contractual waiver in Minnesota

2008Here, the Marital Termination Agreement and the decree included the following two statements, similar to those in Karon , which constitute a contractual waiver of the parties’ rights to maintenance modification: 1) “[e]xcept for the award of $1,000 per month spousal maintenance for a period of forty-two months to [Schmidt], both parties waive any claim to spousal maintenance past, present and future;” and 2) “[i]t is the express intention of the parties that save for the award of 42 months of spousal maintenance to [Schmidt], neither party is awarded any spousal maintenance either past, presen

1997See Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Minn.1989) (when we approved and enforced the parties’ express waiver by stipulation of any right to seek a spousal maintenance modification), and Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 745 (Minn.1994) (when we cautioned that, to have binding effect, a stipulated waiver must contain both the contractual waiver of the statutory right to seek modification and express language divesting the trial court of its continuing jurisdiction to entertain such motion).

2014It divests the court of jurisdiction over spousal maintenance when the following requirements are met: 1) the stipulation must include a contractual waiver of the parties’ rights to modify maintenance; 2) the stipulation must expressly divest the district court of jurisdiction over maintenance; 3) the stipulation must be incorporated into the final judgment and decree; and 4) the court must make specific findings that the stipulation is fair and equitable, is supported by consideration described in the findings, and that full disclosure of each party’s financial circumstances has occurred[.] B

2014Most recently, in Butt , the supreme court synthesized its prior case-law and the 1989 legislation by identifying four requirements that “must be met before a stipulation precluding or limiting maintenance modification divests the court of its jurisdiction over maintenance”: 1) the stipulation must include a contractual waiver of the parties’ rights to modify maintenance; 2) the stipulation must expressly divest the district court of jurisdiction over maintenance, Loo, 520 N.W.2d at 745-46 ; 3) the stipulation must be incorporated into the final judgment and decree; and 4) the court must make

2016The Loo court noted that courts “should not assume that parties specifically bargained to supplant the statutory [maintenance] modification procedure without a clear or express statement divesting the court of jurisdiction” and that “the better approach is to require both a contractual waiver and express language divesting the court of jurisdiction.” Id. at 745 & n.5 (emphasis added).

2014Most recently, in Butt , the supreme court synthesized its prior case-law and the 1989 legislation by identifying four requirements that “must be met before a stipulation precluding or limiting maintenance modification divests the court of its jurisdiction over maintenance”: 1) the stipulation must include a contractual waiver of the parties’ rights to modify maintenance; 2) the stipulation must expressly divest the district court of jurisdiction over maintenance, Loo, 520 N.W.2d at 745-46 ; 3) the stipulation must be incorporated into the final judgment and decree; and 4) the court must make

2016See Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Minn. App. 2014) (remanding a parenting schedule because, while the schedule was clear, the district court failed to articulate its rationale for that schedule); In re Salah, 26 629 N.W.2d 99 , 104 (Minn. App. 2001) (remanding a custody dispute because the district court “failed to adequately explain its application of [the relevant law]”); see generally, Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that for a question to be properly before an appellate court, that question must have been previously presented to and considered by the dist

2016See Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Minn. App. 2014) (remanding a parenting schedule because, while the schedule was clear, the district court failed to articulate its rationale for that schedule); In re Salah, 26 629 N.W.2d 99 , 104 (Minn. App. 2001) (remanding a custody dispute because the district court “failed to adequately explain its application of [the relevant law]”); see generally, Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that for a question to be properly before an appellate court, that question must have been previously presented to and considered by the dist

2014A Karon waiver must contain two elements to properly divest the court of jurisdiction: “(1) a contractual waiver of the statutory right to move for modification of maintenance” and “(2) express language divesting the court of jurisdiction to consider motions for modification of spousal maintenance.” Gossman, 847 N.W.2d at 723 (quotation omitted).

2012We have explained that attorney fees due under a note are not “part of the original debt” and are “not really due when suit is brought, for the services of the attorney are not then fully performed.” Campbell v. Worman, 58 Minn. 561, 564-65 , 60 N.W. 668, 669 (1894).

2012We have explained that attorney fees due under a note are not “part of the original debt” and are “not really due when suit is brought, for the services of the attorney are not then fully performed.” Campbell v. Worman, 58 Minn. 561, 564-65 , 60 N.W. 668, 669 (1894).

2005In Gorczyca v. City of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 594, 598 , 219 N.W. 924, 925 (1928), we stated that a retirement allowance “is not a gratuity when the services are rendered while the pension or retirement relief statute is in force, so that the statute becomes a part of the contract of employment and contemplates such pension or allowance as part of compensation for the services rendered.” In Christensen , we weighed these competing interests and expressly rejected a contractual analysis.

2005In Gorczyca v. City of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 594, 598 , 219 N.W. 924, 925 (1928), we stated that a retirement allowance “is not a gratuity when the services are rendered while the pension or retirement relief statute is in force, so that the statute becomes a part of the contract of employment and contemplates such pension or allowance as part of compensation for the services rendered.” In Christensen , we weighed these competing interests and expressly rejected a contractual analysis.

1994Although the court of appeals held in Berens v. Berens, 443 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Sept. 27, 1989) that either a contractual waiver or express language of divestiture could create a binding waiver, we conclude that the better approach is to require both a contractual waiver and express language divesting the court of jurisdiction. 6 .

1987Co., 263 Minn. 63, 64, 69 , 115 N.W.2d 915, 916, 919 (1962), we held that a contractual requirement that the contractor “continually maintain a smooth and drained roadway over which vehicular traffic can move safely * * * ” was admissible as evidence of the contractor’s negligence.

1987Co., 263 Minn. 63, 64, 69 , 115 N.W.2d 915, 916, 919 (1962), we held that a contractual requirement that the contractor “continually maintain a smooth and drained roadway over which vehicular traffic can move safely * * * ” was admissible as evidence of the contractor’s negligence.

1985Krueger v. Zoch, 285 Minn. 332, 334 , 173 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1969).

1985Krueger v. Zoch, 285 Minn. 332, 334 , 173 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1969).

1977The following statement concerning this doctrine applied to trusts is found in First and American National Bank v. Higgins, 208 Minn. 295, 319 , 293 N.W. 585, 597 (1940): “The rule of practical construction is based upon the principle that the parties to an instrument may adopt their own interpretation of obscure or doubtful provisions and as between themselves render clear and certain what their language has left in ambiguity.” The present case is not appropriate for application of this contractual doctrine.

1977The following statement concerning this doctrine applied to trusts is found in First and American National Bank v. Higgins, 208 Minn. 295, 319 , 293 N.W. 585, 597 (1940): “The rule of practical construction is based upon the principle that the parties to an instrument may adopt their own interpretation of obscure or doubtful provisions and as between themselves render clear and certain what their language has left in ambiguity.” The present case is not appropriate for application of this contractual doctrine.