cited rule in Florida

1978Accordingly, under the above cited rule and under the authority of Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1971) a hearing to determine the defendant's mental condition should have been held.

1974Brock v. State, Fla. 1954, 69 So.2d 344, 346 ; Fowler v. State, Fla. 1971, 255 So.2d 513 .

2019In Torrenga, we pointed out that “[u]nder Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), a party can seek relief from a final judgment based on mistake or excusable neglect, while Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a) allows for rehearing or a new trial.” Torrenga, 153 So. 3d at 953 .

2012Id. at 220 .

2008Id. at 385 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 .

2008Id. at 385 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 .

2004Id.

1998In Aldebot , the court cited the rule set forth in Yeats v. Moody, 128 Fla. 658, 661 , 175 So. 719, 720 (1937), as follows: It is well settled that where services are rendered by one person for another which are knowingly and voluntarily accepted, without more, the law presumes that such services are given and received in the expectation of being paid for, and will imply a promise to pay what they are reasonably worth. 534 So.2d at 1217 .

1997In State v. Pennington, 534 So.2d 393 (Fla.1988), the supreme court noted that the above cited rule expressly states that a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case is not waived by the defendant's subsequent introduction of evidence if properly preserved by a motion at the close of all the evidence.

1991Rooney, Inc., 342 So.2d 121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). 390 So.2d at 106 .

1991In Ogur v. Mogel, 390 So.2d 105 , the third district held that an order entered on summary judgment determining the order in which the liability insurance coverage of the two defendants would be applied to satisfy any judgment the plaintiff may obtain against them was not an appealable non-final order under the cited rule, reasoning that the trial court's order, setting forth the future indemnity rights of the defendants and the sequence in which the defendants would be responsible to pay any judgment in favor of Mogel, (a) did not determine an "issue of liability," since the liability of any

1991In Ogur v. Mogel, 390 So.2d 105 , the third district held that an order entered on summary judgment determining the order in which the liability insurance coverage of the two defendants would be applied to satisfy any judgment the plaintiff may obtain against them was not an appealable non-final order under the cited rule, reasoning that the trial court's order, setting forth the future indemnity rights of the defendants and the sequence in which the defendants would be responsible to pay any judgment in favor of Mogel, (a) did not determine an "issue of liability," since the liability of any

1991In Ogur v. Mogel, 390 So.2d 105 , the third district held that an order entered on summary judgment determining the order in which the liability insurance coverage of the two defendants would be applied to satisfy any judgment the plaintiff may obtain against them was not an appealable non-final order under the cited rule, reasoning that the trial court's order, setting forth the future indemnity rights of the defendants and the sequence in which the defendants would be responsible to pay any judgment in favor of Mogel, (a) did not determine an "issue of liability," since the liability of any

1991Rooney, Inc., 342 So.2d 121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). 390 So.2d at 106 .

1991In Ogur v. Mogel, 390 So.2d 105 , the third district held that an order entered on summary judgment determining the order in which the liability insurance coverage of the two defendants would be applied to satisfy any judgment the plaintiff may obtain against them was not an appealable non-final order under the cited rule, reasoning that the trial court's order, setting forth the future indemnity rights of the defendants and the sequence in which the defendants would be responsible to pay any judgment in favor of Mogel, (a) did not determine an "issue of liability," since the liability of any

1991In Ogur v. Mogel, 390 So.2d 105 , the third district held that an order entered on summary judgment determining the order in which the liability insurance coverage of the two defendants would be applied to satisfy any judgment the plaintiff may obtain against them was not an appealable non-final order under the cited rule, reasoning that the trial court's order, setting forth the future indemnity rights of the defendants and the sequence in which the defendants would be responsible to pay any judgment in favor of Mogel, (a) did not determine an "issue of liability," since the liability of any

1991In Ogur v. Mogel, 390 So.2d 105 , the third district held that an order entered on summary judgment determining the order in which the liability insurance coverage of the two defendants would be applied to satisfy any judgment the plaintiff may obtain against them was not an appealable non-final order under the cited rule, reasoning that the trial court's order, setting forth the future indemnity rights of the defendants and the sequence in which the defendants would be responsible to pay any judgment in favor of Mogel, (a) did not determine an "issue of liability," since the liability of any

1991Kiser v. Jones, 488 So.2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and cases cited.

1991Kinsey v. Skyline Corp., 395 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

1985We concur with appellant’s arguments as to Point I on appeal under the authority and rationale of Spinner v Wainer, 430 So.2d 595 (4th DCA 1983).

1983However, Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 1983) has now explained or receded from Hegstrom to the extent that Hegstrom was interpreted to permit multiple convictions for lesser included offenses in single trial settings. 437 So.2d at 1060 .

1983However, Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 1983) has now explained or receded from Hegstrom to the extent that Hegstrom was interpreted to permit multiple convictions for lesser included offenses in single trial settings. 437 So.2d at 1060 .

1983NOTES [1] This court properly receded from the authority of McRae for the cited principle on the authority of State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).

1980Crim.P. 3.850, citing Engel v. State, 353 So.2d 593 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), and Jenrette v. State, 373 So.2d 718 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), in which, as to questions that were raised on appeals relating to the propriety or legality of sentences, the sentences were affirmed without prejudice to the appellants-defendants to seek post-conviction relief from the sentences in those regards under the above cited rule.

1980In opposing that contention of the State the appellant cites Noble v. State, 353 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1978), as support for the argument that notwithstanding failure of the defendant to have challenged the sentences when made, for failure of the court to give credit for time for which the defendant claims entitlement, such challenge to the sentences when presented on appeal should be considered and decided by the appellate court.

1980Crim.P. 3.850, citing Engel v. State, 353 So.2d 593 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), and Jenrette v. State, 373 So.2d 718 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), in which, as to questions that were raised on appeals relating to the propriety or legality of sentences, the sentences were affirmed without prejudice to the appellants-defendants to seek post-conviction relief from the sentences in those regards under the above cited rule.

1979In addition the order appealed properly notes a distinction between the statutory provision for a minimum term of sentence which was involved in the present case, and the specific reference in the cited rule to a penalty which is both minimum and mandatory: Both present counsel and former counsel cite Norris v. State, 343 So.2d 964 (1st DCA 1977) which the Court finds does not apply in this case.