contractual claim in Connecticut

2021Transportation, Inc. v. Pacelli, 189 Conn. 401, 407 , 456 A.2d 325 (1983), in which our Supreme Court equated the phrase ‘‘utmost good faith’’ with ‘‘fair deal- ing.’’6 The court thereafter explained that it had to deter- mine ‘‘what standards must be shown by the defendant to defeat the plaintiff’s claim upon the bond based on the plaintiff’s omissions or commissions.’’ The court determined that it would need to assess the plaintiff’s conduct through the ‘‘lens of common-law recklessness, unclean hands, and bad faith’’ to establish whether the plaintiff was barred from recovery because the de

2021Transportation, Inc. v. Pacelli, 189 Conn. 401, 407 , 456 A.2d 325 (1983), in which our Supreme Court equated the phrase ‘‘utmost good faith’’ with ‘‘fair deal- ing.’’6 The court thereafter explained that it had to deter- mine ‘‘what standards must be shown by the defendant to defeat the plaintiff’s claim upon the bond based on the plaintiff’s omissions or commissions.’’ The court determined that it would need to assess the plaintiff’s conduct through the ‘‘lens of common-law recklessness, unclean hands, and bad faith’’ to establish whether the plaintiff was barred from recovery because the de

2020Partnership, supra, 157 Conn. App. 171 , citing Collins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 164 Conn. 369, 374 , 321 A.2d 444 (1973) (in construing contract, court cannot disregard words used by parties or revise, add to, or create new agreement).

2020Partnership, supra, 157 Conn. App. 171 , citing Collins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 164 Conn. 369, 374 , 321 A.2d 444 (1973) (in construing contract, court cannot disregard words used by parties or revise, add to, or create new agreement).

2015First, ‘‘[w]hile a waiver may be effectuated by one party, a modification is the result of the bilateral action of both parties to the . . . transaction.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Dynamic Machine Works, Inc. v. Machine & Electrical Consultants, Inc., 444 Mass. 768 , 771–72, 831 N.E.2d 875 (2005); 2A L.

2015First, ‘‘[w]hile a waiver may be effectuated by one party, a modification is the result of the bilateral action of both parties to the . . . transaction.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Dynamic Machine Works, Inc. v. Machine & Electrical Consultants, Inc., 444 Mass. 768 , 771–72, 831 N.E.2d 875 (2005); 2A L.

2015See Dynamic Machine Works, Inc. v. Machine & Electrical Consultants, Inc., supra, 444 Mass. 772 ; Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Products Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 184 , 436 N.E.2d 1265 , 451 N.Y.S.2d 663 , appeal denied, 57 N.Y.2d 674 (1982).

2015See Dynamic Machine Works, Inc. v. Machine & Electrical Consultants, Inc., supra, 444 Mass. 772 ; Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Products Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 184 , 436 N.E.2d 1265 , 451 N.Y.S.2d 663 , appeal denied, 57 N.Y.2d 674 (1982).

2002The plaintiff does, however, improperly seek tort damages based on this contractual claim. "[C]ontract damages ordinarily consist of consequential losses" and "ordinarily do not encompass such losses as pain and suffering." Gazo v. Stamford , 255 Conn. 245 , 265-66 , 765 A.2d 505 (2001).

2002The plaintiff does, however, improperly seek tort damages based on this contractual claim. "[C]ontract damages ordinarily consist of consequential losses" and "ordinarily do not encompass such losses as pain and suffering." Gazo v. Stamford , 255 Conn. 245 , 265-66 , 765 A.2d 505 (2001).

