18 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. FDC Corp.green2 sentences2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context). 2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context). | 4 | 6 |
Juneau v. Intel Corp.green2 sentences2025See Cates, 1998- NMSC-002, ¶ 16 (describing the McDonnell-Douglas analysis in the context of a discrimination claim); Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 9 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell-Douglas framework to retaliation claims). 2025See Cates, 1998- NMSC-002, ¶ 16 (describing the McDonnell-Douglas analysis in the context of a discrimination claim); Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 9 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell-Douglas framework to retaliation claims). | 2 | 4 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen2 sentences1998In Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 517-18 , 787 P.2d 433, 436-37 (1990), we used the evidentiary methodology developed in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to provide guidance in interpreting the New Mexico Human Rights Act. [2] In Smith we *70 recognized that the McDonnell-Douglas test was a useful framework to employ in analyzing discrimination claims. 1998In Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 517-18 , 787 P.2d 433, 436-37 (1990), we used the evidentiary methodology developed in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to provide guidance in interpreting the New Mexico Human Rights Act. [2] In Smith we *70 recognized that the McDonnell-Douglas test was a useful framework to employ in analyzing discrimination claims. | 1 | 5 |
Cates v. Regents of the New Mexico Institute of Mining & Technologygreen2 sentences2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context). 2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context). | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Delgado Ex Rel. Delgadogreen2 sentences2023See Alexander v. Delgado, 1973-NMSC-030 , ¶ 9, 84 N.M. 717 , 507 P.2d 778 (“[T]he Court of Appeals is to be governed by the precedents of [the New Mexico Supreme Court].”). {5} Nevertheless, we consider the additional facts Plaintiff has set forth in his memorandum in opposition to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case. 2023See Alexander v. Delgado, 1973-NMSC-030 , ¶ 9, 84 N.M. 717 , 507 P.2d 778 (“[T]he Court of Appeals is to be governed by the precedents of [the New Mexico Supreme Court].”). {5} Nevertheless, we consider the additional facts Plaintiff has set forth in his memorandum in opposition to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case. | 1 | 1 |
Self v. United Parcel Service, Inc.green2 sentences2017See, e.g., Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC- 14 046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (“Summary judgment is appropriate where there 15 are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 16 matter of law.”). 2017See, e.g., Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC- 14 046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (“Summary judgment is appropriate where there 15 are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 16 matter of law.”). | 1 | 1 |
Piazza v. Cinemark, USA, Inc.green2 sentences2015Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging a claim of reverse discrimination prove that he or she belongs to a class rather than requiring “the plaintiff to show the existence of background circumstances which support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (2004) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a reverse discrimination p 2015Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging a claim of reverse discrimination prove that he or she belongs to a class rather than requiring “the plaintiff to show the existence of background circumstances which support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (2004) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a reverse discrimination p | 1 | 1 |
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.green2 sentences2015McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 (holding that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they [members of a racial minority]” and noting that the specification of the prima facie proof required under McDonnell Douglas “is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations”). {21} Courts recognize that a strict application of the McDonnell Douglas framework would preclude reverse discrimination claims because the first prong would disqualify majority plaintiffs. 2015McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 (holding that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they [members of a racial minority]” and noting that the specification of the prima facie proof required under McDonnell Douglas “is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations”). {21} Courts recognize that a strict application of the McDonnell Douglas framework would preclude reverse discrimination claims because the first prong would disqualify majority plaintiffs. | 1 | 1 |
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Watersgreen2 sentences2015See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the prima facie case, as stated in McDonnell Douglas, “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” and that the “central focus of the inquiry in a [discrimination] case ... is always whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 n.8 (1976) (holding that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioner 2015See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the prima facie case, as stated in McDonnell Douglas, “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” and that the “central focus of the inquiry in a [discrimination] case ... is always whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 n.8 (1976) (holding that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioner | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo.green2 sentences2015Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (W.D.Mo. 1990) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework was “a procedural embodiment of the recognition that employment discrimination is difficult to prove with only circumstantial evidence” and that “Parker shifts the entire burden back to the plaintiff in one fell swoop”). {28} It should also be noted that imposing a heightened burden on majority plaintiffs is difficult to reconcile with United States Supreme Court precedent. 2015Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (W.D.Mo. 1990) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework was “a procedural embodiment of the recognition that employment discrimination is difficult to prove with only circumstantial evidence” and that “Parker shifts the entire burden back to the plaintiff in one fell swoop”). {28} It should also be noted that imposing a heightened burden on majority plaintiffs is difficult to reconcile with United States Supreme Court precedent. | 1 | 1 |
