McDonnell Douglas framework in New Jersey

2025City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 399 (2005) (citing Andersen v. Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 492 (1982)).] Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination and the claim is supported by circumstantial evidence, the evidence is assessed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

2025City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 399 (2005) (citing Andersen v. Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 492 (1982)).] Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination and the claim is supported by circumstantial evidence, the evidence is assessed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

2023Grande v. Saint Clare’s Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 23-30 (2017) (assessing the summary judgment standard through the McDonnell Douglas framework); see also Meade, 249 N.J. at 330-32 (finding summary judgment improper after analyzing the facts of the case pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework); Henry, 204 N.J. at 332 (“[I]f the plaintiff cannot meet his or her obligation under the McDonnell Douglas methodology, the employer will prevail on summary judgment.”); Sisler, 157 N.J. at 208-10, 217-18 (finding summary judgment improper and noting that “this Court has adopted the Mc

2023Grande v. Saint Clare’s Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 23-30 (2017) (assessing the summary judgment standard through the McDonnell Douglas framework); see also Meade, 249 N.J. at 330-32 (finding summary judgment improper after analyzing the facts of the case pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework); Henry, 204 N.J. at 332 (“[I]f the plaintiff cannot meet his or her obligation under the McDonnell Douglas methodology, the employer will prevail on summary judgment.”); Sisler, 157 N.J. at 208-10, 217-18 (finding summary judgment improper and noting that “this Court has adopted the Mc

2026Co., 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002) (citations reformatted).] "The McDonnell Douglas framework utilizes both subjective and objective employer standards at different stages of its analysis." Id. at 21 . "[I]n addressing the second prong of McDonnell Douglas . . . the standard is an objective one: was the employee meeting the employer's legitimate or reasonable expectations." Ibid. (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 600 (1988)).

2026Co., 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002) (citations reformatted).] "The McDonnell Douglas framework utilizes both subjective and objective employer standards at different stages of its analysis." Id. at 21 . "[I]n addressing the second prong of McDonnell Douglas . . . the standard is an objective one: was the employee meeting the employer's legitimate or reasonable expectations." Ibid. (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 600 (1988)).

1998The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that once “the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens — is no longer relevant.” Id. at 510 , 113 S.Ct. at 2749 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 418 .

1998The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that once “the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens — is no longer relevant.” Id. at 510 , 113 S.Ct. at 2749 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 418 .

2021In Tisby, we considered a similar claim against a defendant corrections facility by a Muslim employee alleging the defendant failed to accommodate her by not allowing her to wear a khimar in violation of the defendant's dress policy. 16 The majority in Geo Group did not expressly address the issue of pretext, but, pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas standard, a finding of pretext would have sustained the EEOC's burden and precluded the court's affirmance of summary judgment to the defendant. 411 U.S. at 804 .

2021In Tisby, we considered a similar claim against a defendant corrections facility by a Muslim employee alleging the defendant failed to accommodate her by not allowing her to wear a khimar in violation of the defendant's dress policy. 16 The majority in Geo Group did not expressly address the issue of pretext, but, pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas standard, a finding of pretext would have sustained the EEOC's burden and precluded the court's affirmance of summary judgment to the defendant. 411 U.S. at 804 .

2025In reverse discrimination cases, where the plaintiff is a member of a group "that has not historically been victimized by discrimination," the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to "substantiate . . . that the 'background circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.'" Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 551-52 (1990) (omission in original) (quoting Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 227 N.J.

2025In reverse discrimination cases, where the plaintiff is a member of a group "that has not historically been victimized by discrimination," the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to "substantiate . . . that the 'background circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.'" Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 551-52 (1990) (omission in original) (quoting Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 227 N.J.

2016Corp., 463 F.Supp.2d 528, 534 (E.D.Pa.2006), aff 'd, 271 Fed.Appx. 150 (3d Cir.2008)); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-22 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523, 533 (1985) (stating, in connection with claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§§ 621 to 634, that “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination”). “[T]he production of direct evidence of unlawful discrimination destroys ‘the ... presumption of good faith concerning ... employment decisions which is accorded employers

2016Corp., 463 F.Supp.2d 528, 534 (E.D.Pa.2006), aff 'd, 271 Fed.Appx. 150 (3d Cir.2008)); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-22 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523, 533 (1985) (stating, in connection with claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§§ 621 to 634, that “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination”). “[T]he production of direct evidence of unlawful discrimination destroys ‘the ... presumption of good faith concerning ... employment decisions which is accorded employers

2026Co., 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002) (citations reformatted).] "The McDonnell Douglas framework utilizes both subjective and objective employer standards at different stages of its analysis." Id. at 21 . "[I]n addressing the second prong of McDonnell Douglas . . . the standard is an objective one: was the employee meeting the employer's legitimate or reasonable expectations." Ibid. (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 600 (1988)).

