McDonnell Douglas framework in Maine

2018However, the comi concludes that some of the actions taken by 11 In Brady v. Cumberland County, 2015 ME 143 ~~ 39, 126 A.3d 1145 , the Law Court found the McDonnell Douglas framework to be unnecessary for purposes of evaluating motions for summary judgment in retaliation cases under the Whistleblowers' Act.

2018However, the comi concludes that some of the actions taken by 11 In Brady v. Cumberland County, 2015 ME 143 ~~ 39, 126 A.3d 1145 , the Law Court found the McDonnell Douglas framework to be unnecessary for purposes of evaluating motions for summary judgment in retaliation cases under the Whistleblowers' Act.

2017See Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80 , P 14, 45 A.3d 722 .

2017Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 70 ; see also Daniels, 2012 J\.1E 80, <JI 14, 45 A.3d 722 (applying McDonnell Douglas framework in Maine Human Rights Act claims).

2022Once the employer has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason, "the presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture, 21 the McDonnell Douglas framework with its presumptions and burdens disappears, and the sole remaining issue is of discrimination vel non." Zapata-Matos v. Reckirt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)).

2022Once the employer has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason, "the presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture, 21 the McDonnell Douglas framework with its presumptions and burdens disappears, and the sole remaining issue is of discrimination vel non." Zapata-Matos v. Reckirt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)).

2015Compare Maine Human Rights Comm’n. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)), and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tenn. 2010) (approving “the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent”), with Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3

2015Compare Maine Human Rights Comm’n. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)), and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tenn. 2010) (approving “the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent”), with Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3

2023Servs., 2003 ME 61, § 20 , 824 A.2d 48 (establishing the three-element prima facie case of retaliation under the MHRA by using the same prima facie elements from Bard v. Bath fron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 154 (Me. 1991), a WPA retaliation case), In 2015, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, abandoned the McDonnell Douglas framework when evaluating claims under the WPA at summary judgment.

2023Servs., 2003 ME 61, § 20 , 824 A.2d 48 (establishing the three-element prima facie case of retaliation under the MHRA by using the same prima facie elements from Bard v. Bath fron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 154 (Me. 1991), a WPA retaliation case), In 2015, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, abandoned the McDonnell Douglas framework when evaluating claims under the WPA at summary judgment.

2022Once the employer has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason, "the presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture, 21 the McDonnell Douglas framework with its presumptions and burdens disappears, and the sole remaining issue is of discrimination vel non." Zapata-Matos v. Reckirt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)).

2022Once the employer has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason, "the presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture, 21 the McDonnell Douglas framework with its presumptions and burdens disappears, and the sole remaining issue is of discrimination vel non." Zapata-Matos v. Reckirt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)).

2015Cir. 2008) (noting that the formulation of the prima facie case is “a largely unnecessary sideshow . . . spawning enormous confusion and wasting litigant and judicial resources”); Wells v. Colorado Dep’t. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that McDonnell Douglas has created “wasted judicial effort and greater opportunity for judicial error” and that it causes courts to “focus on the isolated components of the McDonnell Douglas framework, losing sight of the ultimate issue”); Peterson v. City Coll., 32 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (de

2015Cir. 2008) (noting that the formulation of the prima facie case is “a largely unnecessary sideshow . . . spawning enormous confusion and wasting litigant and judicial resources”); Wells v. Colorado Dep’t. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that McDonnell Douglas has created “wasted judicial effort and greater opportunity for judicial error” and that it causes courts to “focus on the isolated components of the McDonnell Douglas framework, losing sight of the ultimate issue”); Peterson v. City Coll., 32 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (de

2015The employee is not called on to present evidence of causation unless and until the employer raises the issue by presenting some evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. [¶30] In most cases, the employer will counter the employee’s evidence of retaliatory intent by producing evidence that it acted for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons.7 Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d. 490, 493 (D.C.

2015The employee is not called on to present evidence of causation unless and until the employer raises the issue by presenting some evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. [¶30] In most cases, the employer will counter the employee’s evidence of retaliatory intent by producing evidence that it acted for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons.7 Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d. 490, 493 (D.C.

