contractual claim in Pennsylvania

2016Commonwealth v. Reed, 135 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2016).

2016Commonwealth v. Reed, 135 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2016).

2019OISR (Dougherty, J.) at 954-55; see also Chepkevich , 2 A.3d at 1189 ; Boyd , 94 A.2d at 46 .

2019OISR (Dougherty, J.) at 14; see also Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1189 ; Boyd, 94 A.2d at 46 . [J-14-2018] [OISA: Baer, J.] - 5

1993The Commonwealth Court, which considered this matter under its original jurisdiction, dismissed all counts except the contractual claim against the Borough and relinquished jurisdiction, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 47 , 564 A.2d 1015 .

1993The Commonwealth Court, which considered this matter under its original jurisdiction, dismissed all counts except the contractual claim against the Borough and relinquished jurisdiction, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 47 , 564 A.2d 1015 .

2026Plaintiff avers there is no legal authority to support the court’s “conclusion that a contractual clause clearly stating that it is a ‘representation’ or a ‘warranty’ made by one party for the benefit of the other is somehow a condition precedent to the other party’s obligations.” Id.

2024Id. at 196 (bold and italic emphasis added; footnote omitted).6 6 The Vaca Court further explained: A more difficult question is, what portion of the employee’s damages may be charged to the union[;] in particular, may an award against a union include . . . damages attributable solely to the 5 Our Supreme Court reaffirmed Falssetti in Ziccardi v. Department of General Services, 456 A.2d 979 (Pa. 1982), therein expounding: The Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that an employee may file an unfair labor practice against its bargaining agent is erroneous.

2023Group, Inc., 488 F. App’x 547 ([3d] Cir. 2012). (2) Whether the [c]ourt’s decision was in error allowing a “Waiver of Subrogation” clause to dismiss a negligence claim, when the contractual waiver of subrogation clause at issue[] does not specifically delineate negligence as an item or circumstance to be waived.

2018In contrast, RESDL, which was enacted over a decade after PBS Coals , contains mandatory language: "Any seller who intends to transfer any interest in real property shall disclose to the buyer any material defects with the property known to the seller." 68 Pa.C.S. § 7303 (emphasis added); Koken , 893 A.2d at 81 .

2016However, the sound arguable basis requirement is not met by “an action that attempts to expand contractual terms through unilateral adoption of managerial policies that are not in response to a specific contractual claim and have unit-wide application.” Id.

2014Appellant’s argument is virtually identical to that leveled by the appellee in Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa.Super.2013) (en banc).

2011Insofar as the Students claim that a contract action can be based on breach of representation contained in the student handbook because the handbook created a contract, we rejected that contention in Tran v. State System of Higher Education, 986 A.2d 179 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009), where we explicitly held that a student handbook of a public university does not create a contract between the public university and the student.

2011Insofar as the Students claim that a contract action can be based on breach of representation contained in the student handbook because the handbook created a contract, we rejected that contention in Tran v. State System of Higher Education, 986 A.2d 179 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009), where we explicitly held that a student handbook of a public university does not create a contract between the public university and the student.

2008We will not address the logic of the argument, which we addressed in Craley, 586 Pa. 484 , 895 A.2d 530 . [10] Concurring with Judge Ford-Elliott's dissent, Judge Gantman issued a dissenting statement, based on a contractual analysis and conclusion that payment of the full UIM coverage limits would provide Appellant the benefit for which she bargained. [11] § 1738.

2008We will not address the logic of the argument, which we addressed in Craley, 586 Pa. 484 , 895 A.2d 530 . [10] Concurring with Judge Ford-Elliott's dissent, Judge Gantman issued a dissenting statement, based on a contractual analysis and conclusion that payment of the full UIM coverage limits would provide Appellant the benefit for which she bargained. [11] § 1738.

2007The contractual clause at issue in Ruzzi obligated the in-demnitors to indemnify the indemnitee, Butler Petroleum, “from any and all liability for claims for loss, damage, injury or other casualty to persons or property.” Id., 527 Pa. at 5 , 588 A.2d at 3 .

2007The contractual clause at issue in Ruzzi obligated the in-demnitors to indemnify the indemnitee, Butler Petroleum, “from any and all liability for claims for loss, damage, injury or other casualty to persons or property.” Id., 527 Pa. at 5 , 588 A.2d at 3 .

2005The examiner also rejected the Township’s defense that it was simply responding to the Auditor General’s report, citing this Court’s decision in Upper Chichester Township v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 446 , 621 A.2d 1134 (1993). 11 The examiner ordered the Township to rescind the Ordinance and restore the status quo ante.

