cited rule in California

2017In Franzen , there was "a complete failure of proof with respect to the use and reliance components of the cited exception." ( *940 Franzen, supra , 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214 , 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 .) The officer was not "asked to explain what use he made of it, or what use the department or other 'businesses' had made of similar information in the past.

2017In Franzen , there was "a complete failure of proof with respect to the use and reliance components of the cited exception." ( *940 Franzen, supra , 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214 , 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 .) The officer was not "asked to explain what use he made of it, or what use the department or other 'businesses' had made of similar information in the past.

2023To the extent that he argues that the instructions incorrectly stated the standard for causation as a matter of law, his judgment 3 The California Supreme Court recently cited the following instruction with approval: “ ‘[A] “cause of death of [the victim] is an act or omission that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the act or omission the death of [the decedent] and without which the death would not occur.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130 , 1138.) The court cited this instruction in holding that the trial cou

2023To the extent that he argues that the instructions incorrectly stated the standard for causation as a matter of law, his judgment 3 The California Supreme Court recently cited the following instruction with approval: “ ‘[A] “cause of death of [the victim] is an act or omission that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the act or omission the death of [the decedent] and without which the death would not occur.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130 , 1138.) The court cited this instruction in holding that the trial cou

2021As the Supreme Court explained, the appellate court in Durant “found that the three crimes did not come within the ‘same occasion/same operative facts’ exception despite the fact that defendant had committed all the offenses at the same general location (a housing complex), against what arguably might be deemed the same group of victims (persons in the housing complex whom he burglarized or attempted to 7The court distinguished Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th 508 on the same basis.

2021As the Supreme Court explained, the appellate court in Durant “found that the three crimes did not come within the ‘same occasion/same operative facts’ exception despite the fact that defendant had committed all the offenses at the same general location (a housing complex), against what arguably might be deemed the same group of victims (persons in the housing complex whom he burglarized or attempted to 7The court distinguished Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th 508 on the same basis.

2021The court cited the analysis in People v. Durant (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1393 (Durant), where the defendant committed a burglary and two attempted burglaries by walking around a condominium complex and committing three crimes at three different houses.

2021The court cited the analysis in People v. Durant (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1393 (Durant), where the defendant committed a burglary and two attempted burglaries by walking around a condominium complex and committing three crimes at three different houses.

2016The trial court's order in that case had held that compelling disclosure was proper under Evidence Code section 999, which provides an exception to the physician-patient privilege. 14 ( City of Alhambra v. Superior Court, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 519 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 49 .) But the Court of Appeal held that the cited exception cannot be applied to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: " Section 999 is applicable only to article 6 of division 8, chapter 4 of the Evidence Code, the physician-patient privilege.

2016The trial court's order in that case had held that compelling disclosure was proper under Evidence Code section 999, which provides an exception to the physician-patient privilege. 14 ( City of Alhambra v. Superior Court, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 519 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 49 .) But the Court of Appeal held that the cited exception cannot be applied to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: " Section 999 is applicable only to article 6 of division 8, chapter 4 of the Evidence Code, the physician-patient privilege.

2014(Hart 1, supra, G039836.) And while the cited factors, as well as his age, may weigh in his favor, they do not outweigh the seriousness or numerousness of his crimes and victims (10 counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, 17 counts of second degree robbery, 10 counts of street terrorism, and 1 count of assault with a deadly weapon, with true findings he committed the conspiracy, robbery, and aggravated assault counts for the benefit of a criminal street gang and that a principal used a firearm in 15 of the offenses and that he personally used a gun in two of the counts).

2014(Hart 1, supra, G039836.) And while the cited factors, as well as his age, may weigh in his favor, they do not outweigh the seriousness or numerousness of his crimes and victims (10 counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, 17 counts of second degree robbery, 10 counts of street terrorism, and 1 count of assault with a deadly weapon, with true findings he committed the conspiracy, robbery, and aggravated assault counts for the benefit of a criminal street gang and that a principal used a firearm in 15 of the offenses and that he personally used a gun in two of the counts).

2006CDR, arguing the new standing provisions do not apply to pending cases, relies on the "well-established presumption that statutes apply prospectively in the absence of a clearly expressed contrary intent . . . ." ( Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1218 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ; see also Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 393 , 182 P.2d 159 ( Aetna Casualty ).) In response, and assuming for the sake of argument the cited presumption governs this case, Mervyn's contends the application of Proposition 64's standing provisions to pending cases is not "ret

2006CDR, arguing the new standing provisions do not apply to pending cases, relies on the "well-established presumption that statutes apply prospectively in the absence of a clearly expressed contrary intent . . . ." ( Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1218 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ; see also Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 393 , 182 P.2d 159 ( Aetna Casualty ).) In response, and assuming for the sake of argument the cited presumption governs this case, Mervyn's contends the application of Proposition 64's standing provisions to pending cases is not "ret

2004Defendant attempts to characterize and then attack plaintiff's fraud theory as "fraud on the market," a concept developed under federal securities law, which the court in Mirkin, supra, 5 Cal.4th 1082 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 , 858 P.2d 568 , refused to import into our common law of torts.

2004Defendant attempts to characterize and then attack plaintiff's fraud theory as "fraud on the market," a concept developed under federal securities law, which the court in Mirkin, supra, 5 Cal.4th 1082 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 , 858 P.2d 568 , refused to import into our common law of torts.

