc. green
nmctapp · 1998
2 sentences

2021Plaintiff proffers no facts suggesting that endemic bias or sexual discrimination in Defendant’s Human Recourses Department prevented her from demonstrating she met minimum job qualifications and thus met her prima facie burden. {4} We note that, consistent with Plaintiff’s arguments [MIO 2], our courts do not apply the McDonnell Douglas framework “rigidly” because “[t]he specific facts of a case must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination[.]” Silverman v. Progressive Broad., Inc., 1998-NMCA-107, ¶ 17 , 125 N.M. 500 , 964 P.2d 61 .

2021Plaintiff proffers no facts suggesting that endemic bias or sexual discrimination in Defendant’s Human Recourses Department prevented her from demonstrating she met minimum job qualifications and thus met her prima facie burden. {4} We note that, consistent with Plaintiff’s arguments [MIO 2], our courts do not apply the McDonnell Douglas framework “rigidly” because “[t]he specific facts of a case must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination[.]” Silverman v. Progressive Broad., Inc., 1998-NMCA-107, ¶ 17 , 125 N.M. 500 , 964 P.2d 61 .

12021–2021
Karl Parker, Jr. v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company T/a the Chessie System the B & O Railroad green
cadc · 1981
2 sentences

2015The Court explained the McDonnell Douglas framework was “not an arbitrary lightening of the plaintiffs burden, but rather a procedural embodiment of the recognition that our nation has not yet freed itself from a legacy of hostile discrimination.” Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 .

2015The Court explained the McDonnell Douglas framework was “not an arbitrary lightening of the plaintiffs burden, but rather a procedural embodiment of the recognition that our nation has not yet freed itself from a legacy of hostile discrimination.” Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 .

12015–2015
Douglas M. Mills v. Health Care Service Corporation green
ca7 · 1999
2 sentences

2015Mills, 171 F.3d at 454 .

2015Mills, 171 F.3d at 454 .

12015–2015
Gonzales v. New Mexico Department of Health green
nm · 2000
2 sentences

2005Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029 , ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 586 , 11 P.3d 550 ; see also McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. at 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 (same).

2005Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029 , ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 586 , 11 P.3d 550 ; see also McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. at 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 (same).

12005–2005
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

2002Accordingly, although the parties discuss the application of the McDonnell Douglas test, because the case was tried on the merits, our focus is whether Plaintiff met her “ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 .

2002Accordingly, although the parties discuss the application of the McDonnell Douglas test, because the case was tried on the merits, our focus is whether Plaintiff met her “ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 .

12002–2002
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks green
scotus · 1993
2 sentences

2001Id. {42} The Supreme Court reversed and determined that the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test would effectively "substitute ... the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination [with] the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable." Id. at 514-15 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 . "[T]he Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff ... ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bea

2001Id. {42} The Supreme Court reversed and determined that the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test would effectively "substitute ... the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination [with] the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable." Id. at 514-15 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 . "[T]he Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff ... ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bea

12001–2001
Gregg v. Rahm green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

11990–1990
Hunt v. Bittman green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

11990–1990
Whirlpool Corp. v. Spagnuolo green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 .

11990–1990

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NM § N.M. Stat. § 28-1-1 (13) NM § N.M. Stat. § 28-1-7 (12) NM § N.M. Stat. § 28-1-13 (6) NM § N.M. Stat. § 28-1-10 (4) USC § 42u.s.c.2000e-2 (4) NM § N.M. Stat. § 28-1-2 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 173 (1992–2026) OH 102 (1985–2026) TX 100 (1993–2026) MI 83 (1997–2026) MN 78 (1985–2025) NJ 54 (1978–2026) TN 39 (1997–2020) WA 30 (1985–2025) IA 24 (1990–2026) VT 22 (1979–2026) PA 20 (1983–2026) KY 19 (2002–2025) NM 18 (1990–2025) IL 16 (1989–2026) MA 15 (1994–2025) WV 15 (1985–2025) NY 13 (2012–2026) DC 13 (2000–2025) HI 11 (1997–2025) MO 10 (1984–2024) MD 10 (2000–2025) DE 10 (1980–2026) ME 10 (2003–2023) RI 9 (2004–2017) GA 9 (2013–2023) CT 9 (1991–2024) FL 8 (2007–2024) MT 8 (1987–2007) ND 7 (1993–2015) MS 7 (1991–2017) NE 6 (1999–2017) IN 6 (1995–2009) LA 5 (2005–2022) NC 5 (2004–2019) AK 5 (1983–2019) SD 4 (2006–2018) KS 3 (1990–2024) NH 3 (2001–2024) ID 3 (1979–2018) VA 3 (1997–2011) UT 3 (2022–2025) CO 2 (2000–2001) WY 2 (2006–2009) VI 2 (2015–2015) AR 2 (2013–2014) WI 2 (1985–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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