7 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Austingreen1 sentence2023Possession of a large quantity of drugs may be grave or serious, while possession of 3 In People v. Austin, 799 P.2d 408, 413 (Colo. App. 1990), a division of this court cited the rule that a sentencing court may consider dismissed charges and then stated, without analysis, that “it is appropriate for the court conducting the proportionality review to consider such factors.” Not only did Austin predate Wells-Yates by nearly three decades, but it did not address the fundamental differences between sentencing and proportionality review that we describe above. | 1 | 1 |
Dungaree Realty, Inc. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2009A. Legal St'andards Under the cited rule, we may award attorney fees if we determine an appeal is frivolous In Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.8d 289, 292 (Colo.App.2006), a division of this court noted that an appeal may be frivolous in two ways: *1220 First, where an appeal is taken in a case in which "the judgment by the tribunal below was so plainly correct and the legal authority contrary to appellant's position so clear that there is really no appealable issue," the appeal is held to be "frivolous as filed." Second, even in cases in which genuinely appealable issues may exist, so that t | 1 | 1 |
Cannon v. Oregon Moline Plow Co.green2 sentences2002Then, the court cited the rule derived from Hadley v. Baxendale for recovery of special damages [2] in a contract action: "Damages flowing from a conversion which are not ordinary, usual, or commonly to be expected are recoverable `if, under the circumstances, it can fairly be said that both parties have these consequences in contemplation at the time of the wrong complained of, as the probable result thereof, and if these unusual consequences are neither uncertain, unnatural, nor remote as to cause, nor speculative and conjectural in effect.'" 144 Colo. at 549 , 357 P.2d at 631 -32 (quoting C 2002Then, the court cited the rule derived from Hadley v. Baxendale for recovery of special damages [2] in a contract action: "Damages flowing from a conversion which are not ordinary, usual, or commonly to be expected are recoverable `if, under the circumstances, it can fairly be said that both parties have these consequences in contemplation at the time of the wrong complained of, as the probable result thereof, and if these unusual consequences are neither uncertain, unnatural, nor remote as to cause, nor speculative and conjectural in effect.'" 144 Colo. at 549 , 357 P.2d at 631 -32 (quoting C | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Industrial Commission v. Employers Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 147 , 230 P. at 114 . 2009Id. at 147 , 230 P. at 114 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Colorado Kenworth Corporation v. Whitworth
green
2 sentences2002Then, the court cited the rule derived from Hadley v. Baxendale for recovery of special damages [2] in a contract action: "Damages flowing from a conversion which are not ordinary, usual, or commonly to be expected are recoverable `if, under the circumstances, it can fairly be said that both parties have these consequences in contemplation at the time of the wrong complained of, as the probable result thereof, and if these unusual consequences are neither uncertain, unnatural, nor remote as to cause, nor speculative and conjectural in effect.'" 144 Colo. at 549 , 357 P.2d at 631 -32 (quoting C 2002Then, the court cited the rule derived from Hadley v. Baxendale for recovery of special damages [2] in a contract action: "Damages flowing from a conversion which are not ordinary, usual, or commonly to be expected are recoverable `if, under the circumstances, it can fairly be said that both parties have these consequences in contemplation at the time of the wrong complained of, as the probable result thereof, and if these unusual consequences are neither uncertain, unnatural, nor remote as to cause, nor speculative and conjectural in effect.'" 144 Colo. at 549 , 357 P.2d at 631 -32 (quoting C | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McPhee & McGinnity Co. v. Union Pac. R.
green
2 sentences1984“A privilege granted ... temporarily for the construction of a building upon an abutting lot, for a cab stand, an apple stand, or for any similar commercial purpose is a license and not a franchise.” Id. at 10 . 1984"A privilege granted ... temporarily for the construction of a building upon an abutting lot, for a cab stand, an apple stand, or for any similar commercial purpose is a license and not a franchise." Id. at 10 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
United States v. Stanley Spiegel, Allen E. Perkins and Allan Holloway
green
1 sentence1984In United States v. Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 , 100 S.Ct. 2151 , 64 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980), the Fifth Circuit upheld a trial court’s reconsideration of a previous order granting a new trial, holding that where the motion to reconsider was timely the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1984In People v. Thompson, 38 Ill.App.3d 101 , 347 N.E.2d 481 (1976), the court cited the rule that a trial court retains jurisdiction to modify an interlocutory order, held that an order granting a new trial is interlocutory, and concluded that a trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider its motion granting a new trial. 1984In People v. Thompson, 38 Ill.App.3d 101 , 347 N.E.2d 481 (1976), the court cited the rule that a trial court retains jurisdiction to modify an interlocutory order, held that an order granting a new trial is interlocutory, and concluded that a trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider its motion granting a new trial. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Abercrombie v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence1984In United States v. Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 , 100 S.Ct. 2151 , 64 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980), the Fifth Circuit upheld a trial court’s reconsideration of a previous order granting a new trial, holding that where the motion to reconsider was timely the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Appalachian Power Co. v. United States
green
1 sentence1984In United States v. Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 , 100 S.Ct. 2151 , 64 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980), the Fifth Circuit upheld a trial court’s reconsideration of a previous order granting a new trial, holding that where the motion to reconsider was timely the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Licavoli v. United States
green
1 sentence1984In United States v. Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 , 100 S.Ct. 2151 , 64 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980), the Fifth Circuit upheld a trial court’s reconsideration of a previous order granting a new trial, holding that where the motion to reconsider was timely the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Industrial Commission v. Valdez
neutral
2 sentences1957Likewise the cited rule in Industrial Commission v. Valdez, 101 Colo. 482 , 74 P.2d 710 , and other cases, that inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are for the Industrial Commission and not for the courts has no application to cases of undisputed facts, for in Colorado the clear rule is that where the facts in workmen's compensation cases are undisputed, the entire question is one of law for the court, and the courts are not bound by the referee's or the Commission's conclusions of law upon such facts. 1957Likewise the cited rule in Industrial Commission v. Valdez, 101 Colo. 482 , 74 P.2d 710 , and other cases, that inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are for the Industrial Commission and not for the courts has no application to cases of undisputed facts, for in Colorado the clear rule is that where the facts in workmen's compensation cases are undisputed, the entire question is one of law for the court, and the courts are not bound by the referee's or the Commission's conclusions of law upon such facts. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Industrial Commission v. Bonfils
green
2 sentences1957Denver Truck Exchange v. Perryman, 134 Colo. 586 , 307 P.2d 805 citing Industrial Commission v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306 , 241 P. 735 . 1957Denver Truck Exchange v. Perryman, 134 Colo. 586 , 307 P.2d 805 citing Industrial Commission v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306 , 241 P. 735 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Denver Truck Exchange & State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Perryman
green
2 sentences1957Denver Truck Exchange v. Perryman, 134 Colo. 586 , 307 P.2d 805 citing Industrial Commission v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306 , 241 P. 735 . 1957Denver Truck Exchange v. Perryman, 134 Colo. 586 , 307 P.2d 805 citing Industrial Commission v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306 , 241 P. 735 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.