Lind v. City of Battle Creekgreen2 sentences2015Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging a claim of reverse discrimination prove that he or she belongs to a class rather than requiring “the plaintiff to show the existence of background circumstances which support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (2004) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a reverse discrimination p 2015Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging a claim of reverse discrimination prove that he or she belongs to a class rather than requiring “the plaintiff to show the existence of background circumstances which support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (2004) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of intentional disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a reverse discrimination p | 1 | 1 |
cluster 761508green2 sentences2001See, e.g., Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir.1999). 2001See, e.g., Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Colombo A. SPAGNUOLO, Appellee, v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Appellantgreen2 sentences1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . 1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . | 1 | 1 |
Frank L. LOEB, Plaintiff, v. TEXTRON, INC., Et Al., Defendantsgreen2 sentences1990See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1018-19 (1st Cir.1979). 1990See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1018-19 (1st Cir.1979). | 1 | 1 |
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurstongreen2 sentences1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . 1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martinez v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Cf. Smith, 109 N.M. at 518 , 787 P.2d at 437 , see also Martinez v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 113 N.M. 366 , 370 n. 8, 826 P.2d 962 , 966 n. 8 (1992). 1998Cf. Smith, 109 N.M. at 518 , 787 P.2d at 437 , see also Martinez v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 113 N.M. 366 , 370 n. 8, 826 P.2d 962 , 966 n. 8 (1992). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Cates v. REGENTS NMIM & T
green
2 sentences2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context). 2024Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 , 124 N.M. 633 , 954 P.2d 65 ; see Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514 , 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23 , 139 N.M. 12 , 127 P.3d 548 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Silverman v. Progressive Broadcasting, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021Plaintiff proffers no facts suggesting that endemic bias or sexual discrimination in Defendant’s Human Recourses Department prevented her from demonstrating she met minimum job qualifications and thus met her prima facie burden. {4} We note that, consistent with Plaintiff’s arguments [MIO 2], our courts do not apply the McDonnell Douglas framework “rigidly” because “[t]he specific facts of a case must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination[.]” Silverman v. Progressive Broad., Inc., 1998-NMCA-107, ¶ 17 , 125 N.M. 500 , 964 P.2d 61 . 2021Plaintiff proffers no facts suggesting that endemic bias or sexual discrimination in Defendant’s Human Recourses Department prevented her from demonstrating she met minimum job qualifications and thus met her prima facie burden. {4} We note that, consistent with Plaintiff’s arguments [MIO 2], our courts do not apply the McDonnell Douglas framework “rigidly” because “[t]he specific facts of a case must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination[.]” Silverman v. Progressive Broad., Inc., 1998-NMCA-107, ¶ 17 , 125 N.M. 500 , 964 P.2d 61 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Karl Parker, Jr. v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company T/a the Chessie System the B & O Railroad
green
2 sentences2015The Court explained the McDonnell Douglas framework was “not an arbitrary lightening of the plaintiffs burden, but rather a procedural embodiment of the recognition that our nation has not yet freed itself from a legacy of hostile discrimination.” Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 . 2015The Court explained the McDonnell Douglas framework was “not an arbitrary lightening of the plaintiffs burden, but rather a procedural embodiment of the recognition that our nation has not yet freed itself from a legacy of hostile discrimination.” Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Douglas M. Mills v. Health Care Service Corporation
green
2 sentences2015Mills, 171 F.3d at 454 . 2015Mills, 171 F.3d at 454 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Gonzales v. New Mexico Department of Health
green
2 sentences2005Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029 , ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 586 , 11 P.3d 550 ; see also McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. at 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 (same). 2005Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029 , ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 586 , 11 P.3d 550 ; see also McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. at 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 (same). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
green
2 sentences2002Accordingly, although the parties discuss the application of the McDonnell Douglas test, because the case was tried on the merits, our focus is whether Plaintiff met her “ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 . 2002Accordingly, although the parties discuss the application of the McDonnell Douglas test, because the case was tried on the merits, our focus is whether Plaintiff met her “ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2001Id. {42} The Supreme Court reversed and determined that the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test would effectively "substitute ... the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination [with] the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable." Id. at 514-15 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 . "[T]he Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff ... ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bea 2001Id. {42} The Supreme Court reversed and determined that the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test would effectively "substitute ... the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination [with] the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable." Id. at 514-15 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 . "[T]he Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff ... ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bea | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Gregg v. Rahm
green
2 sentences1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . 1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hunt v. Bittman
green
2 sentences1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . 1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Whirlpool Corp. v. Spagnuolo
green
2 sentences1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . 1990See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 , 102 S.Ct. 316 , 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.