cited rule in Ohio

2025The Court cited the factors in considering this request as specified by State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St. 2d 65, 67 , 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981).

2025The Court cited the factors in considering this request as specified by State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St. 2d 65, 67 , 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981).

2021Id. {¶149} The cited exception to the general rule is a “more elastic standard” called the “value to the owner” standard, and it applies “in exceptional circumstances” if the “market value cannot be feasibly obtained.” Bishop, 143 Ohio St. at 546 .

2021Id. {¶149} The cited exception to the general rule is a “more elastic standard” called the “value to the owner” standard, and it applies “in exceptional circumstances” if the “market value cannot be feasibly obtained.” Bishop, 143 Ohio St. at 546 .

2018HAZEL’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING FIRST. {¶ 13} Hazel’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel appears to be premised upon his argument that the State, during his 2011 trial, violated his right to due process by failing to provide him with exculpatory evidence, consisting of the DNA test results, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). {¶ 14} We begin by noting that, under certain circumstances, it is appropriate for a court to recast a motion t

2018HAZEL’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING FIRST. {¶ 13} Hazel’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel appears to be premised upon his argument that the State, during his 2011 trial, violated his right to due process by failing to provide him with exculpatory evidence, consisting of the DNA test results, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). {¶ 14} We begin by noting that, under certain circumstances, it is appropriate for a court to recast a motion t

2018And in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dougherty , 105 Ohio St.3d 307 , 2005-Ohio-1825 , 825 N.E.2d 1094 , ¶ 9, the court cited the rule for dismissals based on insufficient evidence and the decision in In re Complaint Against Harper , 77 Ohio St.3d 211 , 216, 673 N.E.2d 1253 (1996), in which the court recognized that it was not precluded from reviewing a panel's recommended dismissal.

2018And in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dougherty , 105 Ohio St.3d 307 , 2005-Ohio-1825 , 825 N.E.2d 1094 , ¶ 9, the court cited the rule for dismissals based on insufficient evidence and the decision in In re Complaint Against Harper , 77 Ohio St.3d 211 , 216, 673 N.E.2d 1253 (1996), in which the court recognized that it was not precluded from reviewing a panel's recommended dismissal.

2018And in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dougherty , 105 Ohio St.3d 307 , 2005-Ohio-1825 , 825 N.E.2d 1094 , ¶ 9, the court cited the rule for dismissals based on insufficient evidence and the decision in In re Complaint Against Harper , 77 Ohio St.3d 211 , 216, 673 N.E.2d 1253 (1996), in which the court recognized that it was not precluded from reviewing a panel's recommended dismissal.

2009The trial court stated that to establish fraud in this context, a buyer has to prove that a seller's agent had a duty to disclose any facts related to the property to a buyer and that a buyer could justifiably rely upon any such disclosure, especially when the buyer had the property inspected and accepted its condition "as is." In granting summary judgment to Realtor, the trial court found that Buyers did not produce "any evidence that [Realtors] failed to disclose the claimed property defects or intentionally and deliberately concealed facts about the property." {¶ 11} "The doctrine of caveat

2006State v. Heins, 72 Ohio St.3d 504 , 506 , 1995-Ohio-208 .

2006State v. Heins, 72 Ohio St.3d 504 , 506 , 1995-Ohio-208 .

2005Roark Cos., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 274 , the trial court did not state a factual basis for its finding that Allen was liable in his personal capacity, or its basis for finding Merle's Inc. liable as an "owner." Regarding both appellants' liability, the opinion states in full, "[Allen and Merle's Inc.] are in violation of the Toledo Municipal Code by failing to abate the nuisance at 1102 Girard, Toledo, Ohio, as requested by ordered dated July 30, 1999, December 9, 2002, and June 5, 2003. * * * [T]he court finds that there is an abundance of testimony and evidence to establish that Jimmy V.

2003Donnelly, 13 Ohio St.2d at 4 ; see, also, Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 539 , 544 . {¶ 13} In applying the above cited test, Appellants have contended that the actions of the Lorain City Council were administrative.

1999Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 , "other acts" evidence may be admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." The Supreme Court of Ohio expounded on the cited rule and statute in State v. Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277 , 281-282 , as follows: Because R.C. 2945.59 and Evid.R. 404(B) codify an exception to the common law with respect to evidence of other acts of wrongdoing, they must be construed against admissibility, and the standard for determining admissibility of such evidence is strict. * * * Neithe

1981Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 , followed.” In the case before this court, the trial court found that the affidavit did not meet the second prong of the above cited test in that the reliability of the undisclosed source was not established.