2015Cir. 2008) (noting that the formulation of the prima facie case is “a largely unnecessary sideshow . . . spawning enormous confusion and wasting litigant and judicial resources”); Wells v. Colorado Dep’t. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that McDonnell Douglas has created “wasted judicial effort and greater opportunity for judicial error” and that it causes courts to “focus on the isolated components of the McDonnell Douglas framework, losing sight of the ultimate issue”); Peterson v. City Coll., 32 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (de

2015Cir. 2008) (noting that the formulation of the prima facie case is “a largely unnecessary sideshow . . . spawning enormous confusion and wasting litigant and judicial resources”); Wells v. Colorado Dep’t. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that McDonnell Douglas has created “wasted judicial effort and greater opportunity for judicial error” and that it causes courts to “focus on the isolated components of the McDonnell Douglas framework, losing sight of the ultimate issue”); Peterson v. City Coll., 32 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (de

2015The McDonnell Douglas framework constitutes “an information-forcing device by requiring employers to explain arguably suspicious activity.” Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514 .

2015The McDonnell Douglas framework constitutes “an information-forcing device by requiring employers to explain arguably suspicious activity.” Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514 .

2015Id. ¶¶ 16, 19 (considering the same evidence at both the prima facie and pretext stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 255 n.10 (1981); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 286 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[N]othing about the McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the evidence between one stage or the other.”).

2015Id. ¶¶ 16, 19 (considering the same evidence at both the prima facie and pretext stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 255 n.10 (1981); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 286 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[N]othing about the McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the evidence between one stage or the other.”).

2015Compare Maine Human Rights Comm’n. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)), and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tenn. 2010) (approving “the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent”), with Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3

2015Compare Maine Human Rights Comm’n. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)), and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tenn. 2010) (approving “the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent”), with Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3

2015Compare Maine Human Rights Comm’n. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)), and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tenn. 2010) (approving “the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent”), with Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3

2015Compare Maine Human Rights Comm’n. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)), and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tenn. 2010) (approving “the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent”), with Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3

2015See, e.g., Budge, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12 , 55 A.3d 484 (referring to the plaintiff’s burden to produce evidence of a prima facie case for each element of a claim to defeat a motion for summary judgment). [¶29] Under McDonnell Douglas, if the employee succeeds in presenting evidence of a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate the explanation for the adverse employment action—in other words, to produce evidence of an explanation that will cause the disappearance of the initial “inference of discrimination,” which arose only because of the absence of a leg

2015See, e.g., Budge, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12 , 55 A.3d 484 (referring to the plaintiff’s burden to produce evidence of a prima facie case for each element of a claim to defeat a motion for summary judgment). [¶29] Under McDonnell Douglas, if the employee succeeds in presenting evidence of a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate the explanation for the adverse employment action—in other words, to produce evidence of an explanation that will cause the disappearance of the initial “inference of discrimination,” which arose only because of the absence of a leg

2015Id. ¶¶ 16, 19 (considering the same evidence at both the prima facie and pretext stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 255 n.10 (1981); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 286 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[N]othing about the McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the evidence between one stage or the other.”).

2015Id. ¶¶ 16, 19 (considering the same evidence at both the prima facie and pretext stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 255 n.10 (1981); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 286 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[N]othing about the McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the evidence between one stage or the other.”).

2003Human Rights Comm’n v. Dep’t of Corr., 474 A.2d 860, 867 (Me.1984) (quoting City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1262 ); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 , 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). [¶ 16] In granting a summary judgment to DHS, the Superior Court concluded that even if it assumed that Doyle had established a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, DHS successfully met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.

2003Human Rights Comm’n v. Dep’t of Corr., 474 A.2d 860, 867 (Me.1984) (quoting City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1262 ); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 , 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). [¶ 16] In granting a summary judgment to DHS, the Superior Court concluded that even if it assumed that Doyle had established a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, DHS successfully met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.