McDonnell Douglas framework in Texas

2025If “jurisdictional evidence rebuts the prima facie case, the entire McDonnell Douglas framework is fully implicated, and sufficient evidence of pretext and causation must exist to survive the jurisdictional plea.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 783 .

2025If “jurisdictional evidence rebuts the prima facie case, the entire McDonnell Douglas framework is fully implicated, and sufficient evidence of pretext and causation must exist to survive the jurisdictional plea.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 783 .

2021Under this second method, Texas courts follow the burden- shifting mechanism set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802–05 (1973). 18 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, if an employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises.

2021Under this second method, Texas courts follow the burden- shifting mechanism set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802–05 (1973). 18 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, if an employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises.

2023Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 ; Toennies, 47 S.W.3d at 477 (discussing McDonnell Douglas framework).

2017In resolving disparate-treatment cases, the courts utilize the same McDonnell Douglas standard of shifting burdens that applies to retaliation cases, where "the burden of production shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant and then back to the plaintiff." Navy v. Coll. of the Mainland , 407 S.W.3d 893 , 898 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133 , 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097 , 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ; McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802 -05 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824-26 ).

2021While the particular elements of a prima facie case vary depending on the circumstances, the plaintiff’s burden at the first stage is “not onerous.” Id. (noting the McDonnell Douglas presumption is “merely an evidence-producing mechanism”).

2021While the particular elements of a prima facie case vary depending on the circumstances, the plaintiff’s burden at the first stage is “not onerous.” Id. (noting the McDonnell Douglas presumption is “merely an evidence-producing mechanism”).

2025Alternatively, it may refer to “the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 254 n.7 (1981) (discussing McDonnell Douglas framework).

2018“The McDonnell Douglas presumption is ‘merely an evidence-producing mechanism that can aid the plaintiff in his ultimate task of proving illegal discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. (citing Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 , 1292-93 (11th Cir. 1999)).

2007Travis v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Texas, 122 F.3d 259, 263 (5th Cir.1997).

2007Travis v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Texas, 122 F.3d 259, 263 (5th Cir.1997).

2024See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (explaining that McDonnell-Douglas test is inapplicable when plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination); Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 784 (explaining that burden-shifting framework is “a mechanism for proving discriminatory intent absent direct evidence”).

2015Bank of New Albany, Miss., 34 F.3d 329 -30 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1984)).

2024See id. at 433–34.

2024See id. at 433–34.

2023See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 137 (addressing whether judgment as a matter of law was appropriate); Toennies, 47 S.W.3d at 481–82 (evaluating legal sufficiency of evidence).

2023Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 ; Toennies, 47 S.W.3d at 477 (discussing McDonnell Douglas framework).

2012Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that the Fifth Circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas framework to age discrimination cases).

2012Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that the Fifth Circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas framework to age discrimination cases).

2025Though TCHRA claims of race or sex discrimination are often analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment stage,15 when a discrimination 14 The TCHRA reflects “the Legislature[’s] ‘inten[t] to correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination cases,’” so “we look to federal law to interpret the [statute’s] provisions.” AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Ysleta Indep.

2025Though TCHRA claims of race or sex discrimination are often analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment stage,15 when a discrimination 14 The TCHRA reflects “the Legislature[’s] ‘inten[t] to correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination cases,’” so “we look to federal law to interpret the [statute’s] provisions.” AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Ysleta Indep.

2016Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2012). 9 (5th Cir. 1998) (not selected for publication) (concluding that evidence that supervisor referred to plaintiff as an “old man” and told him “you don't need this job” only implied discrimination, and did not provide direct evidence of discrimination; therefore plaintiff was required to demonstrate discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework).

2016Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2012). 9 (5th Cir. 1998) (not selected for publication) (concluding that evidence that supervisor referred to plaintiff as an “old man” and told him “you don't need this job” only implied discrimination, and did not provide direct evidence of discrimination; therefore plaintiff was required to demonstrate discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework).

2015Michael v. City of Dallas, 314 S.W.3d 687, 690-91 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). *235 “The McDonnell Douglas presumption is merely an evidence-producing mechanism that can aid the plaintiff in his ultimate task of proving illegal discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.” Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 634 (quotations omitted).

