cited standard in Washington

2018App. at 44 (citing SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 158 Wn.2d 422 , 433 n.7, 144 P.3d 1160 (2006)). 6 No. 51047-2-II Accordingly, to establish its prima facie case in regard to a serious violation of a WISHA regulation, the Department must prove each of the following elements: (1) the cited standard applies; (2) the requirements of the standard were not met; (3) employees were exposed to, or had access to, the violative condition; (4) the employer knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the violative condition; and (5) ‘there is a substantial proba

2014WAC 263-12--115(2)(b); SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 158 Wn.2d 422, 433 , 144 P.3d 1160 (2006). ¶23 To establish a serious violation of a WISHA safety regulation, the Department carries the burden to prove: “(1) the cited standard applies; (2) the requirements of the standard were not met; (3) employees were exposed to, or had access to, the violative condition; (4) the employer knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the violative condition; and (5) there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from the vio

2018App. at 44 (citing SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 158 Wn.2d 422 , 433 n.7, 144 P.3d 1160 (2006)). 6 No. 51047-2-II Accordingly, to establish its prima facie case in regard to a serious violation of a WISHA regulation, the Department must prove each of the following elements: (1) the cited standard applies; (2) the requirements of the standard were not met; (3) employees were exposed to, or had access to, the violative condition; (4) the employer knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the violative condition; and (5) ‘there is a substantial proba

2014WAC 263-12--115(2)(b); SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 158 Wn.2d 422, 433 , 144 P.3d 1160 (2006). ¶23 To establish a serious violation of a WISHA safety regulation, the Department carries the burden to prove: “(1) the cited standard applies; (2) the requirements of the standard were not met; (3) employees were exposed to, or had access to, the violative condition; (4) the employer knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the violative condition; and (5) there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from the vio

2019Coluccio Constr., 181 Wn.

2018Co. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 181 Wn.

2023App. at 21 (quoting Pilchuck Contractors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 170 Wn.

2015If the Department charges a “serious” WISHA violation, as it did here, the Department must prove as part of its prima facie case “(1) the cited standard applies; (2) the requirements of the standard were not met; (3) employees were exposed to, or had access to, the violative condition; (4) the employer knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the violative condition; and (5) there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from the violative condition.” Pilchuck, 170 Wn.

2015The court cited the rule at common law that not only is a defendant entitled to be free of shackles at trial, "prior to 1722, when a prisoner was arraigned or appeared at the bar of the court to plead, he was presented without manacles or bonds, unless there was evident danger of his escape." Id. at 49 .

2015The court cited the rule at common law that not only is a defendant entitled to be free of shackles at trial, “prior to 1722, when a prisoner was arraigned or appeared at the bar of the court to plead, he was presented without manacles or bonds, unless there was evident danger of his escape.” Id. at 49 .

2001There this court cited the rule that "[e]vidence connecting another person with the crime charged is not admissible *23 unless there is a train of facts or circumstances which tend clearly to point to someone other than the defendant as the guilty party." Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 734 , 940 P.2d 1239 (citing Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 316 , 868 P.2d 835 ).

2001There this court cited the rule that “[e]vidence connecting another person with the crime charged is not admissible unless there is a train of facts or circumstances which tend clearly to point to someone other than the defendant as the guilty party.” Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 734 (citing Lord, 123 Wn.2d at 316 ).

2001There this court cited the rule that "[e]vidence connecting another person with the crime charged is not admissible *23 unless there is a train of facts or circumstances which tend clearly to point to someone other than the defendant as the guilty party." Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 734 , 940 P.2d 1239 (citing Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 316 , 868 P.2d 835 ).

2001There this court cited the rule that “[e]vidence connecting another person with the crime charged is not admissible unless there is a train of facts or circumstances which tend clearly to point to someone other than the defendant as the guilty party.” Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 734 (citing Lord, 123 Wn.2d at 316 ).

2001The only Washington case that cites the statute is Division Three of the Court of Appeals’ DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd,., 100 Wn.

2001The cited rule applies to "others," i.e., persons not in the employ of the independent contractor. [3] The only Washington case that cites the statute is Division Three's DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd., 100 Wash.App. 885 , 1 P.3d 587 (2000).

1996R.R., 352 U.S. 59 , 77 S. Ct. 161, 165 , 1 L.

1996R.R., 352 U.S. 59 , 77 S. Ct. 161, 165 , 1 L.

1996The court cited the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and found that the doctrine applies "where, even though a claim originally may be cognizable in the courts, the enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues within the particular competence of an administrative body.” Id. at 656 (citing United States v. Western Pac.

1996The court cited the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and found that the doctrine applies "where, even though a claim originally may be cognizable in the courts, the enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues within the particular competence of an administrative body." Id. at 656 , 763 P.2d 206 (citing United States v. Western Pac.

2025Id. 35 No. 59710-1-II Unlike the defendant in Brown, Chhim had no chance to vacillate on his request to proceed as a self-represented litigant because the trial court denied Chhim’s request.