2005The examiner also rejected the Township’s defense that it was simply responding to the Auditor General’s report, citing this Court’s decision in Upper Chichester Township v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 446 , 621 A.2d 1134 (1993). 11 The examiner ordered the Township to rescind the Ordinance and restore the status quo ante.

2000PSTA contends that this was error and, relying on Indiana Borough v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 695 A.2d 470 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), PSTA asserts that this court “has firmly rejected the application of the contractual privilege defense in cases arising out of Act 111 and Sections 6(l)(e) of the PLRA.” (PSTA’s brief at 15-16, emphasis added.) However, PSTA’s reliance on Indiana Borough is misplaced.

1995(R.R. at 41a-42a.) In arguing that this indemnity provision operates as a contractual waiver of immunity, Appellants rely on this Court’s statement in Ludwin that the terms of a similar indemnity provision in a lease “are tantamount to a waiver of immunity by the City.” Ludwin , 102 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 45, 517 A.2d at 1010 .

1993McIntosh Road Materials Co. v. Woolworth, 365 Pa. 190 , 74 A.2d 384 (1950). 9 *554 Although Petitioners concede that the Authority’s award of the contract allegedly was contingent upon City Council approval, Petitioners argue that the RFP did not indicate that City Council approval was mandatory but merely stated that contract approval may be subject to such approval “in accordance with the Lease and Service Agreement between the City of Philadelphia and the [Authority] adopted by Ordinance of City Council dated June 29, 1989.” (Exhibit A § 4.06.) Further, Petitioners contend that a requiremen

1993McIntosh Road Materials Co. v. Woolworth, 365 Pa. 190 , 74 A.2d 384 (1950). 9 *554 Although Petitioners concede that the Authority’s award of the contract allegedly was contingent upon City Council approval, Petitioners argue that the RFP did not indicate that City Council approval was mandatory but merely stated that contract approval may be subject to such approval “in accordance with the Lease and Service Agreement between the City of Philadelphia and the [Authority] adopted by Ordinance of City Council dated June 29, 1989.” (Exhibit A § 4.06.) Further, Petitioners contend that a requiremen

1985While it is true that interest on principal is awarded in cases where money has been unjustly or unlawfully withheld, Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86 , 156 A.2d 865 (1959); Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa.Super. 506, 608 , 184 A.2d 24 (1962), the facts of this case indicate a bona fide dispute as to the meaning of a contractual clause.

1985While it is true that interest on principal is awarded in cases where money has been unjustly or unlawfully withheld, Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86 , 156 A.2d 865 (1959); Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa.Super. 506, 608 , 184 A.2d 24 (1962), the facts of this case indicate a bona fide dispute as to the meaning of a contractual clause.

1985While it is true that interest on principal is awarded in cases where money has been unjustly or unlawfully withheld, Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86 , 156 A.2d 865 (1959); Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa.Super. 506, 608 , 184 A.2d 24 (1962), the facts of this case indicate a bona fide dispute as to the meaning of a contractual clause.

1985While it is true that interest on principal is awarded in cases where money has been unjustly or unlawfully withheld, Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86 , 156 A.2d 865 (1959); Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa.Super. 506, 608 , 184 A.2d 24 (1962), the facts of this case indicate a bona fide dispute as to the meaning of a contractual clause.

1985The decision was based, in part, on Rule 1141(a), which provided that “[a]s used in this chapter, ‘action’ means an action at law to foreclose a mortgage upon any estate, leasehold or interest in land but shall not include an action to enforce a personal liability,” and on Rule 1146, which provided that “[t]he plaintiff may state in the complaint two or more grounds for foreclosure but may not state more than one cause of action.” We then concluded: “Read in conjunction with Rule 1141, [Rule 1146] prevents a mortgagee from joining a contractual claim on a mortgage bond to a mortgage foreclosur

1985The decision was based, in part, on Rule 1141(a), which provided that “[a]s used in this chapter, ‘action’ means an action at law to foreclose a mortgage upon any estate, leasehold or interest in land but shall not include an action to enforce a personal liability,” and on Rule 1146, which provided that “[t]he plaintiff may state in the complaint two or more grounds for foreclosure but may not state more than one cause of action.” We then concluded: “Read in conjunction with Rule 1141, [Rule 1146] prevents a mortgagee from joining a contractual claim on a mortgage bond to a mortgage foreclosur

1984The Court in Warren repudiated the contractual analysis of Williams v. Keystone Insurance Co., 302 Pa.Super. 44 , 448 A.2d 86 (1982).

1984The Court in Warren repudiated the contractual analysis of Williams v. Keystone Insurance Co., 302 Pa.Super. 44 , 448 A.2d 86 (1982).