2004Proc., § 647.) The cited rule applies only to instructions containing "an incorrect statement of the law, in contrast to a claim that the instruction is too general or incomplete." ( U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1431, 1447 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 533 ; see National Medical Transportation Network v. Deloitte & Touche, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 412 at p. 428 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 720 .) Here the challenged instruction, which is part of BAJI No. 2.60, told the jury that it "should consider all of the evidence bearing upon every issue, regardless of who produced it." (Italics a

2004Proc., § 647.) The cited rule applies only to instructions containing "an incorrect statement of the law, in contrast to a claim that the instruction is too general or incomplete." ( U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1431, 1447 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 533 ; see National Medical Transportation Network v. Deloitte & Touche, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 412 at p. 428 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 720 .) Here the challenged instruction, which is part of BAJI No. 2.60, told the jury that it "should consider all of the evidence bearing upon every issue, regardless of who produced it." (Italics a

2023Closing this “ ‘loophole,’ ” the 2001 amendment would ensure that “ ‘apartment units that have remained rentals would be subject to local rent control laws.’ ” ( Burien, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1046– 1047.) The court assessed the parties’ proffered interpretations of section 1954.52(a)(1) against what the court took to be the purpose of the exemption. 10 ( Burien, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1047–1048.) The court explained, “[w]hen a building is constructed, added on to, or altered, a certificate of occupancy is generated at the conclusion of all inspections to certify that the buildin

2023Closing this “ ‘loophole,’ ” the 2001 amendment would ensure that “ ‘apartment units that have remained rentals would be subject to local rent control laws.’ ” ( Burien, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1046– 1047.) The court assessed the parties’ proffered interpretations of section 1954.52(a)(1) against what the court took to be the purpose of the exemption. 10 ( Burien, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1047–1048.) The court explained, “[w]hen a building is constructed, added on to, or altered, a certificate of occupancy is generated at the conclusion of all inspections to certify that the buildin

2022Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th 1187 .

2022Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th 1187 .

2021(Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 953 .) “Beneath all three statutory pleading requirements lies a bedrock principle of due process,” namely that “ ‘ “[a] criminal defendant must be given fair notice of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity properly to prepare a defense and avoid unfair surprise at trial.” ’ [Citation.] This goes for sentence enhancements as well as substantive offenses: A defendant has the ‘right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

2021(Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 953 .) “Beneath all three statutory pleading requirements lies a bedrock principle of due process,” namely that “ ‘ “[a] criminal defendant must be given fair notice of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity properly to prepare a defense and avoid unfair surprise at trial.” ’ [Citation.] This goes for sentence enhancements as well as substantive offenses: A defendant has the ‘right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

2021He notes the statute expressly allows for modification of a sentence after a plea agreement, and he argues the court’s emphasis on the finality of judgments goes against public policy and the legislative intent underlying the law, citing Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 (a plea agreement is deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy).

2020(Id. at p. 768.) The court cited the waiver language in the Supreme Court’s opinion and noted that, “[a]lthough the court was not addressing the litigation privilege, its discussion suggests that breach of contract claims like the one advanced here have potential merit.” (Id. at p. 774.) In Wentland v. Wass (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1484 (Wentland) the court held that the litigation privilege did not bar a claim for breach of contract based on statements made in pleadings opposing a summary judgment motion.

2020Code, § 1200, subd. (a);3 further undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.) Unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, “hearsay evidence is inadmissible.” (§ 1200, subd. (b).) “ ‘The proponent of hearsay has to alert the court to the exception relied upon and has the burden of laying the proper foundation.’ ” (Scott S. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 326, 342 (Scott S.); Furman v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 416, 421 (Furman) [the proponent bears “the burden of ‘producing evidence sufficient to establish the necessary foundation

2016His argument based on Proposition 47 is essentially a modification of the argument in his opening brief addressing the determination of dangerousness under section 1170.126, subdivision (g). 15 of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” The cited clause enumerates eight particularly egregious felonies, sometimes referred to as “super strikes.”8 (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 682 .) Proposition 47 requires misdemeanor sentences for certain drug and theft related offenses that had been felonies or wobblers, unless the defendant has a prior

2015The trial court also cited Romero and Williams.5 The trial court explained the standard from the Williams case—whether a defendant should be deemed to be outside the spirit of the “Three Strikes” law due to the nature and circumstances of the present and prior convictions, 5 People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 . 37 and the particulars of the defendant’s background, character, and prospects.

2015As the trial court noted, the motion was made after the jury venire was empaneled, sworn, and “seconds from [entering] the courtroom.” Additionally, the court cited the standard under Maciel, supra, stating that “counsel appear[s] to be diligent at all stages of the matter,” and that new counsel would require substantial time to familiarize with the “complex case,” resulting in further delay.

2014(Id. at pp. 1568-1569.) The court of appeal reversed a judgment in favor of the long-distance carrier, holding the carrier had failed to mitigate its damages by failing to contact the boys’ parents after it learned of the first hacking incident. ( Thrifty-Tel, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1568-1569.) In its brief discussion of the issue, the court cited the rule a plaintiff cannot recover losses it could have avoided through reasonable efforts and explained: “Thrifty-Tel’s only response is that mitigation does not ‘ “require a complex series of doubtful acts and expenditures.” ’ Picking up the

2014(People v. Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) 16 Aguilar relies most heavily on People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 328 ], in which the defendant was seeking relief on grounds similar to those raised by Aguilar in this case.

2014(People v. Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) 16 Aguilar relies most heavily on People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 328 ], in which the defendant was seeking relief on grounds similar to those raised by Aguilar in this case.

2013“We „credit jurors with intelligence and common sense‟ [citation] and presume they generally understand and follow instructions [citation].” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670 .) The cited instruction regarding the use of Murphy‟s statements could not be any clearer.