2000August 20, 1999) (“[t]he court further concludes that if the parties had wished to make any assignment void, that any clause purporting to invalidate assignments must contain language that it would be void or invalid if not made in a certain specified way”); University Mews Associates v. Jeanmarie, 122 Misc. 2d 434, 440 , 471 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984) (“[f]or a contractual clause forbidding or restricting an assignment of rights thereunder to reveal the intent necessary to preclude the power to assign, or cause an assignment violative of contractual provisions to be wholly void, such clause must con

2000August 20, 1999) (“[t]he court further concludes that if the parties had wished to make any assignment void, that any clause purporting to invalidate assignments must contain language that it would be void or invalid if not made in a certain specified way”); University Mews Associates v. Jeanmarie, 122 Misc. 2d 434, 440 , 471 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984) (“[f]or a contractual clause forbidding or restricting an assignment of rights thereunder to reveal the intent necessary to preclude the power to assign, or cause an assignment violative of contractual provisions to be wholly void, such clause must con

1998“We have repeatedly indicated our disfavor with the failure, whether because of a mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to errors occurring in the course of a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected, and thereafter, if the outcome of the trial proves unsatisfactory, with the assignment of such errors as grounds of appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knock v. Knock, 224 Conn. 776, 792 , 621 A.2d 267 (1993).

1998“We have repeatedly indicated our disfavor with the failure, whether because of a mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to errors occurring in the course of a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected, and thereafter, if the outcome of the trial proves unsatisfactory, with the assignment of such errors as grounds of appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knock v. Knock, 224 Conn. 776, 792 , 621 A.2d 267 (1993).

1998Since a contractual claim was not properly raised at trial, it is not reviewable by this court. “[T]o review [a] claim, which has been articulated for the first time on appeal and not before the trial court, would result in a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 741 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993).

1998Since a contractual claim was not properly raised at trial, it is not reviewable by this court. “[T]o review [a] claim, which has been articulated for the first time on appeal and not before the trial court, would result in a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 741 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993).

1998The United States Supreme Court, in considering the contractual waiver of due process rights in a sales agreement, has stated that the standards appropriate to determining the validity of waivers of such rights in criminal cases would not necessarily apply to a contractual waiver in the context of civil litigation, although the court stated that “a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear. ” (Emphasis in original.) Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 , 92 S. Ct. 1983 , 32 L.

1998The United States Supreme Court, in considering the contractual waiver of due process rights in a sales agreement, has stated that the standards appropriate to determining the validity of waivers of such rights in criminal cases would not necessarily apply to a contractual waiver in the context of civil litigation, although the court stated that “a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear. ” (Emphasis in original.) Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 , 92 S. Ct. 1983 , 32 L.

1997The Court did not explain why a contractual waiver was disallowed even though a party who fails to plead the statute of limitation in a defense may be held to have waived it, that is, why inadvertent waivers are valid and advertent waivers, perhaps bargained for in an exchange of substantive and procedural advantages, are not valid, even though waiver in either circumstance has precisely the same impact on the "societal interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs." While it is by no means clear that Connecticut's courts, which regard statutes of limitation as personal and waiva

1997McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482 , 486 (1980), reaffirming that a party must be aware of a right he possesses prior to a proper waiver of it.

1995CT Page 7274 Similarly, in Costello Construction Corporation v. Teamsters Local 559, supra, on which the Waterbury Board of Education decision was based, the procedural violation of the parties' agreement which the Court found to be reviewable on a motion to vacate involved not the merits of the disputed issues before the arbitrators, but the arbitrability of those issues in light of the asserted untimeliness of the aggrieved party's filing for arbitration.

1994Promissory Estoppel This count alleges there should be recovery on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. . . ."under a promissory estoppel theory a party may maintain a claim for damages based upon a promise which induces the party's action or forbearance, if such action or forbearance is undertaken in reasonable reliance upon the promise." Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190 , 205 (1987).

1993The action was commenced with service of the complaint upon the defendant on March 23, 1989, Beckenstein v. Potter Carrier, Inc., supra, 156 , and if the right to indemnification accrued when the DEP order was issued, the contractual claim for indemnification was commenced within the six year statute of limitations in section 52-576 .

1992In Wadia Enterprise, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, supra, the fact that the defendant had an architect who approved the work did not preclude a defense based on section 20-429 (a) of the General Statutes and a summary judgment for failure to comply with that statute.