2015Michael v. City of Dallas, 314 S.W.3d 687, 690-91 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). *235 “The McDonnell Douglas presumption is merely an evidence-producing mechanism that can aid the plaintiff in his ultimate task of proving illegal discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.” Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 634 (quotations omitted).

2011See e.g., Dias v. Goodman Manufacturing Company, L.P., 214 S.W.3d 672, 676-77 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework in a retaliation case where summary judgment granted in favor of employer).

2011See e.g. , Dias v. Goodman Manufacturing Company, L.P. , 214 S.W.3d 672, 676-77 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)(applying McDonnell Douglas framework in a retaliation case where summary judgment granted in favor of employer).

2009See also Bauer v. Albemarle Corp. , 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff in ADEA case to establish prima facie case of discrimination as described in McDonnell Douglas ). 6.

2009See also Bauer v. Albemarle Corp. , 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff in ADEA case to establish prima facie case of discrimination as described in McDonnell Douglas ). 6.

2006Id. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825 ; see also Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying McDonnell Douglas test); Vaughn v. Edel , 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).

2006Id. at 804 , 93 S.Ct. at 1825 ; see *758 also Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir.1994) (applying McDonnell Douglas test); Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir.1990) (same).

2006Id. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825 ; see also Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying McDonnell Douglas test); Vaughn v. Edel , 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).

2006Id. at 804 , 93 S.Ct. at 1825 ; see *758 also Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir.1994) (applying McDonnell Douglas test); Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir.1990) (same).

2004Compare Sanders v. City of Montgomery, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1314 (M.D.

2004Compare Sanders v. City of Montgomery, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1314 (M.D.

2003See id. at 252-53; see also Walther, 952 F.2d at 122-23 .

2003See id. at 252-53; see also Walther, 952 F.2d at 122-23 .

2020Id. “[W]hen the plaintiff offers proof that the employer’s articulated reasons are false, the dispute must then be submitted to a jury to decide.” Russo v. Smith Intern., Inc., 93 S.W.3d 428, 438 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).

2020Id. “[W]hen the plaintiff offers proof that the employer’s articulated reasons are false, the dispute must then be submitted to a jury to decide.” Russo v. Smith Intern., Inc., 93 S.W.3d 428, 438 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).

2024The final step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis is to determine whether the “proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Dabbasi v. Motiva Enters., L.L.C., 107 F.4th 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2024).

2024The final step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis is to determine whether the “proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Dabbasi v. Motiva Enters., L.L.C., 107 F.4th 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2024).

2023Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2001); see Sepulveda, 2023 WL 2529747 , at *5 (reviewing whether plaintiff met objective hiring criteria).

2023See Remaley v. TA Operating LLC, 561 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

2023See Remaley v. TA Operating LLC, 561 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

2023See Leffel, 113 F.3d at 793–94 (setting out the causation element as requiring proof that the circumstances surrounding the employee’s discharge “indicate that it is more likely than not that her disability was the reason for [the] adverse actions” and explaining that “the nature of the proof giving rise to the requisite inference of discrimination cannot be reduced to a formula that will serve any and all discrimination cases”).

2023See Leffel, 113 F.3d at 793–94 (setting out the causation element as requiring proof that the circumstances surrounding the employee’s discharge “indicate that it is more likely than not that her disability was the reason for [the] adverse actions” and explaining that “the nature of the proof giving rise to the requisite inference of discrimination cannot be reduced to a formula that will serve any and all discrimination cases”).

2023See City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Tex. 2000) (treating failure to promote as an adverse employment action); Esparza v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 471 S.W.3d 903, 909 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2015 , no pet.) (“Employment decisions actionable as adverse employment actions include decisions to hire, discharge, promote, and compensate.”). 6 544 S.W.3d at 782 .

2023See City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Tex. 2000) (treating failure to promote as an adverse employment action); Esparza v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 471 S.W.3d 903, 909 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2015 , no pet.) (“Employment decisions actionable as adverse employment actions include decisions to hire, discharge, promote, and compensate.”). 6 544 S.W.3d at 782 .