2026Co., 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002) (citations reformatted).] "The McDonnell Douglas framework utilizes both subjective and objective employer standards at different stages of its analysis." Id. at 21 . "[I]n addressing the second prong of McDonnell Douglas . . . the standard is an objective one: was the employee meeting the employer's legitimate or reasonable expectations." Ibid. (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 600 (1988)).

2025However, a plaintiff does not qualify for a jury trial unless he or she can "point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." A-1932-22 16 [Zive, 182 N.J. at 455 -56 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).] "Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion at all times; on

2025However, a plaintiff does not qualify for a jury trial unless he or she can "point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." A-1932-22 16 [Zive, 182 N.J. at 455 -56 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).] "Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion at all times; on

2024Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 .

2024Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 .

2024Accordingly, if an employee has direct evidence, "the McDonnell Douglas analysis does not apply." Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 396 (2016) (quoting A.D.P., 428 N.J.

2024Accordingly, if an employee has direct evidence, "the McDonnell Douglas analysis does not apply." Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 396 (2016) (quoting A.D.P., 428 N.J.

2022Simply put, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate he "[wa]s qualified to perform the essential functions of the job," Victor, 203 N.J. at 410 , between the date of his physical examination and his return to service following completion of his sleep apnea treatment.

2022Simply put, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate he "[wa]s qualified to perform the essential functions of the job," Victor, 203 N.J. at 410 , between the date of his physical examination and his return to service following completion of his sleep apnea treatment.

2025However, a plaintiff does not qualify for a jury trial unless he or she can "point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." A-1932-22 16 [Zive, 182 N.J. at 455 -56 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).] "Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion at all times; on

2025However, a plaintiff does not qualify for a jury trial unless he or she can "point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." A-1932-22 16 [Zive, 182 N.J. at 455 -56 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).] "Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion at all times; on

2023Under the McDonnell Douglas test: (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the defendant then must show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision; and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity to show that [the] defendant's stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its application. [Dixon v Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 442 (1988).] Based on the McDonnell Douglas framework, to defeat an employer's summary judgment motion, an employee plaintiff must first establis

2023Under the McDonnell Douglas test: (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the defendant then must show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision; and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity to show that [the] defendant's stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its application. [Dixon v Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 442 (1988).] Based on the McDonnell Douglas framework, to defeat an employer's summary judgment motion, an employee plaintiff must first establis

2017After reciting the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Jansen Court observed that in the disability discrimination context, the employer often admits that it subjected an employee to disparate treatment because of a disability, “but claims that [the treatment] was justified.” Id. at 381 , 541 A.2d 682 (quoting Andersen v. Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 498 , 446 A.2d 486 (1982)).

2017After reciting the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Jansen Court observed that in the disability discrimination context, the employer often admits that it subjected an employee to disparate treatment because of a disability, “but claims that [the treatment] was justified.” Id. at 381 , 541 A.2d 682 (quoting Andersen v. Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 498 , 446 A.2d 486 (1982)).

2017For example, in Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260 , 1266 n.6 (10th Cir. 2015), the court stated that the McDonnell Douglas framework was inapplicable because the defendant “indisputably rescinded [the plaintiffs] job offer because of her disability.” The court relied on a prior holding that “[i]f the employer admits that the disability played a prominent part in the decision, or the plaintiff has other direct evidence of discrimination based on disability, the burden-shifting framework may be unnecessary and inappropriate.” Osborne, supra, 798 F.3d at 1266 n.6 (quoting Morgan v

2017For example, in Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260 , 1266 n.6 (10th Cir. 2015), the court stated that the McDonnell Douglas framework was inapplicable because the defendant “indisputably rescinded [the plaintiffs] job offer because of her disability.” The court relied on a prior holding that “[i]f the employer admits that the disability played a prominent part in the decision, or the plaintiff has other direct evidence of discrimination based on disability, the burden-shifting framework may be unnecessary and inappropriate.” Osborne, supra, 798 F.3d at 1266 n.6 (quoting Morgan v

2016In the rare case in which there is direct evidence of discrimination, “the McDonnell Douglas analysis does not apply.” A.D.P., supra, 428 N.J.Super. at 533 , 54 A.3d 813 (citing Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir.1996); Snyder v. Norfolk S. Ry.

2016In the rare case in which there is direct evidence of discrimination, “the McDonnell Douglas analysis does not apply.” A.D.P., supra, 428 N.J.Super. at 533 , 54 A.3d 813 (citing Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir.1996); Snyder v. Norfolk S. Ry.