2023SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE BOARD’S FINDING THAT, THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE, KUNEY COULD HAVE KNOWN THAT ITS WORKER WAS VIOLATING SAFETY REGULATIONS When the Department charges a serious WISHA violation it must prove, as part of its prima facie case, that “‘(1) the cited standard applies; (2) the requirements of the standard were not met; (3) employees were exposed to, or had access to, the violative condition; (4) the employer knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the violative condition; and (5) there is a substantial probability

2017The court cited the principle that on a partial or incomplete record, appellate courts will presume a conceivable state of facts consistent with the record that will "' sustain and support the ruling or decision complained of" rather than presume facts'" for the purpose of finding reversible error."' Id. at 123-24 (quoting Barker v. Weeks, 182 Wash. 384,391 , 47 P.2d 1 (1935).

2017The court cited the principle that on a partial or incomplete record, appellate courts will presume a conceivable state of facts consistent with the record that will "' sustain and support the ruling or decision complained of" rather than presume facts'" for the purpose of finding reversible error."' Id. at 123-24 (quoting Barker v. Weeks, 182 Wash. 384,391 , 47 P.2d 1 (1935).

2017The court cited the principle that on a partial or incomplete record, appellate courts will presume a conceivable state of facts consistent with the record that will "' sustain and support the ruling or decision complained of" rather than presume facts'" for the purpose of finding reversible error."' Id. at 123-24 (quoting Barker v. Weeks, 182 Wash. 384,391 , 47 P.2d 1 (1935).

2015App. at 518 (quoting Express Constr., 151 Wn.

2014Mowat, 148 Wn.

2014Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 145 Wn.

2013Mac Amusement, 95 Wn.2d at 966 .

2001The cited rule applies to "others," i.e., persons not in the employ of the independent contractor. [3] The only Washington case that cites the statute is Division Three's DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd., 100 Wash.App. 885 , 1 P.3d 587 (2000).

2001There this court cited the rule that "[e]vidence connecting another person with the crime charged is not admissible *23 unless there is a train of facts or circumstances which tend clearly to point to someone other than the defendant as the guilty party." Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 734 , 940 P.2d 1239 (citing Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 316 , 868 P.2d 835 ).

2001After reviewing the record, this court concluded, "Nothing in the record before this Court, except for the unsubstantiated suspicions voiced by the Defendant, tends to point to anyone else as the murderer." Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 734-35 , 940 P.2d 1239 .

1992App. 135, 148 , 758 P.2d 13 (1988), which is a sex offense case in which future dangerousness was considered. [10] Barnes , at 716 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). [11] 115 Wn.2d 445 , 799 P.2d 244 (1990). [12] Noted at 118 Wn.2d 1015 (1992). [13] See RCW 9.94A.340. [14] 62 Wn.

1992The court cited the analysis of Weaver , and In re George, 52 Wn.

1992The court cited the analysis of Weaver, and In re George, 52 Wn.

1992App. 135, 148 , 758 P.2d 13 (1988), which is a sex offense case in which future dangerousness was considered. [10] Barnes , at 716 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). [11] 115 Wn.2d 445 , 799 P.2d 244 (1990). [12] Noted at 118 Wn.2d 1015 (1992). [13] See RCW 9.94A.340. [14] 62 Wn.

1992App. 135, 148 , 758 P.2d 13 (1988), which is a sex offense case in which future dangerousness was considered. [10] Barnes , at 716 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). [11] 115 Wn.2d 445 , 799 P.2d 244 (1990). [12] Noted at 118 Wn.2d 1015 (1992). [13] See RCW 9.94A.340. [14] 62 Wn.

1989State v. Mortrud, 89 Wn.2d at 721 ; see also State v. Alberts, 51 Wn.

1980State v. Hartzog, supra at 588 , citing State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368 , 226 S.E.2d 353 (1976). [1] Here, the record discloses that most of the above cited factors were considered by the trial court.

1980State v. Hartzog, supra at 588 , citing State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368 , 226 S.E.2d 353 (1976). [1] Here, the record discloses that most of the above cited factors were considered by the trial court.

1980Great reliance was placed by the Nelson court on Owens v. Seattle, 49 Wn.2d 187, 191 , 299 P.2d 560 , 61 A.L.R.2d 417 (1956), where the court stated: A municipality is ... obligated to exercise ordinary care to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition for persons using them in a proper manner and exercising due care for their own safety. *133 (Italics ours.) The cited rule was correct when contributory negligence was a complete defense to a tort claim, but is not applicable since this state adopted comparative negligence.

1980Great reliance was placed by the Nelson court on Owens v. Seattle, 49 Wn.2d 187, 191 , 299 P.2d 560 , 61 A.L.R.2d 417 (1956), where the court stated: A municipality is ... obligated to exercise ordinary care to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition for persons using them in a proper manner and exercising due care for their own safety. *133 (Italics ours.) The cited rule was correct when contributory negligence was a complete defense to a tort claim, but is not applicable since this state adopted comparative negligence.