contractual waiver in Florida

2015See Spring Lake NC, LLC v. Beloff, 110 So. 3d 52, 54-55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

2015See Spring Lake NC, LLC v. Beloff, 110 So.3d 52, 54-55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

2011See In re Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Rule 4-1 .5(f)(4)(B) of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, 939 So.2d 1032 (Fla.2006) (adopting an amendment to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar to per mit a contractual waiver of section 26, imposing a specified legal fee structure for contingency fees).

2007See Shaw v. Premier Health & Fitness Ctr., Inc., 937 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding that a contractual waiver released health club from liability for its own negligent acts); In re Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, 939 So.2d 1032 (Fla.2006) (adopting an amendment to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar to permit a contractual waiver of the 2004 self-enacting Florida constitutional amendment imposing a specified legal fee structure for contingency fees).

2026See id. at 1224–25.

2021Id. at 137 (“[T]o the extent that ERISA is concerned with the expeditious payment of plan proceeds to beneficiaries, permitting suits against beneficiaries after benefits have been paid does not implicate any 8 In Estate of Kensinger, the Third Circuit held that an estate can sue a former spouse to enforce a contractual waiver and to recover disputed ERISA- governed 401(k) plan proceeds after the plan administrator distributes the proceeds to the former spouse as the named beneficiary. 674 F.3d at 132 . 15 concern of expeditious payment or undermine any core objective of ERISA.”) (emphasis in

2021Id. at 137 (“[T]o the extent that ERISA is concerned with the expeditious payment of plan proceeds to beneficiaries, permitting suits against beneficiaries after benefits have been paid does not implicate any 8 In Estate of Kensinger, the Third Circuit held that an estate can sue a former spouse to enforce a contractual waiver and to recover disputed ERISA- governed 401(k) plan proceeds after the plan administrator distributes the proceeds to the former spouse as the named beneficiary. 674 F.3d at 132 . 15 concern of expeditious payment or undermine any core objective of ERISA.”) (emphasis in

2021We agree and approve the growing body of case law supporting the Estate’s position that it can sue to recover the proceeds after they are distributed by the ERISA plan administrator pursuant to the plan documents. 9 Courts have recognized three important ERISA objectives: “(1) simple administration of plans; (2) avoiding double liability for plan administrators; and (3) ensuring that beneficiaries receive funds promptly.” MetLife, 886 F.3d at 1007 (citing Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 301 ). 10 See, e.g., Andochick v. Byrd, 709 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that “ERISA does not preempt post-di

2021We agree and approve the growing body of case law supporting the Estate’s position that it can sue to recover the proceeds after they are distributed by the ERISA plan administrator pursuant to the plan documents. 9 Courts have recognized three important ERISA objectives: “(1) simple administration of plans; (2) avoiding double liability for plan administrators; and (3) ensuring that beneficiaries receive funds promptly.” MetLife, 886 F.3d at 1007 (citing Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 301 ). 10 See, e.g., Andochick v. Byrd, 709 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that “ERISA does not preempt post-di

2021We agree and approve the growing body of case law supporting the Estate’s position that it can sue to recover the proceeds after they are distributed by the ERISA plan administrator pursuant to the plan documents. 9 Courts have recognized three important ERISA objectives: “(1) simple administration of plans; (2) avoiding double liability for plan administrators; and (3) ensuring that beneficiaries receive funds promptly.” MetLife, 886 F.3d at 1007 (citing Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 301 ). 10 See, e.g., Andochick v. Byrd, 709 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that “ERISA does not preempt post-di

2016Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Huber, 137 So.3d 562, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); see also Bank of New York v. Calloway, 157 So.3d 1064, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (applying the de novo standard of review to an order granting an involuntary dismissal).

2016Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Huber, 137 So.3d 562, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); see also Bank of New York v. Calloway, 157 So.3d 1064, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (applying the de novo standard of review to an order granting an involuntary dismissal).

2015Co. v. O’Hara, 604 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir.2010) (finding that the ERISA plan’s contractual requirement that the holder of the plan reimburse the plan for 100% of the medical expenses provided does not unduly punish the holder even if it the reimbursement would substantially reduce his total settlement amount with the hable third-party).

2015See Krenisky, 807 A.2d at 978 .

2015We find that the loss payment provision “falls far short of creating a contractual bar to assignment.” Cf. Kohl, 988 So.2d at 658 (language stating that “[bjenefits will be paid directly to you” fell “far short of creating a contractual bar to assignment”).

2014And in Canada v. Allstate Insurance Co., 411 F.2d 517, 519-20 (5th Cir.1969), the former Fifth circuit suggested that the Cahill rule “goes even further” than articulated by our Supreme Court and allows “an oral modification of a written contract under circumstances of detrimental reliance even though the contract contains a provision prohibiting its alteration except in writing.” In other words, the Canada court opined that a claim of “promissory estoppel” was itself sufficient to circumvent a contractual bar to enforcement of an oral modification.

2014Id. at 520 .

2012Corp., 589 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1342 (S.D.Fla.2008) (dismissing a contractual claim for breach of implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing “as a matter of law” because the insured’s “relief for the unreasonable or untimely payment of its claim is limited to a section 624.155 action that does not ripen until [the coverage] litigation is concluded”); QBE Ins.

2012See id. at 313 (stating that “we are mindful of the rigorous standard employed” in a conflict of law analysis); see also Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So.2d 1166, 1169 (Fla.1985) (holding that a statute prohibiting contracts that provide for less than the statutory allotted time period to bring a contractual claim was not a sufficient public policy concern to render the choice-of-law provision unenforceable); Morgan Walton Props., Inc. v. Int’l City Bank & Trust Co., 404 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla.1981) (“The ‘public policy’ against usury ... was not so strong as to overcome the po

2012See id. at 313 (stating that “we are mindful of the rigorous standard employed” in a conflict of law analysis); see also Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So.2d 1166, 1169 (Fla.1985) (holding that a statute prohibiting contracts that provide for less than the statutory allotted time period to bring a contractual claim was not a sufficient public policy concern to render the choice-of-law provision unenforceable); Morgan Walton Props., Inc. v. Int’l City Bank & Trust Co., 404 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla.1981) (“The ‘public policy’ against usury ... was not so strong as to overcome the po

2012See id. at 313 (stating that “we are mindful of the rigorous standard employed” in a conflict of law analysis); see also Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So.2d 1166, 1169 (Fla.1985) (holding that a statute prohibiting contracts that provide for less than the statutory allotted time period to bring a contractual claim was not a sufficient public policy concern to render the choice-of-law provision unenforceable); Morgan Walton Props., Inc. v. Int’l City Bank & Trust Co., 404 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla.1981) (“The ‘public policy’ against usury ... was not so strong as to overcome the po

2011See Hughes Supply, Inc. v. Lupton, 487 So.2d 429, 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (“A contractual waiver of venue privileges encompasses the ground of convenience as well as other statutory grounds set out in Chapter 47.”).