2016Corp., 463 F.Supp.2d 528, 534 (E.D.Pa.2006), aff 'd, 271 Fed.Appx. 150 (3d Cir.2008)); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-22 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523, 533 (1985) (stating, in connection with claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§§ 621 to 634, that “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination”). “[T]he production of direct evidence of unlawful discrimination destroys ‘the ... presumption of good faith concerning ... employment decisions which is accorded employers

2016Corp., 463 F.Supp.2d 528, 534 (E.D.Pa.2006), aff 'd, 271 Fed.Appx. 150 (3d Cir.2008)); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 , 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-22 , 83 L.Ed.2d 523, 533 (1985) (stating, in connection with claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§§ 621 to 634, that “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination”). “[T]he production of direct evidence of unlawful discrimination destroys ‘the ... presumption of good faith concerning ... employment decisions which is accorded employers

2005In Petrusky , we made clear that "[t]he focal question is not necessarily how old or young the claimant or his replacement was, but rather whether the claimant's age, in any significant way, `made a difference' in the treatment he was accorded by his employer." Petrusky, supra, 342 N.J.Super. at 82 , 775 A. 2d 723 (citations omitted); see also Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l., 766 F. 2d 788 , 792 (3d Cir.1985) ("[T]he fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test could be satisfied by proof of either replacement by someone outside the protected class or by someone younger or by other proof that the

2005In Petrusky , we made clear that "[t]he focal question is not necessarily how old or young the claimant or his replacement was, but rather whether the claimant's age, in any significant way, `made a difference' in the treatment he was accorded by his employer." Petrusky, supra, 342 N.J.Super. at 82 , 775 A. 2d 723 (citations omitted); see also Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l., 766 F. 2d 788 , 792 (3d Cir.1985) ("[T]he fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test could be satisfied by proof of either replacement by someone outside the protected class or by someone younger or by other proof that the

2010Although most employment discrimination claims proceed in accordance with the McDonnell Douglas 9 burden-shifting paradigm, see Goodman v. London Metals Exch., 86 N.J. 19, 81-32 , 429 A.2d 341 (1981) (utilizing McDonnell Douglas framework); Peper v. Princeton Univ.

2010Although most employment discrimination claims proceed in accordance with the McDonnell Douglas 9 burden-shifting paradigm, see Goodman v. London Metals Exch., 86 N.J. 19, 81-32 , 429 A.2d 341 (1981) (utilizing McDonnell Douglas framework); Peper v. Princeton Univ.

2010Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 82-83 , 389 A.2d 465 (1978) (embracing McDonnell Douglas framework), the first step in that analysis requires plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she can meet each of the elements of the prima facie case.

2010Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 82-83 , 389 A.2d 465 (1978) (embracing McDonnell Douglas framework), the first step in that analysis requires plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she can meet each of the elements of the prima facie case.

2000Because the first two stages of a McDonnell Douglas test seem to require findings of law, and since McDonnell Douglas itself arose in the context of a summary judgment, the Appellate Division has stated that many courts that "have considered the issue have determined that, in an employment discrimination case, it is either unnecessary or incorrect to charge the jury on the elements and burden shifting." Baker v. National State Bank, 312 N.J.Super. 268 , 711 A. 2d 917 (App.Div.1998)(citing cases), aff'd on other grounds, 161 N.J. 220, 732 [736] A. 2d 462 (1999).

2000Because the first two stages of a McDonnell Douglas test seem to require findings of law, and since McDonnell Douglas itself arose in the context of a summary judgment, the Appellate Division has stated that many courts that "have considered the issue have determined that, in an employment discrimination case, it is either unnecessary or incorrect to charge the jury on the elements and burden shifting." Baker v. National State Bank, 312 N.J.Super. 268 , 711 A. 2d 917 (App.Div.1998)(citing cases), aff'd on other grounds, 161 N.J. 220, 732 [736] A. 2d 462 (1999).

1990Thus, when a complainant is not a member of the minority, courts have generally modified the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas standard to require the plaintiff to show that he has been victimized by an “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Livingston v. Roadway Express, 802 F. 2d 1250, 1252 (10th *552 Cir.1986); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., supra, 770 F.2d at 67; Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir.1985); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C.Cir.1981); Jones v. Slater Steels Corp., 660 F.Supp. 1570, 1575 (

1990Thus, when a complainant is not a member of the minority, courts have generally modified the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas standard to require the plaintiff to show that he has been victimized by an “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Livingston v. Roadway Express, 802 F. 2d 1250, 1252 (10th *552 Cir.1986); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., supra, 770 F.2d at 67; Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir.1985); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C.Cir.1981); Jones v. Slater Steels Corp., 660 F.Supp. 1570, 1575 (

2026Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J.

2026Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J.