cited standard in Pennsylvania

2023Instead, observing the facts were “almost identical” to those in Shambe and a United States Supreme Court case, Green v. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railway Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907), the Law Court explained both decisions “held that the defendant could not be served within the County or State in question since it was not ‘doing business’ therein.” Law, 79 A.2d at 254 (emphasis partially omitted).

2023The Court also cited the rule “that in the absence of a statute to the contrary, public property used for public purposes is exempt from taxation . . . and no express exemption law is needed.” Id. (quoting Se.

2019Responsively, we reiterate that Section 9(a) simply does not provide for Option C reimbursement. 7 The Darling’s court cited the principle that “statutes in derogation of a natural or common right, including statutes that ‘threaten [] to invade an existing property or contract right’ must be narrowly interpreted.” Id. (quoting NORMAN J.

2016“Each case differs in the complexity of the issues presented, the seriousness of the charges, the number of charges to be considered, the amount of testimony to be digested and reviewed . . . [to determine whether to] accept the jury's conclusion that they were hopelessly deadlocked.” Chester, supra (citing Commonwealth v. Monte, 329 A.2d 836, 841 (Pa. 1974)).

2015Among the reasons the Court cited was the doctrine of separation of powers, pointing to the General Assembly’s taxing and spending powers under Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 44 and the speech and debate clause in Article II, Section 15. 45 Finn, 990 A.2d at 106 .

2014In Appellant’s direct appeal, this Court cited the standard instruction to be given in such circumstances. 2 Charleston, 16 A.3d at 528 , citing Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 563 Pa. 533 , 763 A.2d 359, 365 (2000).

2014In Appellant’s direct appeal, this Court cited the standard instruction to be given in such circumstances. 2 Charleston, 16 A.3d at 528 , citing Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 563 Pa. 533 , 763 A.2d 359, 365 (2000).

2002It cites Korn v. Epstein, 727 A.2d 1130 (Pa.Super.1999), where the court cited the requirement of Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a) that the argument section of a brief be divided into as many sections as there are questions to be argued "followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent” and where the court deemed a particular issue waived when an appropriate argument was not developed.

2002The Court also found persuasive the fact that appellant “did not handle either cash or marijuana, did not enter into negotiations or delivery and was present only passively during the ride to Shiner’s residence and thereafter.” Id. ¶ 20 In its analysis the Court discussed the fact that appellant was acting as an agent for the buyer.

2001In Kupetz , where neither causation nor damages were at issue on appeal, 16 this Court cited the standard enunciated by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D.Pa.1992), and Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa.1990), which both adopted the approach set forth in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976). ¶ 13 I agree with the Stechers’ position that the issue of whether a plaintiff in a crashworthiness/second collision case must quantify the extent of enhanced injuries resu

2001In Kupetz , where neither causation nor damages were at issue on appeal, [16] this Court cited the standard enunciated by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D.Pa.1992), and Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa.1990), which both adopted the approach set forth in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976). ¶ 13 I agree with the Stechers' position that the issue of whether a plaintiff in a crashworthiness/second collision case must quantify the extent of enhanced injuries re

2001Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d 88 (1st Cir.1999).

2001Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d 88 (1st Cir.1999).

2001In Kupetz , where neither causation nor damages were at issue on appeal, 16 this Court cited the standard enunciated by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D.Pa.1992), and Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa.1990), which both adopted the approach set forth in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976). ¶ 13 I agree with the Stechers’ position that the issue of whether a plaintiff in a crashworthiness/second collision case must quantify the extent of enhanced injuries resu

2001In Kupetz , where neither causation nor damages were at issue on appeal, [16] this Court cited the standard enunciated by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D.Pa.1992), and Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa.1990), which both adopted the approach set forth in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976). ¶ 13 I agree with the Stechers' position that the issue of whether a plaintiff in a crashworthiness/second collision case must quantify the extent of enhanced injuries re

2001In Kupetz , where neither causation nor damages were at issue on appeal, 16 this Court cited the standard enunciated by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D.Pa.1992), and Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa.1990), which both adopted the approach set forth in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976). ¶ 13 I agree with the Stechers’ position that the issue of whether a plaintiff in a crashworthiness/second collision case must quantify the extent of enhanced injuries resu

2001In Kupetz , where neither causation nor damages were at issue on appeal, [16] this Court cited the standard enunciated by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D.Pa.1992), and Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa.1990), which both adopted the approach set forth in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976). ¶ 13 I agree with the Stechers' position that the issue of whether a plaintiff in a crashworthiness/second collision case must quantify the extent of enhanced injuries re

1985Turner v. Smith, 237 Pa.Super. 161 , 346 A.2d 806 (1975).

1985Turner v. Smith, 237 Pa.Super. 161 , 346 A.2d 806 (1975).

1984In such cases it is the second or subsequent offense that is punished, not the first.” In Spahler v. Colman, 379 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1980), petitioner was denied bail because of previous convictions and in denying the petition for writ of habe-as corpus, the court held: “The test for whether or not application of the cited rule and statute to the petitioner is unconstitu tional because “ex post facto” in effect, depends on whether or not both felony offenses were committed prior to the effective date of the rule and statute.

1958The time-tested rejoinder to the above contention is contained in the same case where on p. 253 it is stated: . . the doctrine does not extend to benefits which by their very nature cannot be surrendered and the retention of which is, therefore, not voluntary, as, for example, paved highways or improvements upon buildings . . .” In Charleroi Lumber Company v. Bentleyville Borough School District, 334 Pa. 424, 433 , 6 A. 2d 88 , the construction of a building for a municipality is encompassed by the cited rule.

1958The time-tested rejoinder to the above contention is contained in the same case where on p. 253 it is stated: . . the doctrine does not extend to benefits which by their very nature cannot be surrendered and the retention of which is, therefore, not voluntary, as, for example, paved highways or improvements upon buildings . . .” In Charleroi Lumber Company v. Bentleyville Borough School District, 334 Pa. 424, 433 , 6 A. 2d 88 , the construction of a building for a municipality is encompassed by the cited rule.